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This thesis attempts to establish the most important factors that influence US intelligence 
cooperation between the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
 
Flaws in US interagency intelligence cooperation are an enduring policy problem. 
Indeed, 9/11 only served to remind US policy-makers that gaps in NSA–CIA–FBI 
cooperation remain as significant today as they were in 1941 when the FBI and 
precursors of the CIA and NSA failed to exchange vital information pointing to an 
impending attack on Pearl Harbor. To be sure, close NSA–CIA–FBI cooperation did 
materialize on occasions though the factors that prompted these agencies to join forces 
remain very much a mystery. To ensure that US intelligence agencies work closely 
together, policy-makers must first understand the most important factors that facilitated 
cooperation and then introduce relevant policy initiatives to strengthen them.  
 
Guided by a qualitative research methodology called grounded theory, this thesis 
examined 12 historical cases ranging from the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 to 9/11 in 
2001 for answers. A widely-accepted methodology, grounded theory is a diagnostic tool 
that emphasizes the natural discovery of insights. The results are then used to identify the 
reforms and policy initiatives needed to close out gaps in US interagency intelligence 
cooperation.  
 
ii   
This investigation reveals that interagency cooperation is to a great extent instrumentally-
oriented. In other words, agencies work together because of the requirement to pool 
resources and expertise. But on top of instrumentalism, there is also a normative aspect. 
In particular, interagency cooperation is also guided at times by individualized 
preferences and mindsets not associated with a cold calculation of instrumentality. On the 
other hand, this investigation reveals that interagency competition and excessive secrecy 
limited cooperation more than anything else. Interagency competition promoted unilateral 
actions on the part of these agencies whereas secrecy, when routinized to an excessive 
degree, has been found to restrict the flow of vital information. More importantly, these 
results differ from prevailing perspectives in this policy field – which view interagency 
cooperation as a function of similarities between agencies – indicating that a new 
discovery has been made.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis argues that an overarching authority with broad powers should 
be created to coordinate US intelligence activities. At present, the office established in 
the aftermath of 9/11 to oversee the US intelligence system – the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) – remains sidelined because it lacks substantial administrative, 
personnel, tasking and budgetary authority. Only an overarching authority with far 
greater powers than the DNI can push through tough measures needed to bring US 
intelligence agencies closer. But creating an all-powerful authority to preside over the 
vast US intelligence system requires strong leadership and political will.  
 
Unfortunately, Washington has little of both right now.   
iii   
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1.1 THE 9/11 ATTACKS 
 
The Past is Prologue. Study the Past. 
 
   Inscription at the entrance to the National Archives  




“I can’t come up with a rational reason why I didn’t pick up the phone and tell [the FBI] 
these hijackers or really bad guys are in the US,” laments former FBI agent Mark 
Rossini.1 In early 2000, Rossini, then a senior FBI agent assigned to the CIA’s bin Laden 
tracking unit, sensed that something sinister was afoot when he learned that CIA officers 
had lost track of two suspected al-Qaeda operatives who had just attended a terror summit 
in Malaysia. Rossini was especially concerned because at least one of the two was 
believed to hold a valid entry visa into the US.2  
 
                                                  
1 Interview with Mark Rossini, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, Public Broadcasting Station (PBS), Feb 3, 
2009. URL: http://video.pbs.org/video/1051968443  
2 “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.  
2   
The two suspected terrorists, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, had travelled from 
Yemen to Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 to attend a meeting with other known terror 
suspects.3 We know now that al-Qaeda leaders had called that meeting to set in motion 
the 9/11 attacks.  
 
The CIA (or “the Agency”) had been alerted to that meeting in Kuala Lumpur by the 
NSA – the US spy agency responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT). The NSA, for its 
part, had been monitoring the telephone at al-Mihdhar’s residence in Sana’a, Yemen and 
by chance, intercepted a phone conversation instructing al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to 
travel to Kuala Lumpur to attend what appeared like a terror summit. “That phone was 
the focal point for [al-Qaeda] operatives in the field to call in and that number would then 
contact bin Laden to pass along information and receive instructions back,” explains 
Rossini. 4  That phone in Sana’a, Yemen, was in effect a switchboard for al-Qaeda 
operatives around the world to communicate with one another.5  
 
The NSA tip-off was a major breakthrough for the CIA. For years, the CIA had been 
trying to eavesdrop on al-Qaeda communications but with limited success; for one, it had 
asked the NSA for raw intercepts – the verbatim transcripts – of al-Qaeda communiqués 
but “we never heard back from [the NSA]”, complains Michael Scheuer, the former head 
                                                  
3 Ibid 
4 Interview with Mark Rossini, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.  
5 That phone belonged to a jihadist named Ahmed al-Hada who also happened to be al-Mihdhar’s father-in-
law (Wright, 2006, pp. 315). 
3   
of the CIA’s bin Laden tracking unit. All the CIA ever received from the NSA were 
narrative summaries of intercepted al-Qaeda communications.6         
 
When CIA officers learned of the upcoming meeting in Kuala Lumpur from the NSA, 
they decided to place al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar under surveillance as the two travelled to 
Malaysia. During al-Mihdhar’s stopover in Dubai, the CIA, with help from the local 
intelligence service, managed to make a photocopy of al-Mihdhar’s passport. When CIA 
officers examined the photocopied passport, they were stunned to discover that al-
Mihdhar had a valid multiple-entry visa to enter the US. Notwithstanding that, CIA 
officials did not alert the FBI – the only agency that could put out alerts to stop al-Hazmi 
and al-Mihdhar from entering the US7 – even though another al-Qaeda operative, Ahmed 
Ressam, had only shortly ago tried unsuccessfully to blow up Los Angeles International 
Airport during the Millennium celebrations (see, e.g., Mansnerus & Miller, 2001).  
 
Besides the CIA, the NSA also alerted the FBI to the al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur.8  As it turned out, it was the Bureau that had passed that phone number in 
Sana’a, Yemen to the NSA in the first place; Bureau agents investigating the 1998 
bombing of US embassies in East Africa had stumbled upon the phone number and later 
passed it on to the NSA for monitoring (Wright, 2006, pp. 315; Tenet, 2007, pp. 194).9  
 
                                                  
6 Interview with Michael Scheuer, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009. 
7 Interview with James Bamford, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.   
8 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, pp. 
12.   
9 See also House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 
2002, pp. 129.   
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Nonetheless, the FBI (or “the Bureau”) was not showing all its cards. Evidently, the 
Bureau had been conducting its own parallel investigations into al-Qaeda at the time but 
was withholding vital information on the terror organization from other US intelligence 
agencies (Coll, 2004, pp. 323).  
 
When Rossini learned of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, he requested permission from the 
senior CIA official in charge of the case to share the information with FBI Headquarters. 
“No, it is not the FBI’s case; it is not the FBI’s jurisdiction,” Rossini was rebuffed by that 
official; so he did nothing. “If [I] had picked up the phone and called the Bureau, I would 
have broken the law; I would have been removed from that [CIA] building that day and I 
would have been gone,” the FBI agent explains later.10  
 
After attending the Kuala Lumpur meeting, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar eluded surveillance 
and crossed into Thailand. And from the Thai capital, Bangkok, the two al-Qaeda 
operatives boarded a flight for Los Angeles. On January 15, 2000, al-Hazmi and al-
Mihdhar arrived at their destination and pass through US customs undetected.11  
 
Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar made no attempt to hide their presence after arriving in the US 
– they obtained driver’s licenses in their own name and used a local bank to receive funds 
from a known al-Qaeda financier.12 Al-Hazmi’s name was even listed in the California 
phone book and on March 20, 2000, a call was made from al-Hazmi’s phone in California 
                                                  
10 See Interview with Mark Rossini, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.   
11 See House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 
2002, pp. 147 
12 “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.  
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to the phone in Yemen that was being monitored by the NSA.13 Incredibly, even though 
the NSA had intercepted that call and its technology would have indicated that the call 
had originated from inside the US, it failed to alert the FBI – the US agency responsible 
for domestic intelligence and federal law enforcement – that there might be al-Qaeda 
operatives in the US.14 In May and June, the NSA intercepted more calls from al-Hazmi’s 
phone to Yemen and again, it failed to report those calls to the FBI (Aid, 2009, pp. 212).  
 
By late 2000, both the NSA and CIA had enough information linking al-Hazmi and al-
Mihdhar to Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, the US embassy bombings in Africa and the 
attack on the USS Cole; yet neither agency shared that information with the FBI.15 Close 
surveillance of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in the US would also have led FBI investigators 
to other 9/11 hijackers such as Hani Hanjour, Salem al-Hazmi, Marwan al- Shehhi and 
Mohamed Atta – the ringleader.16  
 
In late August 2001, the CIA finally alerted the FBI to the two al Qaeda operatives but by 
then, it was too late to stop the 9/11 attacks.17 Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar 
would hijack Flight 77 and crash it into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 
 
                                                  
13 FBI Report, “9/11 Chronology: Hijackers Timeline – Part 1”, Mar 2011, pp. 58, FBI FOIA, URL: 
http://vault.fbi.gov/9-11%20Commission%20Report/9-11-chronology-part-01-of-02/view  
14 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, pp. 
17, 135 & 148. See also “Nova – The Spy Factory”.  
15 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, pp. 
86.  
16 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, pp. 
135.  
17 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, pp. 
86.  
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This episode provided valuable insights into the level of cooperation between the NSA, 
CIA and FBI; although there were some informational exchanges, gaps in interagency 
cooperation were patent.18 More importantly, this episode of imperfect cooperation was 
not an exceptional instance – limited cooperation between US intelligence agencies is an 
enduring problem that actually dates back at least six decades to December 1941 when 
Pearl Harbor was attacked and 9/11 only served as a reminder that gaps in cooperation 
between the NSA, CIA and FBI remain a longstanding policy issue (Jeffreys-Jones, 2008, 
pp. 12; Theoharis, 2007; Sims, 2005, pp. 42). Even today, more than a decade after the 
9/11 attacks, it is broadly recognized by noted researchers in this policy field that full 
cooperation between the NSA, CIA and FBI remains elusive (see, e.g., Theoharis, 2007, 
pp. 5 & 263; Lipton, Schmitt & Mazzetti, 2010; Aid, 2012, pp. 60).   
 
What is the source of limited cooperation between the NSA, FBI and CIA? Above all, 
what are the most significant factors that limited cooperation between them (such as 
when the NSA denied the CIA access to raw intercepts and when the CIA withheld 
information on al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi from the FBI)? Conversely, what are the most 
important factors that facilitated cooperation between them (such as when the FBI shared 
with the NSA the phone in Yemen used by al-Qaeda as a switchboard)?  
 
The primary objective of this Ph.D. thesis is to answer these questions. Using grounded 
theory to assess 12 historical cases, this thesis attempts to establish the most important 
factors that influence NSA–CIA–FBI cooperation. The insights from this investigation 
                                                  
18 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, pp. 
XV.  
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will then be used to identify and formulate a set of policy measures to close out existing 
gaps in US interagency intelligence cooperation.  
 
The following section presents the formalized research questions.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: 
 
What are the most important factors that hampered intelligence cooperation between the 
NSA, CIA and FBI?  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: 
What are the most important factors that facilitated intelligence cooperation between the 
NSA, CIA and FBI?  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 3: 
Based on the answers to the above research questions, what policy measures can be 
introduced to bring about close cooperation between them?  
 
1.3 GENERAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Central to this thesis is a qualitative research design that is based on grounded theory. A 
widely-accepted research methodology, grounded theory is used as a diagnostic tool in 
many fields such as sociology, anthropology and history (Glaser, 1998, Strauss & Corbin, 
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1998; Charmaz, 2006; Dunne, 2010). By promoting the discovery of new theoretical 
propositions (rather than the verification of existing ones), grounded theory is especially 
suited for use in fresh research fields (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 1; Glaser, 1992 & 
1998; Charmaz, 1983, pp. 125; McCann & Clark, 2003; Payne, 2007).  
 
Grounded theory, it must be pointed out, does not attempt to test “grand” theories by 
analyzing variables, taking measurements and verifying hypotheses; instead, it focuses on 
the generation of theoretical propositions and conceptual explanations through a reflexive 
process of data collection and analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998, 
pp. 23; Payne, 2007, pp. 68; Dey, 2004; pp. 82). This aspect of grounded theory is 
particularly advantageous for research projects where test hypotheses, research variables 
and measurement units cannot be clearly delineated. Considering the heterogeneity of this 
research topic, no other method is as effective as ground theory in capturing the richness 
within. 
 
The second reason for using grounded theory is that the methodology allows for the 
treatment of all extant information in the field as possible data for examination (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1998; Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In a field that is 
plagued by data scarcity (as a result of government secrecy), grounded theory is 
especially useful because it enlarges the breadth of empirical data that can be used (see, 
e.g., McCann & Clark, 2003; Payne, 2007; Dick, 2007; Locke, 2001). Owing to this 
important feature, this thesis is able to draw from a sizable historical database. In all, a 
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total of 12 historical cases involving US interagency intelligence cooperation between 
1941 and 2001 are analyzed (see Appendix 1 for details of these cases).  
 
In terms of the cases, 1941 is chosen as a starting point because it marked the beginning 
of the complex triadic relationship between the CIA, NSA and FBI with the creation of 
the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCOI) – the predecessor of the CIA. On 
the other hand, 2001 is selected as an end point because that was the year 9/11 took place. 
Notably, even though 9/11 is the last historical event assessed, various policy measures to 
improve US interagency intelligence cooperation were introduced in the aftermath of the 
attacks. But as a practical matter, discussions of those post-9/11 measures will be made 
only when they are relevant to this investigation. 
 
Methodologically, historical data associated with these 12 historical cases are first coded 
to identify primary categories of information that might help to explain the specific 
phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These individual categories are then refined into 
conceptual explanations known as central categories (see, e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Lastly, these conceptual explanations are compared with pre-
existing perspectives in this policy field to establish if new discoveries have been made 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Since grounded theory considers all extant information as data, archival documents, oral 
accounts, documentary films and public literature are examined for this thesis. To 
augment these data sources, interviews are also conducted with noted researchers in this 
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field. The intention here is to saturate the analytical process until new information can no 
longer provide fresh insights into the research phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 
136).   
 
To establish the most important factors that influence US interagency intelligence 
cooperation, two sets of historical cases are evaluated. The first comprises those historical 
cases that demonstrate the NSA, CIA and FBI avoiding cooperation whereas the second 
comprises those historical cases that demonstrate the NSA, CIA and FBI working 
together. The aim here is to draw from these historical cases the forces that prompted US 
intelligence agencies to either engage in or shun cooperation. While grouping strategy is 
adopted herein to delineate these cases into two distinct sets, they are analyzed 
chronologically so as to retain those historical contexts which they are ensconced in.     
 
Furthermore, the historical case in this thesis contains three main features. Firstly, it is a 
past event that reveals the forces or conditions that produced a particular outcome (Yin, 
1984; Gottschalk, 1950; Watson, 1992). Secondly, it is of varying length and developed 
with data obtained from various sources. Thirdly, it is not selected beforehand but the 
product of theoretical sampling – a process in grounded theory whereby one case points 
to another for study (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 73). While it may not be possible to 
establish all the factors that influence interagency cooperation, the expansive research 
design utilized in this thesis helps to ensure that the most important ones are uncovered.  
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Definition-wise, interagency cooperation is defined in this thesis as two or more agencies 
working together or at least, engaged in some form of informational exchanges (Alter & 
Hage, 1993; Alexander, 1995). Meanwhile, a factor is important if it satisfies the 
following criteria set by grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 147): 
 
 Contains central features derived from the data. 
 Appears regularly in the data.  
 Is reliable, consistent and logical.  
 Accounts for the research phenomenon across time as well as variations in the 
data.  
 
One might contend that an assessment of 12 historical cases cannot produce statistically 
significant results. To that, one must recognize that this thesis is not a quantitative study 
but one that is focused on understanding a complex phenomenon not easily given to 
numerical analysis. Furthermore, it is also important to point out that the results of this 
investigation are not intended as sweeping generalizations but rather, contextualized 
inferences that are specific to the field of US intelligence policy. Given the complex 
research phenomenon investigated here, the only viable approach to capture the richness 
embedded within is a qualitative research methodology (Brady & Collier, 2002). Lastly, 
grounded theory research is more concerned with the way information are linked and the 
way in which they interweave to culminate in a particular outcome than with correlation 
as understood in quantitative methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 133). In particular, 
the grounded theory researcher is interested in “why, how come, and to what situations, 
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problems, or issues [people] are responding to when they act” than how variables 
correlate with one another.19 Drawing statistically significant results is not the primary 
function of grounded theory research.    
 
1.4 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT STUDIES  
 
Although grounded theory encourages its practitioner to approach the research topic with 
an open mind, this must not be interpreted to mean that the researcher should be 
completely ignorant of the research traditions of that particular field; indeed, it is quite 
impossible to undertake any study without some prior knowledge of the discipline 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, pp. 157; Dunne, 2010; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Therefore, a review of relevant literature in the field of intelligence studies 
is made to establish any dominant perspective that might account for the research 
phenomenon herein. Accordingly, this policy field is currently dominated by four major 
perspectives.  
 
One dominant perspective blames limited FBI–CIA cooperation on incompatibility 
stemming from their different geographical briefs (see, e.g., Riebling, 2002; Jeffreys-
Jones, 2007; Cumming & Masse, 2005; Posner, 2005). Specifically, the CIA and FBI 
share few areas for cooperation because the former is responsible for foreign intelligence 
whereas the latter is responsible for domestic intelligence. Even if the two agencies were 
to opt for close cooperation, there are supposedly few areas for them to work together as 
a result of this ‘foreign vs. domestic’ dichotomy.   
                                                  
19 Ibid 
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Another leading perspective blames limited NSA–CIA cooperation on a difference in 
agency ethos (see, e.g., Posner, 2007; Russell, 2007; Ungerer, 2008; Feaver & Kohn, 
2001). In particular, because the NSA is a military organization steeped in a regimented 
ethos, it shuns the CIA since the Agency is a civilian organization known for an 
undisciplined culture (Posner, 2007, pp. 106). This ‘military vs. civilian’ dichotomy, 
according to this perspective, presents a formidable barrier to close cooperation between 
the two powerful agencies.  
 
A third substantial body of literature posits that because US intelligence agencies are 
divided by collection disciplines, there are few opportunities for interaction and exchange 
between them (Turner, 2006; Hammond, 2007). Within the US intelligence community, 
the CIA is responsible for human intelligence (HUMINT) whereas the NSA is tasked 
with the collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT). HUMINT refers to secret 
information obtained by human spies whereas SIGINT refers to secret information 
obtained through electronic means. This difference in spy craft means that it is not easy 
for the NSA and CIA to work together. And accordingly, this ‘HUMINT vs. SIGINT’ 
dichotomy has produced sharp division between the two agencies limiting any scope for 
cooperation between them (Posner, 2007; Keegan, 2003, pp. 385).  
 
The fourth dominant perspective posits that CIA–FBI cooperation is limited by 
procedural incompatibility (see e.g., Posner, 2005, 2006 & 2007; Baker, 1994; Odom, 
2003; Turner 2006; Riebling, 2002; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007). In particular, this perspective 
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sees the CIA as a spy – one that steals secrets, recruits agents and conducts surveillances 
– whereas the FBI as a cop – one that makes arrests, investigates crimes and prosecutes 
criminals. Posner (2006, pp. 130) in particular argues that cooperation between 
intelligence agencies dominated by this ‘spy vs. cop’ dichotomy is “difficult at best”. 
   
Meanwhile, this review process also reveals that the literature in this policy field rarely 
delves into the factors that facilitated US interagency cooperation. The focus is invariably 
on those factors that prompted US intelligence agencies to shun cooperation (see, e.g., 
Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Riebling, 2002; Zegart, 2007; Theoharis, 2007). This is 
understandable because matters pertaining to close intelligence cooperation are often kept 
out of the public domain. Therefore, by uncovering those key factors that facilitated 
interagency cooperation, this thesis also makes a significant contribution to this policy 
field.   
 
The outcome of this review process raises a number of questions though.  
 
Firstly, even though these perspectives appear reasonable, it is uncertain if they are 
supported by substantial empirical evidence (see, e.g., Zegart, 2007; Posner 2005, 2007; 
Sales, 2010a & 2010). It is certainly possible that these perspectives are based purely on 
idiosyncratic observations derived from a single event. In the event that the results of this 
thesis re-affirm these perspectives, then at the very least there will be confirmation that 
they do indeed offer an accurate explanation of the research phenomenon (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, pp. 52).    
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Secondly, none of these four dominant perspectives can satisfactorily account for how 
those features endemic to the NSA, CIA and FBI might have influenced interagency 
cooperation. Indeed, features such as secrecy and rancorous relations between key 
personnel are overlooked without grounds. This will turn out to be a gross oversight if 
these features prove ultimately to be the key factors that limited interagency cooperation.  
  
Thirdly, it is also important to note that intelligence agencies do cooperate under certain 
conditions; indeed, contrary to the notion of intelligence agencies as hermitic entities, 
they do work together on occasions (see, e.g., Tenet, 2007; Helms, 2004; Turner, 2006a; 
Richelson & Ball, 1990; Herman, 1996). But none of these four dominant perspectives 
can account for such variations because based on their assumptions, interagency 
cooperation will not materialize under any circumstances. But as illustrated in the 
beginning of this chapter, some collaboration between the NSA, CIA and FBI did occur 
and that brings into question how reliable these four dominant perspectives really are.  
 
The fact that major perspectives dominating this policy field today cannot satisfactorily 
explain why US intelligence agencies shun cooperation or work together suggests that 
significant knowledge gaps remain in this policy field.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE 
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Despite the introduction of an array of policy measures to improve US intelligence 
cooperation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, gaps in interagency cooperation remain 
(see, e.g., Lipton, Schmitt & Mazzetti, 2010; Aid, 2012, pp. 60). This strongly suggests 
that the measures introduced in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks have yet to address some 
of the fundamental problems that prompted these agencies to shun cooperation (Rovner & 
Long, 2005). Indeed, without a thorough understanding of the most important factors 
influencing interagency cooperation, trying to build a more cohesive US intelligence 
system will be next to impossible (Goodman, 2008). It is only through an “understanding 
of the history of these intelligence agencies and their interrelationships” that we may 
finally comprehend what needs to be done to bring about full cooperation between them 
(Theoharis, 2007, pp. 9). To this end, this thesis makes a significant contribution toward 
the creation of a cohesive US intelligence community.  
 
At the same time, it is noteworthy that some of the measures intended to protect the US 
against future terror attacks entail far-reaching policy implications. As a case in point, in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, there were repeated calls by some US lawmakers for the 
creation of a spy agency separate from the FBI (and in the image of the UK’s MI5) to 
handle US domestic intelligence (see, e.g., Posner, 2007; Zegart, 2007; Masse, 2003). In 
particular, this move is intended to eliminate the ‘spy vs. cop’ dichotomy that supposedly 
limited the FBI’s usefulness as an intelligence partner to the CIA. However, aside from 
whether such a move can prevent future terror attacks, creating another agency to handle 
domestic intelligence will undoubtedly add more layers of bureaucracy to an already 
cumbersome intelligence system. In the worst case scenario, enlarging the US intelligence 
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bureaucracy with the creation of another agency might even exacerbate gaps in interagency 
cooperation.  
 
At the very least, by ascertaining the key factors that influenced US interagency 
intelligence cooperation, this thesis can alert policy-makers to those knee-jerk reactions 
and short-term fixes which will ultimately prove to be ineffective. Understanding what the 
most important factors influencing interagency cooperation are will ensure a match 
between the requirement for close interagency cooperation and the measures to bring that 
about. To this end, this thesis hopes to make an important contribution toward this 
alignment between means and end.  
 
Compared to other research projects in this field, this thesis also makes a number of 
important research contributions.  
 
A key feature of this thesis is that, unlike those research projects that draw on a single 
historical event – such as the 9/11 attacks – to make sweeping generalizations and broad-
based policy recommendations (see, e.g., Zegart, 2007; Posner 2005, 2007; Sales, 2010a & 
2010), this thesis examines a broad spectrum of historical data. Notably, by studying the 
history of NSA–CIA–FBI cooperation through a sequence of historical cases over an 
extended period of six decades, the results of this thesis are solidly grounded in empirical 
evidence and hence, more reliable and consistent. In a field that is infused with 
idiosyncratic findings, this thesis undoubtedly makes an important research contribution.      
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Meanwhile, compared to other research projects that adopted a historical approach to the 
study of US interagency intelligence cooperation (see, e.g., Riebling, 2002; Theoharis 
2007; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Weiner, 2007; Trento, 2001; Bamford, 1983 & 2002), this 
thesis is the first research project in this discipline to apply grounded theory to the 
systematic study of this issue. It must be pointed out that a general criticism of qualitative 
works is that their lack of structure tends to reduce them to mere works of journalism 
(Johnson, Long & White, 2001, pp. 245). Grounded theory was hence developed, among 
other reasons, to give structure and analytical rigor to qualitative research (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). The application of grounded theory to investigate this research phenomenon 
thus ensures that this thesis is both systematic and rigorous. By using grounded theory as a 
research methodology, this thesis adds rigor to a field that has unfortunately been infused 
with the occasional methodologically-wanting work. In that sense, this thesis makes an 
important research contribution.  
 
Thirdly, by incorporating freshly declassified data into the analysis, this thesis provides a 
more accurate depiction of past events. With fresh data, the historical accounts herein are 
definitely more precise. As an example, this thesis uses extensively a recently-
declassified FBI chronology of 9/11 to reconstruct the events that culminated in the 
attacks on September 11, 2001. Furthermore, using information obtained exclusively for 
this thesis, a number of particularly baffling questions in this policy field are answered. 
For example, the question of why the NSA withheld verbatim transcripts from the CIA 
prior to 9/11 was answered through a series of exclusive interviews with NSA expert 
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Matthew Aid. To this end, this thesis makes an important contribution by adding to the 
richness as well as the precision of this field.  
 
Fourthly, this thesis contributes to its field by delving into those issues and cases that are 
overlooked or ignored by other researchers. As an example, a historical case that has been 
largely overlooked by other researchers is a counter-narcotics program jointly operated 
by the NSA and CIA in the 1970s. This particular program is especially significant in that 
it provides vital insights into some of the key factors that prompted the two agencies to 
operate alongside each other. By giving attention to such cases, fresh insights are 
uncovered and a significant research contribution is made.   
 
Fifthly, this thesis is probably the first systematic study to establish those factors that 
facilitated US interagency intelligence cooperation. Perhaps prompted by the cataclysmic 
events of 9/11, literature in this policy field tends to focus squarely on the issue of limited 
US intelligence cooperation (see, e.g., Posner, 2007; Zegart, 2007; Turner, 2006; Russell, 
2007). Neglected are those historical precedents which pointed to US intelligence agencies 
working together. By focusing on these cases, this thesis aims to uncover those factors that 
enhance interagency cooperation; this in itself is an important research contribution.  
 
Lastly, this thesis contributes to its field by adding to existing research. By re-assessing 
the work of other researchers in this field, this thesis also reveals if these works are 
inaccurate, overly rudimentary or only partially correct. To this end, this thesis aims to 
make an important contribution to the body of knowledge in this policy discipline.    
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1.6 SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
 
This thesis does not assess whether enhanced interagency cooperation can prevent future 
intelligence surprises, which by its very definition, cannot be anticipated. The aim of this 
thesis is strictly limited to establishing the most important factors that influence NSA–
CIA–FBI cooperation and the policy measures that will facilitate close US intelligence 
cooperation. It is also important to point out that close interagency cooperation cannot 
guarantee that intelligence fiascos will become a thing of the past; however, close 
intelligence cooperation can at the very least, make it harder to overlook fragmentary 
clues pointing to impending national security crises.  
 
Even though the main focus of this thesis rests on three major intelligence agencies – the 
NSA, CIA and the FBI – other relevant institutions are examined as and when they are 
pertinent to the discussion. In fact, this thesis will be incomplete if it fails to account for 
those institutions – such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) – 
that were created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks as well as those that were the 
precursors of the CIA and NSA. Moreover, foreign intelligence services, both friendly 
and hostile to the US, are also discussed throughout this thesis. But in order to maintain 
clarity and purpose, references to such institutions are made only when necessary.    
 
It is also important to point out that intelligence cooperation can occur at both the 
interagency level as well as the intra-agency level. The main difference is that while 
interagency cooperation entails exchanges between intelligence organizations, intra-
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agency intelligence cooperation involves an exchange within an intelligence organization. 
This research focuses exclusively on intelligence cooperation between intelligence 
organizations, or interagency intelligence cooperation and the main rationale for this 
delimitation is that although intra-agency intelligence sharing is significant, it is next to 
impossible to examine this aspect alongside interagency cooperation in one thesis. 
Consequently, this thesis focuses exclusively on interagency cooperation.  
 
Another feature of this thesis is that it is focused on investigating the collection, analysis 
and dissemination of strategic intelligence. As opposed to tactical intelligence, strategic 
intelligence is information pertaining to geopolitical issues – information that can be used 
to develop a broader picture of the threat environment (Aid, 2012, pp. 51). For example, 
sensitive information such as the strategy of al-Qaeda and Chinese espionage activities in 
the US belong to the domain of strategic intelligence. Tactical intelligence, on the other 
hand, is often information collected for targeting purposes during war and highly-specific 
to hostile nations. Information such as enemy troop movements, locations of airfields, 
hidden command posts and supply depots sites all belong to the domain of tactical 
intelligence.20 Although both the NSA and CIA are known to collect tactical intelligence, 
their primary focus is strategic intelligence (Richelson, 2012, pp. 18 & 31). The FBI, 
meanwhile, is focused on strategic intelligence. Since these three agencies are the 
primary focus of this investigation, it is only logical to concentrate on a domain that is 
their principal focus – strategic intelligence.  
  
                                                  
20 Ibid 
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While every attempt is made to ensure that this thesis is as comprehensive as possible, it 
is impossible to cover every aspect of this intricate topic in a single volume. Certainly, 
given the complexity of this topic, it is impossible to establish every factor that 
influenced US interagency intelligence cooperation; inevitably, some elements that may 
be of concern to the reader are left unanswered. Nevertheless, this thesis does cover some 
of the most pressing issues associated with this topic. Indeed, even though not every 
aspect of this topic is addressed, there is no question that major elements have been 
examined herein.     
 
1.7 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
It is important to acknowledge that there are certain limitations as to how much one can 
truly learn of the secret organizations being investigated here. 
  
Firstly, because large segments of sensitive historical records remain filed away in the 
archives of the FBI, NSA and CIA, one may not be able to grasp the full picture until 
these still-classified holdings are released to the public for examination. Furthermore, 
because vital historical records have been destroyed (often intentionally), any attempt to 
research these organizations is rendered much more difficult. The paucity of 
documentation is further compounded by the fact that these organizations periodically 
remove declassified documents from their archives. As a consequence, it is almost 
impossible to determine the full extent of interagency cooperation between the NSA, CIA 
and FBI in some cases.  
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Secondly, while every effort is made to ensure that the historical cases discussed herein 
are constructed as accurately as possible, like virtually all other research into classified 
intelligence matters, it is impossible to cover every minute aspect of these past events. 
Despite this limitation, one can still over time come to a fairly accurate picture because 
sensitive information – albeit in piecemeal – are declassified on a regular basis. But of 
course, until more secret documentations are made public, the results of this thesis must 
be treated as provisional and subjected to future revisions.  
 
1.8 SUMMARY OF THESIS FINDINGS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
This section presents the main findings of this thesis – namely, the most important factors 
that influenced US interagency intelligence cooperation over the time period investigated 
herein. This synopsis is then followed by a concise discussion of the policy options that 
should mitigate those barriers to cooperation while promoting those elements that enhance 
it. A more elaborate discussion of these results and associated policy options can be found 
in chapters 9 and 10 respectively.   
 
In all, four key factors were found to hamper cooperation between the NSA, CIA and FBI.  
 
Firstly, these agencies (and in some cases, their predecessors) shunned cooperation 
because they viewed each other as competitors. Secondly, rancorous interagency relations 
limited any room for cooperation. Thirdly, excessive secrecy presented a formidable 
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barrier to interagency cooperation time and again. Lastly, because their responsibilities 
were not clearly defined, these agencies were able to duplicate each others’ capabilities 
creating a disincentive for collaboration.  
 
On the other hand, three key factors were found to facilitate cooperation between the NSA, 
CIA and FBI.  
 
Firstly, the human element is central to close interagency cooperation. Specifically, close 
relationships between key intelligence officials facilitated interagency cooperation. 
Secondly, interagency cooperation is almost always facilitated by the requirement to pool 
expertise and resources. Thirdly, this thesis found that a commitment by these agencies to 
protect shared secrets facilitated interagency cooperation. By assuaging fears of betrayal, 
this factor was found to be an important factor that prompted these agencies to join forces.  
 
Using these insights, a set of policy recommendations is developed in an attempt to close 
those gaps that were found to hamper interagency cooperation. Promoting those elements 
that bring about interagency cooperation is also an important consideration. 
 
In summary, this thesis recommends the creation of an overarching authority with broad 
powers to preside over the US intelligence system. At present, the head of US 
intelligence – the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) – is too weak to effect far-
reaching reforms (Mazzetti, 2010 & 2010a; Aid, 2012, pp. 61). The recommendation 
herein greatly expands the authority of the DNI by requiring that the head of US 
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intelligence be given broad administrative, personnel, budgetary and tasking powers. 
While other policy alternatives to enhancing US intelligence cooperation do exist, this 
policy recommendation is the most realistic and viable given Washington’s penchant for 
creating new institutions over dismantling existing ones. Even then, creating such an 
overarching authority to preside over the US intelligence system will be an uphill task 
since his authority can only be augmented at the expense of other cabinet-level officials – 
and it is doubtful that these officials will surrender control over the intelligence agencies 
under their departments (Turner, 2005, pp. 248).      
 
1.9 SHAPE OF THE THESIS 
 
In this introductory chapter, the research problem and the general research design were 
presented. The significance of this investigation and the contributions that this thesis aims 
to make in this policy field were also laid out. Lastly, the scope and delimitation of this 
investigation were discussed. Chapter 2 will provide a broad overview of the US 
intelligence community and a discussion of those literatures that have emerged as 
dominant works in this policy discipline. An analytical framework for investigating the 
research phenomenon will also be presented. Chapter 3 will map out the research design 
and methodology of this thesis. It will describe how data is collected and explain how the 
historical cases are chosen. Also discussed are the analytical techniques used to assess the 
data.   
   
Chapter 4 will analyze US interagency cooperation prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941. Chapter 5 will assess cooperation between various US 
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intelligence agencies and departments during World War II and Chapter 6 will examine 
US interagency cooperation during the early Cold War years. Cooperation between US 
intelligence agencies at the height of the Cold War will be examined in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 will delve into US interagency cooperation as the Cold War came to an end.  
 
Chapter 9 will examine the chain of intelligence events which culminated in 9/11. The 
second part of that chapter will refine the specific information obtained from each 
historical case to form a set of conceptual explanations for the research phenomenon. In 
Chapter 10, the results will be used to formulate a series of policy measures to enhance 
US interagency intelligence cooperation. In that concluding chapter, areas that require 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 












This chapter provides a review of relevant literature in the field of intelligence studies. It 
begins with a broad overview of the US intelligence community followed by a discussion 
of the major perspectives that dominate this policy field today. Key issues associated with 
these dominant perspectives are then presented. Lastly, this chapter discusses the 
analytical framework that is used to guide this investigation forward.  
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2.2 THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY  
 
One of the largest and most complex intelligence bureaucracies in the world, the US 
intelligence community (USIC) is made up of 18 intelligence agencies from different 
parts of the US government (see Diagram 2.1).21  According to intelligence historian 
Matthew Aid, the USIC employed approximately 200 thousand personnel and spent a 
whopping US$80 billion in 2010 (Aid, 2012). To put its annual budget into perspective, 
the USIC spent more money in 2010 than the US State Department and Justice 
Department combined.22 Another important feature of the USIC is that it is delineated 
along geographical, departmental and technical lines.      
 
In particular, the CIA is responsible for foreign intelligence whereas the FBI is in charge 
of domestic intelligence. This geographical separation actually dates back at least to the 
law enforcement proviso of the 1947 National Security Act which set down the 
jurisdictions of the CIA and FBI (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007). Beyond prescribing the foreign 
intelligence role of the CIA, the National Security Act also prohibited the CIA from 
exercising internal security functions – a practice adopted by most Western countries 
                                                  
21 The USIC is headed by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) coordinates with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence on intelligence matters related to the Department of Defense (DOD). Other members of the 
USIC include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Department’s Air Force Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Surveillance Agency (AIA), Army Military Intelligence (MI), Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Security Agency (NSA), and Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI), the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI), the 
US Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), and Coast Guard 
Intelligence (CGI), the US Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR), and the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). See 
US Intelligence Community website, URL: : http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members.shtml 
22 See, “A New Era of Responsibility – Renewing America’s Promise.” Office of Management and Budget, 
2010. URL: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2010-BUD.pdf  
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(Kris, 2006, pp. 497, footnote 62). But contrary to the practice of many Western 
countries, the FBI is granted authority over both domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement (Cumming and Masse, 2005). Consequently, the FBI is able to conduct 
intelligence operations as well as make arrests.  
 
The vast USIC is also divided along departmental lines with agencies falling under the 
control of various federal departments. For example, the FBI reports to the US Attorney 
General, the NSA falls under the command of the US Secretary of Defense, and the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) falls under the responsibility of the US 
Secretary of State. The CIA is the only agency within the USIC that is independent of any 
federal department and before the creation of the Office of the Director of intelligence 
(ODNI) in 2004, was answerable directly to the US president and the National Security 
Council or NSC (Richelson, 2012; Reveron, 2006; Berkowitz, 2005).  
 
Lastly, the USIC is divided along technical lines with agencies specializing in the 
collection and analysis of various forms of intelligence such as signals intelligence, image 
intelligence and human intelligence (Richelson, 1999; Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002). For 
instance, the NSA is responsible for signals intelligence whereas the CIA is in charge of 
human intelligence. Although the US Defense Department conducts some human 
intelligence operations through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the NSA, the 
scale of these operations are relatively miniscule compared to those of the CIA (Russell, 
2007, Johnson, 1995, pp. 3). The following diagram lays out the complex structure of the 
USIC.  
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DIAGRAM 2.1: ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE US INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY POST-INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM 
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2.2.1 COORDINATING MECHANISMS WITHIN THE USIC  
 
Over time, the fragmented structure of the USIC prompted the creation of a number of 
institutional mechanisms to facilitate interagency cooperation (see, e.g., Richelson, 1999 
& 2012; Andrew, 1995; Gates, 1996; Zegart, 1999). Ranging from the overarching 
position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to the now-defunct position of the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his support staff – known as the Community 
Management Staff (CMS) – to interagency boards such as the Intelligence Advisory 
Committee (IAC) and the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), these institutional 
mechanisms were designed to bring about close interagency cooperation within the vast 
USIC. Legislations were also enacted to ensure that US intelligence agencies work 
together. Chief among them were the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 
(EO) 12333. But the question is: how successful or effective have these institutions been 
in terms of facilitating close interagency cooperation?  
 
In 2004, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was established to 
oversee the USIC. Until then, the CIA Director (DCIA) had reported directly to the US 
President because it was the only agency that is independent of any federal departments; 
but with the creation of the ODNI, the DCIA must now report to the DNI instead. In 
essence, the CIA Director has been demoted – a political punishment for the CIA’s 
blundering role in the 9/11 intelligence fiasco (Pillar, 2011). Previously, the DCIA had 
wore a second hat – that of Director Central Intelligence (DCI). As DCI, the DCIA had, 
in theory, overarching authority over the entire USIC. In practice though, he was more of 
a titular figurehead with little control – except for the CIA – over the vast US intelligence 
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apparatus (see. e.g., Goodman, 2008; Helms, 2004; Turner, 2006a). As a matter of fact, 
the DCI had control over less than 15 percent of the USIC budget while the Secretary of 
Defense disproportionally controlled the remaining 85 percent (Bamford, 2005, pp. 353; 
Goodman, 2008). Most notably, two of the largest US intelligence agencies, the NSA and 
the FBI, fell outside the direct authority of the DCI. As a result, even though the DCI was 
supposedly in command of all US intelligence agencies, he often had to resort to cajoling 
and pleading whenever he needed the cooperation of these agencies (see, e.g., Weiner, 
2007; Goodman, 2008; Helms, 2004; Turner, 2006a). 
 
To help the DCI discharge his duties as head of the USIC, the CMS was created within 
the CIA in June 1992. Responsible for developing, coordinating and implementing DCI 
policy and exercising DCI responsibilities, the CMS replaced the Intelligence Community 
Staff (ICS) – a CIA office established in the early 1960s for the same purpose (Richelson, 
1999, pp. 388). However, based on information obtained exclusively for this thesis, the 
CMS was not particularly geared toward the task of facilitating interagency cooperation – 
in fact, the CMS was focused for the most part on community-wide budgetary issues. It 
was made up mostly of budgetary and career staffers – not intelligence officers with 
operational and analytical experiences – and their role was to ensure that the assorted 
budgets of the USIC were duly prepared and delivered to Congress for approval.23 In 
terms of facilitating community-wide cooperation, the CMS’ role was limited in that 
regard.24   
 
                                                  
23 Email interview with Ivian C. Smith, Jul 25, 2012.  
24 Ibid 
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In addition to the CMS, the National Foreign Intelligence Board or NFIB also served 
under the DCI acting as his principal coordinator for community-wide activities. But in 
contrast to the CMS – a body consisting mainly of career staffers – the NFIB was made 
up of senior intelligence officers from every agency in the USIC (Richelson, 1999, pp. 
390). Accordingly, these senior intelligence officers would meet on a regular basis to 
work out major interagency issues with the DCI acting as chairman. Established in 1976, 
the NFIB succeeded the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which in turn was 
created in 1958 through the merger of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and 
the US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).25  
 
Smith (2004) provided by far the most intimate account of the NFIB. According to the 
former FBI official who represented the FBI on the NFIB, that board was responsible for 
issuing the National Intelligence Estimates (or NIEs for short) – a confidential 
intelligence report read by top US policy-makers.26 And as the nation’s most prestigious 
intelligence policy board, the NFIB was represented by the heads of US intelligence 
agencies – they included the “Directors of the NSA, DIA, NIMA, INR [and] NRO 
(Richelson, 1999, pp. 390). But more interestingly, Smith noted that in one instance an 
NIE prepared by the NFIB was practically rendered useless due to excessive secrecy 
which severely limited its dissemination.27 Instead of facilitating information flow, the 
NFIB actually hampered it in that case.   
 
                                                  
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid, pp. 35  
27 Ibid, pp. 348 – 349  
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The most detailed accounts of the USIB and the IAC were found in Sullivan (1979, pp. 
193) and Riebling (2000, pp. 95) and both authors provided valuable insights into FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover’s apathetic attitude toward those institutions during his lengthy 
tenure as head of the Bureau. Specifically, Hoover considered the USIB subordinate to 
the Bureau even though that coordinating board was the nation’s highest intelligence 
body (Sullivan, 1979, pp. 193). Similarly, the FBI Director refused to attend IAC 
meetings because he did not want “to sit below the DCI” (Riebling, 2000, pp. 95).  
 
The USCIB meanwhile, turned out to be a major source of bureaucratic tensions between 
the CIA and NSA during the early 1950s when the former succeeded in wrestling a stake 
in signals intelligence from the latter and DCI Walter Bedell Smith was made chairman 
of that communications intelligence board (Johnson, 1995, pp. 89). Given the high 
priority in which bureaucracies attach to so-called turf, losing full control over the 
national signals intelligence program must have been a slap on the face for the NSA at 
the time (see, e.g., Wilson, 1989, pp. 179 – 181).     
 
In addition to the DCI, the CMS and the NFIB, the National Security Act (1947) and EO 
12333 were introduced to ensure cooperation between US intelligence agencies.   
 
Signed into law by President Truman in July 1947, the National Security Act created the 
CIA charging it with “coordinating the nation’s intelligence activities and correlating, 
evaluating, and disseminating intelligence that affects national security”.28 Under the Act, 
                                                  
28 See, “History of the CIA.” CIA website, Apr 10, 2007. URL: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-
the-cia/  
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the CIA Director would also oversee the USIC as DCI. So in short, the 1947 National 
Security Act made the CIA the nation’s top intelligence agency with responsibility over 
the entire US intelligence apparatus. But this coordinating mechanism, as shown in the 
next section, was not without issues. Most importantly, the Act segregated the USIC into 
foreign and domestic intelligence even though it had set out to centralize USIC under the 
rubric of the DCI. As shown next, this geographical division was alleged to have 
prevented the CIA from working with the FBI. 
 
A second key legislation introduced to ensure that US intelligence agencies work together 
was Executive Order 12333. Signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in December 
1981, EO 12333 stipulated in no uncertain terms the DCI’s authority over administrative, 
tasking and budgetary matters.29 In particular, the DCI was made responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of a set of standard security protocols that would 
enhance information flow across agencies (EO 12333, section 1.5g). The DCI was also 
given the authority to task US intelligence agencies in the collection and analysis of 
national foreign intelligence (EO 12333, section 1.5k). In the event of a clash in tasking 
priorities, the DCI was empowered to resolve that conflict (EO 12333, section 1.5m). 
Lastly, on budgetary matters, the DCI retained the authority to “develop, review, approve 
and implement” the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget which funded all non-
military foreign intelligence activities conducted by the USIC (EO 12333, section 1.5n, 
section 1.5o & 1.5p; Richelson, 1999, pp. 396).  
 
                                                  
29 Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities.” NARA, Dec 4, 1981. URL: 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html#1.7 
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By granting administrative, tasking and budgetary powers to the DCI, EO 12333 was 
conceivably one of the most important institutional mechanisms that promoted 
interagency cooperation within the USIC. But even with the authorizations of EO 12333 
(in conjunction with the 1947 National Security Act), the DCI actually held little sway 
over US intelligence agencies other than the CIA (Warner, 2006, pp. 49).       
 
This review of the assorted institutional mechanisms for coordinating US intelligence 
reveals an obvious point: in spite of these coordinating mechanisms, gaps in US 
interagency intelligence cooperation remain (see, e.g., Crumpton, 2012). Therefore, one 
is prompted to ask: what prevented US intelligence agencies from working together even 
though cooperation had been institutionalized through these mechanisms? While this 
review may not have covered every institutional mechanisms for coordinating US 
intelligence, that US intelligence agencies have either squirreled away vital information 
or opted to act unilaterally on a number of occasions is strong evidence of their 
limitations in general (Theoharis, 2007; Jeffreys-Jones, 2008, pp. 12). 
 
This review also revealed a number of factors that could have precluded US intelligence 
agencies from working closely together. Firstly, a turf-conscious bureaucracy might not 
be so keen on working together with another organization since collective actions often 
entail surrendering some bureaucratic autonomy (Wilson, 1989). The attachment US 
intelligence agencies have for their ‘turf’ might be so strong that they invariably prefer 
operating unilaterally. Secondly, the apathy FBI director Hoover had for the NFIB and 
USIB suggests that his actions could have undermined the effectiveness of these 
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coordinating boards. Thirdly, it is certainly conceivable that the institutional coordinating 
mechanisms were themselves the source of discord between US intelligence agencies. 
After all, the National Security Act (1947) did widen the gaps between US intelligence 
agencies by segregating according to geographical lines of responsibility.          
 
Separately, a number of influential perspectives purporting to explain why US 
intelligence agencies shun close cooperation can be found in the literature on this 
particular subject. The following section first presents these perspectives and then 
discusses their respective inadequacy in terms of offering a comprehensive explanation of 
why close cooperation within the USIC remains an issue. 
 
2.3 WHY US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SHUN COOPERATION  
 
The dysfunctional relationship between various US intelligence agencies is well-
documented (see, e.g., Riebling, 2002, Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Theoharis, 2007; Aid, 2010). 
This state of affairs even prompted a former deputy director of the CIA to use the 
pejorative term “a tribal federation” to describe the US intelligence system (Johnson, 
2005, pp. 63). Even today, that description is still appropriate as gaps in US intelligence 
cooperation remain (see, e.g., Kessler, 2008; Markon, 2008; Gorman, 2003; Crumpton, 
2012; Lipton, Schmitt & Mazzetti, 2010). A number of influential perspectives have 
come to dominate this policy field with their accounts of why US intelligence agencies 
shun cooperation. It must be pointed out that these perspectives are submitted by other 
researchers to be factual and hence, instead of using qualifiers such as “allegedly”, 
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“purportedly” and “supposedly” in every sentence when discussing them, they are simply 
presented as accurate depictions of the way things are.   
 
2.3.1 LIMITED INTERAGENCY COOPERATION DUE TO THE 
‘FOREIGN VS. DOMESTIC’ DICHOTOMY 
 
As mentioned before, the CIA is the principal agency responsible for foreign human 
intelligence whereas the FBI is its domestic equivalent. The source of this geographical 
division can actually be attributed to the National Security Act of 1947 (Jeffreys-Jones, 
2007).  
 
Signed by President Truman into law on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act 
established the Department of Defense (DOD), the US Air Force, the National Security 
Council (NSC) and the CIA.30  
 
In addition to creating the CIA and delineating its responsibilities, the National Security 
Act also empowered the CIA Director as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) making 
him both the principal intelligence advisor to the US president and in theory, the overall 
head of the entire US intelligence community. The decision to create the DCI position 
was largely prompted by the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Centralization of 
intelligence, US lawmakers had hoped, would prevent fragmentary clues pointing to 
looming strategic surprises from being overlooked again. A central authority – in the 
                                                  
30 See, “A Look Back…..The National Security Act of 1947.” CIA, Jul 31, 2008. URL: 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/national-
security-act-of-1947.html  
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form of a DCI – to oversee and coordinate the activities of all US intelligence agencies 
was the outcome.31 Nevertheless, the goal of centralization was never achieved as the 
DCI was given little control – in the form of administrative, budgetary, personnel and 
tasking authority – over the vast US intelligence apparatus.32 
 
On top of laying down the authority of the DCI and responsibilities of the CIA, the 1947 
Act also created a formidable barrier to interagency cooperation by dividing up the vast 
US intelligence apparatus into discrete agencies and departments (see, e.g., Ratcliff, 
2006; Kris, 2006; Riebling, 2002; Zegart, 1999). Indeed, even though the 1947 Act 
centralized every US intelligence agencies under the DCI, it also divided up the vast US 
intelligence apparatus into discrete entities (Ratcliff, 2006). Specifically, the Act 
geographically divided up US intelligence into a foreign and a domestic component with 
the CIA assigned primary responsibility for the former while the FBI was assigned 
responsibility for the latter. Since each agency held separate geographical responsibilities, 
there were few areas for collaboration and over time, the two agencies simply ceased to 
talk to each other (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 12).     
 
Actually, this geographical division between foreign and domestic intelligence was 
intended to protect the American people from the highly intrusive and often questionable 
espionage techniques of the CIA (see, e.g., Leigh, 2005). Truman, indeed fearful that the 
Agency might one day be used against the American people, made doubly sure that the 
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CIA would not retain any domestic law enforcement responsibilities.33 This is because 
the techniques used for collecting foreign intelligence can be very different from those 
used for collecting domestic intelligence. In fact, many of the CIA’s aggressive espionage 
activities abroad would be considered illegal if those same activities were carried out 
within the US. Because of such concerns, the CIA’s domestic activities were heavily 
restricted by the National Security Act and domestic security intelligence became the sole 
domain of the FBI (Best, 2007). 
 
Since the CIA is responsible for foreign intelligence and the FBI is in charge of domestic 
intelligence, the two agencies share few areas for cooperation. Even if the CIA and FBI 
wanted to, there are few common areas for them to collaborate on due to this ‘foreign vs. 
domestic’ dichotomy. But how accurate is this account of why the FBI and CIA shun 
cooperation? Equally important, does this perspective correspond with the empirical data 
on these agencies?  
 
2.3.2 LIMITED INTERAGENCY COOPERATION DUE TO THE 
‘MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN’ DICHOTOMY 
 
 
A second aspect that contributed to the division between the NSA and the CIA is their 
radically different institutional cultures (see, e.g., Sales, 2010; Goodman, 2008; Posner, 
2007; Ungerer, 2008). Certainly, no two organizational cultures are more distinct than the 
one that exists between a military and a civilian organization (Feaver & Kohn, 2001).  
                                                  
33 See, “The Office of Strategic Services: The Forerunner of Today’s CIA.” CIA, Apr 3, 2008. URL: 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/office-of-
strategic-services.html 
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Military organizations impose strict discipline so that orders are carried out swiftly and 
more importantly, without questions. Ranks are also used to denote seniority and 
authority. Moreover, even though militaries around the world might display different 
levels of discipline, the chain of command in a military organization is always clearly 
defined. The civilian organization, on the other hand, emphasizes less on discipline and 
more on performance. Pay grades, rather than ranks, denote seniority and responsibility. 
Meanwhile, the chain of command in a civilian organization can sometimes be quite 
nebulous (Feaver & Kohn, 2001).    
 
This stark contrast can be readily observed in the cultures of the NSA and CIA, according 
to Posner (2007).   
 
The NSA is believed to retain a strong military ethos since it is primarily a military 
institution (Posner, 2007; Russell, 2007). It falls under the direct command of the US 
Secretary of Defense and its 80,000-strong workforce is made up of a considerable 
number of military personnel (Richelson & Ball, 1994; Aid, 2010). The NSA also 
operates closely with other branches of the US military (Bamford, 2009; Aid 2010). 
Moreover, since its inception in 1952, the position of NSA Director (DIRNSA) has 
always been held by a military officer (see Appendix 5). 
 
In contrast, the CIA has a much less regimented culture since it is inherently a civilian 
organization (Posner, 2007; Riebling, 2002). It is an independent agency accountable 
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only to the NSC and the US President (Andrew, 1995, pp. 169; Zegart, 1999). Civilians 
also form the bulk of its workforce (Kessler, 1992).  Furthermore, the position of CIA 
director has been held on a regular basis by a civilian (See Appendix 4).  
 
By all accounts, the CIA has never been a well-disciplined organization (see, e.g., 
Weiner, 2007; Moran, 2005; Riebling, 2002). In contrast, the NSA’s reputation as a 
disciplined organization has never really been questioned (see, e.g., Bamford, 2009; 
Richelson & Ball, 1994; Aid, 2010). This difference in the level of discipline has 
reportedly been a constant source of tensions between the NSA and CIA (Sales, 2010; 
Goodman, 2008; Posner, 2007; Ungerer, 2008). Indeed, Posner (2007) asserts that NSA 
officials tend to view CIA officials with contempt because of the latter’s lack of military-
style discipline, while CIA officials often reciprocate NSA officials’ disdain and animus 
with much less flattering depictions. 34  This ‘military vs. civilian’ dichotomy has 
prompted leading researchers such as Posner (2007) and Sales (2010) to conclude that 
close cooperation between the NSA and CIA is all but impossible.  
 
The question one must ask here is: does this perspective matches up with the factual 
nature of these agencies? Does the CIA maintain a straitjacket civilian culture or is it a 
more complex organization that embodies a military ethos as well? Conversely, is the 
NSA simply an organization with a military ethos or does its history paint a more diverse 
culture? If these agencies are in fact more complex than the ones we have been led to 
believe, then what are the most important factors that actually limited cooperation 
between them?   
                                                  
34 Ibid, pp. 106 
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2.3.3 LIMITED INTERAGENCY COOPERATION DUE TO THE 
‘HUMINT VS. SIGINT’ DICHOTOMY  
 
Within the vast USIC, US intelligence agencies are further divided according to 
intelligence collection disciplines (Hammond, 2007; Richelson, 2012). For example, the 
CIA is the lead agency in charge of human intelligence or HUMINT operations whereas 
the NSA is responsible for signals intelligence or SIGINT operations. But dividing US 
intelligence agencies according to discrete intelligence collection disciplines can also 
limit opportunities for interaction and exchanges between them (Turner, 2006).  
 
More significantly, this distinction in discipline or “tradecraft” of the NSA and CIA 
means that it may not be easy for them to work together. For one, CIA officers may not 
know how to make full use of raw SIGINT intercepts since the highly-technical nature of 
SIGINT makes it difficult to be appreciated by HUMINT practitioners. On the other 
hand, NSA officers may not know how to use HUMINT reports written by CIA case 
officers from the field. As a case in point, in a post-mortem conducted after the 1973 
Middle East War to determine why US intelligence agencies failed to anticipate the war, 
the CIA was found to be at fault because CIA analysts could not understand or effectively 
evaluate the tons of NSA intercepts that they were provided with prior to the outbreak of 
hostility (Aid & Wiebes, 2001).    
 
Certainly in terms of tradecraft, the NSA and CIA cannot be more different. The NSA 
relies heavily on sophisticated eavesdropping platforms (such as spy satellites, 
submarines, aircrafts and listening stations) to collect intelligence while the CIA relies 
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almost exclusively on human spies. The NSA collects intelligence passively – it sits back 
and vacuums up every bit of electronic information (such as faxes, emails, radio 
transmissions and telephone communication). The CIA, on the other hand, uses more pro-
active means to collect intelligence – its officers actively target foreigners looking for 
potential turncoats, set up agent networks and run risky covert operations in foreign 
countries (see, e.g., Gill & Phythian, 2006). 
 
Such tradecraft differences have generated sharp divisions between the NSA and CIA 
(Posner, 2007). Supporters of SIGINT praise its timeliness, reliability, flexibility and cost 
effectiveness, while criticizing HUMINT for its slowness, unreliability, inflexibility and 
high risks (Aid & Wiebes, 2001).  
 
To a large extent, it is accurate to say that SIGINT is (1) “live” in that high priority 
communications are intercepted while in transmission, (2) more reliable since it is less 
susceptible to disinformation by double-agents, (3) more flexible because it can be re-
tasked rapidly to deal with changing circumstances, and (4) more cost-effective because it 
produces on a dollar-for-dollar basis more intelligence than any other collection methods 
(Aid & Wiebes, 2001, pp. 4 – 11).  
 
HUMINT, on the other hand, is not as speedy because case officers had to first write up 
their intelligence reports before being passed on for analysis – a final report usually takes 
weeks, if not months before it reaches intended consumers (Moran, 2005). HUMINT is 
also inherently less reliable because it is easily given to disinformation by double-agents 
45   
or disgruntled defectors as the example with “Curveball” illustrates. 35  Furthermore, 
HUMINT also lacks flexibility in that it takes time to cultivate human sources and set up 
spy networks (Goodman, 2008). Lastly, HUMINT entails political and physical risks if 
the case officer or agent were exposed or captured (see. e.g., Bearden & Risen, 2003).  
 
Doing little to ameliorate tensions between the NSA and CIA, supporters of HUMINT – 
namely, the CIA – would dispute the shortcomings of HUMINT by deriding SIGINT and 
portraying NSA intercept operators as boring and grubby radio men with little sex appeal 
(Rosenau, 1994). As a matter of fact, a CIA official once complained publicly that 
“electronics intercepts are great; but you don’t know if you got two idiots talking on the 
phone” (Drogin, 2000). The 2003 debacle involving US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
making a case at the UN for an Iraqi invasion based on fragmentary and ambiguous NSA 
intercepts underscores to some degree the limitations of signals intelligence (Chesterman, 
2006).  
  
Due to such wide tradecraft differences, it is not difficult to see why the “HUMINT 
versus SIGINT” dilemma between the NSA and CIA has been blamed for poor 
cooperation between the two (Keegan, 2003, pp. 385).  
                                                  
35 Curveball is the codename given to an unidentified Iraqi who defected to the Germany prior to the 2003 
Iraqi War. During interrogation by German intelligence officials, Curveball sang like a bird and gave 
German intelligence volumes of false information on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
program. Due to Curveball’s unbridled candor, German intelligence officials became skeptical of his 
assertions and duly communicated to American intelligence officials their assessment that Curveball’s 
claims were dubious and thus, “Iraq may not be in possession of an elaborate WMD program”. 
Unfortunately, by the time that piece of information reached CIA Director George Tenet, it had become 
“Iraq may be in possession of a WMD program” because CIA analysts, who were under tremendous 
pressure to produce evidences of Iraq’s illicit weapons program, had failed to thoroughly investigate and 
cross-check Curveball’s fabricated claims (Bamford, 2005; Drogin & Goetz, 2005).  
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But how factual is this perspective in terms of explaining limited cooperation between the 
NSA and the CIA? Is there any historical evidence that supports this view? Can these 
agencies be divided by other factors that are more significant?   
 
2.3.4 LIMITED INTERAGENCY COOPERATION DUE TO THE 
‘SPY VS. COP’ DICHOTOMY 
 
According to this perspective, interagency cooperation between the CIA and FBI is 
hampered primarily by their incompatible operational procedures (see, e.g., Hulnick, 
2004 & 2007; Posner, 2005 & 2007; Marchetti and Marks, 1974; Sales, 2010). Hulnick, a 
former CIA official, refers to this procedural incompatibility specifically as the ‘spy vs. 
cop’ dichotomy.  
 
Broadly speaking, intelligence agencies are geared toward long term assessment of 
national security threats while law enforcement agencies have a wider remit that includes 
enforcing the law, maintaining order and prosecuting criminals (Posner, 2007). The two 
types of agencies do not work well together since intelligence officers gather information 
to develop a broader picture of threats to national security whereas law enforcement 
officers are focused on investigating crimes and arresting criminals (Hulnick, 2004, pp. 
110). Consequently, this procedural incompatibility has been cited by a number of 
researchers in this field as a major stumbling block for FBI–CIA cooperation (Hulnick, 
2004, 2007; Posner, 2005 & 2007; Marchetti and Marks, 1974; Sales, 2010).  
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In particular, Posner (2005) and Hulnick (2004) observe that the FBI is at the core a law 
enforcement agency whose principal mission is to investigate crimes and make arrests – 
meanwhile, its domestic intelligence role is but an ancillary function. As proof of this, 
Posner (2005, pp. 27 – 28) points to anecdotal evidence which indicate that FBI agents on 
the Bureau’s intelligence desk are typically considered second class compared to those 
working on law enforcement matters. Cumming and Masse (2005) meanwhile, also note 
that a successful criminal conviction has traditionally been the quickest way for Bureau 
agents to earn a promotion. These observations cumulatively suggest that the FBI as a 
whole is focused on enforcing the law but not particularly geared toward intelligence 
work.  
 
The CIA, in stark contrast, subjects its suspects to extended periods of surveillance to 
gather more intelligence on their operations and known accomplices (Posner, 2005; 
Hulnick, 2004 & 2007). In some cases, the CIA might even recruit less dangerous 
suspects to become CIA “assets” (Sales, 2010; Posner, 2007).36 At the FBI, a successful 
prosecution is the best way for an agent to earn a promotion; but at the CIA, a less 
dangerous suspect should be exploited for intelligence instead of being incarcerated 
(Marchetti & Marks, 1974, pp. 206).  
 
                                                  
36 In intelligence parlance, the spies that CIA case officers recruit to carry out espionage activities for the 
CIA are typically referred to as “assets”; on the other hand, the snitches that FBI agents recruit to work for 
the Bureau are known as “informants”. This parlance is reflected in this thesis.   
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Accordingly, an area that has been a perennial problem for the FBI and CIA is that of 
counter-intelligence.37 Specifically, under US Executive Order 12333 (section 1.8a & 
1.8c), whenever the CIA detects an enemy spy operating in the US, it is required to alert 
the FBI and then coordinate the ensuing investigation with the Bureau.38 That is in theory 
how domestic counter-intelligence is to be carried out.  
 
But in practice, the CIA had actually withheld such cases from the FBI because when 
alerted, the FBI’s first inclination was to arrest these enemy spies instead of recruiting 
them as double-agents (Marchetti and Marks, 1974, pp. 206). 39  The CIA has even 
periodically accused the FBI of jeopardizing ongoing national security investigations 
because of what CIA officials considered as premature arrests by the Bureau (Hulnick, 
2004). But to the FBI, it was doing precisely what it is supposed to do, i.e., making 
arrests and securing convictions. Consequently, the FBI’s operational procedure limited 
its usefulness to the CIA as an intelligence partner and over time, with little scope for 
cooperation, the two agencies ceased to work together.40  
 
This perspective raises a number of questions though. Most importantly, is the FBI a 
bona fide law enforcement agency that is incapable of intelligence work? Does the 
Bureau’s dual law enforcement and intelligence remit limit its usefulness to the CIA? 
                                                  
37 Counter-intelligence (CI) refers to those activities that an intelligence agency undertakes to deny hostile 
intelligence services its secrets. See, Wasemiller, A.C., “The Anatomy of Counterintelligence.” CIA/CSI, 
Jul 2, 1996. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol13no1/html/v13i1a02p_0001.htm  
38 The full text of E.O. 12333 can be found here: http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12333.html#1.8  
39 A double-agent is one who spies on behalf of one intelligence service but is in fact, also secretly working 
for the enemy. 
40 Ibid 
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What does the history of these agencies have to offer in terms of their disposition? This 
thesis shall attempt to answer these questions.  
 
2.4 ISSUES WITH EXTANT PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLIGENCE 
COOPERATION 
 
The literature review above serves three important functions. Firstly, it identified a 
number of perspectives that are influential in the field of intelligence studies today; 
secondly, it exposed what knowledge gaps remain in that field and thirdly, it pointed to 
an analytical framework which will guide this research forward.   
 
On the first point, four major perspectives dominant the field of intelligence studies today 
not least because they were submitted by noted researchers and former intelligence 
officials. Presented as dichotomies, these perspectives postulate that US intelligence 
agencies shun cooperation primarily because of differences in their remits, ethos, 
disciplines and procedures (see Diagram 2.2).  
 
The review process also exposed a number of issues related to these perspectives.  
 
In general, these perspectives are based on homophilic precepts – which say that 
individuals are more attracted to those who share complementary features with them (see, 
e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Byrne, 1971). In other words, they tend to 
view limited interagency cooperation as a product of incompatibility or incongruous 
features between two agencies. Whether interagency cooperation materializes or not, is 
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therefore contingent on how comparable one agency is to another – the more identical 
they are, the more inclined they are to work together (and vice versa). In short, 
similarities enhance cooperation whereas dissimilarities hamper it. If it is easier for those 
who share the same language, culture and physical appearance to bond with each other, 
then dissimilarities between US intelligence agencies should by extension hamper 
interagency cooperation.  
 
DIAGRAM 2.2: FOUR DOMINANT PERSPECTIVES ON US INTERAGENCY 
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
             
 
 
Crucially, if these perspectives indeed hold the answers to improving US interagency 
intelligence cooperation, then they definitely lend credence to calls for the creation of an 
‘SPY vs. COP’  
DICHOTOMY 
 
 Division caused by 
procedural 
incompatibility  
HUMINT vs. SIGINT 
DICHOTOMY 
 
 Division caused by 
incompatible tradecraft 
MILITARY vs. CIVILIAN 
DICHOTOMY 
 
 Division caused by 
incompatible ethos 
‘FOREIGN vs. DOMESTIC’ 
DICHOTOMY 
 
 Division caused by the 
National Security Act 
(1947) 
 




51   
agency separate from the FBI to handle domestic intelligence (see, e.g., Masse & 
Cumming, 2005; Posner, 2005). Dedicated to intelligence matters, a domestic intelligence 
agency distinct from the FBI should maintain close cooperation with the CIA. 
 
However, the problem with drawing on homophilic precepts to explain interagency 
intelligence cooperation is that they cannot account for variations in the research 
phenomenon (see. e.g., Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Indeed, while there were definitely gaps 
in US intelligence cooperation, it is also a matter of fact that US intelligence agencies 
have at times maintained close cooperation (see Appendix 1). If US intelligence agencies 
shun cooperation due to compatibility issues, then interagency cooperation should not 
have materialized at all since their respective features (i.e., remit, ethos, discipline and 
procedure) have remained largely constant over time. This is at least an indication that the 
conceptual explanations given by the aforementioned perspectives may be incomplete.   
 
Furthermore, it is important to point out that not all of these perspectives are based on 
substantial historical data. Indeed, the perspectives of Zegart (2007), Posner (2005 & 
2007) and Sales (2010) are uniformly based on a single event – 9/11 – and this over-
reliance on a single event certainly raises the possibility that their viewpoints are in fact 
idiosyncratic and unreliable (Rueschemeyer, 2003). If anything, this single-case study 
approach contravenes the research precept that for the result to be reliable, it must be 
derived from a systematic investigation of the research phenomenon over a sustained 
period of time (Watson, 1992; Gottschalk, 1950; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003; 
Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Yin, 1984).  
52   
 
It should also be pointed out that none of these perspectives took into account how 
routine practices peculiar to the intelligence field might have affected US interagency 
intelligence cooperation. Take for example the stringent level of secrecy that intelligence 
agencies maintain. The NSA, as a case in point, is shrouded in such intense secrecy that 
its acronym has been jokingly referred to as “No Such Agency” or “Never Say Anything” 
(Bamford, 2008, pp. 13). The fact that the aforementioned perspectives failed to consider 
how secrecy might have influenced US interagency intelligence cooperation is therefore 
particularly strange.  
 
More importantly, if a feature as fundamental as secrecy can go unnoticed, then it is quite 
likely that other vital aspects have been overlooked as well. Unless one scrutinizes a 
broad spectrum of historical data, one cannot be confident enough to say that a result is 
significant and reliable (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 201). Indeed, given the complexity 
of this research topic, focusing on a single or a small number of events is unlikely to yield 
credible results.41  
 
The impact of personal relations on interagency cooperation is also not being accounted 
for even though good interpersonal relations often form the basis for close collaboration 
while rancorous relations – especially between key decision-makers – have the potential 
to derail cooperation (March & Simon, 1958). This should strike one as particularly odd 
since key personalities such as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, OSS Director William J. 
Donovan and NSA Director Ralph Canine had a huge influence on the FBI, CIA and 
                                                  
41 Interview with Dr. Richard K. Betts, Jun 20, 2011.  
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NSA respectively. Yet, none of the aforementioned perspectives took this aspect into 
account even though traditional qualitative methodologies treat action (of persons) as a 
relevant category of information for analysis (see, e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Flick, 
2009; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Silverman, 2010).  
 
2.5 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The literature review process exposed a number of important issues related to pre-
existing conceptions on US interagency intelligence cooperation. It also revealed key 
weaknesses in these dominant perspectives and hence, the need for a systematic study of 
this phenomenon. This section discusses the analytical framework that this study must 
possess. 
 
Crucially, a study to investigate the phenomenon of US intelligence cooperation must 
examine a considerable spectrum of empirical data. This is to ensure that the factors 
observed to influence US interagency cooperation at any particular point in time are 
reliable over time. Historical events have often been studied not only because they 
present a rich source of empirical data but also because the researcher can draw on a 
myriad of sources for information (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003; Howell & 
Prevenier, 2001, pp. 20 – 27). Moreover, by examining a series of historical events, one 
can also ensure that any observation made is not merely idiosyncratic (Watson, 1992; 
Gottschalk, 1950; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, pp. 324 
– 327).  
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Secondly, this study must take into account the actions of key personalities and their 
relationships with one another (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; pp. 132). It will not be 
methodologically sound to overlook these elements since they are an integral part of these 
organizations (see, e.g., March & Simon, 1958). Indeed, to ignore these elements is to 
completely divorce the human agency from enterprises that are essentially made up of 
people (Ott, Parkes & Simpson, 2003). Only by accounting for the roles of key historical 
figures can this study fully capture the dynamic forces that weighed on the research 
phenomenon at any point in time.   
 
Thirdly, the impact of certain organizational features endemic to US intelligence agencies 
must be assessed. As a whole, intelligence agencies maintain certain routines that are 
atypical compared to those practiced by governmental organizations where transparency 
is the norm. Secrecy, for example, is so integral to intelligence agencies that it simply 
cannot be taken for granted. It must be pointed out that the intention here is not to target 
any specific feature for investigation through an a priori approach but rather, establish 
from the data which feature(s) are the most significant to the research phenomenon 
(Glaser, 1992 & 1998).  
 
This study must also pay attention to counterfactual information that challenges the major 
perspectives that dominate this field (Morgan & Winship, 2007). Whether apparent 
differences in remit, ethos, discipline and procedure are significant to the research 
phenomenon can, to some extent, be established by subjecting them to rigorous empirical 
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analysis. If counterfactual information is uncovered, then that may be an indication that 
these perspectives are incomplete or even flawed explanations (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 
Morgan & Winship, 2007). Conversely, if the empirical data lends strong support to these 
established views then at the very least, they have “[earned] their way into [the] 
narrative” (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 126).  
 
Lastly, this study must also be able to account for variations in the research phenomenon; 
in other words, it must be able to explain why US intelligence agencies shunned 
cooperation in some cases but not others. Accounting for this variation is essential in that it 
ensures a more thorough explanation of the research phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, 146 – 147). Indeed, an explanation that describes why a specific outcome 
materialized in one case but not in another has failed to capture “in a general sense, what is 
going on” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 145). In any event, to establish the kind of policy 
measures needed to bring about close US interagency intelligence cooperation, a complete 
understanding of why US intelligence agencies shunned cooperation in some cases while 
embracing it in others is absolutely essential (Goodman, 2008).    
 
In summary, the following requirements must be incorporated into the research design of 
this study: 
 
1. The research phenomenon is examined over a sustained period of time. 
2. The actions of key historical figures and their interactions are assessed.  
3. Routines specific to these organizations are evaluated.  
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4. Pay attention to counterfactual information.   
5. Variations in the research phenomenon are accounted for.     
 
These requirements call for a research design that is rigorous but at the same time, open 
to the discovery of new information. It must also be able to capture the richness and 
complexity of the research topic – a condition which standardized surveys and statistical 
analyses can hardly fulfill (Yin, 1984, pp. 23; Huberman & Miles, 1994; Flick, 2007; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Hence, a qualitative research method is called for.  
 
Nevertheless, even though it is qualitative in nature, this study should not be so 
unsystematic that it degenerates into what Johnson, Long & White (2005, pp. 245) called 
“mere journalism”. The breadth of data to be analyzed must be substantial as well; hence, 
it must be given to drawing from a wide range of sources. Finally, two types of cases 
involving US intelligence agencies shunning cooperation and working together must be 
examined. After evaluating a considerable number of research methodologies, one in 
particular satisfies these requirements – a qualitative research method called Grounded 
Theory.  
 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter provided a broad overview of the USIC as well as relevant literature on this 
subject. An assortment of factors that purportedly facilitate or limit US interagency 
intelligence cooperation were also presented. On facilitating interagency cooperation, the 
dominant view is that key institutional mechanisms were responsible for bringing US 
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intelligence agencies together. On the other hand, gaps in interagency cooperation were 
blamed on differences in remits, ethos, disciplines and procedures. Nonetheless, it 
remains unclear if these perspectives are supported by strong historical evidence. Finally, 
the review process provided a number of useful guidelines for mapping out the analytical 
framework of this thesis. The following chapter shall present the research design and 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 












3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents the general research design of this thesis. Central to this research 
design is the application of grounded theory to investigate the research phenomenon over 
a period of 60 years. A research methodology that promotes the natural discovery of 
insights, ground theory is a widely-accepted diagnostic tool (Dunne, 2010; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, pp. 1). To establish which factors are most important to US interagency 
intelligence cooperation, 12 major historical cases will be examined. The diagnostic 
strategies used to analyze these historical events are also presented in this chapter.  
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3.2 GENERAL RESEARCH DESIGN – A GROUNDED THEORY 
APPROACH 
 
This thesis utilizes a qualitative research design that is based on grounded theory. A 
widely-accepted research methodology, grounded theory is particularly useful for “the 
discovery of theory from data” by promoting an approach where information is revealed 
to the researcher naturally (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 1; Glaser, 1992 & 1998; Dunne, 
2010). As its name suggests, grounded theory essentially attempts to explain a research 
phenomenon from the ground up through the development of conceptual explanations or 
central categories of information (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). When 
utilizing this methodology, the researcher is concerned primarily with the way categories 
of information are linked and the way in which they crisscross to create events leading to 
a particular outcome. Strauss & Corbin (1998, pp. 133) offer the most accurate depiction 
of what grounded theory research is by describing the methodology as “when people act, 
we want to know why, how come, and to what situations, problems, or issues they are 
responding to”.  
 
In grounded theory research, categories refer specifically to those themes or concepts 
drawn from the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1992; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Not any idea that seems to be related to a research phenomenon can be 
treated as a category though; a theme or concept qualifies as a category only when it 
contains explanatory properties.42  
 
                                                  
42 Ibid 
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To refine the specifics of a category, the researcher must look for instances representing 
that particular category by constantly asking oneself “who, what, why, when, where and 
how much” while examining the data set (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pp. 78). Grounded 
theorists call this process of using emergent categories to point toward new data for 
analysis theoretical sampling (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 201). This stage basically 
requires the researcher to ask himself what other data is needed in order to better 
understand the research phenomenon in question. Hence, data collection and analysis 
proceed simultaneously (Charmaz, 1983, pp. 125; Payne, 2007, pp. 78). Meanwhile, it is 
important to look out for repeated confirmation of a category because that is how a 
conceptual explanation is generated (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 147). This reflexive 
examination of data and refinement of categories should continue until saturation is 
achieved – i.e., when new information can no longer provides fresh insights into the 
phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 136).  
 
The final step in grounded theory research involves connecting relevant categories 
together to produce a discursive set of conceptual explanations or central categories. This 
set of conceptual explanations is then measured up against pre-existing theories or 
perspectives to establish if it conforms to them (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 
2006, p. 126). Diagram 3.1 illustrates the key methodological stages in grounded theory 
research.  
 
As a research methodology, grounded theory is unique in a number of important ways.  
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Firstly, grounded theory does not analyze variables, verify hypotheses and make 
measurements (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 23; Payne, 2007, pp. 
68; Dey, 2004; pp. 82). Instead, it seeks only to develop conceptual explanations through 
the careful analysis of empirical data (Charmaz, 1983, p. 125). Precisely because 
grounded theory intentionally privileges data over pre-existing concepts, research 
projects that utilize this methodology generally do not contain research hypotheses, 
experimental variables and associated measurements (Dunne, 2010).  
Indeed, most research designs require the formulation of research hypotheses and 
relevant variables once the research question(s) has been defined (see Diagram 3.2). 
Grounded theory, on the other hand, favors data collection and analysis over the 
formulation of research hypotheses and relevant variables once the research phenomenon 
has been identified (see Diagram 3.1). The main rationale for this is to promote an 
investigation uninhibited by pre-existing theoretical frameworks and associated 
hypotheses (Glaser, 1998, pp. 68; Dunne, 2010; Dey, 2007, pp. 176; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967, pp. 1).  
Precisely because research hypotheses and associated variables can inhibit the natural 
emergence of categories, grounded theory recommends that the researcher avoids 
specifying them beforehand or even abstain from them altogether (Glaser, 1998; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This explains why research hypotheses and 
associated variables are, as a rule, not found in research projects that utilize grounded 
theory.  
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Sources: Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1998; Strauss & Corbin, 1998 & 2008; Charmaz, 2006.  
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63   
collection is followed by analysis (Chamaz, 1983, p. 125). The key difference between 
grounded theory and research methods not informed by grounded theory is that in the 
former, data analysis points to additional data to collect whereas for latter, the two 
methodological stages are typically sequential and distinct (see Diagram 3.2). 
 
DIAGRAM 3.2: LINEARIZED STEPS OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES NOT 
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This reflexive process of collection and analysis is known as theoretical sampling and is 
completed only when saturation – i.e., fresh data can no longer provide insights – has 
been achieved (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pp. 78). It must be emphasized that by 
following this reflexive process, grounded theory actually limits the ‘cherry-picking’ of 
data since the dataset itself is not delineated in advance (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In fact, 
the dataset continues to expand as the research progresses and as the analysis of data on 
hand points to more data for collection (see Diagram 3.1).  
 
Thirdly, grounded theory is distinctive in that it is focused solely on the discovery of 
conceptual explanations to account for a phenomenon and not on the verification of 
extant theories (Charmaz, 1983). Certainly, the ultimate goal of grounded theory was 
never to test “grand” theories but rather to discover categories of information that would 
explain social or policy phenomena (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 23; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Charmaz, 1983, p. 125). This marks a clear departure from methods of inquiry 
where the verification of existing theoretical conceptions remains their foremost 
objective.  
 
Taken together, grounded theory contains key features that separate it from other methods 
of inquiry. Certainly, by not following a linearized sequence, not developing associated 
hypotheses and variables, not verifying theories and not delineating the dataset, grounded 
theory should not be used if the research objective is specifically to verify pre-existing 
theoretical conceptions. On the other hand, if the goal is to uncover fresh explanations in 
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a field that is relatively obscure, then grounded theory is definitely superior (Glaser, 
1998, pp. 11).  
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3.2.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR UTILIZING GROUNDED THEORY  
 
Several important reasons prompted the use of grounded theory for this thesis.   
 
First and foremost is that grounded theory allows for the treatment of all extant 
information in the field as possible data for examination (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 
1998, pp. 8; Charmaz, 2006). In fields where data is limited, grounded theory is 
especially useful because it helps to overcome data scarcity by basically enlarging the 
breadth of empirical data for research (see, e.g., McCann & Clark, 2003; Payne, 2007; 
Dick, 2007; Locke, 2001). Indeed, through the use of grounded theory, this thesis ended 
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up drawing from a diverse range of sources for information. By adhering to the principle 
that “all is data” (Glaser, 1998; pp. 8), the dataset for this thesis was drawn from sources 
that included archival documents, oral accounts, documentaries, autobiographies, news 
articles, government reports and academic studies.   
 
Secondly, grounded theory is particularly suited for unearthing obscure concepts or 
themes. By requiring the researcher to repeat the data collection and analysis process 
until saturation has been achieved, grounded theory facilitates the discovery of erstwhile 
obscured information. This feature is especially worthwhile since this thesis deals with a 
topic that is considered to be “an academic no-man’s land” (Zegart, 2007, pp. 43). 
Indeed, even though several perspectives have been submitted to explain the research 
phenomenon herewith, none seems to fully capture the fundamental nature of the 
problem. By focusing on data, grounded theory is definitely better equipped to capture 
not only the richness but also the depth of this research topic (see, e.g., Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).        
 
Thirdly, grounded theory is adopted because it encourages an open-minded approach to 
research. Specifically, by ‘liberating’ the researcher from pre-existing theoretical 
frameworks and associate hypotheses, grounded theory facilitates a process of natural 
discovery during research (see, e.g., Glaser 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The danger 
with specifying theoretical frameworks and hypotheses beforehand is often the 
temptation to filter out those findings that do not seem to fit or make sense with existing 
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paradigms or way of thinking (Glaser, 1992 & 1998). With grounded theory, this 
inclination is significantly mitigated.43 
 
The remainder of this chapter will present the mechanics of using grounded theory to 
carry out this investigation.   
 
3.3 PRIMARY DATASET  
 
Two sets of historical cases form the dataset of this thesis. One set comprises of those 
past events that demonstrate cooperation between the FBI, NSA and CIA; the other set 
comprises of those past events that show these three agencies avoiding cooperation. 
Analysis of the former dataset will reveal those factors that facilitated interagency 
cooperation whereas the latter set will expose those factors that hampered it. However, it 
must be noted that some of these events demonstrate limited interagency cooperation 
only to be followed by close interagency cooperation. Under such circumstances, the 
events are treated as cases where both limited and close interagency cooperation are 
involved.  
 
In all, a total of 12 historical cases spanning six decades form the dataset of this thesis 
(see Appendix 1). Unlike traditional case study methodology in which the cases to be 
examined are specified beforehand and selected based on a set of pre-determined criteria, 
the past events examined herein are selected on the basis of theoretical sampling – a 
process in grounded theory whereby one case actually points to another for study (Yin, 
                                                  
43 Ibid 
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1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 73). Moreover, because the historical cases 
investigated herein are assembled and assessed chronologically, any strong parallels and 
divergences over time should be readily observed (Yin, 1984; Flick, 2007; Gottschalk, 
1950).  
 
This thesis uses 1941 as a starting point because it marked the onset of the complex 
triadic relationship between the CIA, NSA and FBI with the creation of the Office of the 
Coordinator of Information (OCOI) – the precursor of the CIA. In 1941, the FBI and the 
precursors of the NSA were already critical components of the US intelligence system 
when the OCOI was established.    
 
2001 is selected as the end point of this investigation because the 9/11 attacks was carried 
out in that year. By far the most devastating attack on the continental US since the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, 9/11 exposed major weaknesses in the US 
intelligence system. It is matter of public record that vital information pointing to 9/11 
was squirreled away by the CIA and NSA instead of being shared with the FBI (Jeffrey-
Jones, 2007, pp. 12). As a result, the vast US intelligence system failed to synthesize the 
information already in its possession into a coherent picture of the looming attacks.   
 
In theory, this investigation can be extended beyond 9/11 to study events that occurred 
after the attack. For instance, the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (a Nigerian who 
tried unsuccessful to bomb a transatlantic flight by setting off an explosive device hidden 
in, of all places, his underwear) is a prime example of limited US interagency intelligence 
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cooperation (see, e.g., Baker & Hulse, 2009; Shane, 2009). Another potentially insightful 
case is the collaborative interagency operation to hunt down Osama bin Laden in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan. However, due to time constraints, the decision is made not to 
pursue these cases.  
 
It is important to point out here that ground theory is not a naïve inductive approach 
because the practitioner is required to apply rigorous logical reasoning at all times 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 136 – 137). Notably, a theme (or category, as grounded 
theorists call it) must be observed regularly and logical to be considered significant 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 146). More importantly, it must be consistent with what we 
already know to be factual in the broader context.44 In other words, the ground theory 
practitioner uses both deductive and inductive reasoning in order to establish the 
connections between various categories as well as the reasons behind their significance. 
As such, examining an infinite number of cases with little attention to the reasons that 
underpin each category is not an approach that ground theory endorses.    
 
3.4 DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION 
 
The archival documents examined in this thesis were drawn primarily from the following 
sources: 
 The CIA 
 The NSA 
 The FBI  
                                                  
44 Ibid 
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 The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 
 The US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) 
 The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
 The National Security Archive (DNSA)   
 US Library of Congress 
 The National Archives (UK) 
 MI6 & M15 (UK) 
 
In addition, this thesis also examined textual, documentary and oratory data from the 
following sources:  
 
 National Public Radio (NPR) 
 Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) 
 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes 
 US Presidential Libraries 
 Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the US Congress 
 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) 
 C-SPAN 
 Memoirs of former intelligence and government officials 
 Published materials on intelligence matters (e.g., news articles, government 
reports and academic studies) 
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Thirdly, views were sought from specific persons to fill in any informational gaps that 
remained; these interviews were conducted face-to-face, through the phone and/or via 
emails. Typically, individually-tailored and specific questions were asked in these 
sessions. The idea is to target certain questions at persons who specialize in particular 
areas in order to obtain exclusive information. Appendix 10 provides a sample of the 
interview questions. Persons who were interviewed for this thesis generally fell into the 
following categories: 
 
 Former intelligence and law enforcement officials. 
 Officials who are involved in intelligence oversight committees. 
 Researchers and scholars who are experts in the field of intelligence.  
 Journalists and writers who have published extensively on this subject.  
 
To augment these targeted interviews, pre-recorded interviews and speeches were also 
examined. In all, many hours of these oratory data were examined for relevant clues and 
the standard practice throughout has been to look for and evaluate those interviews and 
speeches given by officials that were directly or indirectly involved in the historical cases 
examined herein.  
 
3.5 KEY METHODOLOGICAL STEPS 
 
To assess the data obtained, the following diagnostic steps were taken. 
 
STEP ONE: Open Coding for Primary Categories of Information 
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Open coding is the process of developing open codes or primary categories of 
information (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 101). In this initial step, the empirical data is 
first evaluated for any raw information that might explain the specific outcome. The 
standard approach is to begin with empirical data from the most reliable sources (such as 
archival documents, major government reports and original testimonies) to ensure 
accuracy (see, e.g., Watson, 1992). The following guidelines are used to generate the 
primary categories: 
 
 Look out for cues in the data that indicate a link between a primary category of 
information and the phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 126).   
 Pay attention to key words, phrases and concepts that appear regularly.45   
 Constantly ask “who, why, when, where, how and with what consequences”.46 
 Question what key issues persons involved in the case had to grapple with.47 
 Focus on those critical aspects not directly observed.48   
 
It should be pointed out that a primary category of information offers only limited 
explanatory prowess (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 102). For a more precise explanation, 
primary categories must be related to each other and to those derived from other sources 
(e.g., interviews and testimonies). The next step – called axial coding – is to establish the 
linkages between primary categories of information.  
 
                                                  
45 Ibid, pp. 78 
46 Ibid, pp. 127 
47 Ibid, pp. 148 
48 Ibid 
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Axial coding is the process of linking primary categories of information derived from 
open coding to form a set of “more precise and complete explanations” for a particular 
outcome (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 123). In this step, the researcher is required to link 
primary categories of information by sorting them into one of the following axial codes: 
 
 Causal conditions – these refer to those specific conditions or incidents that come 
together to produce an observed outcome (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 130 – 131). 
Specifically, the observed outcome would be radically different if that category had 
not been present (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Gottschalk, 1950; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   
 Actions/Interactions – these refer to those responses or decisions taken by key 
individuals that give rise to a significant outcome (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 
128). Relations between these individuals are also taken into considerations.49 
 Settings/Happenings – these are those broader circumstances that are related to an 
observed outcome. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 130), these might 
arise out of “time and place”. 
 Routines/Policies – these refer to those standardized procedures which 
organizations and their members follow (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 133). In 
particular, these practices are tied to “habituated ways of responding to [daily] 
occurrences”50   
                                                  
49 Ibid, pp. 134 
50 Ibid  
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 Consequences – these are the outcomes of the events under investigation. An 
outcome is basically the net effect of the four axial relations above (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, pp. 128). In the context of this thesis, the outcome of a particular 
historical case is whether interagency cooperation materialized or not.  
 
In practice, the explanations may not fit neatly into these axial codes since cross-
interactions may exist (see, e.g., Stock & Watson, 2003).51 But axial coding is essentially 
an analytical technique to help the researcher organize data and sort out the relations 
between categories in a systematic way (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 142). Ultimately, 
the main focus of the GT researcher is with the accuracy of the explanations and not so 
much with how well they fit into the various axial codes.    
 
Open and axial coding are repeated until saturation is achieved, i.e., when additional 
information can no longer offer fresh insights into that specific case (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, pp. 136). In this thesis, saturation is achieved when all data resources have been 
exhausted to refine the specifics of a category. Specifically, saturation is achieved in this 
thesis when: 
 
 All available materials have been assessed. 
 Specific answers have been solicited through targeted interviews. 
 Informational gaps have been addressed by Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests.    
 
                                                  
51 In statistics, cross interaction refers to a condition whereby two or more explanatory variables are not 
completely independent of each other hence resulting in a non-additive effect on the dependent variable.  
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Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that achieving saturation in practice entails a 
degree of subjectivity. Indeed, according to Strauss & Corbin (1998, pp. 136), one would 
almost certainly be able to uncover fresh information if given unlimited resources and 
time. Unfortunately, most researchers do not have that luxury. Therefore, at some point 
the GT researcher must recognize that collecting additional information will only be 
counterproductive and detracts from the broader objective of the research project.52 At 
that point, the GT researcher has essentially reached saturation.    
  
On completion of open and axial coding in each case, a set of specific explanations of the 
observed outcome should emerge. In this thesis, these explanations are the specific 
factors that prompted US intelligence agencies to engage in or shun cooperation in each 
historical case.  
 
The next step – selective coding – brings together these specific explanations from each 
historical case to form what are known as central categories of information – conceptual 
explanations that account for the research phenomenon being investigated (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, pp. 143 – 145).   
 
STEP THREE: Selective Coding for Central Categories of Information 
 
Step Three is the process for developing central categories of information to connect the 
specific explanations derived from each historical case. Although these explanations 
provide a detailed account of each past event, they still offer but a discrete picture of the 
                                                  
52 Ibid 
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research phenomenon itself; therefore, central categories or conceptual explanation must 
be developed to subsume these specific explanations into a coherent whole (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, pp. 146). In essence, central categories are the answers to the research 
phenomenon.53  
 
Accordingly, a central category must contain the following features: 
 
1. It is central – redundant as it may sound, a central category must be at the 
core of all the categories that are related to it. This means that even though 
a central category is necessarily abstract, it should still contain key 
features associated with all related categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 
147).   
2. It appears regularly in the data – a central category must be based on 
categories of information that are observed repeatedly over a sustained 
period of time (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 147; Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2003, pp. 363; Howell & Prevenier, 2001, pp. 108; 
Gottschalk, 1950, pp. 259). The idea is that a repetitive pattern (across 
time and space) ensures that a central category is neither idiosyncratic nor 
peculiar to a particular case (Charmaz, 2006; Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
pp. 172).  
3. It emerges naturally from the data – in other words, there is no forcing of 
data to arrive at a central category (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 146 – 147; 
Charmaz, 2006, pp. 182 – 183). The reason(s) for relating a series of 
                                                  
53 Ibid 
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explanations from individual cases must be logical and consistent to the 
extent that other researchers, if they follow the same logic, will invariably 
agree that the central category is plausible (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 
146; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, pp. 4; Huberman & Miles, 1994; pp. 202; 
Flick, 2007, pp. 15).    
4. It is abstract – a central category is a conceptual explanation that offers an 
account of the research phenomenon across time and space; therefore, 
even though it retains features of categories derived from individual cases, 
it is also necessarily abstract (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 147). 
5. It has explanatory power – a central category, when combined with others, 
must be able to offer a comprehensive and convincing explanation of the 
research phenomenon.54      
6. It can account for variations – a central category must remain valid even 
when there are variations in the cases. In other words, even if there are 
some deviations (e.g., settings, persons, outcomes, etc), a central category 
shall remain applicable regardless.55  
 
In this thesis, the central categories are developed and presented in the final chapter. 
Drawn from the specific explanations discovered in each historical case, these central 
categories answer the research questions posed in Chapter 1. In other words, they are the 
most important factors that influenced US interagency intelligence cooperation over time. 
 
STEP FOUR: Comparing Results to Dominant Perspectives  
                                                  
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid 
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In this final step, the results are compared with the four major perspectives that 
dominated the literature in this policy field (see Section 2.3). If a central category 
conforms to any of those dominant perspectives, then it has basically reinforced that 
particular view (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 126; Stern, 2007). However, if a central category 
refutes a dominant perspective, then a new discovery has been made. Either way, the 
policy field has been enriched.56  
 
This final comparative step is essential to establish if current literature in this field has 
accurately accounted for the research phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 51 – 52). 
Fresh insights would have been developed if the literature were shown to be “incorrect, 
overly simplistic or only partially explains” the phenomenon.57 On the other hand, if the 
literature is validated, then this policy field still benefits because extant views were 
shown to be substantiated by empirical data.58 
 
In the concluding part of this thesis, the results are used to formulate a series of policy 
recommendations to improve US interagency intelligence cooperation. The diagram 
below illustrates the diagnostic steps taken.  
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Notes: 1) Case X denotes presence of interagency cooperation between the NSA, CIA and FBI.  
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3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This chapter presented the methodology used in this thesis. Specifically, it described the 
type of data needed, how it was collected and analyzed. This chapter also mapped out the 
various diagnostic steps with grounded theory at the core.  
 
The next five chapters will examine CIA–NSA–FBI cooperation over five discrete time 
periods – pre-World War II, World War II, early Cold War, the height of the Cold War 
and the end of the Cold War. The following chapter examines US interagency 
intelligence cooperation prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 to establish the 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
US INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 











This chapter examines US interagency intelligence cooperation prior to the outbreak of 
World War II and assesses why vital information pointing to the attack at Pearl Harbor 
were never synthesized in time to give advance warning of the attack. But first, a brief 
historical overview of the FBI is provided so that the reader can have a better 
understanding of the Bureau as well as its standing within the broader US intelligence 
system. This is followed by an account of the circumstances that led to the creation in 
July 1941 of the Office of Coordinator of Information (OCOI) – the forerunner of today’s 
CIA – to oversee the vast US intelligence system and facilitate interagency cooperation. 
Still, vital intelligence information was squirreled away by various agencies and 
departments and bureaucratic squabbles were commonplace. In the end, that tenuous state 
of affairs culminated in the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. 
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4.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FBI 
 
When the OCOI was established, the FBI had been in existence for more than three 
decades and was by then considered a fairly well-established government institution (see, 
e.g., Kessler, 1993 & 2002; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007). Established in 1908 during Theodore 
Roosevelt’s presidency, the Bureau of Investigation (BOI) was originally intended to be a 
small investigative arm of the Department of Justice. 59  With just 34 agents at its 
inception, the Bureau’s jurisdiction expanded quickly when the Mann Act was passed in 
1910 (Kessler, 2003, pp. 9). At last, the so-called White Slave legislation made it legal 
for Bureau agents to conduct investigations across state lines.60 After a brief stint as the 
US Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau was finally renamed the “Federal Bureau of 
Investigation” in July 1935 so as to reflect its federal authority.61  
 
It is important to point out that the FBI was not given an intelligence remit at its 
inception; nor was it intended by its sponsors to be an intelligence apparatus. But as the 
US entered World War I in April 1917, the Wilson administration quickly realized that it 
needed a specialized intelligence service to conduct counterintelligence operations 
against German infiltrators.62 Subsequently, the Espionage Act was passed in June 1917 
                                                  
59 FBI History, “History of the FBI – Origins: 1908 – 1910”. URL: 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/origins.htm  
60 FBI History, “History of the FBI 
Early Days: 1910 – 1921”. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/earlydays.htm  
61 FBI History, “Timeline of FBI History”. URL: 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historicdates.htm  
62 One of the best known cases of German sabotage in the US during World War I was the attack in 1916 
on a piece of New York Harbor called Black Tom Island. German spies, using large amount of explosives, 
was able to level a significant chunk of New York Harbor and lower Manhattan in the attack. The 
explosion, according to historians, was so powerful that it was felt as far away as Maryland. To this day, no 
one knew exactly how many perished in the attack (Millman, 2006). More than 80 years later, lower 
Manhattan would again be attacked, but this time, by al-Qaeda.     
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and the Bureau acquired the intelligence remit to spy on enemy aliens in the US.63 Nine 
years after it was created, the FBI finally acquired its intelligence remit and it has kept 
that brief along with its law enforcement remit ever since.   
 
With its newly-acquired intelligence remit, the FBI began mounting a series of 
intelligence operations against enemy aliens in the US.64  Moreover, the young man 
chosen to lead those operations would one day become the FBI Director – his name was 
J. Edgar Hoover.65 Using skills he had honed while working as a clerk at the US Library 
of Congress, Hoover instructed his Bureau agents to compile secret dossiers on enemy 
aliens in the US (Kessler, 2002, pp. 15). Consequently, the Bureau would end up 
maintaining dossiers on more than 450,000 aliens and using the information contained in 
these secret files, the FBI would deport or jail foreign aliens for suspected espionage 
activities (Kessler, 2003, pp. 16; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 69). According to the FBI, its 
counterintelligence investigations were so successfully that German espionage activities 
on US soil “essentially evaporated” by the end of World War I.66  
 
FBI activities during World War II would further substantiate its status as an intelligence 
agency.  
 
                                                  
63 FBI History, “History of the FBI – Early Days: 1910 – 1921”. URL: 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/earlydays.htm  
64 FBI History, “History of the FBI – The Lawless Years: 1921 – 1933”. URL: 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/lawless.htm 
65 Ibid 
66 FBI Headline Archive, “A Byte out of History – 1916 “Black Tom” Bombing Propels Bureau into 
National Security Arena.” URL: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/july04/blacktom073004.htm  
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During the mid-1930s, FDR became troubled by the prospect that social unrests in 
America at the time could, in some ways, be linked to Fascism and Communism.67 So in 
June 1939, according to a memo written by FDR himself, the president authorized the 
FBI to handle “the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage 
matters”. 68  The FBI was again given the presidential mandate to conduct domestic 
intelligence operations. But because the FBI’s domestic spying activities had no legal 
basis, FDR had also in essence, renewed the Bureau’s status as an intelligence apparatus 
of the state (Kessler, 2003, pp. 57). 
             
With FDR’s authorization, the FBI swiftly returned to the World War I practice of 
domestic surveillance. Using local police, informants and illegal wiretaps 69 , Bureau 
agents from the newly-created General Intelligence Division (GID) began compiling 
secret dossiers on suspected Axis sympathizers and spies in the US (Kessler, 2003, pp. 
60).70 So thorough was this domestic surveillance program that within 72 hours after 
Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941, Bureau agents were able to round up 
close to four thousands Japanese, German and Italian aliens for suspected espionage and 
subversive activities (Kessler, 2003, pp. 69). In fact, FBI Director Hoover was so 
confident of the thoroughness of his domestic surveillance program that he even 
                                                  
67 FBI Headline Archive, “A Byte Out of History: 70 Years Ago Rise of Fascism leads to FBI Casework.” 
May 7, 2004. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may04/050704amernazi.htm. See also Warner, M., “The 
COI Came First.” CIA/CSI, Mar 15, 2007.   
68 Confidential memo from FDR to the US Secretary of State, dated Jun 26, 1939. CIA/CSI, URL: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/3.gif  
69 The passage of the Federal Communications Act in 1934 had already banned (under Section 605) the use 
of wiretaps (Kessler, 2002, pp. 65).  
70 The FBI’s domestic surveillance program at the time was already quite extensive; indeed, among those 
whom the FBI kept a close watch on was a young naval intelligence officer who would one day become the 
US president – his name was John Fitzgerald Kennedy (Riebling, 2002, pp. 50).   
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disapproved of US military plans to imprison the entire Japanese-American population 
living in the West Coast.71  
 
Meanwhile, FDR also became concerned with external threats coming from south of the 
Rio Grande (Jeffrey-Jones, 2007, pp. 113 – 114). At the time, South America was home 
to a sizable number of German and Japanese descendants that could provide Germany 
and Japan with a rich hotbed of sympathizers once World War II broke out.72 In the 
absence of a dedicated foreign intelligence service – the OCOI would be formed only a 
year later – FDR had few choices but to turn to the FBI and authorizing it to extend its 
intelligence operations into South America.73 For the first time in FBI history, the Bureau 
had received an intelligence remit from the president to operate overseas – the country’s 
premier law enforcement agency had become a foreign intelligence apparatus – and for 
the next decade, the FBI was actually responsible not only for law enforcement and 
domestic security intelligence in the US but also for foreign intelligence in Latin 
America.74 In 1947, the CIA was established and as a result of which, the FBI was forced 
to surrender its Latin America domain to the newly-created Agency.75    
   
                                                  
71 See also FBI History, “History of the FBI – WWII Period: Late 1930's – 1945”. 
72 FBI History, “History of the FBI – WWII Period: Late 1930's – 1945”. 
73 FBI Headline Archive, “A Commemorative WWII History Series 
Part 2: The FBI's Special Intelligence Service, 1940-1946” Jun 24, 2005. URL: 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june05/history062405.htm  
74 Even though the FBI wielded tremendous powers (not unlike that of the KGB) at the time, Hoover 
nonetheless also managed to (through the media) cultivate a knightly image of his G-men that made the 
Bureau immensely popular with the American public. That squeaky-clean image of the G-men was 
especially useful when Bureau agents were conducting investigations. Indeed, members of the public were 
known to be more than happy at the time to provided information to their ‘white knight’ FBI interviewers 
(Kessler, 1993, 2003; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007).  
75 Affidavit & testimony of Papich, Sam, J., Mar 5, 1975, pp. 6, Rockefeller Commission, NARA RIF# 
157-10011-10079. 
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As part of the FBI’s expanded remit, a specialized foreign intelligence unit – the Special 
Intelligence Service (SIS) – was established by the Bureau in 1940 to counter enemy 
espionage activities in South America. 76  The Bureau began sending undercover SIS 
agents into South America to collect intelligence on Axis spies or infiltrate their 
networks.77 After a halting start, SIS agents did eventually master the spy trade and were 
able to render, with the help of local police and intelligence services, South America 
inoperable for Axis spies, according to FBI documents.78  
 
In South America, Bureau agents also demonstrated that they were indeed sophisticated 
enough to suppress their inclinations to make premature arrests in order to secure broader 
intelligence goals. In fact, as opposed to alerting local police or making arrests 
themselves, Bureau agents would occasionally suborn Axis spies into working for the 
FBI. Through these double agents, the FBI would then feed bogus information back to 
the enemy. 79  In at least one case, Bureau agents even fed genuine information on 
America’s massive production capabilities back to the Abwehr (Nazi foreign intelligence 
service) 80  through a double agent in an attempt to demoralize the Nazi leadership 
(Jeffrey-Jones, 2007, pp. 113).  
 
                                                  
76 Ibid 
77 FBI History, “History of the FBI WWII Period: Late 1930's – 1945.”  
78 FBI Headline Archive, “A Commemorative WWII History Series 
Part 2: The FBI's Special Intelligence Service, 1940-1946” Jun 24, 2005.  
79 FBI Headline Archive, “ND-98: The Case of the Long Island Double Agent.” Feb 27, 2004. URL: 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/feb04/nd022704.htm  
80 Under Hitler, the Abwehr was responsible for foreign intelligence whereas the Gestapo was responsible 
for domestic intelligence.   
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My research also revealed that the FBI actually managed to establish a foothold in signals 
intelligence during World War II – a discipline which has never been known to be the 
FBI’s area of specialty.  
 
According to FBI documents, the Bureau built its first major SIGINT facility in Maryland 
in October 1942 to monitor and intercept Nazi radio communications.81 Unknown to the 
Germans then, Bureau cryptanalysts had already broken the German code and with the 
Maryland facility, the FBI was intercepting and reading a significant chunk of Nazi radio 
communications. Masquerading as Nazi spies, Bureau agents even transmitted bogus 
messages back to the German high command. Due to the success of that operation, the 
FBI would eventually build up to 30 signals interception facilities throughout the Western 
Hemisphere to target Axis radio communications.82  
 
In spite of the Bureau’s SIGINT achievements, no sign of close collaboration between the 
FBI and the US military in the realm of signals intelligence could be found; in fact, NSA 
records pointed to frequent clashes between the two during World War II (Johnson, 1995, 
pp. 108).83 If operating in the same discipline facilitates interagency cooperation (see 
Section 2.3.3) then one should have witnessed close cooperation between the FBI and US 
military signals intelligence units during that time period. But that was not the case.  
 
                                                  
81 See also FBI Headline Archive, “A Byte Out of History – Not So Public Radio: Gathering Intelligence 
Over the Airwaves in WWII.” Oct 13, 2004. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct04/radio101304.htm 
82 Ibid 
83 At the time, the War and Navy Departments maintained separate cryptologic units that were the 
precursors of the NSA. In particular, the Army controlled the Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) whereas 
the Navy operated a unit known as OP-20-G (see, e.g., Smith, 1993).       
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The evidence obtained for this thesis indicates that the clashes were linked to the FBI 
encroaching on the exclusive domain of the military. Protective of its domain, the 
military simply refused to share its long-established responsibility for signals intelligence 
with the FBI. As it happened, feuding between the military and FBI was the norm during 
the war and it was not unusual for meetings between Bureau and military officials to 
degenerate into shouting matches (Smith, 1993). The bureaucratic clashes between the 
FBI and the military became so ferocious that the Roosevelt administration subsequently 
had to divide up the signals intelligence domain into separate geographical areas of 
responsibility so that the FBI and the military would be in charge of different parts of the 
world. Unfortunately, that did not put an end to the interagency feuding. 84  Hence, the 
problem was not limited to a piece of intelligence real estate but encompassed 
responsibility for signals intelligence as well. In other words, the FBI and the military 
were not simply fighting over the right to conduct signals intelligence operations in 
certain parts of the world but over responsibility for signals intelligence as well. As 
further proof of this, the internecine squabbles between them subsided only after the war 
– when the FBI finally ended its foray into the realm of foreign signals intelligence 
(Johnson, 1995, pp. 108).       
 
Taken together, the evidence from the early 20th century does provide strong support for 
the case that the FBI was at least no amateur to intelligence work even though it was 
originally established as an agency to uphold the law. If anything, intelligence work has 
always been an integral part of the FBI. From a historical perspective, the FBI has 
“always been both a law enforcement and an intelligence agency [and] you simply can’t 
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neutralize national security and criminal threats — whether terrorist groups or spy 
networks or gangsters — without intelligence,” as FBI historian John Fox notes.85 Even 
though there were times when the inclination was to make arrests and secure convictions, 
Bureau agents demonstrated that they did have the capacity to operate like spies – 
gathering intelligence, feeding the enemy disinformation and even doubling enemy 
agents to work for the Bureau – in order to secure broader intelligence objectives (see 
Diagram 4.1). 
  
So why is the FBI often seen as a ‘cop’ as opposed to a ‘spy’ in spite of its active 
involvement in intelligence matters? 
 
In some respects, the FBI wants to be seen as a ‘cop’ and not a ‘spy’. As Athan Theoharis 
notes, the FBI had long abandoned a “strictly law enforcement approach” when the 
Bureau began conducting intelligence and espionage investigations in the mid-1930s 
(Theoharis, 2007, pp. 5). Aggressive intelligence-gathering methods such as break-ins, 
bugs, phone taps and mail-opening have always been used by Bureau agents, according to 
the eminent historian. At the same time, the FBI also cultivated an image of an “apolitical 
law enforcement agency” for itself in order to mask its (sometimes questionable) 
intelligence activities. Indeed, contrary to media reports of the FBI being a reactive 
agency – i.e., one that reacts after the fact – the Bureau has for many years actively 
targeted Americans and foreigners in the US for intelligence purposes.86 In short, Bureau 
                                                  
85 Comments made by Dr. John Fox. See FBI Headline Archive, “A Byte out of History – Our Intel 
Operations over the Years.” Aug 25, 2006. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/aug06/intelops082506.htm    
86 Ibid 
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interests were better served when the American public saw the FBI as an agency that 
enforced the law instead of one that spied on them.  
 













Yet, even though the FBI was evidently competent in the intelligence realm, FBI-CIA 
cooperation was limited especially in the early years of the CIA. In fact, it is a matter of 
public record that the FBI did not work closely with the precursors of the CIA – the 
OCOI – even though the two agencies were tasked with the collection and analysis of any 
information, foreign or domestic, pertaining to US national security. Certainly, the FBI 
was as much an intelligence apparatus as the OCOI was since the former had been 
conducting intelligence operations for more than two decades by the time the latter was 
established in 1941. However, even though no ‘spy vs. cop’ dichotomy was evident at the 
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why that was the case, one must first be aware of the historical context that led to the 
creation of the OCOI. 
 
4.3 THE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION 
 
Longstanding problems between the FBI and CIA can be traced back to 1941 – the year 
the originator of the CIA – the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCOI) – was 
established. Encountering strong opposition from the FBI, the creation of the OCOI 
marked the beginning of a difficult and tumultuous relationship between the two 
agencies. According to CIA documents, two key reasons prompted FDR to establish the 
OCOI in July 1941 even though the US president had already authorized the FBI to 
conduct intelligence investigations at home and abroad.87  
 
The first was that as war loomed in Europe in the late 1930s, FDR saw the need for a 
more coordinated US intelligence apparatus in case the US were ever drawn into another 
major war in Europe. At the time, the US intelligence apparatus was plagued by incessant 
interagency feuding and its constituents largely operated with little coordination. 
Frustrated with that state of affairs, FDR finally decided to establish the OCOI in the 
hope that a central coordinating authority would at least end internecine squabbles 
between fractious US intelligence agencies. Whoever was appointed to head that new 
office as Coordinator of Intelligence (COI) was supposed to “sort out the mess”. 88 
Furthermore, the OCOI was tasked to “collect and analyze all information and data” 
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pertaining to US national security and then consolidate them into a coherent picture for 
the US president and his officials. The COI would also have exclusive rights to brief the 
US president on all intelligence matters. 89  In other words, as opposed to having 
intelligence chiefs from various agencies briefing the US president separately, the COI 
would synthesize their reports and present one perspective to the White House. To 
facilitate the COI’s task, he would have access to all intelligence in US possession. At 
last, it seemed an overarching authority responsible for the vast US intelligence apparatus 
was in place.    
 
However, because FDR had already authorized the Bureau to conduct foreign intelligence 
operations less than two years before, the newly-created OCOI was required to share 
jurisdiction with the FBI in that realm. Apparently, the president did not have the 
gumption to alienate the powerful FBI by repealing its foreign intelligence brief; in the 
end, it was FDR’s successor – Truman – that terminated the FBI’s role in the foreign 
intelligence domain.90 Moreover, since the OCOI was responsible for all intelligence 
pertaining to US national security, it was all but certain that the newly-created office 
would assume an active role in the domestic intelligence realm as well (see, e.g., Downes, 
1953). Hence, for a brief period in US intelligence history, the precursor of the CIA and 
the FBI actually co-operated in the areas of foreign and domestic intelligence. Yet, close 
cooperation between the two never did materialize.  
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The second factor that prompted FDR to create the OCOI was the so-called British hand; 
indeed, it is believed that the Churchill government might have influenced FDR’s 
decision. Presumably, a pair of British intelligence officials, Admiral John H. Godfrey 
and William Stephenson, met and ultimately convinced FDR of the need for a 
coordinator of US intelligence. Being the only country left standing in the way of Nazi 
domination in Europe, the UK was desperate and the British sought the creation of the 
OCOI so that the FDR administration could better understand the dire consequences if 
Britain were to fall. 91   
 
According to CIA documents, the OCOI was officially created on July 11, 1941, and a 
New York lawyer, William “Wild Bill” Donovan, was appointed as the first COI. 
Furthermore, because the OCOI was not part of any federal department, it became the 
nation’s first and only non-departmental intelligence agency. Crucially, its creation also 
marked the genesis of the CIA.92  
 
Besides inheriting intelligence elements from the ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) and 
G-2 (army intelligence), the OCOI earnestly recruited those Americans who had traveled 
abroad or were well-educated in international affairs. 93  Mirroring Donovan’s own 
background94, OCOI recruits were often culled from Ivy-League universities and top-
notch law firms (see, e.g., Winks, 1987; Riebling, 2002). In fact, the ranks of this new 
agency swelled with so many socially prominent persons and luminaries that its acronym 
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was also referred to as “Oh So Social” when it was renamed the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) in 1942.  
 
Nevertheless, even though the OCOI was established to put an end to internecine 
squabbles between fractious US intelligence agencies, its creation was met with fierce 
opposition from the FBI as well as the intelligence services of the Department of State 
and the War Department. 95  The FBI, in particular, fought hard to prevent the 
establishment of the OCOI because the Bureau foresaw that it would have to share its 
prized domestic and Latin America domains with Donovan’s outfit (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, 
pp. 107 – 110). The FBI’s opposition worked to some extent and the OCOI (as well as its 
successor, the OSS) was largely confined to operating in Europe, Asia and Africa until 
the end of World War II.96 But the FBI’s opposition also poisoned its relation with the 
OCOI and any room for cooperation between the two agencies simply evaporated. 
Indeed, after it was established, the OCOI did not work with the FBI opting instead to act 
unilaterally even when operating in Bureau domains. In one case, the lack of cooperation 
between the two agencies culminated in one of the most devastating intelligence failure in 
US history – the Pearl Harbor attack.      
 
4.4 CASE I: THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 
 
Even today, the question of whether the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, could 
be prevented continues to be hotly debated (see, e.g., Stinnett, 2001; Gillon, 2011). 
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Central to the view that the attack could not be prevented is Wohlstetter (1962). 
According to the noted historian, US intelligence could not have provided advance 
warning of the attack because it was impossible to make out the few “signals” or vital 
clues pointing to an imminent attack from the overabundance of “noise” or irrelevant 
information that flooded the US intelligence system at the time (Wohlstetter, 1962, pp. 2 
– 3 & 228). Grossly overloaded with information, US intelligence was simply unable to 
analyze and synthesize what it had in its possession. Taken to extremity, Wohlstetter’s 
conclusion implies that intelligence collection and analysis are meaningless since 
surprises are inevitable. Nevertheless, Wohlstetter’s conclusion still appeals to some 
researchers in spite of its nihilistic tone primarily because her work remains one of the 
most influential in this field (see, e.g., Layton et al, 1985; Marrin, 2004; Costello, 1982).  
 
The other spectrum of this debate is best characterized by Clausen (1992). 97  Using 
declassified information and witnesses not available to Wohlstetter, Clausen is able to 
demonstrate that “there was no valid reason for US forces to be surprised” (Clausen, 
1992, pp. 7 – 8). Indeed, the reason US forces at Pearl Harbor were surprised on 
December 7, 1941, was that the entire US system for coordinating and evaluating 
intelligence had malfunctioned; as a result, information pointing to the attack was 
squirreled away by various US government agencies and departments instead of being 
shared and synthesized into a coherent picture of an impending attack.98 In short, as 
opposed to Wohlstetter, Clausen is convinced that the surprise at Pearl Harbor was not 
inevitable. 
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Clausen’s finding is significant because it implies that if information held by various US 
intelligence elements were shared and synthesized, the course of history could have been 
radically different today. The question is: why was information pointing to an impending 
attack withheld instead of being shared when a synthesized picture could have made such 
a meaningful difference? 
 
4.4.1 “A DAY WHICH WILL LIVE IN INFAMY” 
         
In the early hours of December 7, 1941, more than 300 Japanese bombers carried out a 
surprise attack on US forces at Pearl Harbor.99 When the attack ended 2 hours later, 
Japanese bombers had crippled the entire US Pacific Fleet and killed more than 2000 US 
servicemen.100 America was literally bombed into World War II that day. The following 
day, in a speech given before the US Congress, FDR described December 7, 1941, as “a 
date which will live in infamy”.101  
 
Despite the impression given by FDR that the attack on Pearl Harbor was completely 
unforeseen, NSA documents did reveal that long before the Japanese attack, the US 
Army’s Signal Intelligence Service (SIS)102 – an antecedent of the NSA – had broken the 
Japanese diplomatic code in late 1940 (a whole year before the Pearl Harbor attack) and 
was reading Japanese diplomatic cables between Tokyo and its embassies around the 
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world. 103  Those diplomatic communications intercepts were given the codename 
“MAGIC” by the US War Departments and by monitoring MAGIC intercepts, the SIS 
was even able to provide advance warning of Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941 
(Bamford, 1983, pp. 59). Yet, even though the Americans had broken the Japanese 
diplomatic code and were reading Japanese communications almost as fast as Japanese 
diplomats were, the Americans were unable to stop the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor.104   
 
According to the NSA, in the early hours of December 7, 1941, American SIGINT 
personnel intercepted a coded message sent by Tokyo to its embassy in Washington 
instructing the Japanese ambassador to terminate all negotiations regarding a recent US 
trade embargo at 1.00pm Central Time the following day. The coded message also 
ordered the destruction of the embassy’s cryptographic equipment once the message had 
been received – an act which could only be interpreted as a declaration of war.105 By the 
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time the entire message (14 parts in all) was deciphered and translated, it was already 
9.00am in Washington and 3.30am in Hawaii where the entire US Pacific Fleet sat, 
oblivious to the impending attack.106 Although the decoded message was read by key US 
military and civilian leaders in Washington before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
took place, the warning was not received by the US Pacific Fleet until the attack was 
over.107    
 
As it turned out, even though US cryptanalysts had broken the Japanese diplomatic code 
and were reading enemy communications a full year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
very few within the US government actually had access to those intercepts.108 While it 
remains debatable whether MAGIC intercepts provided a clear indication of an 
impending attack on Pearl Harbor, there is no question that those intercepted Japanese 
diplomatic communications pointed to the distinct possibility of conflict between the US 
and Japan (see Appendix 7 for a sample of the so-called East-Wind Rain communication 
intercepted by the Americans prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor). Indeed,  while MAGIC 
intercepts did not point directly at an attack on Pearl Harbor at 8:00am on December 7, 
1941, communications (intercepted by the Americans) between Japanese officials in 
Washington and Tokyo just days before the attack hinted strongly at Japanese aggression 
if the US trade embargo imposed on Japan were not lifted.109 In the days immediately 
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preceding the attack, even FDR himself, according to information obtained for this thesis, 
became deeply concerned after reading MAGIC intercepts.110 
 
If Japanese war intentions were becoming increasingly apparent to Washington, why was 
it that those responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor were not warned? The answer to 
this question was found in a CIA archival document which documented the Agency’s 
own assessment of the Pearl Harbor attack.  
 
According to this CIA document, MAGIC intercepts were as a matter of policy routinely 
withheld from key US decision-makers; in fact, MAGIC was so closely guarded a secret 
that even Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-chief of US Pacific forces at Pearl 
Harbor, and General Short, the commander responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor 
had only very limited access to those intercepts.111  Even within Washington, only a 
handful of officials actually knew of the existence of those prized intelligence 
materials.112 
 
The main reason for such intense secrecy was of course to prevent the enemy from 
finding out that his codes had been broken; if that happened, the enemy would simply 
change his codes to render his coded messages unreadable again. The entire painstaking 
process of code-breaking would have to start from the beginning (see, e.g., Kahn, 1973; 
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Hinsley & Stripp, 1993). But the inevitable outcome of such intense secrecy was that no 
one within the vast US intelligence apparatus could access all the fragmentary clues 
already in US possession and synthesize them into a coherent picture of the impending 
attack. Sixty years later, that pattern would repeat itself in the 9/11 attacks.  
 
Besides the War Department, the FBI had also squirreled away vital information pointing 
to the Japanese attack. 
 
Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau had in fact in its possession, 
information pointing to a possible attack. According to noted historian Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones, FBI agents had placed the chancellor of the Japanese consulate in Honolulu, 
Tadashi Morimura, under surveillance and found out that not only was he the chief secret 
agent for Tokyo in that region but that he had also been supplying Tokyo with 
information on the locations of US targets at Pearl Harbor (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 
110). Sensing danger, Hoover asked the War Department to share sensitive Japanese 
communication intercepts with the FBI so that Bureau agents could more accurately 
assess Japanese intentions.  
 
But when that his request was rejected by the War Department, Hoover retaliated by 
suspending all FBI cooperation with US military intelligence units – which until then, 
had relied on the FBI to carry out civilian investigations on their behalf.113 Subsequently, 
information stopped flowing from the FBI to the military as the attack loomed. Hoover, 
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as it turned out, had cut off cooperation with the military at a critical moment. This was 
because a British double agent called Dusko Popov – codenamed “Tricycle” – had just 
passed on to the FBI instructions given to him by the German Abwehr ordering him to 
collect specific intelligence on Pearl Harbor (Popov, 1974; Masterman, 1972, pp. 196 – 
198; Winks, 1987, pp. 169 – 170).114 Since Japan was a close ally of Germany at the 
time, one can be confident that the information Popov had been tasked to collect would 
be shared between the two Axis countries. But even as that kind of intelligence 
information had no apparent value other than for targeting purposes, the FBI never shared 
what the double agent revealed with other US intelligence agencies or the War 
Department (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 110).115  
 
The information Popov gave to the FBI could have produced a more coherent picture of 
the impending Japanese attack if it had been shared with the OCOI (Riebling, 2002, pp. 
27). Indeed, when combined with information held by the OCOI, the information 
provided by Popov would appear less as the Abwehr collecting general intelligence on 
America and more like a hostile power gathering targeting information in preparation for 
war. This was because a lone OCOI agent operating in Southeast Asia had obtained 
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information that a large Japanese naval fleet had left its base on the Japanese island of 
Kyushu and set sailed for an unknown destination to “do something soon”.116 Meanwhile, 
another OCOI operative had also been informed by Japanese special envoy, Saburo 
Kurusu, in a secret meeting that “hotheads could upset the applecart at anytime” (see 
Appendix 7 for a sample of Kurusu’s communications with Tokyo prior to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor; Kurusu clearly knew that war plans were being set in motion by Tokyo).117 
With tensions between the US and Japan reaching boiling point over a recent US trade 
embargo, OCOI analysts were convinced that a major Japanese offensive in the Pacific 
was in the making.118 The question then for OCOI analysts was not whether the Japanese 
would attack the US but where.119 But despite the dire implications, the COI did not pass 
on that information to any other US intelligence agencies too. Even today, it is not 
entirely clear why Donovan – whose responsibility was to direct information flow – 
failed to share that piece of critical intelligence.  
 
So that was the messy state of affairs between various US intelligence agencies prior to 
the Pearl Harbor attack. The entire US system for coordinating and evaluating 
intelligence had broken down as tensions between the US and Japan reached a 
breakpoint. The SIS had broken the Japanese code and was reading enemy 
communications but was barred from sharing those intercepts with the FBI and OCOI by 
the War Department. Meanwhile, the FBI had in its possession information indicating 
enemy hostile intentions toward Pearl Harbor but chose not to share it. The COI also did 
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not share crucial information with other agencies for reasons that remain a mystery. In the 
end, no one within the vast US intelligence community synthesized the pieces of 
information already held by these agencies into a coherent picture of the impending 
Japanese attack. This failure to exchange intelligence information culminated in one of 
the greatest intelligence failures in US history which in hindsight, might have been 
prevented if there had been close interagency cooperation (see Diagram 4.2).  
 
DIAGRAM 4.2: CHAIN OF INTELLIGENCE-RELATED EVENTS LEADING UP 
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The following section examines the key factors that prevented US intelligence agencies 
and departments from exchanging information prior to the attack. 
 
4.5 KEY FACTORS LIMITING US INTERAGENCY 
COOPERATION PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR  
 
A number of important factors limited interagency cooperation in this case. Ranging from 
overly-stringent secrecy requirements to rancorous interpersonal relations to bureaucratic 
tensions, these factors precluded informational exchange within a system that was 
supposed to evaluate and collate fragmentary intelligence information into a coherent 
picture for US policy-makers.  
 
Notably, relation between the FBI and OCOI was decidedly rancorous prior to the Pearl 
Harbor attack and that in turn severely limited any room for interagency cooperation and 
information sharing. Indeed, according to information evaluated for this thesis, there were 
compelling bureaucratic and individualized reasons for the two agencies to shun each 
other.   
 
First of all, the atmosphere for cooperation was poisoned because FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover had opposed the creation of the OCOI. To protect Bureau turf, Hoover had 
sought to destroy the OCOI even before that office was created. On the bureaucratic 
front, the OCOI was a threat to the FBI because many of their responsibilities 
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overlapped. 120  Since the OCOI would be responsible for collecting all information 
pertaining to national security, it was almost a forgone conclusion that that office would 
operate in domains belonging to the Bureau. Convinced that FBI domain would be 
violated by the OCOI, Hoover vehemently opposed its creation (Riebling, 2002). Even 
though Hoover failed to bring to a halt the formation of the OCOI, his objection 
nevertheless poisoned the Bureau’s relation with that office. After all the FBI Director 
did attempt to eliminate the OCOI before it was established.  
 
FBI-OCOI relation never improved after the latter was formed. Among other things, 
Donovan authorized a series of operations on Bureau turf which served to confirm 
Hoover’s earlier suspicions that Bureau domain would be threatened by the OCOI. 
According to Riebling (2002), Donovan’s outfit began running intelligence operations on 
FBI turfs – specifically, Latin America and the Continental US – when it became 
operational. In a sense, Donovan was forced into that predicament. Cut off from the flow 
of intelligence by other US intelligence agencies, the COI had no choice but to order his 
operatives to act unilaterally. Furthermore, encroaching on the Bureau’s domain was 
almost unavoidable because certain types of intelligence information that was essential to 
the OCOI’s work – such as diplomatic cables sent between foreign embassies in the US 
and their home countries – could only be procured within the Bureau’s domains 
(Downes, 1953).  
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Nevertheless, such encroachment onto Bureau domain prompted Hoover to retaliate 
against Donovan’s outfit. Whenever the FBI Director learned of such an incursion, he 
would order his agents to sabotage that operation and the tit-for-tat only aggravated 
tensions between the two agencies (Downes, 1953; Riebling, 2002). Under such hostile 
conditions, one can only conclude that close interagency cooperation was all but 
impossible.     
 
On the personal level, relation between FBI Director Hoover and COI Donovan was not 
particularly smooth either. Even though Hoover and Donovan were both deeply 
ambitious Washington old-hands, the two men were also radically different in terms of 
background and lifestyle.121 According to FBI documents on Donovan, the COI was an 
adventure-seeker, a World War I war hero, a graduate of Columbia Law School, a 
renowned New York corporate lawyer, and a prominent socialite.122 Hoover was, by 
contrast, pretty much a loner123, a clerk for the US Library of Congress during World War 
I, a graduate of the more banal George Washington University, a deskbound Washington 
bureaucrat for much of his career124 and allegedly, a homosexual125 (Kessler, 2011, pp. 
36; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Sullivan, 1979; Riebling, 2002). Riebling (2002), in particular, 
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sees this character, background and lifestyle difference between Hoover and Donovan as 
a powerful source of discord between them.   
 
To be sure, the two men were also bitter rivals aside from their differences in personality, 
background and lifestyle (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 119). The fact was that Hoover 
plotted from the beginning to contain the influence of the COI while Donovan schemed 
to expand it, often at the expense of the FBI (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Downes, 1953). 
Hoover had certainly sought to block the formation of the OCOI while Donovan, on the 
other hand, disregarded established domains by authorizing operations on Bureau turf. 
The FBI and OCOI might have maintained close cooperation if Hoover and Donovan had 
enjoyed a more collegial relationship since iterated interactions have been found to 
promote cooperation (Axelrod, 1984, pp. 125 – 126). But because the two chiefs were on 
bad terms, close cooperation was nearly impossible.      
 
More broadly though, limited informational exchange between the OCOI and the FBI 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor can also be explained by the fact that Donovan’s outfit 
maintained lax security practices. The OCOI, to put it bluntly, simply could not be trusted 
with important secrets. This is confirmed in a declassified FBI file which catalogued 
numerous aspects of Donovan’s personal life.126 In this once-secret FBI file, valuable 
information pertaining to the COI as well as his outfit can be found.127 As it turned out, 
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the FBI had kept a close tab on Donovan and uncovered personal details of the COI 
which indicated that he led a liberal and slapdash lifestyle. 
 
For instance, Donovan’s carelessness led him to misplace secret documents in a 
Bulgarian nightclub 128 ; even worse, it was discovered later that Donovan’s secret 
documents had been stolen by Nazi agents (Riebling, 2002, pp. 491, endnote 29). 
Donovan’s laissez-faire personality even led him to befriend a suspected Nazi agent 
called John Perdicari (Riebling, 2002, pp. 29). More incredible, Donovan’s confidential 
assistant – a man named Duncan C. Lee – would later turn out to be a Soviet spy (Haynes 
et al, 2009, pp. 314 – 317). In sum, the COI himself constituted a security risk in a 
business which demands secrecy.129 
 
Admittedly, beyond simply networking, Donovan probably saw his own association with 
an enemy spy as a necessary means to procure intelligence (Riebling, 2002, pp. 30). After 
all, an enemy spy could prove to be extremely valuable. If an enemy spy were to defect 
later, he could bring to the other side a treasure trove of enemy intelligence. Even if an 
enemy spy did not defect, there was still the chance that he could be suborned into 
becoming a double agent. But if those two scenarios failed to materialize, an enemy spy 
could still be kept under close surveillance to study his modus operandi. Therefore, it 
made sense, from the perspective of securing broader intelligence goals, to establish and 
maintain informal contacts with enemy agents. Donovan, it is not inconceivable, was 
                                                  
128 FBI FOIA, Electronic Reading Room, “William J. Donovan” Document Part 2c, pp. 73, dated Jan 26, 
1941. URL: http://foia.fbi.gov/donovan/donovan2c.pdf 
129 FBI FOIA, Electronic Reading Room, “Venona” Document Part 01, pp. 49, dated May 23, 1952. URL: 
http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf  
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motivated primarily by that imperative when he became a very good friend of 
Perdicari.130  
 
But of course, the reality was much harsher and the FBI definitely perceived Donovan to 
be a serious security risk more than a skilled procurer of information.131 For all the FBI 
knew, given Donovan’s predilection for socializing and slapdash lifestyle, the COI might 
have unwittingly given away US secrets to enemy agents while he was inebriated 
(Riebling, 2002, pp. 491, endnote 29). Indeed, according to Riebling (2002, pp. 29 – 30), 
Perdicari did appear to know a good deal about Donovan’s travel itinerary to Europe. 
Most disconcerting of all, Donovan was seen to be a loose canon even by his own 
security officers (Lovell, 1963, pp. 217).  
   
Given the evidence pointing to Donovan’s indiscretions, it is clear that the FBI’s decision 
to withhold information from his outfit was prompted by the COI’s apparent lack of 
respect for sound security practices. Losing secret documents is inexcusable in the spy 
trade and Donovan’s fledgling spy agency plainly did not maintain strict security 
protocols to protect US secrets. If anything, Hoover must have presumed then that 
sharing secret information with the COI would almost certainly jeopardize the FBI’s own 
intelligence operations. This is because an unintended outcome of informational 
exchange is that the process tends to reveal to the recipient agency sensitive methods and 
sources used by the originating agency. If the recipient agency is insecure, then it is not 
                                                  
130 Ibid 
131 Indeed, the CIA traitor Aldrich Ames would make use of his informal contacts with the Soviets to hand 
over to his KGB handlers bags of US secret documents as the Cold War was coming to an end (Wise, 1995; 
Weiner, Johnston & Lewis, 1995). So it seems that establishing and maintaining informal contacts with 
enemy spies does carry certain risks as well.  
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only the shared information that is at risk but also sensitive secrets pertaining to the 
originating agency itself. As a case in point, the FBI would not have been able to share 
information provided by Dusko Popov with the OCOI without also revealing to that 
office the presence of a double agent in the Abwehr. If the Germans were to somehow 
learn of that leak through loose lips in the OCOI, Popov’s double-crossing career would 
almost certainly be cut short and the FBI would end up losing a source.     
 
Evidence of Hoover’s emphasis on secrecy can be found in a contemporaneous memo 
written by the FBI Director in 1940. According to that document, when the US Justice 
Department’s Neutrality Law Unit tried to gain access to Bureau intelligence reports, the 
FBI Director objected because turning over FBI confidential reports would increase the 
risk of “leaks” and endanger the lives and safety of FBI informants (if their identities 
were exposed).132 So operational secrecy was clearly something the FBI Director treated 
seriously and lax security practices at the OCOI simply made it impossible for the FBI to 
share intelligence with that office. Indeed, “with the distrust of Donovan’s outfit that 
existed because of his lax security, Hoover wouldn’t have passed him anything that was 
truly sensitive,” according to FBI historian Lawrence McWilliams.133  
 
Similarly, it was also fear of betrayal that prompted the War Department to withhold 
sensitive MAGIC intercepts from the FBI. After learning that the chancellor of the 
Japanese consulate in Honolulu had been supplying Tokyo with targeting information on 
                                                  
132 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to L.M.C. Smith, Chief, Neutrality Law Unit, 11/28/40. As cited in 
the Church Committee Report, Book II, The Growth of Domestic Intelligence: 1936 to 1976, Part B: 
Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936 – 1945, Section 6: Control by the Attorney 
General: Compliance and Resistance, Apr 26, 1976, pp. 12 
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Pearl Harbor, Hoover turned to the War Department for MAGIC intercepts so that the 
Bureau could better assess Japanese intentions (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 110). But the 
FBI Director’s request was denied because the War Department, according to evidence 
obtained for this thesis, opted to bottle up vital signals intelligence rather than risk the 
betrayal of a valuable source.134 The basic idea then was that a secret was less likely to be 
betrayed as long as it was made known to only a select few.135  
 
According to a CIA study on the Pearl Harbor attack, the breaking of the Japanese 
diplomatic code was a closely guarded secret at the time and very few within the US 
government actually had direct knowledge of the dramatic cryptanalytic breakthrough.136 
To protect that secret from being compromised, the War Department went to 
extraordinary lengths. Firstly, it introduced exacting compartmentalization measures such 
that only a few senior officials had full access to MAGIC materials.137 This stove-piping 
was meant to ensure that even if the enemy had a spy in Washington with access to 
MAGIC materials, he would only have access to snippets – not the complete view – of 
the cryptanalytic breakthrough. Secondly, MAGIC intercepts were as a rule withheld 
from commanders outside Washington to limit the risk of those materials being 
mishandled.138 If the enemy had a spy outside Washington, he would have almost no 
chance of coming across MAGIC materials. Thirdly, information gleaned from MAGIC 
intercepts had to be paraphrased or disguised as intelligence obtained through other 
                                                  
134 Johnson, T.R., “What Every Cryptologist Should Know About Pearl Harbor”, NSA FOIA, Sep 27, 2007.   
135 Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, “Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
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known intelligence methods – such as HUMINT – before being disseminated to other 
agencies or departments to protect the source of that information (Burrows, 1986).139  
 
The length at which the War Department went to in order to protect MAGIC underscores 
the value of that source. In fact, the measures taken to protect it were so exacting and 
inflexible that one might even be tempted to believe that the secret of the cryptanalytic 
breakthrough itself was more important than the information gleaned from it.140 Given 
how easy it was to lose that invaluable source – a simple code change by the enemy 
would immediately render his communications unreadable again – the fear of betrayal 
was definitely legitimate. To minimize that risk, it was only logical for the War 
Department to withhold MAGIC materials from untested users such as the FBI (Sims, 
2005, pp. 42).  
 
But in the end, the War Department’s decision to withhold MAGIC from the FBI also 
upset relations. As pointed out earlier, that decision prompted Hoover to suspend Bureau 
cooperation with the military as tensions between the US and Japan reached a breakpoint. 
The FBI Director’s response was not atypical since key decision-makers who find 
themselves excluded from the flow of vital information often have a tendency to become 
uncooperative (Sims, 2005, pp. 42). Sims’ analysis is also supported by eminent scholar 
Robert Jervis who observes that this kind of tit-for-tat could worsen over time especially 
                                                  
139 See also Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, “Investigation of the Pearl 
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if no higher authority were present to resolve the dispute in question.141 If left unchecked, 
such difficult behavior might even become institutionalized eventually.142 In the case of 
Pearl Harbor, the War Departments’ policy to protect sensitive secrets started a tit-for-tat 
which ended the collaborative relationship it had established with the FBI (see Diagram 
4.3). 
 
DIAGRAM 4.3: KEY FACTORS LIMITING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 























Lastly, it is also worth pointing out that the FBI was not the only civilian intelligence 
agency to be cut off from the flow of vital signals intelligence materials. The OCOI too 
was denied access to MAGIC materials by the War Department. Army Chief George C. 
Marshall, concerned over sloppy security practices at the OOI, ordered that Axis signals 
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intelligence be withheld from that office (Riebling, 2002, pp. 30). If the FBI, which was 
well-known for its tough discipline at the time, could not be trusted with MAGIC, then 
the odds of Donovan’s outfit – an agency thought to be compromised by enemy spies and 
communist sympathizers – securing access to the crown jewel of US intelligence was 
even more remote (Riebling, 2002, pp. 8 – 9).  
 
Set up to coordinate the factious US intelligence system, the OCOI ultimately failed in 
that regard for a number of reasons. Foremost was the fact that it could not be trusted 
with important secrets. Plagued by poor security, the OCOI was shunned by the very 
agencies and departments it was supposed to draw intelligence information from. 
Bureaucratic tensions between the OCOI and other agencies and departments also limited 
room for interagency cooperation. Of course, the OCOI’s standing within the US 
intelligence system would have been higher if it had been given greater authority to carry 
out its task. But that was not to be the case and as a result, the OCOI was essentially 
reduced to being one of the many agencies that constituted the US intelligence system. It 
did not become the first among equals but rather a less than equal in some respects. In the 
end, FDR’s vision of a central intelligence agency did not come into fruition before his 
death in April 1945. The responsibility of creating an agency to coordinate US 
intelligence would fall on FDR’s successor – Harry Truman.       
 
The following chapter continues with this investigation focusing on US interagency 
intelligence cooperation during World War II. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
US INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 










Despite the intelligence fiasco at Pearl Harbor, US intelligence agencies continued to 
shun cooperation during World War II. Even in the face of a common enemy, they would 
rather act unilaterally than join forces. This chapter examines why that was so. It also 
traces the transmutation of the OCOI into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) soon 
after the US entered the war. But the renamed office was – like its predecessor – shunned 
as an intelligence partner because it continued to be plagued by poor security. 
Meanwhile, relations between the FBI and the military deteriorated to the point where 
cooperation in the realm of signals intelligence was virtually non-existent during the war 
even though the former excelled in that discipline. This chapter assesses the key factors 
that precluded them from working together. By September 1945 when World War II 
finally ended, a cohesive US intelligence system remained as elusive as when that war 
first started six years before.      
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5.2 FORMATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
 
According to CIA account of its history, the United States’ entry into World War II 
prompted new thinking within the US government as to how the OCOI could support US 
military operations.143 The outcome was the transmutation of the OCOI into the OSS.  
 
In June 1942, the OCOI was officially renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
and Donovan managed to stay on to head the wartime precursor of the CIA in spite of his 
role in the Pearl Harbor intelligence fiasco. 144  The OSS’ remit was also expanded 
dramatically; on top of intelligence collection and analysis, it was now authorized to 
conduct covert operations – a remit that would last until today with the CIA.145 When 
FDR created the OCOI in July 1941, he had intended that agency to act primarily as a 
central repository of secrets; but with the US’ entry into World War II, Donovan’s outfit 
soon morph into a secret army. 146 Aside from intelligence work, the OSS was now 
required to fight a war.  
 
To satisfy the OSS’ demand for linguists, analysts and field operatives, Donovan began 
filling its ranks with fresh immigrants to the US. Russians, eastern Europeans and Asian 
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émigrés were all recruited (almost indiscriminately) into the ranks of the OSS.147 Not 
only did these first generation Americans bring with them intimate knowledge of foreign 
cultures and language skills, they also brought to the OSS their foreign identification 
papers and even traditional clothing for use by OSS operatives in infiltration operations 
(Wallace & Melton, 2008, pp. 7). Even notable scholars, some of whom were refugees 
before, were recruited to work for the OSS as either intelligence analysts or operatives 
(Winks, 1987; May, 2005).148    
 
However, in his mad scramble to create a secret army, Donovan also cut a few corners 
during the hiring process, according to CIA historian Michael Warner.149 Recruitment 
standards were idiosyncratic and background checks were carried out haphazardly, if at 
all (Peake, 1997; Winks, 1987, pp. 67). That soon created a security issue for the OSS 
because without adequate background checks, enemy spies could simply lie about their 
backgrounds to get into that outfit.  
 
Owing to its lax security practices, the OSS quickly came to be regarded by other US 
intelligence agencies as untrustworthy of important US secrets.150  In fact, the OSS’ 
acronym was even referred to derisively as either “Oh So Stupid” or “Oh So Socialist” 
(Winks, 1987, pp. 58). The former depiction was a sarcastic suggestion of the amateurish 
                                                  
147 FBI FOIA, Electronic Reading Room, “William J. Donovan” Document Part 2b, pp. 89, dated Jan 26, 
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practices of the OSS whereas the latter was a more serious reference to the large number 
of communists within the ranks of the OSS. 
  
To be fair, Donovan had deliberately recruited Communists into the OSS to secure their 
help with partisan resistance groups in Axis-occupied countries.151 But that also resulted 
in one of America’s most sensitive organizations having ideologues with murky national 
loyalties working from within. According to Haynes et al (2009), some of those dubious 
OSS hires did end up giving away US secrets to hostile governments. Specifically, a 
number of ethnic Chinese working for the OSS were found out later to have passed US 
secrets to communist China. 152  Meanwhile, other communist sympathizers like 
Donovan’s confidential assistant, Duncan C. Lee, gave away US secrets to the Soviets 
(Haynes et al, 2009). The exigencies of war probably necessitated the recruitment of 
dubious characters into the OSS but such a radical move also eroded the OSS’ credibility 
as a secure repository of US secrets in Washington.153      
 
To satisfy his outfit’s wartime demand for manpower and financial resources, Donovan 
began working closely with the War Department.154 In an astute move, Donovan brought 
the OSS under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thereby securing access to 
the War Department’s resources and support. With the military’s backing, the OSS’ ranks 
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grew rapidly with approximately three-quarters of its manpower consisting of military 
personnel seconded from the War Department while civilians made up the rest.155  
 
According to CIA historian Michael Warner, British intelligence also contributed to the 
development of the OSS by providing its personnel with training, expertise and 
information.156 In exchange, the British gained access to the relatively bountiful resources 
of the Americans which were then used to expand British operations abroad.157 It was a 
quid pro quo that benefited the Americans as well as the British.  
 
However, it is important to point out that a number of US government departments (such 
as the State Department, FBI and War Department) did not view the OSS’ partnership 
with British intelligence as a positive development. Certainly, there were fears that the 
OSS might eventually end up being controlled by the British so much so that it no longer 
served US interests (Jeffreys-Jones & Stafford, 2000, pp. 14). Even worse, the OSS might 
inadvertently betray sensitive US secrets to the British (see, e.g., Winks, 1987, pp. 367).  
 
Although Donovan sought to downplay the risk of British treachery, suspicion of the 
British still ran deep, even within the OSS itself. Indeed, while the Germans were openly 
referred to as “the enemy”, the British were quietly referred to as “treacherous friends” 
within the OSS (Winks, 1987, pp. 214). So while the OSS might have profited by 
cooperating with the British, its standing as a secure repository of US secrets was also 
eroded as a consequence. It is important to point out that an intelligence agency’s 
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standing as a secure organization directly affects whether that agency will be given 
important information. More to the point, an intelligence agency will find itself cut off 
from the flow of information if there is a strong possibility that it will mishandle sensitive 
information. Indeed, no intelligence agency will risk jeopardizing its own sources by 
sharing sensitive information with one that cannot be trust to keep a secret (Chesterman, 
2006, pp. 19). This is especially true in the case of untested users since there is no basis 
or history on which to evaluate how they might handle shared information (Sims, 2005, 
pp. 42). As the War Department’s handling of MAGIC intercepts illustrates, the odds of 
information sharing materializing is even more remote when the intelligence is derived 
from a highly-prized source (see Section 4.5).  
 
5.3 INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WITH THE OSS  
 
During the war, the OSS mounted a series of covert operations against Axis enemies. 
According to CIA documents, OSS operatives were routinely dropped behind enemy 
lines for a variety of missions. Aside from intelligence collection, OSS operatives 
organized, trained and armed local resistance groups, established covert networks to 
rescue Allies pilots who were shot down, and also carried out guerilla raids on the 
enemy.158 As the war escalated, the OSS grew in influence and eventually became active 
in almost every major theater of war (except in the Pacific where General Douglas 
MacArthur was in command).159 The OSS was barred from operating in the Pacific for 
several reasons. General MacArthur wanted to maintain exclusive control of that theater 
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of war but he also saw the OSS as a bunch of amateurish war fighters. Supporters of 
Donovan also insist that MacArthur’s decision was influenced by the general’s own 
personal jealousy of Donovan. Accordingly, MacArthur never did get over the fact that it 
was Donovan and not him who had been awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism in 
World War I even though MacArthur had been Donovan’s superior during that war 
(Chambers, 2008, pp. 379 – 380).160 On top of this issue, my research also revealed that 
cooperation between the OSS and other US intelligence agencies and departments was 
limited during the war.  
 
Like its predecessor, the OSS was denied full access to prized Axis signals intelligence 
by the War Department.161 According to CIA historian Michael Warner, the OSS was 
completely cut off from Japanese (MAGIC) intercepts and managed to secure only 
limited access to German (ULTRA) intercepts – mainly via the British – even though it 
was under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 162 But it was not as if the OSS 
had little use for these enemy signals intelligence; on the contrary, full access to Axis 
signals intercepts would have aided OSS’ operations tremendously. Through careful 
analysis of ULTRA intercepts, OSS officers would have been able to determine whether 
the German High Command had been taken in by the bogus information sent out by OSS 
double agents. Since the Germans were convinced that their cipher system (codenamed 
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ENGIMA by the Allies) was unbreakable – when in reality, it had been broken by Allied 
cryptanalysts – all sorts of sensitive Nazi communications were being sent via the 
ENIGMA. By analyzing ULTRA intercepts, Allied intelligence was more or less able to 
gauge whether the enemy had been taken in by Allied disinformation. If not, at the very 
least, ‘more convincing’ bogus information could be sent accordingly. In any 
disinformation operation, this feedback process was absolutely crucial (Len & Ferris, 
2008, pp. 95). But because OSS officers had very limited access to enemy intercepts, it 
was extremely difficult for them to gauge the effectiveness of their disinformation 
operations. Largely as a consequence of this limitation, the OSS was marginalized during 
the war even by its British counterpart.163  
 
Meanwhile, the FBI was also conducting disinformation operations with little 
coordination with the OSS (Riebling, 2002, pp. 51 – 53). In Europe, the OSS was feeding 
the German High Command bogus information through its double agents while in the US 
and Latin America, the FBI was doing the same through its double agents. The problem 
however was that the two agencies did not synchronize the kind of information fed to the 
enemy. This was of course extremely dangerous, since the OSS and FBI could actually 
end up sending radically different or contradictory information to the enemy thereby 
arousing his suspicion over the authenticity of the information he had received. 
Notwithstanding the danger, the OSS and FBI still ran their disinformation operations 
with little coordination.164   
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5.4 CASE II: WHY THE OSS WAS DENIED SIGNALS 
INTELLIGENCE 
 
The main reason the War Department withheld Axis signals intelligence from the OSS 
was that security at the wartime spy agency was dismal. Specifically, Donovan’s mad 
rush to assemble a secret army had led the OSS chief to ignore or overlook sound security 
practices – standard procedures designed to minimize the risk of penetration by enemy 
spies. In the end, those security lapses basically reduced the OSS into an agency that was 
considered untrustworthy of important secrets.  
 
One of those security lapses was to recruit first generation émigrés into the ranks of the 
OSS. As a covert army operating around the world at the time, the OSS had an insatiable 
appetite for people with language and cultural skills. Intellectuals who could make sense 
of international developments were also in high demand. So turning to émigrés to satisfy 
the OSS’ manpower requirements seemed the natural solution. On top of their cultural 
awareness, they were also fluent in their native languages. Some were even leading 
intellectuals who had fled Nazi-occupied Europe. While their national loyalties might be 
somewhat murky, the exigencies of war perhaps necessitated the hiring of these first 
generation émigrés. But as expected, that hiring practice also opened up the OSS to 
penetration by enemy spies and the case of noted political scientist, Franz Neumann, best 
illustrates the grave consequences.   
 
An expert on National Socialism, Neumann had fled Germany when Hitler came into 
power and was later recruited by the OSS as an analyst. Even though he was already in 
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his forties when he joined the OSS, Neumann managed to climb rapidly up its ranks and 
by the time the war ended, had become the deputy chief of the OSS’ Research and 
Analysis branch. But there was more to Neumann’s secret life for he was later exposed as 
a Soviet spy. As it turned out, Neumann had given US secrets to the Soviets while he was 
working for the OSS (Haynes, Klehr & Vassiliev, 2009, pp. 307, 317 – 320 & 328). Even 
though the Soviet Union and the US were allies during the war, the fact that a Soviet 
mole could burrow so deep into the OSS and remain undetected for years indicates that 
there were serious security weaknesses at the wartime spy agency.165    
 
Another security lapse was to recruit Communists into the ranks of the OSS. The 
rationale behind that recruitment practice was certainly reasonable enough – the OSS 
needed people to deal with Communist partisan groups around the world and Americans 
with Communist inclinations were of course ideal candidates.166 But in hindsight, that 
recruitment practice also exposed the OSS to penetration by ideologues who were 
devoted to the Communist cause. The KGB in particular, exploited that security 
weakness effectively and managed to develop a significant number of sources within the 
OSS (Haynes et al, 2009, pp. 293).  
 
The most damaging KGB spy of all was perhaps Donovan’s personal assistant, Duncan 
C. Lee. Through Lee, the KGB came to know about OSS contacts with friendly 
intelligence services and partisan groups in Europe, diplomatic discussions between the 
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US and her allies, OSS analyses of the European situation, and even Donovan’s travel 
itinerary.167 With access to such an assortment of sensitive information, the KGB had for 
all intent and purposes struck an intelligence goldmine in Lee.  
 
Besides pro-Soviet ideologues like Lee, the OSS was also badly penetrated by 
Communist spies who were secretly working for China.168 Posing as OSS operatives, 
clerks or housekeeping staffs, these moles betrayed OSS operations in China to their 
Communist bosses.169 Table 5.1 below lists the names of ten high-ranking OSS officers 
that were later found out to be enemy spies. Notably, this list did not include the names of 
those low-ranking OSS personnel who betrayed US secrets to foreign governments. No 
record of their names exists today; otherwise, this list would undoubtedly be much 
longer.  
 
When one considers the OSS’ explosive growth in the early 1940s and the scope of its 
global operations, Donovan’s decision to hire émigrés and Communists seems logical. If 
Donovan had not hired them, the OSS would have been paralyzed. But Donovan could 
have at least compensated for any potential security breach by making certain that his 
outfit followed rigorous hiring standards and enforced thorough background checks. 
Unfortunately, that was not the case. Indeed, research conducted for this thesis revealed 
that OSS hiring standards could best be described as idiosyncratic. As an example, in a 
bizarre case that reflected the idiosyncrasy of OSS hiring practices, an applicant by the 
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name of Mary W. Price was turned down by the OSS for service due to her communist 
affiliation while her roommate, Helen Tenney, was hired even though she was closely 
associated with Price. Tenney was later exposed as a Soviet spy (Peake, 1997; Haynes et 
al, 2009). Furthermore, when it came to background checks, the OSS rarely conducted 
them. Even when background checks were carried out on new hires, the checks were 
conducted haphazardly (Peake, 1997; Wink, 1987, pp. 87).  
 
 
TABLE 5.1: NAMES OF KNOWN SPIES WITHIN THE OSS AND THEIR 




Name of Spy 
 
 
Duties in the OSS 
1. Duncan C. Lee Personal assistant to William Donovan 
2. Franz L. Neumann Deputy chief of R & A Branch 
3. Donald N. Wheeler COI and later, OSS officer on German matters 
4. Helen B. Tenney Officer in the Russian Division 
5. Maurice H. Halperin Head of the Latin America Division  
6. Jane Foster Zlatovski Officer on Indonesian matters 
7. Philip O. Keeney OSS librarian 
8. Julius J. Joseph Deputy chief of the Japanese Division 
9. Bella Joseph Officer in the photographic department 
10. Stanley Graze Officer in the Russian Division 
11. Alfred Tanz Operative in Europe 
12. Irving Goff Ran OSS missions in Italy and Africa 
 
Sources: Haynes, Klehr & Vassiliev, 2009; Warner, 2007. 
 
Together, the OSS’ security lapses reduced the wartime spy agency into an outfit that 
could not be trusted with important secrets. If anything, security was so poor then that 
CIA historian Michael Warner conceded that the OSS had earned for itself a “dismal 
security reputation” during the war.170 Given that dismal security standing, no one would 
                                                  
170 Warner, M., “X-2” CIA/CSI, Mar 15, 2007. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/art07.htm 
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contemplate sharing anything of importance with the OSS. While there is no indication 
that the War Department was actually aware of serious espionage activities within the 
OSS during the war, the War Department must have been aware of the OSS’ security 
lapses since the wartime spy agency was under its command.171 Moreover, according to 
noted historian Robin Winks, the War Department must have heard of the OSS’ security 
lapses since those breaches were known throughout Washington at the time (Winks, 
1987; Haynes et al, 2009, pp. 329).172 When one takes into account the prized-nature of 
Axis signals intelligence and the OSS’ dismal security standing, it becomes evident why 
the wartime spy agency was never granted full access to that intelligence product (Smith, 
1993, pp. 111). 
 
The second reason behind the War Department’s decision to withhold Axis signals 
intelligence from the OSS was that stringent security protocols had been put in place to 
limit the dissemination of signals intelligence to non-military users (Smith, 1993, pp. 111 
& 169). According to eminent historian Bradley F. Smith, it was a matter of War 
Department policy that all civilian and quasi-military (such as the OSS) organizations of 
the US government be denied access to Axis signals intelligence.173 The belief among 
War Department officials at the time was that if only military personnel had access to this 
prized intelligence product, the risk of betrayal would be kept to a minimum.174 In short, 
only military personnel could be trust with important secrets. But the War Department’s 
monopoly of Axis signals intelligence also had a lasting consequence.  
                                                  
171 Warner, M., “What Was OSS?” CIA/CSI, Mar 15, 2007 
172 See also, Warner, M., “X-2” CIA/CSI, Mar 15, 2007.  
173 Ibid 
174 Ibid 
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The War Department’s stringent security policy gave it tremendous power over 
information which other parts of the US government might find valuable. Indeed, the War 
Department wielded almost complete discretion over which agencies and departments 
could gain access to Axis signals intelligence. But the negative consequence of this 
monopoly on information was that those agencies or departments that were denied access 
might retaliate by withholding information in their possession or becoming 
uncooperative. This tit-for-tat was precisely what happened. According to NSA historian 
Thomas Johnson, after the CIA was reconstituted in 1947 (from remnants of the OSS), 
the Agency exacted revenge on the NSA “over a period of many years” for denying the 
OSS signals intelligence during World War II (Johnson, 1995, pp. 4 – 5).175 
 
So in a nutshell, requirement for secrecy can drive an agency or department to adopt 
stringent security measures that bar information even from legitimate users. Retaliation 
may ensue causing further restriction on the flow of information. The end result is an 
intelligence system whose constituents are factious and uncooperative.    
  
To prevent vital information from being bottled up, Robert Jervis recommends 
establishing an authority that can serve as a “referee” for all US intelligence agencies. 
The major advantage, according to the noted scholar, is that such an authority can act as 
an impartial advocate for those agencies and departments that had been unduly shut out 
of the flow of vital intelligence. At the very least, this authority can ensure that no agency 
                                                  
175 Johnson, T.R., “American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945 – 1989: Book 1: The Struggle for 
Centralization, 1945-1960”, NSA/FOIA, Released Jul 31, 2007. URL: 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/cold_war_i.pdf 
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or department would retain carte blanche over vital intelligence information and establish 
“a level playing field” for all.176 To a certain extent, the DNI position was created in 2004 
to fulfill that role (see Section 2.2.1). But with limited authority over the military aspect 
of US intelligence, the DNI remains hamstrung in many cases (see, e.g., Aid, 2012, pp. 
43 – 44).       
 
Lastly, the third reason that prompted the War Department to deny the OSS access to 
Axis signals intelligence was intimated by OSS veteran, Donald Downes (see Appendix 6 
for more information on Downes). Having served with the OSS in Washington and in 
various parts of the world from 1942 to 1945, Downes experienced firsthand how 
intelligence information was handled in that time period.177 According to him, valuable 
information produced during the war was often rendered useless when intelligence 
officials, out of an “overcautious” and “miserly” attitude, opted to hoard the information 
(Downes, 1953, pp. 28). Instead of being disseminated to other users, the information 
produced was locked up in a safe and soon forgotten. While Downes did not refer 
explicitly to Axis signals intelligence, his insight is certainly applicable to this case given 
his relevant experience as an OSS operative during World War II. Downes’ insight also 
begs the question of why intelligence officials were inclined to behave in such an ego-
centric manner. The answer lies in the way organizations in general work.  
 
According to organizational theorists, organizations must engage in the exchange of 
resources since no one can accumulate all that it needs to function properly (see, e.g., 
                                                  
176 Interview with Dr. Robert Jervis, SIPA – Columbia University, Jun 9, 2011.  
177 See, “Biographical History.” Donald Chase Downes Paper, Yale University Library. 
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Benson, 1975; Grandori, 1987). In order to flourish, an organization must amass surplus 
resources so that it can barter with another in subsequent time periods. This requirement 
for organizational survival means that (1) an organization will often attempt to 
accumulate as much resources as possible, and (2) an organization that manages to 
monopolize crucial resources will be able to maximize its influences on others (Salancik 
& Pfeffer, 1977). Although intelligence agencies belong to a somewhat peculiar form of 
organizations, there is no reason to doubt that they too seek to accumulate intelligence 
information either for subsequent bartering or as a form of asset that enhances their 
influences (Sims, 2005, pp. 42; Chesterman, 2006, pp. 19 – 20). Yet, this ego-centric 
conduct, while ensuring the survival and relevance of an intelligence agency, may also 
render valuable intelligence useless.   
 
DIAGRAM 5.1: KEY FACTORS LIMITING SIGINT EXCHANGES BETWEEN 
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Diagram 5.1 above summarizes the three major factors that precluded the War 
Department from sharing Axis signals intelligence with the OSS. The confluence of these 
factors simply made it impossible for the War Department to share signals intelligence 
with the OSS even though the wartime agency did have a legitimate right to that prized 
intelligence product. Nonetheless, the War Department was not the only departments to 
shun the OSS; the FBI too avoided working closely with Donovan’s outfit for reasons 
discussed below.     
 
5.5 CASE III: LIMITED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE OSS AND 
FBI DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
Cooperation between the OSS and FBI was virtually non-existent during the war. Even 
when some form of coordination was sensible, the two agencies shunned each other 
nevertheless. In at least one particular instance, one even set out to thwart the other’s 
operation. Based on research conducted exclusively for this thesis, the dismal state of 
affairs between the OSS and the FBI can be explained by three major factors – security 
concerns, bureaucratic tensions and rancorous interpersonal relations.  
 
Firstly, the OSS’ dismal security reputation precluded the FBI from cooperating with the 
wartime spy agency. This factor was most apparent in the area of double-agent 
disinformation operations – the deployment of double agents to deceive the enemy with 
misleading information. To clarify, a double agent is an intelligence operative who 
secretly works for a hostile intelligence service while feigning allegiance to his own 
intelligence service. Dusko Popov, for example, was a double agent since he was secretly 
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spying for the British on the Germans while he was still an agent of the German Abwehr. 
Disinformation operations, meanwhile, involve sending bogus (but sometimes also 
genuine) information to the enemy in order to mislead him. Using double agents to 
deliver disinformation can be especially effective since the double agent is trusted by the 
enemy.  
 
During World War II, the OSS was feeding the German High Command disinformation 
through its network of double agents in Europe while the FBI was also doing the same 
through its network of double agents in the US and Latin America. However, the two 
agencies rarely, if ever, synchronized the kind of information delivered to the enemy. 
This was extremely dangerous of course, since the FBI and OSS could well end up 
delivering contradictory information to the enemy thereby arousing his suspicion to the 
authenticity of the information received. But regardless of the dangers involved, the two 
agencies continued to run their double-agent disinformation operations separately 
(Riebling, 2002, pp. 51 – 53).  
 
It is important to note that the FBI was no greenhorn to double-agent disinformation 
operations. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau mounted an especially 
successful double-agent program which decimated the so-called Duquesne spy ring – an 
espionage network of thirty-three Nazi agents operating in the US.178 That operation was 
initiated when the Bureau was approached by a member of that spy ring – a naturalized 
US citizen named William Sebold. Tipped off, the FBI decided to ‘double’ Sebold back 
                                                  
178 See FBI, “The Duquesne Spy Ring” Undated. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-
cases/the-duquesne-spy-ring  
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to the Germans using him to lure out other members of the spy ring as well as to feed 
disinformation back to his Abwehr superiors. Over a period of 16 months, the FBI 
managed to feed the Abwehr more than 300 bogus messages via a shortwave radio station 
built by Bureau technicians. Because the FBI was able to always stay one step ahead of 
the Abwehr, it was able to completely destroy the Duquesne spy ring in due course.179 
The sophistication with which the FBI manipulated the Germans indicated that the 
Bureau was at least no amateur to double-agent disinformation operations. So the FBI 
could not have been recklessness or inexperienced when it opted to shun the OSS. 
    
Crucially, the FBI was convinced that the OSS had been penetrated by spies who were 
secretly working for foreign intelligence services.180 Remember, owing to Donovan’s 
chaotic scramble to build up the OSS, stringent security practices were overlooked and as 
a result, the OSS became badly penetrated by enemy spies.181 More than anything else, 
those security lapses tarnished its reputation in Washington prompting even its patron, the 
War Department, to withhold sensitive signals intelligence from the wartime spy agency.  
Further undermining the OSS’ reputation, Donovan even sought to establish formal ties 
between his agency and the KGB (Haynes et al, 2009, pp. 329). The OSS chief’s wild 
idea was eventually dropped when the FBI, citing serious security concerns, protested.182  
 
When viewed in light of the OSS’ apparent disregard for security, the reason for 
withholding cooperation from the OSS becomes evident. Certainly, no FBI officials 
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would contemplate sharing information with the OSS not least because any form of 
collaboration with the wartime spy agency also risked jeopardizing the Bureau’s own 
intelligence operations and sources. To synchronize their double-agent disinformation 
operations, the FBI would be required to share sensitive operational information with the 
OSS – information such as the kind of disinformation the Bureau was feeding the enemy, 
the means of delivering the disinformation (e.g., shortwave radio, cable or courier) and 
the number of double agents deployed. If such sensitive operational information were to 
fall into the hands of enemy intelligence, FBI operations would surely be in jeopardy. 
Given the OSS’ dismal security reputation, it simply did not make sense for the FBI to 
engage in any form of collaboration with that agency.  
 
The second major factor that limited FBI-OSS cooperation was severe bureaucratic 
tensions. In particular, vicious turf battles between the two agencies made it all but 
impossible for them to work together. As fierce bureaucratic rivals, the OSS and FBI 
feuded regularly during the war and tit-for-tats were a common feature of their 
relationship. Indeed, OSS operations that violated that FBI’s domain were often met with 
swift Bureau retaliation. One particular incident during the war plainly demonstrated this 
rancorous state of affairs between the two US intelligence agencies.     
 
At some point during the war, the OSS set out to establish if Franco’s Spain was truly 
abiding by its promise of neutrality. Above all, the OSS wanted to know if Spain was 
secretly defying a US trade embargo by supplying Germany with oil and spying on the 
US for the Nazis. One way for the OSS to establish the facts was to read Spain’s 
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diplomatic communications. So the order was given to break into the Spanish embassy in 
Washington D.C. to steal relevant documents and cipher materials (Downes, 1953, pp. 
87). The task of carrying out this operation fell on a schoolteacher turned OSS operative 
named Donald Downes.183 
 
To execute the break-in, Downes put together a strange coterie of locksmiths, socialites, 
thieves and secretaries. The role of Downes’ secretaries was to ‘accidentally’ damage the 
embassy safes containing sensitive documents and cipher materials so that Downes’ 
locksmiths would then be called in to make the repairs. While making repairs, the 
locksmiths secretly made extra copies of the keys so that the safes would not have to be 
picked (since picking a lock could leave scratches thus, increasing the risk of exposure). 
When it was time for the break-in, the embassy staffs were lured away to parties 
organized by socialites working for Downes. Once the embassy staffs were gone, 
Downes’ thieves would break into the embassy (Downes, 1953, pp. 87 – 94).     
 
According to Downes’ memoir, his operation ran smoothly for four months producing 
more than 3000 stolen documents – a significant amount of intelligence.184 Then the FBI 
discovered Downes’ operation. As it turned out, the FBI had placed OSS personnel in the 
US under surveillance and managed to figure out what Downes and his team were up to 
(Winks, 1987, pp. 173). If Downes had carried out his embassy operation outside of the 
FBI’s domain, then the FBI would not have intervened. But Downes targeted an embassy 
in the US and that meant the OSS had in effect intruded on the FBI’s domain. When 
                                                  
183 See, “Biographical History.” Donald Chase Downes Paper, Yale University Library. 
184 Ibid, pp. 95 
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Hoover learned of Downes’ embassy operation, the FBI Director swiftly ordered his 
agents to put an end to that OSS operation.185 So one night, just as three of Downes’ men 
were inside the Spanish embassy, two FBI squad cars converged on the front entrance of 
the building with their siren blaring. To avoid arrest, the OSS operatives had to abandon 
their operation and run. Even though none of Downes’ men were arrested by the FBI that 
night, the Bureau had nevertheless put an end to a rather productive OSS operation 
(Downes, 1953, pp. 95; Winks, 1987, pp. 173).    
 
One might think that the real reason the FBI put an end to the OSS’ embassy operation 
was because the Bureau merely wanted to enforce the law and its action had nothing to 
do with the intrusion on Bureau turf. After all, Downes and his team did violate the law 
by committing criminal trespassing and larceny. But it is noteworthy that after Downes’ 
embassy operation had been shut down by Hoover, it was taken over by none other than 
the FBI – Downes’ entire team was turned over to the FBI and would later perform the 
same type of operations for the Bureau (Downes, 1953, pp. 97). Perhaps inspired by the 
OSS’ success in such operations, Bureau agents began breaking into foreign embassies in 
the US and continued with that illegal practice well into the Cold War breaking into the 
embassies and consulates of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia (Sullivan, 
1979, pp. 173 – 179; Lamphere & Shachtman, 1995, pp. 85). So it is not without irony 
that the premier law enforcement agency of the country actually ended up violating the 
law by carrying out the same type of embassy operations mounted by its rival, the OSS. 
And precisely because the FBI took over the OSS’ embassy operation (instead of putting 
                                                  
185 Affidavit & testimony of Papich, Sam, J., Mar 5, 1975, pp. 3, Rockefeller Commission, NARA RIF# 
157-10011-10079.   
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an end to the illegal activity), it is clear that the FBI was not so much concerned with 
fulfilling its law enforcement remit as it was with protecting its domain. Nonetheless, the 
approach taken by the FBI to protect its domain also hurt its relationship with the OSS. 
While the OSS was also partly to blame for that sordid state of affairs, there is no 
question that the Bureau’s tit-for-tat poisoned the atmosphere for cooperation.  
 
Lastly, rancorous interpersonal relations also made it impossible for the FBI and OSS to 
work together during the war. In particular, on top of the longstanding animosity between 
Donovan and Hoover, fresh tensions between the FBI Director and Downes also limited 
room for FBI-OSS cooperation. This section discusses how those personality clashes 
poisoned relations between the two agencies and hampered cooperation.  
 
Section 4.5 in the last chapter has already discussed at length the personality clash 
between Hoover and Donovan when the Office of the Coordinator of Intelligence (OCOI) 
was formed with the latter as chief. To summarize, the tension between the two men 
stemmed in large part from bureaucratic rivalry. On one hand, Hoover had sought to 
block the formation of the OCOI and when that failed, the FBI Director plotted to contain 
its influence. On the other hand, Donovan made no secret that he wanted to expand his 
office’s influence at the expense of the FBI when he authorized operations on Bureau 
turf. After the OCOI was transmuted into the OSS, tensions between the two intelligence 
chiefs did not subside either. OSS violation of FBI domain persisted and Downes’ 
embassy operation was one such example. Hoover in turn sabotaged those OSS 
operations that intruded on FBI turf whenever the FBI Director found them out. Only 
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when the OSS was disbanded in September 1945, did the vicious tit-for-tat come to an 
end. Under those hostile circumstances, close collaboration between the OSS and FBI 
would have been next to impossible. 
 
The trouble between Hoover and Downes was more personal though. While Hoover was 
happy to bury the hatchet with Donovan once the OSS was dismantled by Truman, the 
FBI Director continued to harass Downes well into his retirement by periodically 
accusing the ex-OSS operative of being either a Communist, a dissolute or even a drug 
dealer (Winks, 1987, pp. 173). The bad blood between the two men only ended when 
Hoover died in 1972 and in an indication of how deeply Downes hated the FBI Director, 
he was reported to have celebrated on hearing the news of Hoover’s passing.186  
 
According to eminent historian Robin Winks, the source of Hoover’s personal animosity 
toward Downes could be traced back to his embassy break-in operation.187 But evidently, 
Downes also broke into a place that riled Hoover even more – the records vaults at FBI 
headquarters (Winks, 1987, pp. 170). It was one thing to operate in the FBI domain but 
breaking into FBI headquarters to steal confidential files was a totally separate issue. The 
former was a challenge to the Bureau’s bureaucratic authority while the second was an 
affront to Hoover himself. For an FBI Director who demanded respect and discipline 
from his agents, Hoover must have taken personal umbrage to Downes’ action. While we 
may not know the reason for sure, it is clear that Downes brought upon himself the 
personal wrath of the FBI Director. 
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DIAGRAM 5.2: KEY FACTORS LIMITING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 




















During an exclusive interview conducted for this thesis, Robert Jervis was asked how 
personality clashes might have limited interagency cooperation when the feuds in 
question were largely confined to two individuals. According to the noted scholar, 
knowledge of such personality clashes tend to circulate and get shared within the 
agencies in question. Over time, a collective mindset opposing cooperation set in as more 
agency employees were socialized into that poisoned atmosphere. To protect their 
careers, senior agency officials might not wish to oppose hostile sentiments at the top by 
supporting interagency cooperation. Meanwhile, new personnel might be socialized into 
an environment where retributive acts were the norm. Consequently, personality clashes 
have the potential to severely hamper interagency cooperation even though the feuds in 
question were limited to individuals at the top.188  
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Diagram 5.2 above summarizes the three major factors that limited FBI-OSS cooperation 
during World War II. Together, these factors made it impossible for the two agencies to 
coordinate their intelligence activities even when some form of interagency cooperation 
was desirable. Like the War Department, the FBI shunned the OSS over the latter’s 
dismal security reputation. In addition, bureaucratic tensions and rancorous relations also 
hamper FBI-OSS cooperation. More importantly, we observe once more in the following 
case how bureaucratic tensions also hampered cooperation between the FBI and War 
Department during World War II underscoring the significance of this factor.  
 
5.6 CASE IV: LIMITED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FBI AND 
WAR DEPARTMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
In the previous chapter, the factors that prompted the War Department to withhold signals 
intelligence from the FBI prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were discussed. After that 
intelligence fiasco, one might expect closer cooperation between them – however, that 
was not to be the case. In fact, interagency feuding was the norm even as they faced a 
common enemy. Nowhere was this more evident than in the signals intelligence field.   
   
As noted earlier, the FBI actually demonstrated strong signals intelligence capabilities 
during World War II. Bureau cryptanalysts were knowledgeable and sophisticated 
enough to break the German code allowing the FBI to read a significant chunk of 
intercepted Nazi radio communications. The Bureau even built its own signals 
interception facilities – close to 30 in all – to capture these enemy transmissions. In some 
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instances, Bureau agents even masqueraded as Nazi spies to transmit bogus information 
back to the Abwehr. By all accounts, the FBI did in fact mount a commendable SIGINT 
war against the Nazis.189  But in spite of its SIGINT achievements, there was little 
cooperation between the FBI and the War Department in the field of signals intelligence. 
On the contrary, information obtained for this thesis indicated that clashes between the 
two were actually the norm. 
 
It is worth noting that prior to America’s entry into World War II, the US signals 
intelligence system followed the same decentralized model as the entire US intelligence 
apparatus – it was divided up among various US agencies and departments with each of 
them running parallel and sometimes even competing signals intelligence programs. In 
particular, the War Department carried out its signals intelligence activities via two 
separate agencies – the Army’s Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Navy’s OP-20-
G.190 Later, the FBI managed to chisel away the War Department’s monopoly of signals 
intelligence when it assumed responsibility for signals intelligence in Latin America. 
Recognizing the tremendous value of signals intelligence, even the OCOI jumped into the 
fray by creating a signals intelligence unit called Coordinator of Intelligence Listening 
Service (COILS). 191  In addition, the State Department and the US Federal 
Communications Commission were performing various types of signals intelligence work 
such as radio interception, code-breaking (cryptanalysis) and code-making 
                                                  
189 See also FBI Headline Archive, “A Byte Out of History – Not So Public Radio: Gathering Intelligence 
Over the Airwaves in WWII.” Oct 13, 2004. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct04/radio101304.htm 
190 The SIS and OP-20-G were forerunners of the NSA.   
191 Aid, M. M., “The CIA SIGINT program and its relations with the NSA.” Speech delivered at the 
University of Nottingham, Apr 29 – May 1, 2011. URL: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/04/matthew-
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(cryptography). Meanwhile, the US Office of Censorship also intercepted cable traffic 
sent to and from the US and examined them for communication intelligence (Johnson, 
1995; Smith, 1993).  
 
But as the war progressed, three agencies – namely the FBI, the Army’s SIS and the 
Navy’s OP-20-G – emerged to become dominant players in the realm of signals 
intelligence (Smith, 1993, pp. 110; Johnson, 1995, pp. 4; Aid, 2011). In particular, by 
mid-1942, the SIS was allocated responsibility for handling all foreign diplomatic traffic 
and enemy non-naval communications whereas OP-20-G was tasked with handling all 
enemy naval traffic. The FBI, meanwhile, managed to carve out for itself a role in signals 
intelligence by appealing to its brief for handling all intelligence matters in the Western 
Hemisphere (see Table 5.2). 
 
Unfortunately, in a realm traditionally dominated by the War Department, the FBI’s 
active participation in the field of signals intelligence presented a direct challenge to the 
former. In fact, according to NSA historian Thomas Johnson, the FBI eventually became 
far more of a competitor to OP-20-G in signals intelligence than any other US agencies 
during World War II (Johnson, 1995, pp. 108).192 With the FBI and OP-20-G mounting 
parallel signals intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere, bureaucratic clashes 
between the two powerful agencies broke out regularly and scathing arguments between 
officials from both sides erupted whenever they met over signals intelligence matters 
(Johnson, 1995, pp. 4). 
                                                  
192 Johnson, T.R., “American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945 – 1989: Book 1: The Struggle for 
Centralization, 1945-1960”, NSA/FOIA, Released Jul 31, 2007. URL: 
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TABLE 5.2: HOW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR US SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 
WERE ALLOCATED DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
 
NATURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
US AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT 
RESPONSIBLE 
Diplomatic Army 
Enemy Naval Operations Navy 
Enemy Military Operations Army 
Western Hemisphere Clandestine FBI & Navy 
International Clandestine (outside Western 
Hemisphere) 
Navy 
Navy Weather Navy 
Army Weather Army 
Domestic Criminal FBI 
Voice Broadcast FBI 
Cover Text Communications FBI 
 
Source: Benson, R. L., “United States Cryptologic History – A History of US Communications Intelligence 
during World War II: Policy & Administration.” Center for Cryptologic History, NSA/CSS, Series IV, 
World War II, Vol. 8, 1997, pp. 52 – 53. URL: 
http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/wwii/history_us_comms.pdf  
 
Considering the US military’s longstanding dominance in signals intelligence, there is no 
reason to doubt that the clashes were the result of the FBI’s intrusion into the domain of 
the War Department.193 While a cause-and-effect relationship may be difficult to prove, 
one should recognize that the internecine squabbles between them subsided once the 
Bureau withdrew from that contested domain after World War II (Johnson, 1995, pp. 
108). If anything, that is strong evidence that the clashes were set off by the FBI intruding 
into a domain that traditionally belonged to the War Department. With bureaucratic 
squabbles the norm, one can hardly expect any form of meaningful interagency 
                                                  
193 The US military’s involvement in signals intelligence can be traced back to the Revolutionary War 
(1775 – 1785) when US military officers were called upon to solve encrypted British messages that fell into 
American hands.  
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collaborative to materialize between the FBI and War Department in the signals 
intelligence field.  
 
 
On top of bureaucratic tensions, other factors also contributed to the lack of cooperation 
between the FBI and OP-20-G, and these were uncovered in a contemporaneous 
memorandum from FBI Director Hoover to the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), 
Admiral Roscoe Schuermann. In that scathing December 8, 1943 memo, Hoover 
complained to the DNI that the FBI was not receiving from the Navy raw intercepts or 
verbatim transcripts of Axis signals intelligence but instead, was only given summaries or 
paraphrased versions of them. Without raw intercepts, Bureau agents were able to 
establish the identities of the Axis spies that were transmitting those secret messages as 
well as their means for doing so.194 Characteristic of the FBI Director, Hoover ended the 
memo by threatening to retaliate against the Navy by shutting down OP-20-G’s signals 
intelligence operations in Latin America.195 
 
Unfortunately, Admiral Schuermann’s response to Hoover’s memorandum only fueled 
interagency tensions. Specifically, the DNI rejected outright the FBI Director’s request by 
stating plainly that the Navy was not going to share verbatim transcripts with the Bureau. 
Furthermore, Schuermann warned Hoover that if the FBI were to proceed to shut down 
OP-20-G’s operations in Latin America, the Bureau might end up compromising the 
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entire Allied effort to exploit Axis communications.196 In short, Schuermann made it 
clear that he was not going to be threatened by Hoover.  
 
In the end, Hoover only partially carried out his threats. The FBI closed down a number 
of Axis radio transmitting stations and arrested a few Axis spies (even though the Navy 
had wanted to leave them in place to monitor their clandestine transmissions) while 
leaving others untouched until the end of the war.197 More than anything else, this ugly 
episode plainly illustrated what happens when organizations operate in the same domain 
– they tend to feud rather than to work together (Wilson, 1989, pp. 185). Presumably, 
collaboration between the FBI and OP-20-G would have freed up valuable wartime 
resources for other missions. After all, technical compatibility was not an issue barring 
cooperation. If compatibility in tradecraft facilitated interagency cooperation then one 
should have witnessed close cooperation between the two agencies during the war. But 
the evidence herein suggests otherwise. As a matter of fact, the Navy wanted to keep 
other agencies out of its domain and that posed a formidable barrier to interagency 
cooperation.  
 
Lastly, the War Department’s practice of not sharing raw signals intelligence intercepts or 
verbatim transcripts with other agencies also hampered cooperation with the FBI. 
Although it was driven by this requirement to protect Allied cryptanalytic efforts, the 
War Department also came to be perceived as being uncooperative by the FBI. Any room 
for cooperation between the two agencies was further hampered by a less than diplomatic 
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DNI and an FBI Director given to carrying out retributive acts. Diagram 5.3 below 
summarizes the three major factors that limited FBI-War Department cooperation during 
World War II. 
 
DIAGRAM 5.3: KEY FACTORS LIMITING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
US INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 












This chapter assesses US interagency intelligence cooperation during the 1940s and 
1950s – the early Cold War years. Most importantly, this period witnessed dramatic 
transformation in the structure of the vast US intelligence apparatus with the formation of 
the CIA – as the nation’s centralized intelligence agency – and the NSA – as the nation’s 
leading signals intelligence agency. Steps were also taken by Washington to enhance 
coordination; nonetheless, the USIC at the end of the fifties remained largely “a tribal 
federation” (Johnson, 2005, pp. 63). Meanwhile, that era was also characterized by deep 
suspicion within Washington that communist spies had infiltrated deep into the US 
government (Haynes et al, 2009). As a result, even the US president was not trusted with 
important secrets.     
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6.2 THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND THE CREATION OF 
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 
When World War II ended in August 1945, Truman swiftly disbanded the OSS and what 
remained of Donovan’s outfit was transferred to other parts of the US government. The 
OSS’ Research and Analysis branch was transferred to the State Department while the 
remainder (which included Counterintelligence or X-2, Special Operations and Special 
Intelligence) was transferred to the War Department.198 For the US president, there was 
no place for a paramilitary intelligence organization in peacetime.   
 












 Denotes the transfer of all functions and personnel to the succeeding agency 
Source: National Archives & Records Administration199 
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But within two short years, remnants of the OSS were reconstituted under the National 
Security Act (1947) as the Central Intelligence Agency (see Diagram 6.1).200 Donovan, 
however, was completely sidelined by Truman this time round even though he had held a 
central role within US intelligence as the COI and then the Director of OSS.   
 
Most notably, when Truman established the CIA, he sought assurance that the fledgling 
spy agency would not revert back to its militant OSS model. The president, worried that 
the Agency might one day be used against the American people, made sure that the CIA 
was not given any police or subpoena powers and its domestic security functions were 
heavily proscribed.201  
 
Like FDR before, Truman wanted the new spy agency to fulfill the primary role of a 
central repository of information – one that would keep other parts of the US government 
apprised of developments around the world. More importantly, the newly-created CIA 
was to refrain from carrying out the type of covert military operations the OSS had 
mounted during World War II (see Section 5.3).202  
 
The advent of the Cold War however, dramatically altered Truman’s original vision for 
the CIA; instead of becoming a centralized repository where information collected by 
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various US intelligence agencies and departments were collated and analyzed, the CIA 
soon reverted back to many of its wartime OSS methods for use against a new enemy – 
the Soviet bloc.203 
 
One of the most influential national security statutes to be enacted in the immediate post-
war years was the National Security Act (1947). The Act established the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the National Security Council (NSC) as well as the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). This effectively re-aligned the entire US defense and intelligence 
establishments; in addition to bringing the War and Navy departments (and the newly-
established US Air Force) under the control of the newly-created DOD, the National 
Security Act also established the NSC to act as the national security policy coordinating 
arm of the executive branch.204 205 
 
Aside from establishing the CIA and laying down its responsibilities, the National 
Security Act (1947) also appointed the Director of the CIA (DCIA) the Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI). Hence, the CIA Director became the principal intelligence 
advisor to the US president as well as the supposed head of the entire US intelligence 
community. 206  More than anything else, the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor had 
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prompted US lawmakers to push for an overarching authority – in the form of a director 
of central intelligence – to oversee and coordinate the vast US intelligence apparatus. 
Centralization of intelligence, it was believed, would reduce the risk of fragmentary clues 
pointing to looming national security crises from being overlooked again.  
 
In the end though, full centralization of the vast US intelligence community under the 
DCI was never achieved owing to the ambiguous legal language of the National Security 
Act (1947). Crucially, the DCI never did receive the power to exercise complete authority 
over the vast US intelligence apparatus. Under that arrangement, the DCI would only 
coordinate and not control US intelligence.207 But for some reasons the notion that one 
may not coordinate unless given full control over administrative, budgetary, personnel 
and tasking matters was lost.    
 
Some scholars contend that the National Security Act (1947) limited FBI-CIA 
cooperation (see, e.g., Sales, 2010a & 2010; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Zegart, 1999). In 
particular, by heavily proscribing the domestic activities of the CIA, the Act had also 
segregated US human intelligence into two separate geographical realms: foreign and 
domestic. Hence, the CIA is confined to operating overseas while the FBI is restricted to 
domestic intelligence investigations. 208  Since the FBI and CIA retain separate 
geographical briefs, one can assume that there are few opportunities for them to work 
together and over time, they cease to talk to one another (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, pp. 12). 
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Most notably, this ‘foreign vs. domestic’ dichotomy has been blamed for the 9/11 
intelligence failure (Sales, 2010a & 2010; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Zegart, 1999).      
 
Yet, this important perspective misses a crucial point – i.e., FBI-CIA cooperation did not 
materialize even when the two agencies were operating within the same geographical 
realm. Both the FBI and CIA, it is worth mentioning, have all along targeted foreigners in 
the US for recruitment. To obtain counterintelligence information, the FBI has always 
actively targeted foreign intelligence officers in the US.209 Meanwhile, the CIA has also 
sought to recruit foreigners in the US either as a source of information on foreign 
countries or as CIA agents in the event they return home (Kessler, 1992, pp. 23). While 
the National Security Act (1947) did preclude the CIA from undertaking domestic 
security functions, it did not bar the CIA from collecting foreign intelligence 
domestically. Even so, the two agencies did not coordinate their domestic recruitment 
operations with one another. 210  Only when an agreement to share the fruits of their labor 
was reached in 1966 did the two agencies begin to coordinate their domestic recruitment 
activities.211  
 
So while the National Security Act might have delimited US intelligence into foreign and 
domestic intelligence, it does not explain why the FBI and CIA did not join forces even 
when the two agencies were operating within the same domain. So the issue of limited 
cooperation between the FBI and CIA resists a simple geographical separation as the 
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157-10011-10079.  
211 Ibid, pp. 10  
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source of the problem. Indeed, contrary to the view that limited cooperation between the 
FBI and CIA can be directly attributed the so-called foreign vs. domestic dichotomy, the 
issue between the two agencies appears much more complex.    
  
6.3 FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
 
While the CIA was created under the public spotlight in 1947, the formation of the NSA 
in 1952 was shrouded in secrecy. As a matter of fact, the genesis of the NSA was so 
secret that its existence was not openly acknowledged by the US government until the 
1980s. This section provides a brief history of this ultra-secretive spy agency to 
underscore the dramatic transformation of the USIC during the early Cold War years.  
 
The NSA is today one of the largest and most sophisticated intelligence agencies in the 
world. This super-secret signals intelligence agency boasts the world’s largest 
concentration of mathematicians, linguists, computer scientists and analysts at its 
headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland and at bases around the world. According to 
intelligence historian Matthew Aid, the NSA costs an estimated US$26 billion a year to 
run and it currently employs close to 75,000 civilian and military personnel. To put things 
in perspective, the NSA consumes approximately one-third of the entire US intelligence 
budget making it by far the most expensive US spy agency. In particular, the NSA is so 
expensive because it deploys an array of spatial, aerial, seaborne and land-based 
eavesdropping platforms and then utilizes some of the world’s most sophisticated super-
computers to analyze the information collected. According to Aid, the NSA vacuums up 
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so much electronic information every hour that it can fill up the entire US Library of 
Congress. From primitive short-wave radio communication (used by Taliban fighters in 
Afghanistan, for example) to high-tech fiber optic transmission (used by the Chinese 
government, for example), the NSA listens in on the entire spectrum and is busier today 
than ever.212 But the massive size and sophistication of the NSA today belies its rather 
unassuming beginnings.  
 
While the US has engaged in cryptology since the American Revolutionary War (1775 – 
1783), this arcane field really came to the forefront with the advent of radio 
communications or wireless telegraphy in the late 19th century. It was discovered then 
that by bouncing radio signals off the Earth’s ionosphere, radio messages could be sent 
over vast distances at great speed. Instead of days, messages could now be received in 
minutes with radio transmission. Soon, even diplomatic and military messages were sent 
via radio signals.213   
 
But one of the major drawbacks of wireless telegraphy was that radio transmissions could 
be intercepted by unintended parties rendering it an unsecure form of communication. In 
order to protect their radio communications from being read by unintended receivers, 
governments and militaries around the world began to encrypt their radio messages in 
codes. It was this requirement to intercept and decode international radio communications 
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while at the same time to protect America’s own communications that spawned the rise 
of the modern day NSA.214         
 
Any discussion of the genesis of the NSA would not be complete without mentioning the 
American Black Chambers (also known as the Cipher Bureau). Started in May 1919 with 
just three personnel – the chief, Herbert Yardley, and his two assistants – and a small 
budget of US$100,000 per year, the American Black Chamber was America’s first peace-
time national-level intelligence agency whose primary purpose was to exploit foreign 
diplomatic communications for intelligence. Jointly funded by the US Department of 
State, the US Navy and Army, the Black Chamber soon demonstrated its worth when it 
broke the cipher used by the Japanese delegation during the 1921 Washington 
Conference giving the Americans engaged in negotiation the upper hand. Despite 
demonstrating its worth, the Black Chamber could not avoid being abolished in late 1929 
after its State Department funding was cancelled (on budgetary and to a lesser degree, 
moral grounds).215     
 
Meanwhile, after surrendering some of its cryptologic functions to the Black Chamber 
when World War I ended, the US Navy decided to rebuild its capabilities in that 
discipline by establishing a small cryptologic unit called OP-20-G (an acronym for Office 
of Naval Operations, 20th Division, G Section) in 1922.216 During World War I, the 
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Navy’s cryptologic activities had been fairly limited.  But by the early 1920s, maritime 
use of radio communications by major navies around the world had expanded 
dramatically and the Navy soon realized that it needed to exploit growing maritime 
communication traffic for naval intelligence. Since most naval radio transmissions were 
encoded for security, a specialized cryptologic unit was required to break those naval 
codes and OP-20-G was established as a result.217 In the beginning, OP-20-G had just two 
personnel. But the unit soon proved its worth in the early 1930s by breaking the naval 
codes of several countries. The successes prompted the Navy to expand OP-20-G. So by 
the time the US entered World War II, the number of OP-20-G personnel had grown to 
more than 60.218        
 
After the Black Chamber was abolished in late 1929, the US Army secretly established its 
own cryptologic unit – the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) – in 1930 to take over the 
Black Chamber’s functions.219 Similar to the Black Chamber, the SIS started with only a 
handful of personnel – 4 to be exact – all of whom were civilians.220 Remarkably though, 
despite this humble beginnings, SIS cryptanalysts would eventually manage to break the 
Japanese diplomatic code in late 1940 and one year later, when the US entered World 
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War II, the SIS would assume a crucial role in the signals intelligence aspect of the 
war.221   
 
So by the early 1930s, the Army and Navy each maintained their own cryptologic units. 
Somewhat mirroring the complex relationship between the FBI and the OSS, the 
relationship between SIS and OP-20-G was equally difficult. Indeed, the two units kept 
such a distance that they even arranged their terms of cooperation with the British 
separately during the war (Howe, 1974). According to noted researcher Stephen 
Budiansky, cooperation between OP-20-G and SIS was primarily tempered by their 
requirements for secrecy and autonomy (Budiansky, 2000, pp. 62). More importantly, in 
the absence of a central authority to coordinate their activities, the two units often 
duplicated each other’s work and competed among themselves. Further aggravating the 
disjointed state within US signals intelligence, the Air Force created its cryptologic unit – 
the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) – in 1948 (Budiansky, 2000; Howe, 1974). Hence, 
by the late 1940s, US signals intelligence was essentially comprised of three dominant 
cryptologic units operating with little coordination.   
 
Eventually though, the three armed services’ costly practice of maintaining separate 
cryptologic units – referred to as Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) – drew strong 
opposition from US officials looking to cut defense spending. A more cost-effective 
solution was to consolidate all three SCAs into one so in May 1949, despite oppositions 
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from the Navy and Air Force, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was created to 
bring core elements of the three SCAs under the command of the Joint Chief of Staff 
(JCS). Meanwhile, as a compromise, each SCA was allowed to keep certain functions 
specific to its mission (Howe, 1974). 
 
Yet, the creation of the AFSA failed to bring about close cooperation between the SCAs; 
even worse, the AFSA failed to provide advance warning of the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950 (Johnson, undated).222 Sensing an opportunity to expand the CIA’s role in 
the field of signals intelligence, CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith turned into a vocal 
critic of the AFSA and in December 1951, succeeded in getting Truman to appoint the 
Brownell Committee to evaluate the disjointed state of US signals intelligence (Johnson, 
1995, pp. 89). Roughly six months later, the committee, chaired by Republican Herbert 
Brownell, concluded that the US needed to establish one organization to coordinate “the 
communications intelligence activities of the government” (Burns, 1990, pp. 97).223  
 
Frustrated by the lackadaisical performance of the AFSA, Truman decided to act on the 
recommendation of the Brownell Committee and in June 1952, the US president secretly 
authorized the creation of a new agency to replace the toothless AFSA. As a result of 
which, the AFSA and core elements of the SCAs were consolidated in that same 
November into a new agency called the National Security Agency (Howe, 1974; Aid, 
2009).  
                                                  
222 Johnson, T.R., “American Cryptology during the Korean War”, CIA/FOIA, Jun 2010. URL: 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/CSI/2001-01-01.pdf  
223 Burns, T. L., “The Origins of The National Security Agency, 1940 – 1952 (U)” United States 
Cryptologic History, Series V, Vol. 1, 1990, Center for Cryptologic History, NSA. URL: 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/origins_of_nsa.pdf  
159   
 
Crucially, unlike the AFSA – which retained little authority over the SCAs – the newly-
created NSA was given broad control over them. That effectively ended to a large extent 
the autonomy of the SCAs.224 Furthermore, instead of falling under the command of the 
JCS (as the AFSA did), the NSA was to come under the direct control of the US 
Secretary of Defense.225 General Ralph Canine, the contemporaneous director of the 
AFSA, was appointed the first Director of the NSA or DIRNSA (see Appendix 5 & 6 for 
Canine’s tenure and personality respectively).   
 
The CIA, on the other hand, emerged from that bloody episode of bureaucratic tussle 
winning for itself a significant stake in the signals intelligence domain when DCI Smith 
was made chairman of the USCIB (Johnson, 1995, pp. 89). With a CIA Director to 
oversee the nation’s top communications intelligence board, the military’s dominance of 
the nation signals intelligence program was gone. 226  No longer would the CIA be 
marginalized by the military like its predecessors – the OCOI and OSS – were during 
World War II. More importantly, the CIA now has the permission to operate in the 
signals intelligence realm alongside the NSA.227 But when organizations perform similar 
tasks, conflicts are almost inevitable and that was precisely what happened (Wilson, 
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1989, pp. 185). Indeed, closely mirroring the FBI-Navy feud during World War II over 
control of signals intelligence, the CIA and NSA would struggle over that domain for 
decades to come.228  
 
In 1972, the authority of the NSA over the SCAs was expanded further when it assumed 
full control of their cryptologic efforts.229 Above all, the NSA was to have personnel, 
tasking, budgetary and administrative control over the SCAs, and that effectively ended 
their autonomous status. 230  To reflect the expanded authority of the NSA, the spy 
agency’s name was changed to the National Security Agency / Central Security Agency 
(NSA/CSS) (see Diagram 6.2). 231  Most significantly, the creation of the NSA/CSS 
brought an end to the internecine squabbles between the SCAs (Howe, 1974). While not 
central to this thesis, the formative history of the NSA does offer a number of valuable 
insights.   
 
Firstly, excessive secrecy sharply limited room for cooperation between the SCAs. 
Certainly, efforts to secure fruitful cooperation between them were often tempered by 
their stringent requirements for secrecy. As a case in point, the US Navy initially refused 
to join forces with the US Army in the realm of signals intelligence primarily because the 
latter was reportedly plagued by security problems (Budiansky, 2000, pp. 62).  
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 Denotes the transfer of certain COMINT and COMSEC functions to the succeeding agency 
  
Note: Unlike the other agencies, the US Black Chamber was not subsumed into another agency but was 
completely disbanded. Nevertheless, the contributions made by Mi-8 were significant enough for it to 
secure a permanent place in America’s cryptologic history.    
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Secondly, OP-20-G and SIS shunned cooperation because it conflicted with their desire 
for autonomy.234 Even before World War II drew to a close in August 1945, SIS and OP-
20-G officials were already positioning their units to survive the cutbacks and 
demobilization that were certain to follow once the war ended. For SIS and OP-20-G 
officials, cooperation could draw attention to their dependency on each other and possibly 
engender suspicions that they were perhaps inadequate for their tasks. In other words, SIS 
and OP-20-G officials wanted to avoid the perception that their units joined forces 
because they were somehow unable to function without outside assistance. To 
demonstrate their ability to act unilaterally, the SIS and OP-20-G even resorted to the 
wasteful practice of replicating each other’s work.  
 
Thirdly, operating within a particular intelligence discipline did not facilitate close 
cooperation between the SCAs. As a matter of fact, even though the SIS and OP-20-G 
were focused on the esoteric field of signals intelligence, there was little cooperation 
between them. Turner (2006, pp. 105 – 106), for one, contends that operating in the same 
discipline facilitates cooperation, but that was clearly not the case here. If anything, 
performing the same task turned out to be a bane rather than a boon.  
 
Lastly, according to NSA historian David Hatch, the AFSA turned out to be a failure 
because it was not given the authority to resolve differences between the SCAs, let alone 
nudge them toward cooperation.235 Making matters worse, the AFSA actually wound up 
becoming their competitor. Instead of serving as a central authority, the AFSA in effect 
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became a SCA itself. This was due largely to the mistake of not giving the AFSA its own 
budget in the first place; consequently, it had to rely on the SCAs for financial resources 
and those needs were often met by reductions from the SCAs’ budgets. In those lean 
budgetary times, the AFSA in effect became, in the eyes of the SCAs, a threat to their 
survival by sponging off their resources.236 Somewhat reprising the confused role of the 
OCOI, the AFSA in the end became a competitive producer of intelligence rather than as 
a coordinator of intelligence. Only with the creation of the NSA as a central authority was 
US military signals intelligence unified (Howe, 1974).   
 
The main policy lesson to be drawn from the formative history of the NSA is that the role 
of an intelligence coordinator must be clearly defined. Crucially, not only must the 
coordinating entity be given the authority to perform its task, it must never be allowed to 
become a competitor to other agencies by replicating their functions and becoming an 
intelligence producer itself. This intelligence coordinator, at the same time, must never be 
placed in a position where it had to compete with its charges for resources; even more 
significantly, it is imperative that the coordinating entity retains personnel, budgetary, 
tasking and administrative control in order to carry out its function effectively.     
 
6.4 CASE V: FBI–NSA COOPERATION IN VENONA  
 
During the Cold War, there was an extraordinary case of close cooperation between the 
FBI and NSA and two key factors prompted the two agencies to join forces. Specifically, 
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the two agencies were brought together by a strong commitment to secrecy and the 
requirement to pool expertise and resources.  
 
6.4.1 THE VENONA PROGRAM  
 
VENONA is the official codename for a top-secret US code-breaking program that 
sought to exploit Soviet diplomatic communications for intelligence during the Cold War. 
Interestingly, the Americans and Soviets were still allies when that program was initiated 
in 1943. But even then the US War Department was already growing suspicious of 
Moscow and in particular, feared that Stalin might backstab the Allies by signing a peace 
deal with Hitler to get out of the war. To find out Stalin’s true intentions, the War 
Department turned to the Army’s SIS and ordered its code-breakers to examine and 
possibly exploit Soviet diplomatic communications for much-needed intelligence.237     
 
The SIS was perfect for the task since diplomatic communications was its area of 
expertise; indeed, SIS code-breakers had already broken the Japanese diplomatic code 
earlier (Howe, 1974). Furthermore, cryptanalytic work could begin immediately because 
the SIS had been accumulating Soviet diplomatic cables secretly since 1939. The only 
reason the SIS had not exploited those clandestine Soviet messages for intelligence was 
that there were other more pressing wartime priorities such as Axis communications 
(Benson, 2009, pp. 1).238 Even as Soviet and American soldiers were fighting alongside 
                                                  
237 See interview with Robert Louis Benson in the documentary, “Secrets, Lies and Atomic Spies”, PBS, 
2002. URL: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html  
238 Benson, R.L., “The VENONA Story”, NSA/FOIA, 2009. URL: 
http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/venona_story.pdf  
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each other, the SIS was already preparing for the day when the two countries would turn 
into fierce rivals.  
 
But unlike the Japanese diplomatic code, the Soviet diplomatic code was a different 
problem altogether in that it was double-encrypted and as such, nearly impossible to 
decipher (Crowell, 2009).239 Soviet officials were in fact so confident of the sanctity of 
their diplomatic code, that they would even send their encrypted cables via commercial 
telegram companies. The Soviets probably knew that their telegrams were being 
intercepted by the Americans during transmission, but were not especially concerned 
since their cables were enciphered in a supposedly unbreakable code.240  
 
Briefly, the Soviet code being used at the time was virtually unbreakable because it 
utilized two levels of encryption or a double encryption. The first level of encryption 
utilized a codebook241 to convert a plain text (i.e. a message that is not encoded) into a 
series of code numbers. Depending on how long the codebook had been in used, this 
method of encryption alone would have been formidable enough for most code-breakers.  
 
But the Soviet code utilized an additional level of encryption that further modified the 
code numbers with a one-time pad. A one-time pad is a tiny notebook that contains a 
series of arbitrary numbers and any set of code numbers can be randomized by adding it 
                                                  
239 Crowell, W.P., “Remembrances of VENONA”, NSA/FOIA, 2009. URL: 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/venona/remembrances.shtml  
240See documentary, “Secrets, Lies and Atomic Spies”, PBS, 2002. URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html 
241 A codebook somewhat resembles a dictionary except that the words and phrases in a codebook 
correspond to 5-digit numbers instead of their respective meanings. 
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to the numbers on the one-time pad. As its name suggests, a one-time pad is used only 
once. Making the encryption even more complex, the Soviets used the ‘Chinese addition’ 
method in which a number greater than 10 would not be carried forward. If used 
correctly, the one-time pad renders an enciphered message impossible to break, even if 
the code-breaker had access to infinite computing power (see Appendix 8 on how a secret 
message is encoded with a one-time pad).242 Only the person holding an identical set of 
codebook and one-time pad could decode the encrypted message (Crowell, 2009; 
Lamphere & Shachtman 1995, pp. 81).  
 
Nevertheless, SIS cryptanalysts were able to discover a major flaw in the Soviet code. 
The Soviets, as it turned out, were re-using their one-time pads because the brutal war 
between the USSR and Germany had sharply reduced the supply of paper for the 
manufacture of, among other things, one-time pads. Since different Soviet cables were 
encoded using the same one-time pad, the numbers generated were no longer random and 
therefore, could be ‘attacked’ or analyzed for linguistic patterns (Lamphere & Shachtman 
1995, pp. 311).  
 
Even more remarkable, as SIS cryptanalysts began decoding intercepted Soviet cables, 
they also discovered that those encoded messages contained not only diplomatic issues 
but KGB and GRU espionage matters as well (Crowell, 2009). At that moment, it dawned 
on the Americans that by exploiting intercepted Soviet cables not only could they 
uncover Kremlin secrets, they could also peer right into the heart of Soviet intelligence.  
                                                  
242 See the documentary, “Secrets, Lies and Atomic Spies”, PBS, 2002. URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html 
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By late 1946, US cryptanalysts from the Army Security Agency (ASA) – the postwar 
successor to the SIS – had successfully broken part of the Soviet code and were reading 
Soviet communications from 1944 onwards.243 But instead of revealing Stalin’s wartime 
intentions (which were inconsequential by then since World War II had ended more than 
a year ago), VENONA exposed an even more sinister secret – that there was a massive 
Soviet espionage campaign in the US.244  
 
Yet, the ASA did not share this remarkable discovery of Soviet espionage in the US with 
other US intelligence agencies because it did not want to risk compromising that valuable 
source. There was no way it could share VENONA secrets with other agencies without 
also revealing to them that it had broken into Soviet communications.245 VENONA had 
to be kept totally secret because as long as the Soviets were unaware of the cryptanalytic 
breakthrough by the Americans, Moscow would not change its diplomatic code and the 
US could continue to spy on the USSR via its diplomatic communications. Of course, the 
ASA’s emphasis on secrecy hampered information flow to other agencies. As a result, 
even as a massive Soviet espionage campaign was going on in the US, the ASA kept 
quiet rendering an important piece of information essentially valueless. That logjam was 
only broken when a handful of disillusioned KGB operatives in America came forth and 
                                                  
243 See “VENONA Chronology”, NSA, Jan 15, 2009. URL: 
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244 See the documentary, “Secrets, Lies and Atomic Spies”, PBS, 2002. URL: 
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began providing the FBI vital information on the extent of Soviet espionage in the US. 
Chief among them was a KGB courier named Elizabeth Bentley.246  
 
In November 1945, Bentley approached the FBI and confessed to being a Soviet spy. 
Under FBI interrogation, she named dozens of people in the US whom she knew were 
spying for Moscow. But Bentley was unable to produce any proof to support her claims 
so prosecution of those named was not feasible (Benson, 2009, pp. 33; Peake, 1997). As 
an alternative, the FBI turned Bentley into a double agent tasking her to gather more 
information on her espionage network. However, it soon became clear to the FBI that the 
Soviets were no longer interested in Bentley as an operative, according to FBI historian 
John F. Fox.247 FBI surveillances of those named by Bentley as Soviet spies also turned 
up naught because the Soviets had essentially shut down those alleged operatives for 
reasons that would become apparent only in 1950. Under those circumstances, there was 
little prospect in securing successful conviction of those named suspects. Therefore by 
early 1947, FBI investigation into one of the largest espionage cases in US history had 
essentially grinded to a halt (Fox, 2005). 
 
Crucially, the FBI could not seek assistance from other agencies because a grand jury had 
been impaneled in New York to pursue the case and federal grand jury laws prohibited 
the Bureau from sharing information with unrelated persons while legal proceedings were 
                                                  
246 Those individuals identified in public records to have given the FBI information in the 1940s on Soviet 
espionage in the West included Walter Krivitsky (a Soviet intelligence officer who had defected to the 
West in 1937), Whittaker Chamber (an American writer who had worked for the Soviet GRU), Igor 
Gouzenko (a GRU code clerk who had work in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa before defecting to the West 
in 1945) and Elizabeth Bentley.     
247 Fox, J.F., “In the Enemy’s House: VENONA and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence”, 
Presentation at the Symposium on Cryptologic History, Oct 17, 2005. FBI History. URL: 
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made (Warner & Benson, 1997; Fox, 2005). Specifically, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (1944) – also referred to as Criminal Rule 6 (e) – explicitly prohibited law 
enforcement officials from sharing grand jury information with (among others) 
intelligence officials. The rationale behind that was to ensure a fair trial by protecting the 
identities of witnesses, jurors and even defendants (Collins, 2002; Best, 2007, pp. 11). 
Because of that legal restriction, the FBI was barred from approaching other agencies for 
information related to the Bentley case. In fact, it would have been nearly impossible for 
the Bureau to ask for information from other agencies without disclosing what the FBI 
already knew. So the FBI kept quiet; as a result of which, the ASA knew nothing about 
the information Bentley had provided to the FBI.  
 
So by early 1947, both the ASA and FBI knew separately that there was a major Soviet 
espionage campaign going on in the US but did not share that information. The ASA 
withheld that information from other US intelligence agencies to protect VENONA from 
being exposed whereas the FBI withheld that same information from other US 
intelligence agencies because Criminal Rule 6 (e) prohibited the Bureau from sharing 
information.248 The upshot was that no one within the vast US intelligence apparatus was 
aware that two parallel investigations into a massive Soviet espionage were underway. 
Above all, the information provided by Bentley to the FBI could help the ASA to identify 
the Soviet spies uncovered by VENONA; on the other hand, the FBI could use the leads 
                                                  
248 In the aftermath of 9/11, Section 203(a) of the PATRIOT Act removed the restrictions imposed by 
Criminal Rule 6(e) making it possible for the FBI to share grand jury information with other US 
intelligence agencies (Doyle, 2002).  
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uncovered by VENONA to verify information provided by Bentley and augment the 
Bureau’s investigation.  
 
Fortunately, ASA officials soon recognize that if further breakthroughs in VENONA 
were to be made, the FBI must be brought into the code-breaking program. This was 
because VENONA decrypts did not contain the actual names of those who were spying 
for Moscow; instead, codenames were used to complicate any effort to uncover the real 
identities of those Soviet spies (Benson, 2009, pp. 12). Only the FBI had the authority 
and investigative resources to chase down the leads generated by VENONA. At the time, 
the US military did have some field agents (mainly to track down servicemen who went 
AWOL) but these military investigators did not have the authority to investigate civilians; 
only the FBI had that power.249  
 
So ASA officials faced a difficult choice – keep VENONA secret and risk no new 
breakthroughs, or quicken the pace of VENONA by sharing it with the FBI and risk 
compromising the top-secret program. The ASA ultimately opted for the latter and in 
September 1947, the FBI was officially briefed on VENONA and cooperation between 
the two agencies ensued.250 Initially, there were doubts as to whether the two agencies 
could work together, according to FBI historian John Fox (Fox, 2005). After all, the two 
agencies had radically different cultures – the ASA retained a strong military ethos 
whereas the FBI had always maintained a civilian tradition. According to Posner (2006, 
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pp. 130), cooperation between intelligence agencies dominated by different cultures 
would be “difficult at best” (see Section 2.3.2).  
 
Yet, the impact of this “military vs. civilian” dichotomy was insignificant in this case. As 
a matter of fact, cooperation between the FBI and ASA in the VENONA program did 
become very close and that to some extent, contradicted Posner’s notion that cooperation 
ought to be difficult. As a matter of fact, once the FBI was brought into VENONA, 
Bureau field agents began chasing down investigative leads provided by the ASA and by 
the time VENONA was officially terminated in 1980, the FBI had managed to identify 
approximately 350 persons connected to Soviet intelligence (Fox, 2005). Crucially, many 
of these identifications were made possible through careful reviews of FBI files and 
intensive field investigations (Benson, 2009, pp. 14; Haynes & Klehr, 1999, pp. 36).  
 
But the FBI’s role in the VENONA program was not limited to chasing down leads 
provided by the ASA; at times the FBI also provided new information – collected during 
its investigations – which enabled ASA cryptanalysts to make fresh breaks into the Soviet 
code and develop new leads. Those new leads were then fed back to the FBI for a fresh 
round of investigation (Crowell, 2009). It was precisely this iterative process that allowed 
the ASA to refine partially-decoded Soviet messages and the FBI to fine-tune its 
investigations. In addition, the FBI also turned over to the ASA highly-sensitive Soviet 
plain text messages that Bureau agents had copied during their operations against the 
KGB (Lamphere & Shachtman, 1995, pp. 85). It remains a mystery how the FBI 
managed to photograph those Soviet plain text messages but the chief FBI liaison to the 
ASA for VENONA, Robert Lamphere, speculates that those Soviet documents were 
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photographed in 1944 when FBI agents mounted ‘black bag jobs’251 against the Soviets in 
New York.252 (These so-called black bag jobs could well have been an extension of the 
OSS’ embassy operations during World War II).   
 
It is interesting to note that while Lamphere did not know for certain the source of those 
Soviet plain text messages, the FBI officials who provided those Soviet messages to 
Lamphere also did not know that the messages would in turn be handed over to the ASA 
(Lamphere & Shachtman, 1995, pp. 85). The Soviet plain text messages was a boon to 
the VENONA program because those unencrypted Soviet messages allowed ASA 
cryptanalysts to match intercepted Soviet coded cables to those plain text messages 
thereby revealing the specific code number used to encipher a particular alphabet. As a 
result, more Soviet coded messages became readable.253 In all, more than 3000 Soviet 
coded messages were deciphered, and none of that would have been possible if not for 
the close cooperation between the FBI and ASA. More than anything else, it was this 
marriage of signals intelligence and human intelligence that made the VENONA program 
so successful. 
 
The thousands of VENONA decrypts provided a wealth of intelligence information on 
the Soviets. It was revealed that Soviet intelligence targeted a wide range of US 
technology secrets – classified information on US atomic weapons, jet propulsion, radar 
                                                  
251 A black bag job is a term used to describe surreptitious entry into a denied area to steal documents and 
equipment, or plant bugs. Because black bag jobs involve breaking and entering private properties, these 
operations are illegal when conducted without legal authorizations.      
252 See interview with Robert Lamphere in “The Red Files”, PBS, 1999. URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/redfiles/kgb/deep/interv/k_int_robert_lamphere.htm    
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development and rocket research (Benson, 2009, pp. 19).  It was also discovered that 
various branches of the US government had been penetrated by Soviet intelligence. The 
OSS, Department of State, Department of Justice, War Department, Department of 
Treasury, the US Congress and even the White House were all at one point or another 
penetrated by Soviet spies (Benson, 2009, pp. 38; Fox, 2005).254 Furthermore, VENONA 
decrypts also revealed close links between the American Communist Party (ACP) and the 
KGB with ACP members actively participating in espionage activities in the US (Benson, 
2009, pp. 18). More importantly, the decrypts also provided valuable insights into how 
Soviet intelligence operated (Benson, 2009, pp. 16 – 17 & 23). Consequently, US 
intelligence officials were able to learn in great detail how the Soviets carried out their 
intelligence operations. For example, US intelligence officials learned from VENONA 
decrypts how KGB officers communicated and arranged meetings with their agents, as 
well as the techniques used by the KGB to evade FBI surveillance. Furthermore, 
VENONA decrypts also provided valuable information on how the KGB assessed 
potential targets for espionage work as well as the methods used by the KGB to suborn 
them into becoming traitors.  
 
Lastly, VENONA exposed KGB penetration of the British, Canadian and Australian 
governments. In particular, Soviet cables deciphered between 1948 and 1951 revealed 
British intelligence officers, Donald Maclean, Kim Philby and Guy Burgess, and UK 
nuclear scientist, Klaus Fuchs, to be Soviet spies.255 What really shocked the Americans 
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at the time was that all four had at some point, access to highly-sensitive US secrets. 
Fuchs, for instance, had worked on the Manhattan Project during World War II while 
Philby had served as the chief British intelligence liaison to the US between 1949 and 
1951 (Benson, 2009, pp. 20 – 21). When he was the chief British intelligence liaison to 
the US, Philby had actually maintained close contacts with the fledgling CIA. Both Fuchs 
and Philby would later be found to have betrayed US secrets to the Soviets.      
 
In all, VENONA produced a treasure trove of intelligence information at a time when the 
US was starved of information on the Soviet Union. The information provided by 
VENONA was especially valuable because once the Iron Curtain closed in the late 1940s, 
US intelligence was practically cut off from any source of information on the Soviet 
bloc.256 But unfortunately, this intelligence bonanza did not last long. In 1948, an NSA 
employee by the name of William Wolfe Weisband257  caused grave damage to the 
VENONA program by alerting the KGB to the code-breaking operation (Benson, 2009, 
pp. 21). Once the Soviets learned that their diplomatic code had been compromised, they 
swiftly changed their codes and upgraded their ciphers. The result became what was 
known as “Black Friday” (Oct 29, 1948) to the Americans when all Soviet 
communications suddenly became unreadable (Johnson, 1995, pp. 168; Aid & Wiebes, 
2001; pp. 18).258 But the Soviets could not do anything with the messages that had been 
                                                  
256 See “Cold War: Spies (1944 to 1994).” CNN, Episode 21, 1998.    
257 Weisband’s espionage activities were exposed only in 1950. Nonetheless, Weisband managed to escape 
prosecution after exposure because US government officials feared that a public trial might disclose even 
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sent so the Americans continued to exploit those messages transmitted between 1939 and 
1948 until 1980 when VENONA was officially terminated. By 1980, the remaining 
unidentified persons in VENONA decrypts were most likely dead so the NSA decided to 
end that program.259    
 
In spite of the factors hampering interagency cooperation, the ASA and FBI ultimately 
joined forces in an operation that came to be widely regarded as an exemplary case of 
close interagency cooperation (see, e.g., Benson, 2009; Lamphere & Shachtman, 1995; 
Haynes et al, 2009). What were the key factors that prompted the two agencies to 
maintain close cooperation in this case?  
 
According to NSA and FBI historians, this was due in no small part to the close 
relationship between Meredith Gardner, the top ASA cryptanalyst responsible for 
VENONA, and Robert Lamphere, the chief FBI liaison to the ASA (Benson, 2009, pp. 
11, Fox, 2005). The camaraderie between Gardner and Lamphere was without a question 
an important element that brought the FBI and ASA together – especially during the early 
years of the VENONA program (see Appendix 6 for more information on Gardner and 
Lamphere and their relationship). Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the 
VENONA program would not have progressed as smoothly and fruitfully as it did if it 
had not been for the close professional bond between the two men. But their close 
working relationship also begs the question: what brought Gardner and Lamphere 
together? 
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The two men had different backgrounds. Gardner was a brilliant cryptanalyst who spoke 
several languages. Until his death, Gardner was silent on his role in the VENONA 
program. Lamphere, on the other hand, was a cop and lawyer.260 Before his death in 
2002, Lamphere gave a number of interviews and even co-authored a book on VENONA. 
In spite of those dissimilarities, a bond grew between Gardner and Lamphere. Neither did 
coming from separate agencies with different institutional cultures pose a barrier to close 
cooperation between them.261 262 
 
Based on research conducted for this thesis, it seems that the main reason Gardner and 
Lamphere were able to develop a close working relationship was that the two shared a 
common understanding of the intelligence trade. Gardner was the classic intelligence 
personnel – quiet, reserved and never sought to draw attention to himself. Lamphere, 
meanwhile, was an expert in counterintelligence who clearly appreciated the trade and 
understood its requirements.263 More than anything else, it was this shared understanding 
of the intelligence trade that made it possible for the two men to develop a close bond in 
spite of their different background. This finding is significant in that any attempt to bring 
about close interagency cooperation must at least consider if the personnel involved 
commiserate with each others’ work.      
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Yet the aforementioned factor could not have been the only significant reason since close 
collaboration between the two agencies continued unabated even after Lamphere retired 
from the Bureau in 1955. In fact, research conducted for this thesis indicated that some of 
the biggest breakthroughs in the VENONA program occurred only after Lamphere retired 
from the Bureau. Hundreds of decryption was made for the first time after the G-man 
retired.264 If anything, the FBI and ASA continued to work closely on the VENONA 
program developing every possible lead well until 1980 – 25 years after Lamphere had 
retired from the Bureau. 265  Therefore, beyond the close bond between Gardner and 
Lamphere, other factors must also have contributed to close FBI–ASA cooperation in this 
case. Based on evidence obtained for this thesis, there were at least two other key factors 
that prompted the two agencies to join forces.   
 
Firstly, the ASA and FBI needed to exploit each other’s expertise and resources. The 
weight of the evidence does support the notion that the two agencies had to pool their 
resources and capabilities in order to achieve new breakthroughs in their work (Johnson, 
1995, pp. 168). Specifically, the FBI retained the investigative capabilities which the 
ASA did not.266 The FBI was indispensable to the ASA because the Bureau had at its 
disposal an army of street investigators or field agents that could track down, mount 
physical surveillances, conduct interviews as well as interrogate suspects. The ASA, on 
the other hand, operated primarily in the field of signals intelligence; since it was never 
designed to conduct operations in the discipline of human intelligence, the ASA did not 
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266 Even to this day, the NSA does not retain those capabilities to carry out human intelligence-type 
operations; America’s largest and most sophisticated spy agency simply has to rely on the FBI and CIA to 
perform those operations on its behalf.  
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have field investigators that specialized in the type of investigative work performed by 
FBI agents. In other words, the ASA simply did not have the investigative capacity to 
chase down every human intelligence lead generated by VENONA; hence, it had to enlist 
the FBI’s cooperation.267  
 
According to the FBI’s former domestic intelligence chief William Sullivan, a Bureau 
surveillance operation can require as many as 200 field agents to watch a single suspect 
(Sullivan, 1979, pp. 167). This large number of agents is needed to ensure that the suspect 
will not be alerted to the fact that he is actually being watched by Bureau agents. As a 
general rule, whether the suspect is on foot or in a car, he is never followed for more than 
a few minutes by an agent or a Bureau car. 268  This is how unobtrusive an FBI 
surveillance operation can be. But as one may have noticed, a Bureau surveillance 
operation can also be very labor intensive.  
 
Crucially, the ASA never did command the kind of human resources and expertise 
needed to carry out physical surveillances of the hundreds of suspected Soviet spies 
identified in VENONA decrypts. Moreover, military investigators were not allowed to 
question civilians. In the US, only the FBI had the authority to investigate espionage 
activities.269      
 
In addition to field investigators, the ASA also needed another critical resource belonging 
to the FBI. At the time, the Bureau had already amassed a substantial database of 
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personal information on US persons and this database could be cross-referenced against 
VENONA decrypts to narrow down the list of suspects (FBI VENONA, pp. 66). The FBI 
denied my FOIA request for information on the precise number of secret dossiers it had 
maintained on US persons over the years, but public records indicated that by 1960, the 
FBI had already accumulated more than 430 thousands personal files on Americans.270 
The Bureau, as noted earlier, started compiling secret personal dossiers as early as World 
War I (see Section 4.3). So there is no question that the FBI had already accumulated a 
sizeable database on US persons when it was indoctrinated into the VENONA program.  
 
With access to FBI database, ASA analysts were able to shorten the process of codename 
identification by cross-referencing personal information uncovered from VENONA 
decrypts with FBI files.271  As a case in point, the US Justice Department official, Judith 
Coplon, was identified as a Soviet spy through this cross-referencing method (Haynes et 
al, 2009, pp. 289). Coplon first came to the attention of the ASA in late 1948 after several 
VENONA decrypts revealed the existence of a Soviet spy within the Justice Department 
codenamed “Sima”. As it was mentioned in VENONA decrypts that “Sima” had worked 
for both the Justice Department’s Economic Warfare section in 1944 and then the Foreign 
Agents Registration section in 1945, a quick review of the FBI database straight away 
revealed Coplon to be the only person that fitted the description.272       
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It is important to point out that postwar privacy laws prohibited the ASA from collecting 
personal information on US persons without authorization.273 So it is doubtful that the 
ASA had, in the early Cold War years, already amassed a database of personal 
information on US persons more substantial than that of the FBI. The Bureau, on the 
other hand, had been engaged in domestic surveillance since at least World War I – long 
before the ASA and its predecessor, the SIS, were even created. Given the importance of 
file review as an investigative technique to narrow down the list of possible Soviet spies, 
the ASA simply had no other alternative except to bring the FBI into the VENONA 
program.  
 
While the FBI retained the investigative expertise and resources that the ASA needed to 
advance the VENONA program, the ASA was in possession of a key resource which the 
FBI needed for its own investigation – the VENONA decrypts. Remember, the FBI’s 
investigation into the leads provided by Elizabeth Bentley had essentially come to a halt 
before the Bureau was briefed on the VENONA program by the ASA in 1947. Not only 
did VENONA decrypts corroborate Bentley’s claims (Benson, 2009, pp. 34), the 
materials also provided important intelligence leads that allowed the FBI to expand its 
investigation considerably (Johnson, 1995, pp. 166).274 For example, the guilt of Duncan 
Lee – Donovan’s confidential assistant at the OSS – as a Soviet spy was firmly 
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established by VENONA decrypts (Haynes et al, 2009, pp. 315). Lee had been 
interrogated by the FBI in 1947 after it was tipped off by Bentley to the espionage 
activities of the former OSS officer. Although Lee appeared extremely nervous during the 
interrogation, the FBI nonetheless did not have enough evidence at the time to prove his 
guilty. Ultimately, Lee’s culpability was confirmed by nine VENONA decrypts.275  
 
Information from VENONA decrypts also helped the FBI to secure convictions in a 
number of highly-publicized prosecutions although VENONA decrypts were never 
introduced as evidence during trial (FBI VENONA, pp. 62).276 More than anything else, 
those successful convictions burnished the Bureau’s reputation by demonstrating to 
Washington and the American public that the FBI was meeting its mission of protecting 
US national security; of course, the reality, as we now know, was that the Bureau would 
not have been able to so without the aid of VENONA decrypts.       
    
Taken together, the ASA and FBI were bounded together by a symbiotic relationship. As 
ASA cryptanalysts generated fresh intelligence leads from VENONA decrypts, Bureau 
agents would chase down those leads; and when new information were uncovered during 
field investigations, the new information would be fed back to the ASA. The fresh 
information would in turn enable ASA cryptanalysts to make new breaks into the Soviet 
code, and the whole feedback process would start all over again (Crowell, 2009). As 
                                                  
275 Ibid 
276 By 1957, information developed from VENONA materials had helped the FBI to convict the following 
persons (FBI VENONA pp. 62 & 75): Judith Coplon (Justice Department), Valentine Gubitchev (KGB), 
Harry Gold (atom spy), Alfred Dean Slack, Abraham Brothman (atom spy), Miriam Moskowitz (atom spy), 
David Greenglass (atom spy), Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (atom spies), Morton Sobell (atom spy) and 
William Perl (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics). 
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Lamphere recounts, “From the moment of our breakthroughs in 1948, each week I would 
receive additional deciphered messages and new fragments of messages that had earlier 
been partly deciphered; as the messages became readable, I could set in motion 
investigations based on what they said” (Lamphere and Shachtman, 1995, pp. 86).     
 
The second major factor that facilitated close collaboration between the ASA and the FBI 
in the VENONA program was the Bureau’s commitment to secrecy when handling 
VENONA secrets.  
 
Indeed, there is no indication that the FBI ever shared VENONA materials with any other 
US departments or agencies after it was indoctrinated into the top-secret program by the 
ASA. The FBI in fact kept VENONA so secret that even Truman was not informed of the 
program.277 When it came to sensitive secrets, even the US president himself might not 
have access. In an interview given to PBS before his death in 2002, Lamphere explains 
why the FBI was so tight-lipped about VENONA, “We had the greatest thing that man 
could ever get from a counterintelligence point of view in decrypting the KGB’s system. 
To reveal that, for whatever reason, to me would be a bad, bad mistake”.278      
 
Aside from keeping VENONA from other US agencies and departments, the FBI also 
made sure that leads generated by that program was never introduced during the 
                                                  
277 Interview with Burton Lee Gerber, Georgetown University, Jun 14, 2011.  
278 See interview with Robert Lamphere in the documentary, “Secrets, Lies and Atomic Spies”, PBS, 2002. 
URL: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html  
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prosecutions of those Americans that had been identified as Soviet spies.279 In fact, there 
was absolutely no mention of VENONA in court (Johnson, 1995, pp. 166). During 
investigations, the FBI also maintained strict secrecy by limiting knowledge of VENONA 
even among those Bureau agents who participated in it. As noted earlier, Bureau agents 
who were asked to procure Soviet plain text messages were not told that those documents 
would eventually be passed on to the ASA (Lamphere, 1995, pp. 85). Furthermore, when 
Bureau agents sent out requests to other FBI field offices for information (on persons 
suspected to be Soviet spies), it was standard procedure – a practice mandated by the 
ASA – to carefully paraphrase those requests in order to give the appearance that the 
leads were provided by a “confidential informant of known reliability” rather than by 
VENONA (Lamphere, 1995, pp. 88). Considering the extraordinary level of secrecy, one 
might even suspect that some Bureau agents carrying out surveillances of those suspected 
to be Soviet spies were not even told by their superiors the real purpose of the 
surveillances or the original source of their leads.   
 
The extraordinary security measures introduced by the FBI to protect VENONA assured 
the ASA that the top secret program would not be compromised by the Bureau. Given the 
weight of the evidence, there is no doubt that the Bureau’s commitment to such an 
extraordinary level of secrecy contributed significantly toward close cooperation between 
the FBI and ASA in the VENONA program. Table 6.1 below lists the factors that 
hampered FBI-ASA cooperation in the beginning and the reasons that made cooperation 
possible later.   
                                                  
279 See unknown author, “THE FBI: A Centennial History, 1908-2008 – World War, Cold War, 1939 to 
1953”, FBI, undated. URL: http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistorybook.htm  
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TABLE 6.1: KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED FBI–ASA COOPERATION 
IN VENONA   
 
 




FACTORS THAT FACILITATED 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
 Criminal Rule 6(e) prevented the FBI from 
revealing grand jury evidence to other 
agencies (Routine) 
 
 Strong bond between Gardner & Lamphere 
(Interaction) 
 Fear of betrayal of the VENONA program 
prevented the ASA from seeking other 
agencies for assistance (Setting) 
 
 The FBI provided investigators, personal 
files and Soviet documents to the ASA 
(Causal condition) 
 The ASA provided VENONA decrypts to 
the FBI which augmented the Bureau’s 
investigations (Causal condition) 
 
 




6.4.2 REASONS FOR WITHOLDING VENONA FROM THE CIA 
 
While valuable intelligence was flowing out of the VENONA program, the CIA was 
completely kept out of the loop; in fact, the CIA would not be fully briefed on the top 
secret program until 1953.280 One might argue that this delay in bringing the CIA into the 
VENONA program proved how irresponsible and hidebound the AFSA281 and FBI were 
considering that VENONA had revealed by 1951 that the Agency and its predecessor, the 
OSS, had been penetrated by Soviet spies. Above all, the FBI and AFSA had known by 
1951 that MI6’s liaison to the CIA, Kim Philby, was in fact a Soviet spy. Philby, as it 
turned out, had worked closely with the CIA between 1949 and 1951. Yet the AFSA and 
                                                  
280 See “VENONA Chronology”, NSA, Jan 15, 2009. 
281 By May 1949, the VENONA program had come under the auspices of the successor to the ASA, the 
Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA).  
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FBI withheld that piece of critical information from the CIA until as late as 1953 – two 
years after the two agencies had learned of it.282 
 
Why did the FBI and AFSA withhold from the CIA for so long critical information 
generated by VENONA? What was the basis for this delay?    
 
Based on research conducted exclusively for this thesis, a combination of factors 
ultimately led to this delay.  
 
One key factor was stringent US Department of Defense (DOD) policy on disseminating 
information generated by VENONA.  
 
Crucially, contemporaneous DOD protocols dictated that only the DOD had the authority 
to advise other US agencies or departments on VENONA (VENONA papers, pp. 3).283 
Moreover, since all VENONA decrypts were assigned a “Top Secret” classification, their 
circulation automatically became tightly restricted; consequently, few agencies and 
departments outside of the DOD were able to gain access to those materials (FBI 
VENONA, pp. 71).284 The predictable effect of this stringent DOD policy was observed 
                                                  
282 See Warner, M., “VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939 – 1957 
(Chronology).” CIA/CSI, Mar 19, 2007. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-
1939-1957/chron.htm  
283 See “VENONA”, FBI Electronic Reading Room, URL: 
http://vault.fbi.gov/Venona/Venona%20Part%201%20of%201/view   
284 It is worth noting that MAGIC-ULTRA materials were also classified as “Top Secret” and as a 
consequence, few agencies and departments had access to these communication intelligence materials 
during World War II.  
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in a contemporaneous FBI internal memo (dated September 29, 1950) discussing 
standing policy on disseminating VENONA decrypts to other US agencies.  
 
According to that memo (from V. P. Keay to Alan H. Belmont)285, the CIA had begun to 
apply pressure on then AFSA Director, Admiral Earl Stone, to release VENONA 
decrypts to the Agency after learning of the existence of VENONA in 1950 from former 
AFSA employees who had gone to work for the CIA. Although Admiral Stone did 
consider sharing VENONA decrypts with the CIA, the standing DOD policy was that no 
US agency other than the FBI was allowed access. It was actually the Chairman of the 
JCS, General Omar Bradley, who issued the order to withhold VENONA decrypts from 
all other US agencies except for the FBI (FBI VENONA, pp. 16). General Ralph Canine 
would later sanction the decision to withhold VENONA decrypts from the CIA when he 
succeeded Admiral Stone as the AFSA Director in 1951 (FBI VENONA, pp. 46 – 48).286 
Hoover at last weighed in on the matter of sharing VENONA decrypts with the CIA by 
annotating at the bottom of the memo that he “most certainly agree” that VENONA must 
be kept secret in “the interest of security” (FBI VENONA, pp. 16).  
 
The second reason for the delay in sharing VENONA with the CIA was revealed in 
another contemporaneous FBI internal memo (dated May 23, 1952). That memo (from 
                                                  
285 Keay was head of the FBI’s liaison section whereas Belmont was head of the FBI’s Domestic 
Intelligence Division at the time (Riebling, 2002, pp. 118; Sullivan, 1979, pp. 99).  
286 Canine’s decision to withhold VENONA materials from the CIA may have been in retaliation for CIA 
Director Walter Bedell Smith’s attempts to muscle into the AFSA domain of signals intelligence (see 
Section 6.3). Though fairly plausible, no historical document declassified so far can substantiate beyond 
doubt this point.      
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Alan H. Belmont to D. Milton Ladd)287 detailed a conference held between the CIA and 
AFSA to resolve the issue of CIA access to VENONA materials (FBI VENONA, pp. 49). 
The four participants were William King Harvey (a senior CIA official), Jason Paige 
(Harvey’s deputy), Oliver Kirby (AFSA) and Jeffrey Dennis (AFSA).288 Accordingly, 
Harvey and Paige sought to secure CIA access to VENONA but were stonewalled for “9 
½ hours” by Kirby and Dennis (see Appendix 6 for more information on Harvey).289 The 
two CIA officials wanted to examine VENONA decrypts so as to establish the extent of 
Soviet penetration of the CIA’s predecessor, the OSS – a legitimate request since the 
CIA’s security was at stake. However, Harvey and Paige were told by Kirby that the 
business of identifying persons suspected of espionage activities rested solely with the 
FBI; if anything, the CIA should approach the FBI directly instead (FBI VENONA, pp. 
49 – 50). That was of course not the case since the AFSA and FBI had been working 
closely together on the problem of codename identification since 1948.290 In short, the 
two CIA officials were given the runaround.  
 
At the bottom of that memo, Hoover responded to the whole incident by annotating “in 
view of the limited methods in CIA and some of its questionable personnel, we must be 
most circumspect” (FBI VENONA, pp. 51). More than anything else, this suggests that 
the FBI Director was troubled by the prospect of VENONA being betrayed by the CIA. 
But to be fair, was the newly-created CIA in fact an agency that practiced “limited 
methods” and employed “questionable personnel”? 
                                                  
287 Ladd was the Number 3 man in the Bureau at the time, holding the position of assistant to FBI Director 
(Theoharis et al, 1998, pp. 338).  
288 Kirby and Dennis were respectively the assistant head and head of the Russian Section at the AFSA.   
289 Ibid, pp. 50  
290 Ibid 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the wartime precursor of the CIA – the OSS – had 
earned for itself a “dismal security reputation” and as a result, was shunned by other US 
agencies and departments as an intelligence partner (see Section 5.5).291 Nonetheless, the 
problem of the OSS as an insecure repository of secrets was thought to be eliminated 
when it was disbanded by Truman at the end of the war. The newly-created CIA was 
thought to maintain tighter security than its predecessor (Haynes et al, 2009, pp. 328 – 
329).    
 
But even though the CIA was intended to be an agency distinct from the OSS, its roots 
were undeniably those of the wartime agency. According to CIA account of its history, 
when the Agency was established in September 1947, the newly-created agency also 
inherited confidential files, secret funds, espionage networks and informant contacts that 
belonged to the OSS; moreover, the CIA even re-hired a significant number of former 
OSS personnel.292   
 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the OSS was a hotbed for enemy spies because the 
wartime agency had recruited people with questionable backgrounds and maintained 
idiosyncratic recruitment standards. This combination of loose security practices allowed 
enemy spies to infiltrate into the ranks of the OSS during World War II. When the newly-
created CIA re-hired former OSS personnel, the Agency effectively destroyed any 
                                                  
291 See also Warner, M., “X-2” CIA/CSI, Mar 15, 2007. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/art07.htm 
292 See “The Office of Strategic Services: The Forerunner of Today’s CIA.” CIA, Apr 3, 2008. URL: 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/office-of-
strategic-services.html. See also statement made by William Harvey in FBI VENONA, pp. 53.  
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confidence that other US intelligence agencies might have in the new agency’s ability to 
keep a secret.293 As a matter of fact, the betrayal of scores of early CIA covert operations 
by communist spies who had penetrated the Agency only reinforced the sense that the 
CIA was afflicted by serious security issues during its formative years. 
 
While conducting research for this thesis, a major security failure at the CIA during its 
early years was uncovered. As it turned out, the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination 
(OPC) attempted to infiltrate scores of operatives into the Soviet bloc during the early 
years of the Cold War to collect intelligence behind the Iron Curtain.294 Headed by an ex-
OSS officer named Frank Wisner, OPC was afflicted by serious security problems 
precisely because, like the OSS, it did not maintain sound security practices (see 
Appendix 6 for more information on Wisner). 
 
Based on information obtained exclusively for this thesis, one of the deadliest security 
blunders made by OPC was to take on a group of first generation immigrants as CIA 
contractors to train its operatives. Hired for their cultural and linguistic skills, this group 
of individuals was taken on as contractors precisely because, as first generation 
immigrants, they could not be hired as CIA employees. This group of CIA contractors 
was swiftly penetrated by the KGB and so the Soviets knew almost every operation by 
the OPC. As a consequence, many OPC operations were doomed from the start as they 
had already been betrayed by enemy spies posing as contractors within the CIA.295  
 
                                                  
293 Interview with Dr. John Earl Haynes, US Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Jun 14, 2011. 
294 See “Office of Policy Coordination – 1948 to 1952”, dated Jan 1, 1948, CIA/FOIA, released Mar 1997.  
295 Interview with Dr. John Earl Haynes, Jun 14, 2011.  
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Another mistake Wisner made was to give MI6’s Kim Philby access to OPC operational 
plans. Detailed to Washington from 1949 to 1951, Philby was secretly working for the 
KGB and everything he learned while at the CIA, he passed on to the KGB.296 According 
to Philby’s KGB handler, Yuri Modin, the KGB was able to capture a large number of 
OPC operatives the moment they landed using the information supplied by Philby.297 
According to a CIA document, close to 75 percent of all OPC operatives that were 
infiltrated into enemy territory during that period were never heard from again.298 My 
FOIA request to the CIA to provide the exact number of CIA operatives lost in those 
doomed missions were denied; close to six decades have passed since those ill-fated 
operations and the CIA still refuses to declassify the precise (and likely, gruesome) figure 
underscoring the embarrassment to the CIA brought on by Wisner’s OPC. Offering a 
sense of the extent of Soviet penetration of the CIA during the Agency’s formative years, 
former CIA officer David Murphy acknowledges in an interview that the KGB had so 
thoroughly penetrated the Agency at the time that no CIA operations could take place 
without the KGB knowing (see Appendix 6 for more information on Murphy).299 That 
was how deeply the Soviets had penetrated the newly-created CIA.  
 
In another CIA archival document, additional clues as to how poor security at the CIA 
was during the Agency’s formative years were found. In 1954, President Eisenhower, in 
response to the high human cost of early CIA covert operations, ordered a special 
                                                  
296 Interview with Matthew Aid, Jun 14, 2011.  
297 See interview with Yuri Modin in the documentary, “Cold War: Spies (1944 to 1994).” CNN, Episode 
21, 1998.    
298 See Dujmovic, N., “Review of Legacy of Ashes: The History of CIA.” CIA/CSI, Studies in Intelligence, 
Vol. 51, No. 3, Sep 10, 2007. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/legacy-of-ashes-the-history-of-cia.html#-12-cia-in  
299 See interview with David Murphy in “Cold War: Spies (1944 to 1994).” CNN, Episode 21, 1998.   
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committee convened to investigate the matter. A secret report on the results of that 
investigation was issued that same year but was immediately filed away by the CIA. 
Declassified only in December 1999 under the FOIA, the “Report on the Covert 
Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency” offered rare insights into CIA covert 
military operations during the early Cold War years.  
 
Most notably, the report concluded that security at the CIA had been gravely inadequate. 
The report specifically pointed out that because compartmentalization policies were not 
enforced, unauthorized Agency personnel were able to gain easy access to large segments 
of sensitive CIA files.300  Clearly, the problem of poor security at the CIA was not 
something invented by other US agencies to sully the reputation of the CIA but a real 
issue for the Agency. More importantly, another archival document indicated that the FBI 
knew of the CIA’s security problem at the time.301 Therefore, Hoover was certainly not 
being frivolous when the FBI Director stated that the CIA practiced “limited methods” 
and employed “questionable personnel”. In the intelligence business, it simply does not 
make any sense to share vital secrets with an agency that have been penetrated by enemy 
spies. This assessment is also shared by noted historian Harvey Klehr who noted that the 
CIA was shut out of VENONA because the top secret program had “revealed extensive 
Soviet penetration of the OSS and there was concern that some of the unidentified spies 
might have transferred into the CIA”.302 
 
                                                  
300 See CIA document, “Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency” CIA/FOIA, 
created Sep 30, 1954, pp. 33, released in 1999.  
301 Affidavit & testimony of Papich, Sam, J., Mar 5, 1975, pp. 1, 2 & 5, Rockefeller Commission, NARA 
RIF# 157-10011-10079. 
302 Email interview with Prof. Harvey Klehr, Emory University, May 20, 2011.  
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A third factor that prompted the FBI in particular to withhold VENONA materials from 
the CIA was that the Bureau actually anticipated few benefits from the CIA in return. 
This was confirmed in a follow-up FBI memo to the one noted previously (i.e., between 
A. H. Belmont and D. M. Ladd, dated May 23, 1952).   
 
In that follow-up FBI internal memo (again from Belmont to Ladd, dated Jun 23, 1952), 
the issue of how the FBI should handle the CIA’s request for VENONA materials were 
discussed (FBI VENONA, pp. 52). As mentioned above, the CIA had held a conference 
with the AFSA shortly before regarding CIA access to VENONA, but the two CIA 
officials who attended the meeting (Harvey and Paige) were told by their AFSA 
counterparts that the CIA should instead liaise directly with the FBI over that matter. In 
preparation for an imminent meeting with the CIA, Belmont recommended to Ladd that 
the FBI should strictly limit their discussion to the issue of Soviet penetration of the OSS, 
and the question of how the CIA might be of assistance to the FBI in terms of chasing 
down international leads generated by the VENONA program (FBI VENONA, pp. 53 & 
60).  
 
The rationale for restricting FBI–CIA discussion to the issue of Soviet penetration of the 
OSS was presumably to limit how much the CIA might learn of the full extent of 
VENONA (FBI VENONA, pp. 59 – 60). The program had exposed a massive Soviet 
espionage operation in the West and Soviet penetration of the OSS during the war was 
but a small part of this massive campaign. Therefore, in the interest of security, the FBI 
had to be circumspect in what it was going to reveal to the CIA. The rationale for 
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restricting FBI–CIA discussion to the question of how the CIA might be of assistance to 
the FBI in terms of chasing down international leads was of course purely instrumental in 
nature. The National Security Act (1947) had drastically curtailed the FBI’s responsibility 
by confining the Bureau to the realm of domestic intelligence with limited capacity to 
carry out operations abroad (see Section 6.2). Since the FBI had lost much of its capacity 
to mount operations abroad, sharing some VENONA decrypts with the CIA might not 
seem so abhorrent as long as the FBI could make use of the CIA to carry out 
investigations abroad on behalf of the Bureau. Both sides would stand to gain from such 
an exchange.  
 
Unfortunately, the prospect for such a mutually beneficial exchange was judged to be 
quite low by the Bureau since the CIA was not “always prone to reciprocate” (FBI 
VENONA, pp. 53). Hoover even annotated at the bottom of that memo that he was “not 
optimistic about any benefits accruing the FBI [from cooperating with the CIA]” since 
the “CIA gives a lot of wordage but few results of cooperation” (FBI VENONA, pp. 60). 
When the influential FBI Director actually anticipated few benefits from the CIA in 
return, the prospect for FBI–CIA cooperation in the VENONA program was also more or 
less doomed. In the end, the combination of stringent DOD protocols on disseminating 
VENONA decrypts, concerns over loose security practices at the CIA, and the low 
prospect of profiting from cooperation with the CIA resulted in a crucial delay in sharing 
VENONA with the Agency (see Diagram 6.3). Consequently, the CIA was not fully 
briefed on the VENONA program until as late as 1953.   
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DIAGRAM 6.3: KEY FACTORS THAT PREVENTED THE CIA FROM 
SECURING ACCESS TO VENONA 
 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
             
 
6.4.3 REASONS FOR SHARING VENONA WITH THE CIA 
 
In 1953, the Agency was at last fully indoctrinated into the VENONA program.303 What 
were some of the factors that ultimately altered the steadfast stance of the AFSA and FBI 
against sharing VENONA with the CIA? 
 
For one, it was no longer possible for the FBI and NSA (the AFSA had been consolidated 
into the NSA in November 1952) to keep VENONA from the CIA. By then, the CIA had 
known of the existence of the top-secret program for at least three years and during that 
period of time, had pressured both the AFSA and FBI for access. Moreover, the CIA did 
                                                  
303 See “VENONA Chronology”, NSA, Jan 15, 2009. 
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have a legitimate basis to gain access to at least some VENONA materials since the 
program had exposed serious security issues within the Agency. In any event, the KGB 
probably knew more about VENONA (through Soviet moles William Weisband and Kim 
Philby) than the CIA did by that time. Security concerns, though still important, were 
perhaps less imperative by then. To withhold VENONA from the CIA any longer would 
only aggravate interagency tensions. 
 
More importantly, this thesis has established that the NSA and FBI ultimately opted to 
indoctrinate the CIA into VENONA out of a sense of instrumentality. Rather than leave 
the CIA out in the cold, the Agency might actually aid that program with its unique 
expertise and resources. Specifically, the CIA was able to carry out VENONA-related 
investigations abroad – a task which the FBI was unable to perform.  
 
As pointed out in the FBI internal memo mentioned previously (from A. H. Belmont to 
D. M. Ladd, dated June 23, 1952), the VENONA program had by then produced a 
number of international leads which the FBI was interested in pursuing (FBI VENONA, 
pp. 52). But owing to the geographical delimitation set down by the National Security 
Act (1947), the FBI was essentially confined to a domestic role and hence, was unable to 
chase down international leads without intruding on the foreign intelligence domain of 
the CIA. In any case, the FBI probably did not have the human resources to pursue leads 
abroad after surrendering its foreign intelligence brief to the CIA in 1947. Since the CIA 
had volunteered to carry out VENONA-related investigations abroad in exchange for 
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some access to the program, there was no compelling reason for the FBI to turn down the 
CIA’s request especially since security concerns had mitigated somewhat.  
 
At least in this case, it seems that the geographical delimitation set down by the National 
Security Act (1947) actually facilitated FBI–CIA cooperation. Indeed, rather than 
hampering cooperation between the two agencies – as posited by the “foreign vs. 
domestic” dichotomy (see Section 2.3.1) – the Act essentially compelled the FBI to work 
with the CIA. To be sure, it was a combination of factors and not the Act alone that 
brought the two agencies together; still, one must concede that this outcome could not 
have materialized if the FBI had kept its foreign intelligence brief. After all, it had 
refused to join forces with the OSS during World War II when both agencies actually 
shared responsibility for foreign human intelligence.       
 
The NSA, meanwhile, also stood to benefit from the CIA’s active participation. Such 
international investigations could facilitate fresh breaks into the Soviet code and in turn, 
produce more leads. In any event, the NSA had neither the type of manpower nor 
expertise to carry out such investigations abroad. Therefore, the NSA had to rely on the 
CIA. In an exclusive interview with Burton Gerber, the former head of the CIA’s Soviet 
division reiterated to me that this symbiotic relationship has always been an important 
component throughout the history of NSA–CIA cooperation.304 The NSA also stood to 
gain from the CIA’s participation in another way. The NSA was by then becoming very 
                                                  
304 Interview with Professor Burton Gerber, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., Jun 14, 2011. 
Gerber is a 40-year veteran of the CIA. At the height of his career with the CIA, Gerber headed one of the 
largest departments within the Agency – the Soviet / Eastern Europe (SE) division.    
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expensive to maintain, according to intelligence historian John Earl Haynes.305 Its annual 
budget was increasing so fast that it was soon dwarfing those of other US intelligence 
agencies. The main reason for this rapid increase in funding requirement was the fact that 
the NSA had to maintain an array of highly sophisticated but costly eavesdropping 
platforms. Meanwhile, the number of NSA employees was also increasing rapidly as the 
Cold War escalated. This predicament prompted NSA officials to seek fresh approaches 
to make their agency more worthwhile and one of those ways was to make the NSA more 
useful to other US intelligence agencies. So the NSA decided to pass on prized VENONA 
materials to the CIA. In short, the NSA helped the CIA to help itself.     
 
Taken together, both the NSA and FBI were squarely focused on what they would profit 
from bringing the CIA into the VENONA program. Indeed, much of the final decision to 
share VENONA decrypts with the CIA was dictated by a calculated assessment of how 
their interests would be best served. It is worth noting that my assessment is also shared 
by Klehr who told me that he is certain that “the need for international investigations into 
some of the names that had turned up” in VENONA decrypts had been a factor that 
prompted the NSA and FBI to bring the CIA into the VENONA program.306 Secrecy, 
though important, was in the end supplanted by the desires of FBI & NSA officials to 
expand their investigations abroad. Specifically, when the CIA was needed to pursue 
international leads – a function which neither the FBI nor NSA could perform – secrecy 
became subordinated. Interagency cooperation, it seems, is more likely to materialize 
                                                  
305 Interview with Dr. John Earl Haynes, Jun 14, 2011.  
306 Email interview with Dr. Harvey Klehr, May 21, 2011.  
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when US intelligence agencies need to leverage on each other’s unique expertise or 
resources (see Diagram 6.4).  
 
DIAGRAM 6.4: FACTORS WHICH EVENTUALLY FACILITATED CIA 


















Nevertheless, by delaying until 1953 to fully brief the CIA on the VENONA program, 
both the FBI and NSA had also prevented the CIA from taking prompt actions to 
minimize the damage caused by enemy spies who had penetrated the Agency. Thanks to 
Soviet spies such as Kim Philby, many early CIA operations had gone sour and scores of 
CIA operatives were killed. In retrospect, secrecy is like a double-edged sword – it can 
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cooperation from those who spurned it before. The net result is of course further 
limitation on the flow of information and interagency cooperation.  
 
6.4.4 SUMMARIZING THE KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN THIS CASE 
 
In summary, a complex combination of factors influenced FBI–NSA–CIA cooperation in 
the VENONA program.  
 
The CIA was shunned (at least initially) by the FBI and NSA as an intelligence partner 
because it was thought that the CIA could not be trusted with prized secrets. Fear of 
betrayal invariably prompted the NSA and FBI to withhold VENONA from the CIA. 
Stringent legal and security measures also limited information sharing. In particular, 
federal grand jury laws barred the FBI from sharing information with other agencies. 
Meanwhile, the NSA refused (at least initially) to bring other agencies into VENONA 
because it wanted to protect the VENONA program from being compromised. The 
DOD’s stringent policies for protecting secrets also limited other agencies’ access to 
VENONA decrypts.    
 
But ultimately, the requirement to pool unique expertise and resources prompted the 
NSA, FBI and the CIA to work together. For the NSA, sharing VENONA decrypts with 
other agencies was also a way for the spy agency to justify its rapidly growing budget. 
The FBI’s strong commitment to keep the VENONA program secret also enhanced 
interagency cooperation. Over time, according to Dr. John Earl Haynes, this unwavering 
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commitment to secrecy built not just confidence but trust as well between the NSA and 
FBI. That was why close FBI–NSA cooperation could be sustained long after Meredith 
Gardner and Robert Lamphere had parted ways.307 Last but not least, close interagency 
cooperation materialized when all the parties involved actually profited from working 
together.  
 
6.5 CASE VI: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN THE BERLIN 
TUNNEL OPERATION  
 
Constructed by the CIA and MI6 in 1954, the Berlin Tunnel was dug underneath the 
center of Soviet-controlled East Berlin to enable CIA and MI6 technicians to tap into 
Russian and East German phone lines and eavesdrop on their secret communications. The 
1476-feet tunnel took seven months to build, 125 tons of steel and 1000 cubic yard of 
grout were used, and more than 3100 tons of soil was removed.308  
 
But with that much dirty being removed in plain sight of the KGB (the tunnel was 
constructed from a position just inside the US sector in West Berlin), suspicion as to the 
origin of the soil would automatically be aroused.309 So CIA and MI6 planners decided 
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that they would use the construction of an Air Force warehouse as a cover – both literally 
and physically – for the huge mass of dirty displaced by the construction of the tunnel.310  
 
That problem solved, work on the tunnel began in February 1954. Later, a washer and 
dryer were also installed at the site so that the engineers leaving the warehouse would 
look clean like radar operators and not tunnel diggers (Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey, 
1997, pp. 220). The Berlin Tunnel was finally completed at the end of February 1955 
(Steury, 2007).311 But despite the elaborate ruse, the Soviets already knew about the 
tunnel operation because a Soviet mole in MI6 had learned of the secret operation and 
reported it to the KGB even before construction began. The name of the MI6 officer that 
betrayed the Berlin Tunnel operation was George Blake.312 
 
Even so, the Soviets did not expose the secret tunnel under East Berlin for another 2 years 
so as to protect Blake. If the Soviets had acted swiftly to close down the tunnel, the CIA 
and MI6 might straight away suspect that the operation had been betrayed by one of their 
own and Blake would be put at risk of being exposed.313 Indeed, Sergei Kondrashev, 
former chief of the KGB German Department, explains that the reason the KGB allowed 
the Berlin Tunnel to stay in operation for sometime was that the Soviets had calculated 
that the secrets Blake might continue to pass on to the KGB was potentially more 
                                                  
310 See CIA untitled document, dated September 16, 1953, pp. 334, CIA Historical Review Program, 
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313 See “G. Berlin Tunnel”, pp. 207, CIA Historical Review Program, 1994. 
202   
valuable than the secrets they would end up losing through the tunnel.314 So the Soviets 
feigned ignorance of the tunnel for another 2 more years – until April 21, 1956 (see 
Diagram 6.5).315  
 
DIAGRAM 6.5: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN THE BERLIN TUNNEL 
OPERATION 
 
        EARLY                 BETRAYED                FEB                 TUNNEL                     APR             BLAKE 
          1950s                    BY BLAKE                1954             COMPLETED                1956          EXPOSED 
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        BEGAN               1951 – 1953                BEGAN                                               TUNNEL 
 
Even when the time came to shut down the tunnel, the KGB was extremely circumspect. 
The Soviets in fact waited until a real fault had developed with the cables – one which 
CIA and MI6 operators would surely notice – before sending out a team of soldiers to 
make repairs; of course, after some digging, the group of soldiers finally ‘stumbled’ upon 
the secret tunnel (Pincher, 2009, pp. 462; Steury, 2007). After being in operation for 11 
months and 11 days, the Berlin Tunnel was at last shut down by the KGB. 316 
Notwithstanding the KGB’s carefully calibrated moves, MI6 eventually found out 
Blake’s duplicity and the Soviet spy was arrested and convicted for espionage in 1961.317  
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203   
 
Strangely though, the intelligence collected from the tunnel was surprisingly voluminous 
even though the operation had already been betrayed by Blake. Other than a general 
tightening of security procedures, the Soviets made no attempts to limit the amount of 
information sent over the tapped cables; in fact, it would take another 2 more years after 
the tunnel had been shut down before all the information could be processed (Steury, 
2007). In all, the tunnel produced information on Soviet order of battle, forty thousand 
hours of telephone conversations and six million hours of teletype communications 
(Steury, 2007). The tunnel also exposed the identities of Soviet officers in East Germany, 
produced valuable information on the organizational setup of Soviet intelligence as well 
as KGB activities and tradecraft.318  
 
Even stranger, after cross-checking with intelligence collected from other sources (such 
as human spies), the information obtained from the tunnel were found to be genuine.319 
As it happened, the KGB did not even bother to use the Berlin Tunnel to feed bogus 
information to the Americans and British. While Soviet motivation for not shutting down 
the tunnel earlier is apparent, it is more difficult to understand why the KGB did not use 
the tunnel to feed disinformation to the CIA and MI6. Even today, it remains a mystery 
why the Soviets did not attempt to manipulate the Americans and British with bogus 
information.  
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Another secret that came to light when the Soviets finally shut down the Berlin Tunnel in 
April 1956 was that the CIA had bypassed the NSA in that operation. 
 
By right, the NSA should have played a seminal role in the Berlin Tunnel operation since 
it was the lead US intelligence agency tasked with collecting foreign signals and 
communication intelligence. The case for selecting the NSA as an intelligence partner in 
the Berlin Tunnel operation is even more compelling since both the NSA and CIA share 
the same national loyalty. Notwithstanding that, the NSA was completely shut out of the 
project by the CIA (Aid, 2008). DIRNSA Ralph Canine reportedly exploded in anger 
when he finally learned of the Berlin Tunnel operation from the New York Times 
(Johnson, 1995, pp. 106). Certainly, Canine had no reason to be upset with the CIA if he 
did not think that the NSA should have been involved in that operation. 
 
6.5.1 FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE CIA TO BYPASS THE 
NSA IN THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 
 
A combination of reasons prompted the CIA to bypass the NSA in the Berlin Tunnel 
operation.  
 
Firstly, rancorous relations between key CIA and NSA personnel made it all but 
impossible for cooperation to materialize (Aid, 2008).320 Based on evidence obtained 
exclusively for this thesis, two senior CIA officials at the time were responsible for the 
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decision to shut out the NSA – they were CIA Director Allen Dulles (DCI 1953 – 1961) 
and Berlin Tunnel project director, Frank Rowlett.321  
 
Rowlett in particular had every reason to hate Canine. Already a 20-year veteran of US 
signals intelligence by the time Canine was appointed NSA Director, Rowlett was one of 
the first few to join the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1930.322 Just before the US 
entered World War II, Rowlett and his team managed to break into the Japanese cipher 
system thus enabling the Americans to read Japanese diplomatic communications 
throughout the war. After the war, Rowlett was made chief of the intelligence division 
and later, technical director of operations when the AFSA was established in 1949. In 
1952, as part of Canine’s re-organization effort, Rowlett was transferred to handle 
communications security or COMSEC (Johnson, 1995, pp. 93; Bamford, 2002, pp. 477). 
Unhappy over his transfer, Rowlett resigned from the NSA and went to work for the CIA 
where he essentially headed a mini-NSA at the Agency until 1958. 323  
 
Exclusive information obtained for this thesis indicated that Rowlett was made the Berlin 
Tunnel operation’s project director after joining the CIA. William King Harvey, 
meanwhile, oversaw the tunnel operation as chief of the CIA’s Berlin Operating Base. 
Owing to his personal antipathy for DIRNSA Canine, Rowlett was believed to have used 
his influence to shut the NSA out of the Berlin Tunnel operation.324 
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CIA Director Allen Dulles also had a difficult relationship with DIRNSA Canine and 
both directors were reported to have clashed frequently over a variety of issues (Johnson, 
1995, pp. 106). The source of that antipathy between the Canine and Dulles remains a 
mystery though as the NSA and CIA have both refused to declassify any documents 
pertaining to the historical bad blood between the two agencies. 325  My attempts to 
establish the source of antipathy between Dulles and Canine with Robert Louis Benson 
also came to naught as the NSA historian was equally tight-lipped about that issue. 
Nevertheless, contextual evidence do suggests that the two powerful directors did not get 
along due to a personality clash.  
 
Canine, on one hand, was a soldier who demanded discipline and respect from his staff. 
He was also a profane person with a fiery temper. But the authoritarian DIRNSA also 
single-handedly re-organized a cryptologic service that was in complete disarray into one 
of the most powerful spy agencies in the world despite tough oppositions. Inevitably, he 
also made a few enemies in the process.326 Dulles, on the other hand, came from a 
prominent family and was himself a consummate diplomat (Dulles, 1963). An OSS 
operative during World War II, Dulles eventually reached the pinnacle of US intelligence 
when he was appointed the CIA Director in 1953.327 By all accounts, Dulles was a very 
popular director both within and outside the CIA and he remained until today the longest 
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serving CIA Director.328 However, Dulles’ ability to advance his career by soft-soaping 
his superiors also placed the CIA Director at odds with blunt men like Canine.329 In an 
atmosphere in which key CIA and NSA decision-makers were at loggerheads, one should 
not be surprised at all that the CIA opted to bypass the NSA in the Berlin Tunnel 
operation. 
 
Beyond rancorous relations, a second major factor which prompted the CIA to bypass the 
NSA was the CIA’s desire to maintain operational control over the secret tunnel project.  
 
Berlin was, by all account, an intelligence goldmine for both the CIA and NSA in the 
early 1950s (Johnson, 1995, pp. 118).330 Certainly, from that tiny piece of real estate, US 
spy agencies were able to collect a variety of intelligence information on the Soviets 
using an array of espionage techniques such as human spies and signals interception. 
Before the advent of spy satellites, Berlin truly was a ‘window’ into the Soviet bloc.331 
 
But this goldmine also presented a conundrum for the NSA and CIA; accordingly, the 
NSA wanted to use Berlin to satisfy its military requirements whereas the CIA wanted to 
use it to fulfill its civilian requirements. According to veteran CIA officials, Tom 
Polgar332 and David Murphy333, the NSA and the DOD wanted to know for example 
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where Soviet missiles were located so that those missiles could be destroyed in the event 
of World War III whereas the CIA basically wanted to know how the Soviet system 
functioned – two diametrically different requirements. CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith 
(DCI 1950 – 1953) even fought with the NSA on a regular basis to ensure that his 
agency’s requirement do not take a backseat to that of the military (Johnson, 1995, pp. 
89). Above all, DCI Smith was of the view that, as long as signals intelligence and the 
NSA were under the command of the DOD, the CIA would never get to fulfill its civilian 
requirements.334 Therefore, even though the CIA and NSA were sitting on an intelligence 
goldmine, the two agencies could not agree on what type of intelligence to collect.  
 
With this issue over agency requirements unresolved, it was simply unwise for the CIA to 
collaborate with the NSA in the Berlin Tunnel operation since that would only increase 
the risk of the NSA taking over that operation. To the CIA, the NSA was growing in 
influence as it enjoyed the backing of the powerful DOD as well as President 
Eisenhower. Indeed, Ike (who was one of America’s top general) was known to be a firm 
supporter of SIGINT having witnessed its value during World War II.335 If the NSA were 
brought into the Berlin Tunnel operation, the CIA would almost certainly lose operational 
control of the project to the NSA. Under those circumstances, it was only logical for the 
CIA to bypass the NSA.   
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Thirdly, the CIA was seeking a larger role in the realm of signals intelligence and this 
grandiose ambition of the CIA prompted the Agency to keep the Berlin Tunnel operation 
from its main competitor in the SIGINT business – the NSA.336    
 
The CIA’s venture into the realm of SIGINT occurred as early as 1948 when the CIA 
began broadcasting Voice of America into the Soviet bloc.  Of course, the CIA was well 
within its remit to conduct radio broadcasts; but when Soviet bloc countries began 
jamming those signals, the CIA quickly expanded its mission to include locating the 
jammers in order to target them with electronic countermeasures – a task which came 
under the responsibility of the AFSA (predecessor of the NSA).337 Next, when the AFSA 
failed to provide advance warning of North Korea’s invasion of the South, DCI Smith 
lobbied to have the Brownell Committee formed and as a result of which, the CIA ended 
up gaining a larger stake in the realm of signals intelligence.338 To augment its signals 
intelligence capabilities, the CIA even recruited a small but experienced group of NSA 
personnel (some of whom were reportedly disgruntled with Canine’s abrupt ways) into 
the Agency’s ranks in the 1950s.339  
 
Without a question, these predatory moves indicated that the CIA was indeed seeking a 
more active role in the realm of signals intelligence at the time and this grand aspiration 
on the part of the CIA almost certainly motivated the Agency to bypass the NSA in the 
Berlin Tunnel operation (see Diagram 6.6). It simply did not make sense for the CIA to 
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enrich its main competitor by augmenting its influence in Washington with the Berlin 
Tunnel operation.  
 
DIAGRAM 6.6: KEY FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE CIA TO BYPASS THE 




            
            
            
            
             
 
 
6.5.2 FACTORS WHICH FACILITATED CIA–MI6 COOPERATION 
IN THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 
 
The previous section discussed the key factors that prompted the CIA to shun the NSA in 
the Berlin Tunnel operation. But why did the CIA enlist the cooperation of MI6? 
 
Although US – British intelligence cooperation is not central to this thesis, the main 
factor that prompted the CIA to join forces with MI6 in the Berlin Tunnel operation is 
insightful nevertheless.  
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CIA–MI6 cooperation in this case was driven by none other than an unemotional 
calculation of instrumentalism. Above all, the CIA sought MI6’s participation because 
the British retained an expertise which the CIA did not. As David Murphy, the CIA’s 
former Soviet division chief, explains in an interview, “the [British technicians] came and 
carried out the tap, which was a very dicey business, very difficult [and] you needed 
highly-skilled technicians; this could never have been done without British expertise in 
this area.”340 Indeed, the wiretapping part was the most crucial aspect of the entire Berlin 
Tunnel operation; according to former CIA Director Richard Helms, the tap was only 
accomplished due to the “competence of the British technicians” (Helms, 2003, pp. 136). 
In short, the CIA would not have been able to complete the Berlin Tunnel without MI6 
expertise. Of course, the NSA would have been able to carry out the tap too but it was 
definitely less savory a partner than MI6 was.   
 
A key consideration for the CIA at the time was that, besides the NSA, the British were 
perhaps the only ally at the time that truly excelled in the art of wiretapping (see, e.g., 
Wright, 1987). For instance, CIA officials already knew in 1951 that the British had for 
years been tapping Soviet communication cables in a tunnel underneath Vienna.341 Since 
the CIA was at loggerheads with the NSA, MI6, for all intent and purposes, was the next 
best option for the Agency. Taken together, CIA–MI6 cooperation in the Berlin Tunnel 
operation materialized only because the British retained an expertise that was 
indispensable to the entire operation.  
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Admittedly, MI6 did share at the time a less rancorous relationship with the CIA than the 
NSA did. Moreover, the OSS (the CIA’s wartime precursor) and MI6 had a shared history 
of working together during World War II. But would the CIA have sought MI6 
participation in the Berlin Tunnel operation if the latter had not retained the requisite 
expertise? After evaluating all the information on this case, my view is that it was strictly 
an unemotional calculation of instrumentalism that prompted the CIA to join forces with 
MI6.  
 
6.5.3 SUMMARIZING THE KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN THIS CASE 
 
A number of important factors prompted the CIA to work with MI6 while bypassing the 
NSA completely.  
 
MI6 was chosen by the CIA as an intelligence partner in the Berlin Tunnel operation 
because it retained the necessary expertise. The reasons for bypassing the NSA are more 
complex. Rancorous relations between key NSA and CIA personnel severely hampered 
NSA–CIA cooperation. Beyond that, the CIA also feared that it might lose operational 
control of the Berlin Tunnel operation to the more powerful NSA if it were to partake in 
the project. Losing control of the operation would certainly increase the risk of the CIA’s 
civilian requirements being sidelined by the NSA’s military requirements. Lastly, the NSA 
was bypassed because the CIA saw the former as a competitor in the realm of signals 
intelligence.  
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To be sure, there were several attempts to improve interagency cooperation between US 
intelligence agencies during the early years of the Cold War. But overall, the results were 
mixed.  
 
The United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) was established in 1950 
to coordinate US signals intelligence between the State Department, Army, Navy, CIA 
and FBI.342 But instead of closing interagency fissures in that realm, the USCIB soon 
turned into a source of bureaucratic tensions between the military and CIA when CIA 
Director Walter Bedell Smith was appointed its chairman in 1952 (Johnson, 1995, pp. 
89). In addition to the USCIB, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was also 
established in 1950 by the National Security Council to enhance coordination between 
the CIA and other US intelligence agencies. 343  But Hoover refused to attend IAC 
meetings because the powerful FBI Director refused “to sit below the DCI” (Riebling, 
2000, pp. 95).  
 
Hoover’s apathy toward this committee extended well beyond 1958 when the USCIB and 
IAC were merge into the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) – the nations highest 
and most prestigious intelligence policy-making body (Richelson, 1999, pp. 390; 
Sullivan, 1979, pp. 193). All foreign and domestic intelligence relevant to the security of 
the US was channeled into the USIB and top-ranking officials from every major US 
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intelligence agencies sat on that board with the CIA Director acting as chairman. Given 
its composition and mandate, the USIB was the closest to a central coordinating 
committee and information repository the US intelligence system ever had. With the CIA 
Director heading the USIB, FDR’s pre-war vision of having a single coordinator of 
intelligence to sort out the mess between fractious US intelligence agencies seemed to 
have been realized at last. But the fact was that the USIB held little sway over the FBI in 
particular because no one on that board including the chairman “could take a stand 
against Hoover”, according to former head of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division 
William Sullivan (Sullivan, 1979, pp. 193). As a result, the FBI’s lack of cooperation 
with other US intelligence agencies remained a persistent issue at least until Hoover’s 
passing in 1972. 
 
Not every attempt at improving coordination was futile though. A peace overture from 
the Navy to the FBI in 1947 prompted the Bureau to withdraw from the signals 
intelligence realm ending years of bureaucratic feuding between the two. A major 
competitor to the War Department in signals intelligence during World War II, the FBI 
finally withdrew from that realm when the military offered its signals intelligence 
resources to the Bureau to monitor secret communications and perform cryptanalysis 
(Johnson, 1995, pp. 108). By ending its role as a competitor to the military, the FBI also 
made way for close FBI-NSA cooperation in VENONA, for example. 344  More 
importantly, the weight of the evidence supports the notion that bureaucratic feuding and 
interagency competition poison interagency relations and hamper cooperation. When US 
intelligence agencies shared responsibilities for a particular realm or intelligence 
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discipline, they did not join forces but instead struggled among themselves. So separating 
or at least clearly delineating their responsibilities is a necessary condition for close 
cooperation.  
 
Chapter 7 continues with this investigation focusing on US intelligence cooperation 
during the height of the Cold War.     
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
US INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AT 









7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter examines two important historical cases that occurred during the height of 
the Cold War with the aim of ascertaining if any of the factors influencing US 
interagency cooperation in previous time periods were found once more. Aside from the 
threat of World War III, this time period was also characterized by deep suspicion 
between the American people and the US government. Indeed, while LBJ suspected that 
rampant protests against his administration were instigated by foreign powers, many 
Americans were convinced at the same time that the US president was somehow 
complicit in the assassination of his predecessor – JFK (see, e.g., Theoharis, 2007). It was 
under this cloud that the nation came under illegal surveillance by the NSA, CIA and 
FBI. Meanwhile, gaps in interagency cooperation remained although relations did 
stabilize somewhat compared to earlier time periods.   
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7.2 CASE VII: FBI–CIA COOPERATION DURING THE COLD WAR   
 
Revealed during the Church Committee hearings in 1975, this case is significant in that 
CIA–FBI cooperation was actually maintained over an extended period of 15 years. In 
sharp contrast to the interagency feuding that persisted between the CIA and FBI after the 
COI was created in 1941, this particular instance of sustained cooperation between the 
two agencies was a marked improvement – and it began when the CIA initiated an 




HTLINGUAL is the codename of an illegal mail interception program conducted by the 
CIA during the Cold War. The genesis of HTLINGUAL can be traced back to early 1952 
when someone within the CIA came up with the oddball idea of spying on the Soviet 
Union by monitoring international mails between the US and USSR.345 It was thought 
then that by monitoring the names and addresses on US first-class mails, the CIA could 
find out who in the US were maintaining strong business, political, academic and familial 
ties in the Soviet Union and perhaps even identify persons suitable for recruitment by the 
CIA.346 In any event, the CIA would not be breaking the law as long as it examined only 
the exteriors of the letters – a procedure known as ‘mail cover’. Of course, the implicit 
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understanding within the CIA at the time was that a small number of letters would still be 
opened and the contents analyzed for intelligence information.347  
 
But first, a distinction must be made here. A mail cover involves examining the exterior 
of a letter and possibly to record the names and addresses of the correspondents without 
opening the letter itself. Mail opening, on the other hand, involves removing a letter 
surreptitiously from its envelope to photograph or record its contents and then re-
inserting the letter back into its envelope. Crucially, under US laws, mail cover is legal 
while mail opening is not.348 Above all, the sanctity of US first-class mails is protected by 
both the US Constitution and federal law. 349  Under the Fourth Amendment, 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” of letters are explicitly prohibited; furthermore, as 
letters constitute a form of verbal communication, they are also protected by the First 
Amendment which guarantees the freedom of speech. Meanwhile, US federal statutes 
also provide a degree of protection against illegal mail opening. Accordingly, a letter may 
be opened and its contents inspected by Postal Service personnel only when an address at 
which the letter can be delivered to is not found on the exterior. In other words, a letter 
may only be opened by Postal Service personnel to facilitate its delivery. Under no 
circumstance may a law enforcement or intelligence officer open a letter and record its 
content without a warrant.350 In spite of these prohibitions, the CIA still went ahead with 
the mail interception program.  
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After some preliminary inquiries, CIA officials discovered that the majority of 
international mails between the USSR and US were routed through New York and so the 
decision was taken to conduct the mail interception out of the New York General Post 
Office in Manhattan.351 Before the program could be initiated, the CIA had to secure the 
approval of the Chief Postal Inspector. But CIA officials concluded that securing 
approval would be problematic since no Postal Inspector would knowingly partake in an 
illegal mail opening operation. Therefore, when a group of CIA officials met with the 
incumbent Chief Postal Inspector, he was deliberately misled into thinking that the CIA 
would only be examining the exteriors of first-class mails to and from the USSR. 
Deceived by CIA officials, the Chief Postal Inspector consented.352 With this last obstacle 
out of the way, project HTLINGUAL – as the program came to be known – was finally in 
place, and over the next 20 years (from 1953 to 1973) would evolve into an expansive 
mail opening program intercepting millions of international mails.353  
 
It remains a mystery as to when HTLINGUAL actually morphed into a full-scale mail 
opening program or even who gave the initial authorization for it. 354  But records 
indicated that by 1955, CIA officers, working alongside Postal Service personnel, had 
                                                  
351 It is important to note that the CIA actually carried out four separate mail interception programs within 
the US during the Cold War. The largest and longest-running CIA mail interception program was known by 
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the decision was made to concentrate on this particular program in this thesis.   
352 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part II: CIA 
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354 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part II: CIA 
Domestic Mail Opening, Section 3C: New York City Mail Intercept Project: Full Operation of the Program 
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begun to smuggle a small number of letters out of the New York General Post Office for 
opening at a nearby CIA facility. After being photographed, the letters were re-sealed and 
inserted back into the mail system the following day.355  
 
However, due to the huge volume of mails involved, CIA officials soon made the 
decision to move the operation from a small room at the New York General Post Office 
to a secure room at LaGuardia Airport (and finally to JFK International Airport). More 
importantly, at this new facility, international mails between the US and USSR could be 
intercepted and then quickly processed just as they were about to be delivered. 
Meanwhile, operational control of HTLINGUAL was transferred from the CIA’s Office 
of Security to the CIA’s CI Staff (counterintelligence), which ran the program until it was 
terminated by DCI James Schlesinger in 1973.356 Incidentally, when the CI Staff assumed 
operational control of HTLINGUAL in 1955, that CIA division was headed by a close 
associate of William King Harvey – James Jesus Angleton (see Appendix 6 for more 
information on Angleton).357  
 
By the time HTLINGUAL was terminated, the CIA had intercepted more than 28 million 
first-class mails to and from the USSR. Of this staggering number, close to 215 thousand 
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letters were opened and their contents photographed.358 The sheer number of letters being 
intercepted even prompted a CIA official to use the term “a shotgun approach” to 
describe the broad coverage of HTLINGUAL.359 The CIA for that matter did not appear 
to be selective at all when choosing its targets – dissidents, businessmen, journalists, 
scholars and even politicians were all fair game for the CIA.360  Even more shocking was 
the fact that of the thousand of letters that were photographed, the copies were not 
destroyed after being examined by CIA analysts but indexed and then filed away.361       
 
7.2.2 THE FBI UNCOVERED HTLINGUAL AND ITS REACTION 
 
Presumably, as the nation’s premier law enforcement agency, the FBI would not stand for 
the CIA’s illegal mail interception program if the Bureau were to discover HTLINGUAL; 
after all, the program was clearly illegal. But as it turned out, when the FBI accidentally 
uncovered HTLINGUAL in early 1958, senior Bureau officials opted instead to take 
advantage of the CIA program.362 By the time HTLINGUAL was terminated in 1973, the 
FBI had received more than 57 thousand verbatim transcripts or summaries of intercepted 
letters from the CIA.363  
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Even more incredible, the FBI was itself conducting a contemporaneous mail interception 
program of its own.364 Records indicated that the FBI had begun intercepting US first-
class mails as early as 1940 (in comparison, HTLINGUAL was initiated only in 1953).365 
Over a period of 26 years, the FBI intercepted, screened and opened scores of first-class 
mails in the US.366 One might even argue that the FBI’s mail interception program was 
far more intrusive than HTLINGUAL in the sense that the FBI intercepted purely 
domestic as well as international mails whereas the CIA only intercepted the latter 
kind.367  
 
When the FBI first began intercepting mail, the technique was used primarily to collect 
counter-espionage information on suspected Axis spies operating in the US.368 The idea 
was that Axis spies in the US could be identified by studying the mails of Axis 
diplomatic establishments in Washington D.C.369 When World War II ended, the FBI 
quickly shifted its focus to fighting communism. Mails belonging to the diplomatic 
establishments of Soviet bloc countries were intercepted at the Main Post Office in 
Washington D.C. and then brought to FBI Headquarters for opening.370 In early 1958, the 
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FBI decided to expand its mail interception program to New York City after receiving 
information from an allied nation’s intelligence service that illegal Soviet agents 
throughout the world had been instructed to communicate with a particular address in the 
Soviet Union.371 In theory then, if the FBI could screen every letter sent between the US 
and USSR, it could identify every illegal Soviet agent in the US.  
 
After some preliminary inquiries, Bureau officials learned that all mails between the US 
and USSR were routed through postal facilities in New York City and Washington D.C. 
The FBI was already intercepting mails routed through the Main Post Office in 
Washington D.C., but it did not operate such a program in New York. However, when 
Bureau officials tried to secure approval from the Chief Postal Inspector for a ‘mail 
cover’ operation in New York City, they discovered that another agency was already 
running such an operation in the Big Apple – the FBI had just stumbled upon 
HTLINGUAL.372     
 
Faced with certain exposure of HTLINGUAL, James Angleton finally confessed to the 
FBI Liaison to the CIA, Sam Papich, that the CIA had been tampering with US first-class 
mails sent to and from the Soviet Union since 1953 (see Appendix 6 for more information 
on Papich). 373  When Papich (who happened to share a close bond with Angleton) 
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reported HTLINGUAL to his superiors, he feared that the news would inevitably cause a 
furor at the FBI because it was evident that the CIA had encroached on the FBI’s 
domestic intelligence domain.374 According to William Sullivan, director of the FBI’s 
Domestic Intelligence Division under Hoover, telling Hoover the CIA had intruded on the 
FBI’s domain was tantamount to “waving a red flag in front of a bull” (Sullivan, 1979, 
pp. 62).  
 
As it turned out, all hell did not break loose at the FBI that time partly because senior 
Bureau officials came to acknowledge that, even though HTLINGUAL was conducted on 
US soil, the CIA did have a legitimate right to carry out the program as the intelligence 
information generated was primarily of a foreign nature. More importantly, senior FBI 
officials reasoned that Bureau interests would be better served by leveraging on 
HTLINGUAL for intelligence information than challenging the CIA for control of that 
program. In other words, rather than seize control of HTLINGUAL from the CIA, the 
FBI could simply levy requests on the CIA (to collect certain information for the 
Bureau); that way, the FBI could enjoy the fruits of the program without expending 
resources or assuming any risk of exposure. So the FBI opted not to challenge the CIA 
for control of HTLINGUAL.375 
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Meanwhile, FBI officials also made the decision not to inform the CIA of the FBI’s own 
mail interception program.376 As a result, the CIA never learned of the FBI’s program 
until 1961. 377  In that year, the FBI finally informed the CIA of the Bureau’s mail 
interception program because FBI officials felt that CIA knowledge was necessary in 
order for the Bureau to request from the Agency a list of known espionage mail drops in 
Europe. 378  (The list would enable the FBI to identify illegal agents in the US by 
monitoring letters sent to and from those European addresses.) Certain that the CIA 
would question the rationale behind that somewhat odd request, the FBI finally decided 
to come clean with the Agency.   
 
DIAGRAM 7.1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN THE FBI & CIA MAIL 
INTERCEPTION PROGRAMS 
 
                                    HTLINGUAL                                     FBI INFORMS                        HTLINGUAL                              
          1940                     STARTS                     1958                      CIA                 1966              ENDS 
 
 
   
 FBI PROGRAM               1952              FBI DISCOVERS         1961         FBI PROGRAM    1973 
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It would have made sense for the FBI and CIA to join forces from the beginning. Indeed, 
given the duplicative nature of their mail interception operations, some letters were 
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almost certainly opened twice – once by each agency as the letters moved through the 
postal system. For example, an international letter from Washington D.C. to Moscow 
could be intercepted first by the FBI in Washington D.C., and then again by the CIA in 
New York while in transit to Moscow. Even though it did not take more than a few 
minutes to open a letter and photograph its contents, the translation (if it was written in a 
foreign language) and analysis of it definitely required more time and manpower. Some 
form of interagency collaboration would surely have freed up valuable resources for other 
uses. Furthermore, the CIA and FBI would have benefited from close cooperation since 
their programs produced intelligence information that was relevant to the other’s work.379 
Indeed, domestic intelligence intercepted by the CIA could be passed on to the FBI while 
foreign intelligence intercepted by the FBI could in turn be shared with the CIA. 
Notwithstanding the apparent benefits of cooperation, the CIA and FBI opted to keep 
their mail interception programs secret from each other (at least in the beginning).  
 
7.2.3 FACTORS WHICH PROMPTED THE CIA TO WITHHOLD 
HTLINGUAL FROM THE FBI 
 
To be sure, CIA officials did consider informing the FBI shortly after HTLINGUAL was 
initiated because they understood that the domestic intelligence information generated 
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were of value to the Bureau.380 Even so, the FBI was never informed nor was Bureau 
participation in HTLINGUAL ever sought by the CIA. 
 
A combination of factors ultimately prompted the CIA to shun the FBI in this case.  
 
First of all, the FBI was bypassed because CIA–FBI relations at the time were decidedly 
rancorous. Indeed, according to Angleton, interagency relations “were very spotty leading 
up to 1954”.381  
 
One reason for this agitated state between the two agencies was that the contemporaneous 
FBI Liaison to the CIA, Cartha DeLoach, did little to improve CIA–FBI relations.382 As 
the FBI Liaison to the CIA, DeLoach played a crucial role in terms of bridging any 
division between the two agencies but he seemed to have failed in that capacity.383 
Angleton’s view that DeLoach failed to improve CIA–FBI relations was also echoed by 
William Sullivan; according to the head of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division 
under Hoover, not only did DeLoach fail to improve CIA–FBI relations, he even set out 
to drive “a wedge between the two agencies” (Riebling, 2002, pp. 111). For one, by 
feeding to Hoover’s animosity toward the CIA, the FBI Liaison aggravated pre-existing 
tensions between the FBI and CIA and invariably poisoned the atmosphere for 
interagency cooperation. “[As] long as DeLoach was CIA liaison, there was constant 
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friction [between the FBI and CIA because DeLoach] exacerbated the problems between 
the two agencies rather than to tamp them down,” according to FBI agent Robert 
Lamphere.384 Notably, FBI–CIA relations improved when DeLoach was removed as the 
FBI Liaison to the CIA and that position was taken over by a G-man who eventually 
established a close bond with Angleton – Sam Papich.            
 
The second reason the FBI and CIA did not enjoy “the best of relations” leading up to the 
mid-1950s, according to Angleton, was that the CIA angered Hoover by hiring a number 
of FBI personnel.385 One of those FBI agents hired by the CIA was William King Harvey 
and according to archival documents obtained for this thesis, Harvey certainly did not 
facilitate CIA–FBI relations after joining the CIA.386 As a consequence of this poaching 
of FBI personnel, Hoover developed “a very strong feeling” against the CIA which 
ultimately poisoned the atmosphere for FBI–CIA cooperation.387  
 
On top of spotty interagency relations set off by DeLoach and the CIA practice of hiring 
FBI personnel, my research also established that CIA–FBI relations at the director-level 
were rancorous too. As it turned out, the two CIA directors before 1954 – Roscoe 
Hillenkoetter and Walter Bedell Smith – had both experienced a thorny relationship with 
FBI Director Hoover (see Table 7.1).  
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TABLE 7.1: FBI & CIA DIRECTORS WHO SERVED DURING THE 1950s  
 
 
CIA DIRECTOR & TENURE 
 
 
FBI DIRECTOR & TENURE 
 
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (1947 – 1950) 
 
 
Walter Bedell Smith (1950 – 1953) 
 
 





J. Edgar Hoover 
(1935 – 1972) 
 
Source: Weiner, 2007; Kessler, 1992 
 
Relationship between Hillenkoetter and Hoover was especially bad because of the FBI 
Director’s refusal to share with the CIA FBI information on the Soviet spy, Klaus Fuchs 
(Turner, 2006a, pp. 56).388 Responsible for producing an estimate on when the Soviets 
might acquire an atomic bomb, the CIA was completely blindsided when the Soviets first 
detonated a nuclear device in 1949, according to CIA historian Donald P. Steury.389 For 
the CIA’s blunder, Hillenkoetter blamed Hoover especially because the FBI Director had 
refused to share FBI information on Fuchs with the Agency (Turner, 2006a, pp. 56). 
More than anything else, Hillenkoetter was convinced that if his agency had access to 
FBI information which indicated that Fuchs had given US atomic secrets to the Soviets, 
the CIA would have put forth a more accurate assessment.390 Instead, the CIA put forth a 
final assessment on August 24, 1949 which stated that the Soviets would not acquire a 
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nuclear weapon until at least 1953 – five days later, the USSR detonated its first atomic 
bomb (Steury, 2007).  
 
Relationship between Hoover and Walter Bedell Smith was just as bad because the FBI 
Director would drag his feet whenever the CIA Director levied requests on the Bureau 
(Sullivan, 1979, pp. 41). One day, Smith finally exploded in anger and wrote a harsh 
letter to Hoover with the following words: 
 
Whether you, Mr. Hoover, like me or not has nothing to do with the 
cooperation between the two government agencies and it is mandatory for 
you to give the CIA full cooperation within your limits…………. [If] it is 
not done, if you want to fight this, I’ll fight you all over Washington.391 
 
Finally, relations between Hoover and Allen Dulles were decidedly chilly even though 
there were no reported incidents of major feuding between the two directors, according to 
DCI Dulles himself (Dulles, 1963). This frosty state of affairs was also corroborated by 
Sam Papich who observed that Hoover met Dulles “face-to-face no more than three or 
four times” between 1953 and 1961.392  
 
On the whole, rancorous relations at the director-level definitely acted as a strong 
deterrent against interagency cooperation as few CIA and FBI officials, out of concerns 
for their careers, would want to appear as opposing sentiments at the top by working 
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together. When promotion in an intelligence system is determined on the basis of being a 
“team player” and “not rocking the boat”, it is quite obvious that those intelligence 
officials who disregard sentiments at the top would not be rewarded (Aid, 2012, pp. 64). 
Indeed, according to intelligence expert Matthew Aid, the “natural tendency of all 
bureaucracies is to demand conformity, stifle dissent and squelch personal initiative”.393 
Given the chilly state of affairs between the two agencies, it was no surprise that CIA 
officials neither informed the FBI of HTLINGUAL nor sought Bureau participation in 
the mail interception program.  
 
Fear of losing operational control over HTLINGUAL to the FBI was also another major 
factor which prompted the CIA to bypass the FBI, according to eminent historian Athan 
Theoharis (2007, pp. 141 & 235). By all accounts, HTLINGUAL did encroach on FBI 
domain in that the program was conducted on US soil and it pulled in domestic 
intelligence information (even though it was designed specifically to collect foreign 
intelligence). Based on that technicality, the FBI could certainly dispute the CIA’s 
authority over HTLINGUAL since the Bureau was the lead agency responsible for 
domestic intelligence. If the CIA were to lose control of HTLINGUAL to the Bureau, 
then its requirement for foreign intelligence might ultimately be superseded by the FBI’s 
requirement for domestic intelligence. This point was substantiated by Angleton, who 
testified during the Church Committee hearings that if the FBI were to assume control of 
HTLINGUAL, the CIA’s core requirements would not be served by the FBI “as we have 
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served their”.394 Therefore, the CIA opted to bypass the FBI so that the Agency could 
retain exclusive control of the program. That the CIA wanted to retain exclusive control 
of HTLINGUAL should not be unanticipated as this sort of conduct followed a similar 
pattern observed in the Berlin Tunnel operation. As noted in that case, one of the reasons 
which prompted the CIA to bypass the NSA was that the Agency wanted to retain 
operational control of that operation (see Section 6.5.2).  
 
In his testimony to the Church Committee, Angleton also alluded to the sensitive nature 
of HTLINGUAL as another factor which prompted the CIA to bypass (among others) the 
FBI.395 HTLINGUAL was conducted in clear violation of the law; first-class mails were 
opened, photographed and indexed without warrant or even proper authorization. One 
simply does not make known to the leading law enforcement agency in the country that 
one is breaking the law. The irony was of course that the premier law enforcement 
agency in the country was also breaking the law at the same with its mail interception 
program.   
 
Aside from being illegal, HTLINGUAL was also sensitive in the sense that its success 
rested squarely on the Soviets believing that US intelligence agencies would never 
contemplate violating the sanctity of US first-class mails. 396  Certainly, there was 
indication that the Soviets, confident that the sanctity of first-class mails would not be 
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violated, were using the mail system to communicate with their agents overseas.397 If the 
Soviets were to come to doubt the sanctity of US first-class mails, they would 
undoubtedly terminate the practice of using the open mail system for their secret 
communications and the CIA would end up losing a potentially valuable source of 
intelligence information (see Diagram 7.2).  
 
DIAGRAM 7.2: KEY FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE CIA TO BYPASS THE 
FBI IN HTLINGUAL 
 
            
            
            
            






So from an intelligence standpoint, it was necessary to keep a tight lid on HTLINGUAL 
so as to reduce the risk of exposure. Indeed, HTLINGUAL was so closely guarded a 
secret that even two contemporaneous CIA directors – John McCone and William Raborn 
                                                  
397 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part III: 
Project Hunter, Section IIA: FBI “Discovery” Of The CIA’s Mail Intercept Project: 1958 – A Proposed FBI 






The program was 
considered too 
sensitive to share 
(Routine) 
 





To retain operational 
control so as to ensure 




Relations between the 
FBI and CIA directors 
were tenuous 
(Setting) 
CIA – FBI relations were 
strained due to the 
poaching of FBI 
personnel by the CIA 
(Setting) 
234   
– were never briefed on the mail interception program (see Appendix 4 for the tenures of 
McCone and Raborn).398 Other key figures that were kept in the dark included the US 
president, the Attorney General and the Chief Postal Inspector, just to name a few.399 
Hence, one should not be particularly astonished that the FBI was kept in the dark too.  
 
7.2.4 FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE FBI TO SHUN THE CIA 
 
While the CIA was keeping HTLINGUAL hidden from the FBI, the Bureau was also not 
showing its card either. Even after the FBI was briefed by the CIA on the existence of 
HTLINGUAL in 1958, the Bureau continued to withhold its own mail interception 
program from the CIA.  
 
According to William Branigan, the FBI Section Chief responsible for espionage 
investigations, the CIA was not told of the Bureau’s mail interception program because it 
involved a “strictly domestic situation involving persons in the US [and therefore] solely 
within the jurisdiction of the FBI.”400 In other words, Branigan was asserting that the FBI 
was not obligated to inform the CIA of the Bureau’s mail interception program as the 
operation was essentially domestic in nature and hence, beyond the responsibilities of the 
CIA.   
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However, Branigan’s assertion strikes one as somewhat specious because even though 
the primary focus of the FBI’s mail interception program was to collect domestic 
intelligence, the operation nevertheless generated a large amount of foreign intelligence 
information. In fact, the Church Committee established that the FBI program intercepted 
(on an incidental basis) “a great deal of” intelligence information pertaining to foreign 
countries.401 For instance, the FBI’s program acquired such information as the economic, 
industrial, political and living conditions of an unspecified Asian country.402 In an age 
when the flow of information was still severely limited by technology, such information 
would have been invaluable to the CIA.  
 
Therefore, Branigan’s assertion that the FBI’s mail interception program was beyond the 
CIA’s jurisdiction was untenable since the Bureau’s program was pulling in foreign 
intelligence information and the CIA did hold primary responsibility for foreign 
intelligence. Just as the FBI could have interpreted HTLINGUAL as an intrusion into the 
Bureau’s domestic intelligence domain, the CIA could also make the case that the FBI 
had intruded on the Agency’s foreign intelligence domain with the Bureau’s mail 
interception program (Riebling, 2002, pp. 152). Evidently then, the problem was not a 
bona fide jurisdictional issue.  
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In all likelihood, the key factor that prevented the FBI from sharing its mail interception 
program with the CIA was not so much jurisdictional delineation but the sensitivity of the 
program itself. This raison d’être was clearly reflected in a contemporaneous memo from 
FBI Director Hoover to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI’s New York office 
which stated that the Bureau should not reveal its mail interception program to the CIA 
due to its “extremely sensitive nature”.403  
 
Like the CIA, the FBI broke the law when it opened US first-class mails without proper 
authorization. But for the FBI, the backlash would definitely be more serious if its mail 
interception program were exposed since the Bureau was supposedly the premier law 
enforcement agency in the country. Hence, it was only logical for the FBI to be 
particularly circumspect with regard to its mail interception program. Like 
HTLINGUAL, the FBI’s mail interception program was kept hidden from the incumbent 
US president, Postmaster General and even the Attorney General.404 As Donald Moore, 
head of the FBI’s Espionage Research Branch, explained during the Church Committee 
hearings, “anytime one additional person becomes aware of [the program], there is 
potential for the information to go further.”405   
 
The “extremely sensitive nature” of the FBI’s mail interception program also ensured that 
Hoover would withhold that operation from the CIA simply because the FBI Director did 
                                                  
403 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part IV: FBI 
Mail Opening, Section III: Nature & Value Of The Product: Requests by Other Intelligence Agencies, Apr 
23, 1976, pp. 80   
404 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part IV: FBI 
Mail Opening, Section V: External Authorizations, Apr 23, 1976, pp. 91 – 95  
405 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part IV: FBI 
Mail Opening, Section VII: Legal and Security Considerations Within the FBI – Concern with Exposure, 
Apr 23, 1976, pp. 101   
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not trust the CIA to keep a secret. In particular, my analysis of Angleton’s testimony to 
the Church Committee indicated that Hoover invariably resisted FBI–CIA cooperation 
primarily because the FBI Director feared that Bureau secrets, if shared with the CIA, 
might ultimately be betrayed by Agency personnel.  
 
According to Angleton, because the CIA had re-hired a large number of ex-OSS 
personnel, Hoover “only had to look at the fact that during World War II, the OSS had 
many people who were loyal to General Donovan but also had loyalties to the 
opposition” to conclude that “there was a very grave problem of the security standards of 
the Agency”. It was this acute sense of security that prompted the FBI Director to shun 
FBI–CIA cooperation, according to the legendary CIA spymaster.406  
 
More significantly, an archival document uncovered during this investigation indicated 
that Angleton did not reveal the full extent of the CIA’s security problem at the time. This 
document, which contained the sworn testimony of Sam Papich (FBI Liaison to the CIA 
from 1952 to 1970), exposed a CIA rife with security loopholes. According to Papich, the 
FBI became wary of dealing with the CIA after the Agency hired many aliens out of 
middle-European countries into its ranks.407 Mostly hired during 1947 and 1954, many of 
those CIA personnel “kept their attachments to their previous culture and were 
socialistically-inclined”. Making matters worse, in the immediate postwar years, the 
Soviets launched an aggressive campaign to recruit CIA personnel as spies and this 
                                                  
406 Testimony of James Angleton, Sep 24, 1975, Hearings before the Church Committee, Vol. II: The 
Huston Plan, Sep 1975, pp. 67 – 68. 
407 Affidavit & testimony of Papich, Sam, J., Mar 5, 1975, pp. 1, 2 & 5, Rockefeller Commission, NARA 
RIF# 157-10011-10079. 
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particular group of former aliens was targeted for recruitment due to their cultural and 
ideological dispositions. Consequently, FBI officials came to doubt the loyalty of that 
group of CIA personnel and distrusted them deeply.408  
 
Given the “extremely sensitive nature” of the FBI’s mail interception program, it would 
have been inconceivable for Hoover to risk betrayal by sharing the program with the CIA 
– an organization deeply distrusted by the Bureau at the time. So the CIA never learned 
of the FBI’s program until 1961 when the Bureau had no choice but to come clean. As 
noted earlier, even though secrecy is imperative in the intelligence business, it could still 
be superseded – especially when another agency’s specialized resources were required. In 
this case, the FBI ultimately owned up to the CIA over the Bureau’s mail interception 
program when CIA knowledge was necessary for the Bureau to acquire from the Agency 
a list of espionage mail drop addresses.  
 
DIAGRAM 7.3: KEY FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE FBI TO WITHHOLD 
ITS MAIL INTERCEPTION PROGRAM FROM THE CIA 
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In retrospect, even though FBI–CIA cooperation did eventually materialize – foreign 
intelligence collected by the FBI was disseminated to the CIA and domestic intelligence 
generated by HTLINGUAL was shared with the Bureau – the practice of withholding 
intelligence information or resources for subsequent bartering was once more observed in 
this case. The danger of course with such a practice is that an agency without the requisite 
information or resources can easily be cut off from the flow of vital intelligence. 
Certainly, in the absence of an overarching authority to act as an impartial advocate for 
those agencies and departments that had been unduly shut out, it is highly doubtful that 
this problem can be resolved.       
 
7.2.5 KEY FACTORS THAT FACILITATED CIA–FBI 
COOPERATION IN HTLINGUAL 
 
After the FBI learned of HTLINGUAL in early 1958, it began to levy requests on the 
CIA to intercept the correspondence of persons under Bureau investigation and over the 
next 15 years (until HTLINGUAL was terminated), the FBI received more than 57 
thousand letters from the CIA.409 410 My research indicated that two major factors greatly 
facilitated the CIA’s readiness to share intelligence generated by HTLINGUAL with the 
FBI even though the Bureau did not contribute any financial or manpower resources to 
the CIA program. 
 
                                                  
409 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part III: 
Project Hunter, Section III: Requests Levied by the FBI on the CIA’s New York Mail Intercept Project – 
The Procedure Established, Apr 23, 1976, pp. 59   
410 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part III: 
Project Hunter, Section IV: Products Received by the FBI from the CIA’s New York Mail Intercept 
Project, Apr 23, 1976, pp. 63   
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Crucially, the CIA was prepared to share HTLINGUAL materials with the FBI because 
the Bureau introduced strict security measures to minimize the risk of HTLINGUAL 
being compromised. The FBI put in place a special program – known as Project Hunter – 
to ensure that HTLINGUAL materials would not be mishandled by Bureau personnel. 
Because of Project Hunter, the FBI assuaged CIA fears of HTLINGUAL being betrayed 
by Bureau personnel; after all, the success of HTLINGUAL rested squarely on the 
Soviets believing that US intelligence agencies would never contemplate violating the 
sanctity of first-class mails. Moreover, the CIA program was also illegal so the last thing 
the Agency wanted was for HTLINGUAL to be exposed.  
 
Project Hunter mandated a number of exacting security protocols to minimize the risk of 
HTLINGUAL materials being mishandled by Bureau personnel. Firstly, HTLINGUAL 
materials received from the CIA were handled only by a single desk within the Soviet 
Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) at FBI Headquarters. This ensured 
that the number of FBI personnel who could gain access to those sensitive materials were 
strictly limited. Once HTLINGUAL materials were received by that particular desk, the 
FBI agent in charge would review the materials and then channel specific items to other 
interested supervisors within the DID. Moreover, to ensure that items channeled to 
interested supervisors were not being mishandled, they must all be returned to the 
originating desk. Once returned, these items were either destroyed or filed away in a 
special area separate from other Bureau files to limit access by unauthorized FBI 
personnel. Lastly, if an item were found to contain information which might be of interest 
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to a Bureau division411 outside of the DID, that information would first be disguised or 
paraphrased as information obtained from a more banal source (such as an informant) 
before being disseminated with a specific warning that the information must be not 
shared with any agencies outside of the FBI.412 Owing to these strict security protocols, 
the FBI was able to keep HTLINGUAL secret until it was uncovered by the Church 
Committee in the mid-1970s. Without a doubt, this exercise of intense circumspection on 
the part of the Bureau contributed to the CIA’s readiness to share HTLINGUAL with the 
FBI.          
 
To some extent, the CIA’s readiness to share HTLINGUAL with the FBI was also due to 
the close bond between Angleton and Papich. At the very least, their closeness promoted 
an atmosphere that was conducive to CIA–FBI cooperation. On a somewhat trivial level, 
both Angleton and Papich loved fly fishing and that brought them together (Riebling, 
2002, pp. 136 – 139). But in my view, the more crucial aspect was that Papich actually 
understood intelligence work and that helped the G-man to establish a bond with 
Angleton. Above all, Papich commiserated with the CIA’s work because he had served in 
the FBI’s SIS in Rio de Janeiro from 1943 until that foreign intelligence unit was 
disbanded in 1947.413 Angleton, meanwhile, was the quintessential ‘spook’ who had been 
in the intelligence business since the days of the OSS (Holzman, 2008). This shared 
                                                  
411 The FBI, it is important to point out, consists of a headquarters in Washington D.C., 56 field offices in 
every major city and more than 400 smaller resident agencies in smaller cities throughout the US. 
Meanwhile, the FBI also maintains a number of so-called Legal Attaché offices overseas (Aid, 2012, pp. 
47; Richelson, 2012, pp. 153).   
412 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part IV: 
Product Received by the FBI from the CIA’s New York Mail Intercept Poject – Administrative Processing 
of the Product Received, Apr 23, 1976, pp. 64  
413 Affidavit & testimony of Papich, Sam, J., Mar 5, 1975, Rockefeller Commission, NARA RIF# 157-
10011-10079  
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understanding of the intelligence trade, in my view, was what ultimately brought Papich 
and Angleton together and that in turn facilitated the dissemination of HTLINGUAL 
materials to the Bureau by Angleton’s CI Staff.  
 
Still, it is important to avoid overstating the significance of the bond between Papich and 
Angleton in facilitating interagency cooperation between the CIA and FBI. After all, 
Angleton did not reveal the existence of HTLINGUAL to Papich until its discovery by 
the FBI was imminent. Nor did Papich immediately come clean with Angleton on the 
Bureau’s own mail interception program. So in the intelligence world, it seems that 
secrets are still kept even among close friends. Ultimately, one must recognize that the 
actions of both Angleton and Papich were circumscribed by orders laid down by their 
superiors and it would have been tricky for them to defy those instructions. But while 
there are limits to how much a fine liaison officer (such as Papich) can do to facilitate 
close interagency cooperation without the support of superiors, a poor liaison officer 
(such as DeLoach) certainly has the capacity to create an incredible amount of damage to 
interagency relations.  
 
Therefore, action must be taken whenever intelligence officials end up poisoning the 
atmosphere for cooperation, according to Burton Gerber. Having served with the CIA for 
almost 40 years, the former head of the Soviet/Eastern Europe (SE) division insists that it 
is imperative to recuse an intelligence official once it becomes apparent that he is 
undermining the atmosphere for interagency cooperation. Regardless of whether he is a 
CIA officer or not, that intelligence official must be removed from his position to avoid 
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damaging interagency relations to the point where cooperation becomes impossible.414 
Indeed, looking at every case discussed so far, one can certainly observe that rancorous 
relations were invariably associated with limited interagency cooperation.  
 
DIAGRAM 7.4: TWO MAJOR FACTORS THAT FACILITATED THE 







7.2.6 TERMINATION OF UNAUTHORIZED MAIL INTERCEPTION 
 
The FBI terminated its mail interception program in June 1966 whereas the CIA 
terminated HTLINGUAL in February 1973. With the termination of the two programs, 
all illegal mail interception activities by the two agencies supposedly came to an end.  
 
When Hoover turned seventy in 1964, the FBI Director reportedly became conservative 
in his handling of Bureau affairs. By then, Hoover was already passed the mandatory 
retirement age for US civil servants but was able to hang on as head of the Bureau only 
because President Lyndon B. Johnson had specifically waived that retirement 
requirement for the elderly FBI Director. Worried that any embarrassment to the FBI 
could bring about his downfall, Hoover turned cautious and decided to terminate all 
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questionable Bureau programs (Sullivan, 1979, pp. 60 & 205). Hence, the FBI’s mail 
interception program was brought to an end.  
 
But despite turning cautious, Hoover did not deem it necessary though to terminate 
Project Hunter because that program carried little risk for the Bureau (in the event of 
exposure). As the CIA was solely responsible for the mail interception, the Agency – not 
the Bureau – would bear the full brunt if that illegal program were to come to light. It 
seems that even though Hoover had grown old, he remained shrewd as ever. 
Consequently, the Bureau continued to receive intelligence from the CIA via Project 
Hunter until HTLINGUAL was terminated.415       
 
In 1973, CIA Director James Schlesinger too brought HTLINGUAL to an end after 
concluding that the cost of exposure to the CIA far outweighed the value of the 
intelligence produced.416 In that tension-charged climate brought on by the Watergate 
scandal, Schlesinger’s decision seemed only logical. To be sure, in the years prior to 
Schlesinger’s decision to terminate HTLINGUAL, the question of whether that program 
ought to be terminated had already been raised. Indeed, as early as 1969, the CIA 
Inspector General Gordon Stewart had assessed that HTLINGUAL was illegal and that 
the program ought to be terminated or handed over to the FBI for management.417 Despite 
that assessment, then CIA Director Richard Helms decided that the CIA should continue 
                                                  
415 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part V: 
Termination of the Project, Apr 23, 1976, pp. 66  
416 The Church Committee Report, Book III: Domestic CIA & FBI Mail Opening Programs, Part II: CIA 
Domestic Mail Opening, Section 2: New York City Mail Intercept Project: Termination of the Project – 
Schlesinger’s Decision to Suspend the Project, Apr 23, 1976, pp. 38 – 39  
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Domestic Mail Opening, Section 2: New York City Mail Intercept Project: Termination of the Project – 
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with HTLINGUAL; hence, that program was not terminated until 1973 when Schlesinger 
took over from Helms as CIA Director.418  
 
7.2.7 SUMMARIZING THE KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED 
CIA–FBI COOPERATION IN THIS CASE 
 
A number of key factors influenced FBI–CIA cooperation in this case.  
 
Firstly, the CIA concealed its mail interception program from the FBI to maintain 
operational control over the operation. In some respects, the CIA was prompted by a 
rational fear that it might lose its authority over HTLINGUAL if the FBI were informed. 
Secondly, fear of betrayal also prompted both the CIA and FBI to conceal their respective 
mail interception programs from each other. Since both the CIA and FBI were breaking 
the law by violating the sanctity of US first-class mails, these agencies were prompted to 
limit the number of people with knowledge to their illegal programs. Rancorous relations 
at the director-level also limited interagency cooperation. With the atmosphere poisoned 
at the highest levels of the CIA and FBI, it would be suicidal, career-wise, for lower-level 
officials from these agencies to defy their directors by engaging in interagency 
cooperation.  
 
Eventually, both the FBI and CIA did come clean with each other over their mail 
interception programs when it was no longer possible to conceal their respective 
operations from each other. In particular, the CIA revealed HTLINGUAL to the FBI 
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when it realized that discovery of its mail interception program by the Bureau was 
imminent. Later, the FBI decided to come clean with the CIA over its mail interception 
program when it needed a list of European addresses held by the Agency.  
 
Two other important factors also facilitated interagency exchanges in this case. 
Extraordinary security measures taken by the FBI to protect HTLINGUAL from being 
exposed convinced the CIA that the Bureau would not mishandle sensitive HTLINGUAL 
materials. Secondly, the close bond between Papich and Angleton no doubt also 
facilitated interagency exchanges.  
 
During the 1970s, a case of NSA–CIA cooperation provided valuable insights into the 
forces that prompted the two agencies to work together. Despite being relative obscure, 
this case stood out during the course of this investigation because it is perhaps the only 
case (as far as declassified records are concerned) in which NSA and CIA intercept 
operators actually operated alongside each other. This case is discussed next.  
 
7.3 CASE VIII: NSA–CIA COOPERATION DURING THE COLD 
WAR 
 
The genesis of this case can be traced back to early 1970 when the US Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)419  received information that several public 
telephone booths in New York City were being used by drug dealers to place calls to 
                                                  
419 The BNDD was the frontrunner of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).   
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South America in what appeared to be illegal drug deals. 420  In response, the drug 
enforcement agency wiretapped those phone booths in question to eavesdrop on the 
conversations. But one problem soon became evident. Under the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Street Act (1968) or Title III for short, a judicial warrant was required for crime-
related wiretaps.421 When BNDD officials concluded that such a warrant could not be 
obtained, they decided to turn to the NSA for assistance to monitor those international 
calls.422  
 
Then BNDD Director John Ingersoll sent a request to NSA Director Noel Gayler asking 
for “any and all COMINT information” on the alleged drug activity.423 In particular, 
Ingersoll wanted the NSA to help in identifying those who were involved in the drug 
trade as well as information on the locations of associated drug production centers.424 To 
facilitate the NSA in its task, Ingersoll even provided the NSA with a list of persons and 
organizations long suspected of involvement in illegal drug activities.425 The NSA swiftly 
complied with the BNDD Director’s request and in due course, even wound up 
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monitoring indiscriminately a large number of international calls placed between cities all 
over America and South America.426  
 
To understand why the NSA complied so readily with the BNDD’s request, it is 
important to recognize that the NSA does not have a statutory charter which set forth its 
responsibilities.427 In particular, the NSA was created by Executive Order in 1952 and its 
activities were authorized under a series of secret executive directives issued in the 
1950s.428 According to these secret directives, the NSA was banned from conducting 
domestic surveillance and strictly consigned to the realm of foreign signals 
intelligence. 429  But the phrase “domestic surveillance” was defined narrowly as 
monitoring those communications where both terminals laid inside the US. Over time, the 
NSA came to interpret that restriction to mean that it could at least monitor those 
communications where only one terminal originated from the US.430 In other words, as 
long as one end of a telephone call was outside the US, that call could be monitored by 
the NSA regardless of whether it was made between Americans. It was also this loose 
interpretation that gave the NSA the sanction it needed to begin monitoring international 
calls between the US and South America on behalf of the BNDD.   
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In June 1970, the NSA started to monitor only selected telephone switches in New York 
on behalf of the BNDD.431 However, because a large number of international calls made 
from or received in cities all over the US were switched or routed through New York, the 
NSA eventually ended up monitoring scores of phone conversations (often of people 
unrelated to the drug trade).432 Ironically, if the BNDD had proceeded to wiretap only 
those New York City public telephone booths in question, the resulting privacy intrusion 
would have been less severe; instead, thanks to the NSA’s sophisticated array of 
eavesdropping platforms, a vast amount of (mostly irrelevant) private information was 
vacuumed up by the NSA during the course of the 3-year operation (from June 1970 to 
June 1973).433  
 
7.3.1 THE CIA JOINED FORCES WITH THE NSA 
 
Sometime after the phone surveillance program was initiated, senior NSA officials 
apparently grew nervous over the potential fallout if the operation were exposed.434 After 
all, the NSA was in this particular case engaged in warrantless searches of Americans in 
clear violation of the Fourth Amendment – not to mention a slew of other statutes that 
protected the privacy of US persons. The main concern for the NSA at that time was that 
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this controversial surveillance program could be exposed because the East Coast station 
tasked with the operation was staffed by young military personnel on short tours and not 
by seasoned career intelligence officers.435 Seasoned career intelligence officers, it was 
thought, were inclined to practice a heightened sense of security whereas young enlisted 
men were more prone to security lapses.  
 
So in a move somewhat reminiscent of the NSA courting the CIA to investigate 
international leads in the VENONA program, the NSA turned to the CIA again for 
assistance. Specifically, the NSA wanted to deploy CIA career intercept operators for this 
particular operation so as to tighten security around it. The CIA readily complied with the 
NSA’s request and by late 1972 the two agencies began working together on the phone 
surveillance program.436  
 
During his testimony at the Church Committee hearings, Benson K. Buffham, a deputy 
director of the NSA at the time, explained that the decision to turn to the CIA was above 
all due to NSA concerns that the surveillance program “was a sensitive matter” and that 
“greater security would be achieved by utilizing the career intercept operators of the CIA 
to perform the activity”.437 So the NSA joined forces with the CIA in this case primarily 
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because it wanted to (1) tighten operational security and (2) secure access to the CIA’s 
signals intelligence resources.  
 
An important distinction must be made here. Crucially, it was the NSA’s requirement for 
greater confidentiality that prompted the NSA to enlist the cooperation of the CIA. In other 
words, the CIA’s cooperation was sought because the CIA retained a resource which the 
NSA needed in order to satisfy its requirement for tighter security. The NSA would not 
have enlisted the CIA’s cooperation if the Agency did not boast a resource needed by the 
NSA. Hence, tighter operational security was essentially an end in itself whereas the CIA’s 
signals intelligence resource was primarily a means to that end.  
 










Once the CIA was brought into the surveillance program, CIA intelligence officers were 
dispatched to the NSA’s East Coast Station and given the responsibility of monitoring 
those calls deemed too sensitive for NSA operators.438 But even though CIA and NSA 
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intercept operators were literally working side-by-side, there were still some divisions of 
labour between them still. In particular, the CIA intercept operators monitored only those 
phone calls of Americans named explicitly in the watch-list provided by the BNDD 
whereas the NSA operators monitored the New York switches on a less targeted scope.439 
According to NSA Deputy Director Buffham that collaborative arrangement worked well 
because “[the NSA] would be able to give the CIA operators the specific names on the 
watch-list that we did not feel we could or should provide to the [enlisted men at the] East 
Coast station.”440 More importantly, with this arrangement, the NSA could continue its 
phone surveillance operation without significant risk of public disclosure. Unfortunately, 
this cozy arrangement did not last long.  
 
7.3.2 TERMINATION OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM 
 
Shortly after the CIA was brought into the phone surveillance operation, the CIA grew 
nervous over the legality of the Agency’s participation in that program and initiated an 
internal review.441 What worried the CIA was that the Agency seemed to be serving a law 
enforcement function in that case – in clear violation of its charter. Although the National 
Security Act (1947), which created the CIA, laid out in somewhat ambiguous language 
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the Agency’s responsibilities, a domestic law enforcement function was definitively 
beyond the legal boundaries of that Act.   
 
Three months after the CIA began cooperating with the NSA, the CIA’s General Counsel 
Lawrence Houston concluded definitively that CIA participation in the phone 
surveillance program was illegal.442  Specifically, because intercepted information on 
Americans was being shared with the BNDD, the Agency had been guilty of violating 
Section 605 of the Communications Act (1934), which prohibited the unauthorized 
dissemination of the private communications of an American citizen.443 Moreover, as the 
BNDD happened to be the primary recipient of CIA intercepts, the CIA could also be 
deemed as participating in law enforcement – a function which clearly violated its 
charter. 444  Houston’s legal opinion effectively put an end to any questions over the 
legality of the Agency’s participation in the drug surveillance program. As a consequence 
of that, the CIA withdrew its cooperation with the NSA in February 1973.445  
 
Meanwhile, the CIA’s withdrawal also prompted the NSA to question whether it was 
legal for the NSA to continue assisting the BNDD.446 Soon after, the NSA initiated its 
own internal review which ultimately concluded that the NSA had gone beyond its 
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primary responsibility as a collector of foreign intelligence.447 Even though one end of 
the intercepted phone calls were made or received in a foreign country, the NSA was also 
acting in support of the BNDD in a law enforcement function – a role which the NSA had 
rejected all the while. As one senior NSA official confirmed during the Church 
Committee hearings: “We do not understand our mission to be one of supporting an 
agency with a law enforcement responsibility.”448  As a consequence of this internal 
review, NSA participation in the phone surveillance program was terminated by the 
newly-appointed NSA Director Samuel C. Phillips in June 1973 (see Diagram 7.5).449 
 
DIAGRAM 7.6: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN THE BNDD-INITIATED 
DRUG SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
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7.3.3 KEY FACTORS WHICH PROMPTED THE CIA TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE NSA 
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448 Ibid 
449 Ibid 
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As noted above, the NSA sought the CIA’s cooperation because the NSA wanted to draw 
on the career intercept operators of the CIA to enhance operational security for that 
program. But the main reasons that prompted the CIA to readily extend its assistance to 
the NSA have never been fully investigated. Specifically, what were the key factors that 
prompted the CIA to join forces with the NSA in the first place?    
 
The task of evaluating this case is particularly difficult in that relevant information is 
scarce even though it is no longer classified. Given this limitation, the most productive 
method was to analyze the context in which this case was situated in. Based on a careful 
assessment of the background forces at work then, it became clear that the CIA was 
influenced primarily by three key factors.  
 
The first major reason was that NSA–CIA relations had improved dramatically by then. 
NSA Director Ralph Canine (DIRNSA 1952 – 1956) and CIA Director Allen Dulles 
(DCI 1953 – 1961) were no longer in charge and it is a matter of public records that they 
were often at loggerheads. Meanwhile, two close friends – CIA Director Richard Helms 
(DCI 1966 – 1973) and NSA Deputy Director Louis Tordella (DDIRNSA 1958 – 1974) – 
were at the helms of the CIA and NSA respectively ((Johnson, 1995, pp. 107; Bamford, 
2002, pp. 99).  
 
The close bond between Helms and Tordella certainly facilitated CIA–NSA cooperation. 
According to former NSA Director Gordon A. Blake (DIRNSA 1962 – 1965), he often 
left NSA–CIA matters to his deputy, Louis Tordella, because “he and Dick Helms were 
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thick as thieves.” 450  This marked improvement in high-level relations undoubtedly 
facilitated interagency cooperation between the two agencies during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Not only did the close bond between Helms and Tordella facilitate an 
atmosphere in which interagency cooperation could materialize readily, it also lessened 
the chances of conflict between their agencies. Indeed, according to NSA historian 
Thomas R. Johnson, this “era of good feeling” between the NSA and CIA was due in 
large part to the solid diplomatic skills of Tordella and as a result of which, relations 
between two erstwhile bickering agencies stabilized (Johnson, 1998, pp. 224).  
 
In addition, based on information obtained exclusively for this thesis, a second set of 
close relations also greatly enhanced NSA–CIA cooperation during that time period.  
 
As it turned out, specific responsibility for the phone surveillance program fell on the 
NSA’s G Group and the CIA’s Division D.451 In particular, G Group was the sub-unit 
within the NSA’s Production Organization (or simply “P”) responsible for producing 
signals intelligence of all non-communist states and hence, the NSA unit tasked with 
monitoring drug-related phone calls between New York and South America. 452 
Meanwhile, Division D (formerly known as Staff D) was the CIA’s dedicated signals 
intelligence unit whose earlier exploits included the Berlin Tunnel operation. More 
significantly, G Group and Division D were at the time headed by two seasoned 
                                                  
450 As quoted in Bamford, 2002, pp. 99.   
451 Telephone interview with Matthew Aid, Jul 8, 2011 
452 The existence of G Group was separately confirmed by NSA document, “National Security Agency – 
Organizational Manual, No. 22 – 1”, pp. 50, dated Jan 1, 1965, released Nov 22, 2006, FOIA Case #7482, 
National Security Archives.   
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intelligence officials who shared a close bond – they were the NSA’s Francis Raven and 
the CIA’s Carleton Swift (see Appendix 6 for more information on Swift and Raven).  
 
According to NSA records, Raven was a brilliant cryptanalyst whose career could be 
traced back to World War II. After the war, Raven stayed on with the Naval Security 
Group (successor to OP-20-G) and when the NSA was established in 1952, he was 
appointed the spy agency’s deputy technical director. Raven then held a number of key 
positions within the NSA until 1962 when he was made chief of G Group in “P” – a 
position he held until his retirement in 1974.453 So there is no question that Raven was 
directly in charge of the phone surveillance program at the NSA.  
 
Swift, on the other hand, came from one of America’s wealthiest families but during 
World War II, decided to do his part for the war by joining the OSS. When the CIA was 
established in 1947, Swift joined the spy agency and quickly rose up its ranks becoming 
at one point, Frank Wisner’s deputy. As Wisner’s deputy, Swift also personally witnessed 
his boss’ mental breakdown. In 1963, Swift replaced William King Harvey as head of the 
CIA’s Division D – a position he held until his retirement in 1974.454 So there is no 
question too that Swift was directly in charge of the drug surveillance program at the 
CIA.  
 
                                                  
453 Mowry, D. P., “Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series – Francis A. Raven.” NSA/Center for 
Cryptologic History, released Jun 12, 2009, FOIA Case# 52567.  
454 Telephone interview with Matthew Aid, Jul 8, 2011 
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According to intelligence historian Matthew Aid, Raven and Swift made sure that G 
Group and Division D worked closely together when they were in charge. 455  It is 
important to point out that in addition to collecting signals intelligence through technical 
means (such as bugs or tiny listening devices), Division D was also responsible for 
stealing codes and cipher materials from diplomatic establishments abroad (not unlike the 
embassy operations carried out by Donald Downes during World War II). When Swift 
was head of Division D, a significant portion of signals intelligence materials procured by 
Division D was regularly turned over to G Group for analysis since the CIA was never as 
proficient as the NSA in cryptanalysis. Meanwhile, whenever G Group encountered a 
code it could not decipher, Raven would ask Division D to steal any cipher materials that 
might G Group to complete its task.456  
   
So when G Group levied a request on Division D for career intercept operator to monitor 
drug-related phone calls, Swift would of course accede to that request. On a personal 
level, Swift was extending a hand to a friendly counterpart at the NSA. Meanwhile, on a 
pragmatic level, there was absolutely no reason for Swift to jeopardize a meaningful quid 
pro quo relationship between Division D and G Group.  
 
Careful examination of testimonies given during the Church Committee hearings also 
revealed a second factor which prompted the CIA to extend its assistance to the NSA. 
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The CIA’s decision to participate in the BNDD-initiated phone surveillance program was 
also influenced by President Richard Nixon’s call on the CIA to act against the 
international drug trade. To stem the massive inflow of narcotics into the US, Nixon (US 
President 1969 – 1974) had earlier turned to the CIA in his presidency.457 According to 
NSA Director Lew Allen (DIRNSA 1973 – 1977), Nixon had ordered the CIA to 
“mobilize its full resources to fight the international drug trade” and in doing so, Nixon 
was perhaps the first US president to sanction the use of both law enforcement and 
intelligence means to counter international drug trafficking. 458  Nixon’s order was 
significant because it focused the CIA’s attention on the issue of international drug 
trafficking. It was also significant in the sense that the Agency had always rejected a law 
enforcement role and Nixon’s order prodded the CIA into action.459 The outcome was of 
course close cooperation between the NSA and CIA in this case (see Diagram 7.7).  
 
DIAGRAM 7.7: KEY FACTORS WHICH PROMOTED CIA–NSA 
COOPERATION  
 





Finally, one might draw upon this case of NSA–CIA cooperation to argue that it was 
primarily technical compatibility that facilitated interagency cooperation (see Section 
                                                  
457 See testimony of Lew Allen in Hearings before the Church Committee, Vol. 5, The National Security 
Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights, Oct 29 & Nov 6, 1975, pp. 11.   
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2.3.3).  After all, the NSA ended up working with the CIA primarily because the latter 
retained career intercept operators demanded by the former. If the CIA had not been in 
the SIGINT business, the NSA would not have sought its assistance. Still, it is worth 
noting that NSA–CIA relations in the past had been badly strained whenever the CIA 
ventured into the NSA’s domain of signals intelligence (see Section 6.5.2). If anything, 
the CIA’s ability to mount parallel (even competing) SIGINT operations only fueled 
interagency conflict in those cases. Therefore, when one examine historical evidence over 
a sustained period of time (as opposed to looking at one particular case), one will find 
that being operators in the same intelligence discipline had brought about more 
interagency discord than collaboration. Indeed, whenever a US intelligence agency 
ventured into another’s domain, it invariably turned out to be a bane rather than a boon 
for US intelligence cooperation. So while it is tempting to credit technical compatibility 
as a key factor facilitating interagency cooperation, it is necessary to recognize that an 
intelligence system whose constituents are endowed with specialized expertise or 
resources is more likely to promote interagency cooperation than one whose constituents 
are predisposed to duplicate each other’s activities. Indeed, if promoting close 
interagency cooperation is the ultimate goal, then it makes sense to clearly delineate the 
activities of US intelligence agencies.  
 
 
7.3.4 SUMMARIZING THE KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN THIS CASE 
 
A number of key factors facilitated NSA–CIA cooperation in this case.  
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Firstly, the close bond between key personnel at the highest levels of the NSA and CIA 
greatly enhanced cooperation between the two agencies. In stark contrast to the hostile 
environment which permeated the two agencies when DCI Dulles and DIRNSA Canine 
were in charge, that friendly atmosphere was a major factor that promoted close 
interagency cooperation. Secondly, the role of the US president in focusing the priorities 
of US intelligence agencies was patent in this case. Indeed, if Nixon had not called on the 
CIA to act against international drug trafficking, the Agency probably would not have 
acted as swiftly as it did since it had traditionally viewed counter-narcotics as a law 
enforcement matter and hence, beyond the CIA’s brief. Thirdly, even though cooperation 
materialized in this case because the CIA retained career intercept operators, it was 
primarily the NSA’s requirement for greater confidentiality that prompted the NSA to 
seek the CIA’s assistance. More than anything else, one must recognize that operating in 
the same intelligence discipline had fueled interagency conflict more than cooperation in 
the past.  
 
In a final analytical step for this particular case, the results were submitted to eminent 
historian Athan Theoharis for his assessment. Having served on the Church Committee, 
Theoharis is widely acknowledged to be the foremost authority today on this particular 
subject-matter. Notably, he is of the view that these “conclusions are on the mark” and 
reiterates that even though the NSA and CIA do not always work closely together, one 
should not be surprised to see the two agencies cooperating on “matters of mutual 
concerns”.460 In other words, US intelligence agencies can set aside their differences and 
                                                  
460 Email interview with Prof. Athan Theoharis, Aug 18, 2011.  
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work together when there are pragmatic reasons to do so – such as to maintain tighter 
security or to pool expertise and resources.  
 
On a final note, it is also worth pointing out that CIA–NSA cooperation improved 
significantly after a “peace treaty” was signed between the two agencies in 1977 
(Johnson, 1998, pp. 231).461 The accord effectively ended the CIA’s ambition in signals 
intelligence while solidifying NSA control over that realm. Under that accord, the CIA 
was to be subordinated to the NSA in all signals intelligence matters.462 Although the 
CIA would continue to run SIGINT operations, it could no longer carry out competing or 
parallel operations against the NSA (such as the Berlin Tunnel operation). More 
importantly, as the CIA was no longer seen to be a competitor by the NSA in the 
discipline of signals intelligence, CIA–NSA relations improved over time. 463 







       
                                                  
461 Johnson, T.R., “American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945 – 1989: Book III: Retrenchment and 
Reform, 1972 – 1980.” NSA/FOIA, 1998, released Jul 31, 2007. URL: 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
US INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AT 














This chapter examines US intelligence cooperation from the 1980s to the 1990s – a 
period which saw the Cold War come to an end with the collapse of the USSR. But even 
as the Soviet bloc unraveled, the intelligence war between the US and Russia showed no 
signs of abating. Meanwhile, despite signs of improvement in FBI–CIA cooperation in 
the early 1980s, it soon deteriorated – especially in the area of counterespionage. In the 
end, limited FBI–CIA cooperation led to the escape of a CIA traitor, the belated detection 
of another and the execution of more than three dozens well-placed US agents by the 
KGB.  
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8.2 CASE IX: CIA–FBI COOPERATION IN THE CASE OF 
EDWARD LEE HOWARD  
The espionage case of Edward Lee Howard involved the CIA withholding vital espionage 
information from the FBI. More than anything else, this case provides valuable insights 
into some of the factors that prompted the CIA to shun cooperation with the FBI even 
after the Agency discovered that Howard had sold US secrets to the KGB. Again, 
because much of the information on this case remains classified, the most productive 
approach to understanding it was through a careful examination of the contextual forces 
at play then. Indeed, all my questions on Ed Howard were met with nothing but silence 
from his former CIA boss, Burton Gerber, illustrating the sensitive nature of this case.   
 
8.2.1 EDWARD LEE HOWARD 
 
In early 1981, Edward Lee Howard was a 28-year old American with an exciting future. 
A graduate of the University of Texas at Austin and the American University, Howard 
had applied to the CIA the year before and finally received word from the Agency that he 
was hired. The CIA had even decided that Howard would be made a DO case officer – a 
much coveted position within the Agency.464 Indeed, the DO case officer belonged to a 
rare breed of highly-trained men and women tasked with the important mission of 
collecting foreign intelligence for the US government. Evidently, in the eyes of CIA 
officials, Howard possessed the right set of attributes to become one of those few. But in 
                                                  
464 The CIA’s Directorate of Operations (or DO for short) was responsible for most of the Agency’s 
clandestine HUMINT operations abroad and all CIA case officers came under the command of this 
powerful branch. In 2005, the DO was renamed the National Clandestine Service (NCS).   
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a few short years, Howard would turn into an FBI-wanted fugitive for selling US secrets 
to the Soviets (Wise, 1988; Bearden & Risen, 2003).465  
 














Source: Kessler, 1992. 
 
8.2.2 THE FIRING OF HOWARD BY THE CIA 
 
After almost a year of intensive CIA training, Howard was finally ready for his first 
assignment. The CIA, apparently impressed by Howard’s performance during training, 
decided that the rookie case officer would be posted to Moscow. There, Howard would 
be pitted against the best in the espionage trade – the KGB. Due to the rigor of that 
                                                  
465 Wise is the author of the book, The Spy Who Got Away – The Inside Story of The CIA Agent Who 
Betrayed His Country. For his book, Wise made contact with Howard after his escape to Russia and met 
with the traitor for six days to interview him for the book. In the mid-1980s, Bearden was the CIA’s deputy 
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posting, Howard was sent for more training to instruct him on how to detect and evade 
KGB surveillance; ironically, during this phase of Howard’s training, the FBI would end 
up teaching Howard the counter-surveillance techniques that he would later use to detect 
and evade FBI surveillance (Wise, 1988, pp. 60). After several months of tough counter-
surveillance training and preparations, Howard was at last ready for his first assignment; 
then all of a sudden, the rookie CIA officer’s life fell apart.     
 
Shortly before Howard was to depart for his Moscow posting, Howard’s superiors 
received information that he had just failed a polygraph exam. Howard, the polygraph 
found, had apparently lied about his history with drug use, alcoholism, and petty theft. 
Because his polygraph results indicated deception, Howard was deemed unsuitable by his 
CIA superiors for any sensitive position in the Agency, let alone the Moscow posting 
(Wise, 1988; Bearden & Risen, 2003). Ultimately, it was not the addiction or stealing that 
got Howard into trouble with the CIA but the act of lying itself – the Agency simply 
could not tolerate dishonesty from its officers even though they were trained to use 
deception and trickery in their overseas assignments.   
 
An intense debate ensued within the CIA over what to do with Howard in light of his 
polygraph results. Firing him might drive a disgruntled Howard to retaliate against the 
CIA. Alternatively, Howard could be kept on in the CIA perhaps in some innocuous 
capacity and that might at least keep him happy for a while; but more importantly, 
Howard could be watched closely by the CIA for any signs of trouble (Wise, 1988). The 
argument against keeping Howard was that the disappointed man might still decide to 
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betray his country – not only by giving away US secrets but by becoming a mole as well. 
In the end, CIA officials felt that Howard was too much of a security risk to keep on in 
the Agency and the decision was made in May 1983 to fire him.466   
 
8.2.3 THE CIA FAILED TO ALERT THE FBI  
 
But a major problem soon emerged; the CIA had at that point given Howard all the 
secrets he would need to know to operate in Moscow – sensitive information such as the 
names of those Russians secretly working for the CIA, the identities of other CIA case 
officers, the covert locations where CIA case officers would meet with their agents, the 
secret sites where CIA case officers could retrieve dead-drops, etc. According to an 
intelligence official who knew of the case, Howard was “shown everything” (Wise, 1988, 
pp. 69).  
 
Suddenly stripped of his position, Howard became disgruntled and at some point, decided 
that he would exact revenge on his former employer by selling CIA secrets to the 
Soviets.467 In September 1984, Howard allegedly offered his service to the KGB (Wise, 
1988). The following year, Howard met with the KGB again and this time, he was 
believed to have betrayed a number of sensitive CIA operations to the Soviets.468  
                                                  
466 Ibid 
467 Besides operational information, Howard also allegedly betrayed vital CIA secrets pertaining to its 
electronic intelligence gathering operations in Moscow. Taken together, the damage caused by Howard to 
US national security was tremendous despite his junior status within the CIA (Wise, 1988).    
468 SSCI, “An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case & Its Implications for US Intelligence.” 
November 1, 1994, pp. 14.  
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However, it was not as if Howard had not given any indication that he was about to 
commit treason. In fact, there were clear warning signs. Firstly, Howard began making a 
series of bizarre phone calls to the US embassy in Moscow shortly after he was fired by 
the CIA. In one of those calls, Howard allegedly spoke to a female KGB colonel on the 
US embassy staff although it remains a mystery what the two had talked about. Later, 
Howard confided to a good friend that he was contemplating selling CIA secrets to the 
Soviets, but that friend in turn betrayed Howard by tipping off the CIA. Alerted to 
Howard’s intention to commit treason, the CIA dispatched two senior CIA officials to 
interview Howard in September 1984 during which the ex-CIA case officer admitted that 
he did consider giving away CIA secrets (Wise, 1988; Bearden & Risen, 2003).   
 
Yet remarkably, the CIA did not inform the FBI – the lead agency responsible for 
counterespionage – that Howard posed a major security risk given his knowledge of vital 
US secrets and was prepared to sell them to the Soviets. Similar to HTLINGUAL, the 
CIA would remain tight-lipped about Howard until it was no longer possible to hold back 
from the Bureau. 
 
The crucial turn of events came in August 1985 when a high-ranking KGB colonel by the 
name of Vitaly Yurchenko defected to the US bringing with him some exciting 
information for the FBI in particular. Although Yurchenko would later re-defect back to 
the USSR after three months in US custody, he did manage to single out Howard and a 
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NSA employee by the name of Ronald Pelton to be Soviet spies during debriefings held 
by CIA and FBI officials (Wise, 1988, pp. 20; Bearden & Risen, 2003).469 470 
 
While Yurchenko did not know Howard by name or face, the Russian defector did help 
US counterintelligence officials to identify Howard by giving them an important piece of 
lead – that person, Yurchenko said, was fired by the CIA shortly before leaving for his 
posting to Moscow.471 CIA officials knew right there and then who Yurchenko was 
referring to; the Agency had deemed that person, a discharged case officer, a security risk 
after learning that he had made a series of bizarre phone calls to the US embassy in 
Moscow and had even told a good friend that he contemplated selling US secrets to the 
KGB. In fact, the CIA became so alarmed that it even dispatched two senior officials to 
interview that man. Now, unable to hold back from the FBI because of the information 
provided by Yurchenko, CIA officials finally informed the FBI that the Agency had 
suspected Howard to be a major security risk for almost a year (Wise, 1988; Bearden & 
Risen, 2003). 
 
8.2.4 HOWARD’S FLIGHT TO MOSCOW 
 
                                                  
469 Yurchenko’s bona fide as a defector was questioned by US intelligence officials after he escaped back to 
the USSR. His suspicious conduct certainly raised many questions over the information he provided to US 
intelligence during his brief stay in US custody. One of those questions was whether Yurchenko was 
delivered to US intelligence as an agent provocateur, i.e., a double agent whose real intention was to feed 
bogus or low-level genuine information to the enemy so as to sidetrack its attention from more important 
moles. Yurchenko could very well have been sent by the KGB to deflect the FBI’s attention from Aldrich 
Ames, a high-ranking CIA official who would not be exposed as a Soviet spy for almost another decade 
after Howard was exposed as a Soviet spy.  
470 See Appendix 6 for more information on Pelton.  
471 SSCI, “An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case & Its Implications for US Intelligence.” 
November 1, 1994, pp. 15  
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After learning that Howard had sold US secrets to Moscow, the FBI immediately placed 
Howard under close surveillance. The idea was to catch Howard in the act of passing US 
secrets to the Soviets. If caught red-handed, Howard would face the death penalty; then 
he would have no choice but to enter into a plea bargain. With Howard’s full cooperation, 
the FBI would then be able to establish the full extent of his treachery including what 
secrets he had sold to the KGB. But unless Howard were caught red-handed, the FBI was 
certain that the former CIA officer would not enter into a plea bargain; even worse, 
Howard could be acquitted due to insufficient evidence (since Yurchenko’s charges 
against Howard could not be used in prosecution).  
 
But Howard, owing to his CIA training, soon detected FBI surveillance. With its 
surveillance operation blown, the FBI decided to confront Howard hoping that he would 
break and confess to high treason. But ex-CIA officer did not budge (Howard, 1995, pp. 
76). Then in an amazing getaway, Howard eluded his FBI watchers only to re-surface in 
Moscow later, much to the Bureau’s embarrassment. Thanks to the evasion techniques 
taught to him by the FBI, Howard escaped and became the first CIA officer in US history 
to ever defect to the USSR (Wise, 1988).  
 
As the timeline below indicated, it took the CIA almost a year (September 1984 to 
August 1985) after learning of Howard’s intentions to commit espionage to inform the 
FBI. If Yurchenko had not defected to the US in August 1985, the CIA would almost 
certainly have waited even longer (or perhaps never) to come clean with the FBI on 
Howard.   
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8.2.5 FACTORS WHICH PROMPTED THE CIA TO WITHHOLD 
INFORMATION FROM THE FBI 
 
Throughout the history of US intelligence, traitors have betrayed US secrets but the case 
of Ed Howard is significant for two reasons:  
 
 Firstly, it provides crucial insights into some of the factors that prompted the CIA 
to withhold vital counterespionage information from the FBI.472 
 Secondly, it underscores the kind of hard choices that the FBI must face during its 
investigations.  
 
So why did the CIA withhold crucial information on Howard from the FBI even though it 
is required to do so by law?  
 
                                                  
472 Counterespionage refers to those specific measures taken to ferret out a mole within an intelligence 
service whereas counterintelligence refers to those broad measures taken to limit penetration of an 
intelligence service by a hostile one.    
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In defense of the CIA, some CIA officials have maintained that it is often difficult for the 
Agency to foresee when a seemingly minor incident might evolve into a colossal security 
breach that warranted Bureau attention (Riebling, 2000, pp, 356). In other words, it is not 
easy for the CIA to anticipate major security problems early enough so that the FBI can 
be alerted in a timely fashion. As a consequence, the CIA might come across as 
deliberately withholding information from the FBI when in fact that was absolutely not 
the case. In the case of Ed Howard, the CIA could never have known beforehand that he 
would turn out to be a traitor and that was why the Agency failed to inform the FBI for 
almost a year.  
 
In my view, the above justification is weak at best. Crucially, the CIA had already 
suspected Howard to be a major security risk for some time before he was exposed by 
Yurchenko; otherwise, it would not have taken the unusual step of dispatching two senior 
Agency officials to interview him in September 1984. Furthermore, the harsh 
circumstances under which Howard was fired, his bizarre behavior after that, his intimate 
knowledge of CIA operations and his subsequent confessions to commit espionage all 
made him stood out as a prime candidate for treachery. Hence, to say that the CIA did not 
see Howard as a potential security risk early enough is not convincing at all.  
 
A more plausible explanation for the CIA’s reticence was that the Agency wanted to 
cover up the problem by containing it within the Agency (Wise, 1988, pp. 186). After all, 
in the aftermath of the Church Committee hearings, the CIA was hard pressed not to air 
more of its misconduct in public. If Howard’s case were exposed in public, the CIA 
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would almost certainly be required to explain why it had recruited a substance abuser for 
a highly-sensitive position and why a rookie case officer had been given access to large 
segments of sensitive CIA information in flagrant disregard for compartmentalization 
policies (Wise, 1988, pp. 268). That was a situation in which the CIA wanted to avoid 
terribly. Like many large bureaucracies, the CIA wanted to project an image of 
infallibility – but of course, no one is free from errors. As a consequence of that, the 
natural inclination for the CIA was to conceal its ‘dirty linens’ from the public.   
 
This supposition is echoed by Theoharis (2007). According to the renowned historian, the 
principal reason the CIA kept quiet on the Howard case was that CIA officials felt that 
they “could and should act alone”.473 Specifically, the CIA wanted to keep the FBI out of 
the case because it wanted to manage and retain control over how the case might be 
handled.474 Sharing the Howard case with the FBI inevitably meant that the CIA would 
have to give up at least some, if not all of its control over the case to the Bureau. If the 
FBI were to subsequently conduct a high-profile arrest and public trial, the CIA’s 
reputation would almost certainly be ruined. On the other hand, if the problem were 
contained within the Agency, the CIA could then dictate the case on its own terms and 
hopefully, reduce the risk of it degenerating into a public spectacle. So the CIA pursued a 
course that best served its interest – it withheld the case from the FBI.  
 
The secretive culture of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) also contributed to the 
CIA’s decision to withhold information from the FBI.  
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According to CIA Director William Colby (DCI 1973 – 1976), the DO was for all intents 
and purposes a secret fraternity – its officers worked closely together when overseas and 
as a result, often developed a deep sense of loyalty to one another (Kessler, 1992, pp. 39). 
As the most secret component of the CIA, the DO was responsible for espionage as well 
as covert actions (Kessler, 1992, pp. 3). Only the most qualified applicants to the CIA 
were accepted by the DO and then trained to be case officers (Moran, 2005). On 
completion of their training, they would be posted overseas to steal secrets for the US 
government, former DO officer Lindsay Moran explains.475 Making up only about 10 
percent of the CIA’s estimated 20,000 workforce, DO case officers were considered the 
“actual spies” who carried out “the real work of the Agency” (Kessler, 1992, pp. 3; 
Moran, 2005, pp. 5). The secretive nature of the DO combined with its elite status within 
the CIA effectively turned that entity into an ultra-secretive army within an already 
clandestine organization.  
 
Although secrecy was absolutely essential to the work of the DO, the problem was that 
this requirement for operational secrecy could degenerate into a form of bureaucratic 
silence used invariably to keep outsiders out of its affairs (Moynihan, 1998, pp. 12 & 
143). This was precisely what happened to the DO; indeed, even CIA officers who were 
not part of the DO were invariably shut out of its affairs (Wise, 1995, pp. 318). With such 
an ingrained culture of secrecy within the DO, one should not be surprised at all that 
those within the DO who knew about Howard’s suspected espionage activities opted to 
withhold that information from the FBI. If CIA officers who were not part of the DO 
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could be kept out of the affairs of the DO, then the chance of the DO sharing 
(embarrassing) information with the FBI was even more remote.        
 
After assessing all the information obtained for this case, it appears that the CIA’s 
decision was also influenced by a belief among those CIA officials responsible that their 
malfeasances would go unpunished.  
 
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan had signed into law Executive Order 12333 which 
(among other things) required all US intelligence agencies to promptly refer suspected 
espionage cases to the FBI. Specifically, Part 1 Section 1.7b of E.O. 12333 stated that:  
 
[The heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the 
Intelligence Community or the heads of such organizations, as 
appropriate, shall] in any case involving serious or continuing breaches of 
security, recommend to the Attorney General that the case be referred to 
the FBI for further investigation. 476 
 
E.O. 12333 clarified beyond any doubt that the FBI held primary responsibility for 
investigating espionage cases; and when the CIA withheld information on Howard’s 
suspected espionage activities from the Bureau, it had clearly broken the law. To a certain 
extent, the CIA’s conduct in this case also demonstrated the limitation of imposing 
cooperation on US intelligence agencies through legislation (Riebling, 2000, pp. 341). 
                                                  
476 See “Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities.” NARA, Dec 4, 1981. URL: 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html#1.7  
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Powerful as they are, it is doubtful that the actions of US intelligence agencies can be 
dictated by a few weak statutes.  
 
Even though some CIA officials had clearly violated E.O. 12333, CIA Director William 
Casey (DCI 1981 – 1987) was unable to punish them.  
 
Given the CIA’s penchant for less than chivalrous means to obtain intelligence, one may 
be surprised to learn that the CIA has always been an organization where trust between 
the Director and his officers is actually held in high regard. According to noted writer 
Tim Weiner, CIA officers tend to place greater confidence in a CIA Director who 
commiserates with them and their work (Weiner, 2009). On the other hand, a CIA 
Director who betrays their trust risks becoming deeply unpopular in the CIA.477 “If the 
professional employees in the agency don’t believe the agency’s leadership is on their 
side, they won’t take risks for it,” explains Tom Twetten, a former deputy director of the 
CIA’s Directorate of Operations (Borger, 2004).  
 
Having seen what happened to his immediate predecessor, Stansfield Turner (DCI 1977 – 
1981), when he fired 820 DO officers in one fell swoop, Casey must have known that he 
could not punish his officers without repercussions. As it happened, after carrying out the 
brutal sacking, Turner became a victim of an insidious disinformation campaign initiated 
by his own CIA officers to have him removed as CIA Director (Turner, 2006a, pp. 187). 
Clearly, CIA officers then were no pushovers. So in the Howard case, it was only 
                                                  
477 Ibid 
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practical for Casey to side with his own officers over enforcing E.O. 12333.478 Not 
surprisingly, for the failure to inform the FBI of Howard’s suspected espionage activities 
only a handful of CIA officials were censured and no harsh punishment was meted out by 
Casey.479 Notably, the perception of the DCI being a prejudiced figure is also reported in 
the influential Joint Inquiry Report into 9/11.480 
 
In retrospect, the National Security Act (1947) should never have given the CIA Director 
a second hat to wear as the head of the US intelligence community. Being the DCI at the 
same time only placed the CIA Director in a precarious position where he would be torn 
between the CIA and the broader intelligence system. Although one would expect the 
DCI to stay impartial as he was responsible for directing the entire US intelligence 
community, few DCIs actually managed to accomplish that opting instead to focus on the 
affairs of the CIA (Weiner, 2007; Warner, 2006, pp. 49).481 
 
8.2.6 CONCLUSION TO THE HOWARD CASE AND SUMMARY OF 
THE FACTORS THAT LIMITED CIA–FBI COOPERATION 
 
After defecting to the USSR, Howard began working closely with the Soviets. He told the 
KGB (1) the names of those Russians working secretly for the CIA, (2) CIA espionage 
methods, and (3) the identities of CIA case officers in Moscow (Wise, 1988, pp. 256 & 
                                                  
478 Casey’s disregard for the law while he was DCI was also patent in two other incidents. Firstly, in an act 
of war, he secretly ordered the mining of Nicaragua’s port even though no presidential approval was given. 
And secondly, he funded the Contras by selling weapons to Iran in contravention of a US arms embargo.   
479 SSCI, “An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case & Its Implications for US Intelligence.” 
November 1, 1994, pp. 17  
480 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, 
pp. 64.  
481 Warner, M., “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution.” In George, R. Z. & Kline, R. D. (eds), 
“Intelligence and the National Security Strategist.” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, pp. 49.  
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267). For his contribution to Soviet intelligence, the traitor was given an apartment in 
Moscow and a dacha in the outskirts by the KGB (Tavernise, 2002). But Howard’s good 
fortune did not last for in 2002 (at the age of 50) the former CIA officer mysteriously fell 
down the stairs of his apartment and died of a broken neck.482 
 
In summary, a number of key factors limiting cooperation between the CIA and FBI were 
established from this case (see Diagram 8.3).  
 
DIAGRAM 8.3: KEY FACTORS WHICH PROMPTED THE CIA TO 
WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM THE FBI 
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Firstly, competition for control over the investigation seriously hampered information 
sharing between the CIA and FBI. By law, the FBI was to be in charge but the CIA 
wanted to establish operational control so that it could minimize any fallout from the 
investigation. The insular and secretive culture of the DO also contributed to the CIA’s 
silence. Consequently, vital information was not passed on to the FBI by the CIA even 
when it became evident to Agency officials that Howard posed a danger to US national 
security. Thirdly, the legal measure that mandated informational exchanges between the 
CIA and FBI were ineffective because the DCI could not enforce them without alienating 
his own CIA employees.483  
 
The combination of the aforementioned factors prompted the CIA to withhold Howard’s 
case from the FBI causing grave damages to US national security in the end. One might 
presume that given this harsh lesson, the CIA would become more amenable to sharing 
counterespionage information with the Bureau. Unfortunately, that would not be the case.    
 
8.3 CASE X: FBI–CIA COOPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION 
OF ALDRICH HAZEN AMES  
 
As it happened, the CIA’s problem did not end with the defection of Edward Lee Howard 
in September 1985; one after another, Soviet agents recruited by the CIA were arrested 
and executed by the KGB. What really troubled the CIA was that Howard did not know 
                                                  
483 Email interview with Ivian C. Smith, Nov. 10, 2011.  
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of all these CIA agents and that could only mean that there was another source within the 
CIA that was compromising their identities to the KGB.484  
The CIA would take another nine years before it discovered that a 32-year CIA veteran 
named Aldrich Hazen Ames had been the source of those betrayals. Similar to the 
Howard case, the CIA intentionally withheld vital espionage information on Ames from 
the FBI. In fact, a detailed re-construction of the Ames case herein revealed that the CIA 
withheld information from the FBI not only once but on three separate occasions. There 
is no doubt that if the FBI had been alerted earlier, it would not have taken nine years to 
expose Ames as the traitor because he had been an incredibly sloppy spy.485 Significantly, 
the Ames case again illustrated the keys factors that prompted the CIA to shun the FBI – 
the lead agency responsible for counterespionage investigation.  
8.3.1 ALDRICH HAZEN AMES 
 
When Aldrich Ames was arrested by the FBI in February 1994, the 53-year old senior 
CIA officer had been spying for the Russians for the last 9 years of his 32-year career. 
Until then, no other CIA traitor had inflicted more damage to US national security than 
                                                  
484 See “Abstract of Report of Investigation – the Aldrich H. Ames Case: An Assessment of CIA’s Role in 
Identifying Ames as an Intelligence Penetration of the Agency” (hereinafter referred to as “the CIA IG 
Report), Oct 21, 1994. In “Report of Investigation: The Aldrich Ames Espionage Case”, (hereinafter 
referred to as “the HPSCI Report”), Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), US House of 
Representative, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 14.    
485 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 16          
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Ames.486 As a result of Ames’ betrayal, more than three dozen Russians who had been 
secretly spying for the CIA were arrested by the KGB and then shot or imprisoned.487   
 
Ames started out as a filing clerk for the CIA in 1962 but eventually managed to get into 
its highly selective case officer training program in 1967. After completing his training in 
1969, Ames married a fellow case officer and both were assigned to the CIA station in 
Ankara, Turkey; it was Ames’ first assignment abroad. In 1972, Ames returned to CIA 
Headquarter in Langley and was assigned to the coveted Soviet / Eastern European (SE) 
division even though he had been rated poorly for his performance in Ankara.488  
 
Over the next four years, Ames’s career at CIA Headquarters was relatively uneventful; 
then in 1976, Ames was assigned to the CIA station in New York City.489 While in New 
York, Ames’ marriage started to fall apart owing in large part to his drinking. Ames’ 
sloppiness also started to show when, on one occasion, he lost a briefcase containing 
classified CIA documents in a New York subway train.490 But in spite of his alcoholism 
and negligence, Ames was promoted for his work in New York.491 In September 1981, 
Ames left New York for an assignment with the CIA station in Mexico City while his 
                                                  
486 See “An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case And Its Implications For US Intelligence”, 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report (hereinafter referred to as the “SSCI Report”), Nov 1, 
1994, pp, 53.  
487 Statement of Frederick P. Hitz, CIA IG on the Ames Investigation before the HPSCI & SSCI, Sep 28, 
1994, pp. 4. In the HPSCI Report, Appendix 1.    
488 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 18 – 19.       
489 CIA operations in New York City primarily involved efforts to recruit foreign diplomats and officials 
representing their countries at the UN. Not only were these foreigners a rich source of foreign intelligence, 
the idea was to maintain contact with them when they eventually return home to higher positions.        
490 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 22 – 23.         
491 Ibid, pp. 19        
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estranged wife remained in New York City.492 This was perhaps the turning point in 
Ames’ life as his separation from his wife and subsequent attraction to another woman 
ultimately drove him to commit treason.  
 
In Mexico City, Ames met and became attracted to a Colombian woman named Maria del 
Rosario Casas Dupuy (hereafter referred to as “Rosario”).493 Soon after returning to CIA 
Headquarter in 1983, Ames divorced his wife and married Rosario. But his divorce and 
subsequent marriage to the spendthrift Rosario also plunged Ames into serious financial 
difficulties. Under intense financial pressures, Ames first thought of selling US secrets to 
the Soviets.494 And Ames was certain that the Soviets would be interested in what he had 
to offer. After returning to CIA Headquarter in September 1983, he had been promoted to 
become a branch chief responsible for counterintelligence (CI) within the SE division.495  
In that capacity, he was tasked with reviewing every SE agent to ascertain their bona fide, 
i.e., whether the person in question was truly sincere in working for the CIA or merely a 
double agent sent by the KGB to feed disinformation to the CIA.496 In other words, Ames 
knew of virtually every CIA agent from the Soviet bloc. In addition to his CI duties with 
the SE division, Ames was simultaneously involved in a joint CIA–FBI program 
codenamed COURTSHIP.497   
 
8.3.2 CASE XI: FBI–CIA COOPERATION IN THE COURTSHIP 
PROGRAM 
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COURTSHIP was a joint FBI–CIA program to recruit Soviet officials in Washington 
D.C. as spies for the US. Initiated in 1980 by FBI Director William Webster and CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner, many aspects of COURTSHIP remain classified today. But 
through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a CIA memo was obtained by me which 
proved beyond doubt the existence of that top-secret program (see Appendix 9). 
Furthermore, the existence of COURTSHIP was also corroborated by two of my sources 
who happened to be intimately involved in that program – they are former SE division 
chief Burton Gerber and former FBI Special-Agent-in Charge (SAC) Ivian C. Smith.      
 
Until now, very little is known publicly of COURTSHIP. But through a number of 
different informational sources (e.g., interviews, testimonies and archival documents), 
this investigation has managed to assemble a fairly coherent picture of that program. 
More importantly, COURTSHIP is significant to this thesis in that it demonstrates the 
key factors which prompted the CIA and FBI to work closely together.  
 
The primary purpose of COURTSHIP was to recruit Soviet officials in the US capital to 
spy on behalf the US government. Those targeted for recruitment included Soviet 
diplomats, code clerks and the most prized of all, Soviet intelligence officers. The idea 
was that once recruited as US spies, not only would these Soviet agents pass on secret 
information to the FBI and CIA while they were in the US but would also continue to spy 
for the US when they returned to the USSR.498 499 
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The FBI, for its part, has always targeted foreign embassy officials in the US for 
recruitment just as it would recruit informants to snitch on domestic criminal and anti-
government organizations (see, e.g., Sullivan, 1979). As a practical matter, the FBI is 
most interested in recruiting intelligence officers from an opposition service because they 
could provide the Bureau with valuable counterintelligence information such as the 
identities of Americans who are secretly spying for that service as well as the kind of 
operations that service is running in the US. When it comes to counterintelligence 
strategy, the Bureau has always taken an offensive and proactive stance.500 
 
One of the Bureau’s best sources was a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer named 
Dmitri Polyakov. Recruited by the FBI in the early 1960s while he was stationed in New 
York as the Soviet military representative to the UN, Polyakov provided US intelligence 
vital information on the Soviet establishment until his retirement from the GRU in 1980. 
During that 20-year period, Polyakov was in and out of the USSR and whenever he was 
inside it, the CIA would be responsible for maintaining contact with him.501 The Polykov 
case was in essence a joint operation that leveraged on the singular strengths of the FBI 
and CIA – the Bureau ran the GRU officer when he was in New York while the Agency 
handled him whenever he was outside the US. The Polyakov case also helped FBI and 
CIA officials to “recognize the value of [joint] recruitments in the US”. 502       
 
                                                  
500 Email interview with Ivian C. Smith, Nov 10, 2011.  
501 National Security Archive interview with John Mabey, Jan 2, 1998. URL: 
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The CIA, for its part, has also targeted foreign nationals in the US for recruitment. 
Although the National Security Act (1947) heavily proscribed the CIA’s domestic 
security functions, it did not bar the CIA from collecting foreign intelligence within the 
US. As a result, the CIA has always mounted intelligence collection operations within the 
US since its creation and the unit tasked with recruiting foreigners in the US was called 
the Domestic Operations Division.503 
 
When it was headed by Frank Wisner in the 1950s, the Domestic Operations Division 
frequently angered Hoover with its recruitment operations, according to former FBI 
Liaison to the CIA, Sam Papich. As it happened, CIA officers from the Domestic 
Operations Divisions (often posing as officials from another US government agency) 
would approach foreigners indiscriminately in the US asking them to work as spies for 
the US government. Offended, many of those approached filed complaints with the FBI 
and when Bureau agents followed up on those complaints, they invariably discovered that 
the CIA had been behind those poorly-conceived operations. News of such CIA activities 
in the Bureau’s domain always angered Hoover and such encroachments were a constant 
source of conflict between the FBI and CIA.504  
 
It was not until February 1966 when a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between the FBI and CIA that the problem caused by the activities of the Domestic 
Operations Division was largely resolved. Under the terms of that agreement, the CIA 
                                                  
503 Affidavit & testimony of Papich, Sam, J., Mar 5, 1975, pp. 5, Rockefeller Commission, NARA RIF# 
157-10011-10079.  
504 Ibid 
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would coordinate its domestic recruitment activities with the FBI and all information 
collected would be shared with the Bureau. So for a while, Hoover was appeased.505  
 
But after Sam Papich retired from the FBI in 1970, the idea of the CIA and FBI working 
together to recruit foreigners in the US lost its strongest proponent and interagency 
cooperation in that area soon languished.506 It was not until 1980 when senior CIA and 
FBI officials proposed that their agencies formalize joint recruitment was FBI-CIA 
cooperation in that realm resurrected. The outcome was COURTSHIP.507 
 
A number of key factors facilitated interagency cooperation in the COURTSHIP 
program.   
 
Firstly, the “general atmosphere for [CIA–FBI] cooperation” was conducive in that the 
contemporaneous CIA Director Stansfield Turner and FBI Director William Webster 
were close friends.508 It has even been suggested that President Jimmy Carter picked 
Webster to head the FBI because Carter had gambled that Webster’s close bond with 
Turner would help to improve relations between the two agencies (Riebling, 2002, pp. 
333 – 334). Apparently, Carter’s gamble paid off – the two agencies were brought closer 
together as the good relationship at the director-level “filtered down and it was hard for 
an assistant director or anyone else under Webster not to get along with the Agency”.509 
Considering how rancorous relations at the director-level had hampered US interagency 
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cooperation, it is not difficult to see how the close bond between Webster and Turner 
ultimately fostered an atmosphere that was conducive to CIA–FBI cooperation.   
 
But as a practical matter, there were distinct advantages for the CIA and FBI to join 
forces too.  
 
For the CIA, the task of recruiting foreign nationals in their countries to spy for the US 
has never been an easy one, especially in countries where contacts between citizens and 
foreigners are tightly monitored by local security services. In the former Soviet Union 
particularly, CIA officers working under diplomatic cover could rarely recruit an agent 
there because they were placed under constantly surveillance by the KGB (Wise, 1988, 
pp. 64). As the movements of CIA officers and their targets were not monitored so 
closely within the US, it would be much easier for the CIA to carry out recruitments 
domestically. But the CIA could only do so with the authority of the FBI since the latter 
is the principal agency responsible for domestic intelligence.510 
 
Aside from the FBI’s authority, the CIA could also benefit from the Bureau’s manpower. 
Before a Soviet official was to be approached for recruitment, it was necessary to 
establish that person’s access to classified information as well as his or her willingness to 
spy for the US. The most valuable recruits were of course intelligence officers from the 
KGB or GRU and one of the most effective ways to find out if a Soviet official were an 
intelligence officer was to place him under close surveillance for tell-tale signs of an 
intelligence operative. Once established as a Soviet intelligence officer, FBI surveillance 
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teams would then seek to learn everything about their target so as to assess his 
susceptibility to recruitment. 511 Within the US, only the FBI had the manpower trained to 
carry out such close and yet, unobtrusive surveillances. As Burton Gerber explains:  
 
[The] FBI had the control of the cityscape, so to speak, the surveillance 
capabilities and the experience of operating here. 512               
 
Meanwhile, the FBI also profited from joining forces with the CIA. 
        
More than anything else, the CIA “brought to the COURTSHIP program its expertise and 
experience” in that particular area.513  By all accounts, the FBI has always recruited 
informants to snitch on domestic organizations and groups (see, e.g., Broad, 2010; Fahim, 
2010; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007, Sullivan, 1979). For instance, the Bureau made extensive use 
of informants to infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and it was a crucial technique that 
stopped many of the white supremacy group’s violent acts.514 Bureau informants also 
played a crucial role in the FBI’s fight against organized crime (Kessler, 1993, 13).515 
Moreover, it is matter of public record that Bureau informants were used to infiltrate 
lawful domestic organizations such as universities, civil rights groups and religious 
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institutions.516 In fact, the use of informants by the FBI was so extensive that, according 
to the Church Committee, 85 percent of all domestic intelligence investigations 
conducted by the Bureau prior to 1975 utilized that particularly invasive technique.517       
 
But recruiting an informant to snitch on a violent hate group, domestic institution or 
criminal organization, and recruiting a high-ranking Soviet official to spy for the US 
called for different expertise (Odom, 2003, pp. 177).  
 





Lt. Col. Valery F. Martynov 
 
Mr. Gary Thomas Rowe 
 
A lieutenant colonel in the KGB, Martynov was 
recruited under the COURTSHIP program in 1982. 
Based in the Soviet embassy in Washington D.C., 
Martynov was well-educated, spoke fluent English 
and sophisticated. He was open to the American 
way of life and enjoyed socializing. Although he 
was paid for passing Soviet secrets to the US, the 
amount he received was nominal. His motivation to 
spy for the FBI was not monetary but a genuine 
belief that the US was not an enemy of his country. 
Martynov was exposed by Aldrich Ames to be a US 
spy and later executed by the KGB (Wise, 1995, 
Earley, 1997; Kessler, 1992; Weiner, Johnston & 
Lewis, 1995).  
Rowe was a Ku Klux Klan member as well as an 
FBI informant in the sixties. In addition to reporting 
the activities of his fellow KKK members to the 
FBI, Rowe also actively participated in their violent 
activities claiming that he did so in order to preserve 
his secret identity. Rowe also claimed that he often 
bedded the wives of fellow Klan members to break 
up their marriages and sow dissension within the 
KKK. Paid handsomely by the FBI for his activities, 
Rowe was a thug and a redneck that often got into 
bar fights. Later, while testifying in front of the 
Church Committee, Rowe actually wore a white 
hood over his head to conceal his identity. (Jeffreys-
Jones, 2007; Sullivan, 1979).518   
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Broadly speaking, their motivations are different – informants snitch primarily for money 
whereas spies are typically motivated by ideological reasons.519 In terms of backgrounds, 
the former also happen to be less sophisticated whereas the latter is more cultured 
overall. 520  Taken together, the snitch and the spy are two unique targets requiring 
different methods to assess and suborn (see Table 8.2 for a comparison of the two).  
 
This was where the CIA’s expertise and experience in recruiting Soviets made an 
important contribution to the COURTSHIP program. Using surveillance information 
provided by the FBI, CIA psychologists would assess a target’s receptiveness to 
recruitment and recommend an approach that could exploit that susceptibility most 
effectively. KGB officer Valery Martynov, the first agent recruited by COURTSHIP, was 
targeted precisely because the CIA had found him to be more interested in the American 
way of life than his Russian colleagues were.521 Again, as Burton Gerber explains: 
 
[The] CIA had the experience of successful recruitment operations 
throughout the world and the use of ploys in meeting and assessing targets, 
manipulating them and then recruiting.522 
 
                                                  
519 For example, three of the most productive Cold War spies from the USSR – Valery Martynov, Adolf 
Tolkachev and Dmitri Polyakov – were all motivated by ideological reasons to spy for the US. By and 
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In addition to the CIA’s expertise in recruiting Soviets, the FBI also needed the CIA for 
another important reason. After being recruited in the US, it was only a matter of time 
before an agent would return to the USSR or get assigned to another country. In that 
event, the CIA was the only agency capable of maintaining contact with that agent since 
the FBI neither has the authority nor the manpower to conduct operations abroad. 
Although the FBI maintains legal attaches in a number of foreign countries, they are 
restricted to liaison duties with local law enforcement – not run spies. In any case, the 
FBI would be encroaching on the CIA’s foreign intelligence domain and violating its own 
statutory mandate if it did so. Therefore, the FBI has to rely on the CIA to handle an 
agent once he departed the US.523    
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In all, COURTSHIP reaffirmed the model for US interagency intelligence cooperation 
seen so far. The joint program was supported at the highest levels of the FBI and CIA, 
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and both agencies stood to profit from it. The FBI gained from the expertise and 
experience of the CIA in terms of assessing and suborning a potential recruit as well as 
the CIA’s dominance in the realm of foreign intelligence. The CIA, meanwhile, was able 
to carry out recruitments in the US – a significantly less hostile environment – and take 
advantage of the Bureau’s dominance in the realm of domestic intelligence (see Table 
8.3). It was a win – win situation for the CIA and FBI – at least until COURTSHIP was 
betrayed by Aldrich Ames.524     
 
8.3.3 “THE BIG DUMP”     
 
On top of his counterintelligence duties, Ames had also began to work for the 
COURTSHIP program a year before he started selling US secrets to the KGB.525 As part 
of the COURTSHIP team, Ames was actually authorized to meet with Soviet officials to 
assess their suitability for recruitment; instead, he would take full advantage of those 
meetings to pass on US secrets to the Soviets.526 
 
Under financial pressures from his divorce and re-marriage, Ames decided in April 1985 
to sell the names of two or three CIA agents – Soviets who are secretly working for the 
CIA – to the KGB.527 According to public documents obtained for this thesis, Ames 
simply gave up their names (for $50,000) to the KGB station chief on one of his 
sanctioned visits to the Soviet embassy.528 After that, Ames rationalized that since there 
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were still other Soviets working as spies for the CIA, they could eventually learn that he 
was a KGB spy and expose him.529 That was when Ames decided to give up the names of 
all the CIA agents that he knew of – and Ames knew virtually all of them owing to his 
position at the CIA.530 In what came to be called “The Big Dump”, Ames simply carried 
out in his hands two large shopping bags of secret documents from CIA Headquarters and 
handed them over to the KGB.531 Thanks to the CIA’s lax security, Ames was not even 
searched by security guards as he was walking out.532 It was June 1985 but in terms of 
security practices, the CIA seemed to be operating the way it did in the forties and fifties 
when limited security practices had been the norm.         
 
Over the next nine years, Ames continued to sell US secrets to the KGB and then its 
successor, the SVR, until his arrest in February 1994 by the FBI.533 In all, he was paid 
close to $2.5 million by the Russians.534 Crucially, it took that long before Ames was 
exposed because the CIA had again withheld vital information from the FBI. In fact, 
based on research conducted for this thesis, the CIA withheld vital information from the 
FBI not only once but on three separate occasions in this case. The three missed 
opportunities are presented below and then followed by an assessment of the factors that 
                                                  
529 Ames would have known, for example, of the fate of William Kampiles – the CIA traitor who was 
eventually exposed by a GRU intelligence officer working secretly for the CIA. For a mere $3000, 
Kampiles had sold to the Soviets in 1977 a top-secret US spy satellite manual (Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 
30).    
530 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 14.  
531 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 24          
532 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 14 
533 The SVR was formed in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR to handle Russia’s foreign intelligence 
requirements. It was actually transmuted from the First Chief Directorate of the KGB – the division 
responsible for foreign intelligence in the former Soviet Union. Notably, the transition to the SVR was so 
seemly that Ames’ treachery was not exposed in spite of the dismantling of the KGB by Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin.  
534 SSCI, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 2 
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prompted the CIA to repeatedly shun cooperation with the FBI even as it became clear to 
CIA officials that the Agency had been penetrated.  
 
8.3.4 FIRST MISSED OPPORTUNITY  
 
Within a year of “The Big Dump”, the CIA was losing its Soviet agents at a rate that 
could not be attributed to chance (Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 156 – 158). One after 
another, they were arrested by the KGB and then either shot or imprisoned. Two KGB 
officers that were recruited under the COURTSHIP program – Valery Martynov and 
Sergey Motorin535 – were ordered back to Moscow, interrogated and then executed by the 
KGB for treason (Earley, 1997). In the end, the CIA’s entire network of Soviet spies was 
decimated.536  
 
CIA officials initially thought that Edward Lee Howard might have been the source of the 
compromises but they soon realized that Howard could not have been responsible for all 
of the losses. The reason was that Howard could not have known of Martynov and 
Motorin since they were based in the US. Howard was supposed to have been assigned to 
the CIA station in Moscow and thus, had been given the names of CIA agents in Russia; 
but he would not have been given the names of CIA agents in the US.537 In other words, 
Howard could not have been the only source of the CIA’s massive losses in 1985 – 86. 
                                                  
535 Unlike Martynov, Mototin was actually blackmailed by the FBI into spying for the US. Motorin could 
have confessed to his superiors that he was being blackmailed by the FBI; but he did not, choosing instead 
to spy for the US. And strangely, Motorin, like Martnov, accepted nominal payments from the FBI for the 
incredible risk that he took (Earley, 1997).     
536 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 16 
537 Ibid 
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Despite the serious implication, the CIA did not alert the FBI – the agency responsible for 
counterespionage.   
 
But soon, because Martynov and Motorin were both recruited under COURTSHIP, the 
FBI decided to create a task force in 1986 to investigate the cause of their compromises 
after learning that they had been executed by the KGB.538 Meanwhile, at the CIA, a small 
task force was also created to look into the CIA’s huge losses after senior CIA officials 
concluded that the losses could not be attributed to a technical compromise or Howard.539 
Over the next two years, the FBI and CIA task forces met on a regular basis to discuss 
their findings and exchange information. 540  However, the two task forces worked 
independently and the CIA denied the FBI access to the its operational files; nor did the 
CIA reveal to the FBI that it had suffered far greater losses than just Martynov and 
Motorin; in fact, the FBI would not learn of the CIA’s huge losses until 1991 (Weiner, 
Johnston & Lewis, 1995, pp. 166).541  
 
8.3.5 SECOND MISSED OPPORTUNITY  
 
When senior CIA officials first learned in the fall of 1985 that CIA agents were being 
arrested by the KGB, their initial reaction was that besides Howard, a technical 
compromise might explain the losses. Somehow, the KGB could have managed to break 
into the CIA’s communication system and hence, was able to learn of CIA operations in 
                                                  
538 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 14         
539 Ibid        
540 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 28.  
541 See also SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 28 
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the USSR. Although the possibility of a human penetration by a mole was grappled with, 
senior CIA officials opted to focus on a technical penetration by the KGB. In December 
1985, the CIA decided to send a series of false messages through its communication 
system to solicit a reaction from the KGB. In those messages, the CIA deliberately listed 
the names of loyal Soviet intelligence officers as spies working for the US hoping that 
they would in turn be arrested by the KGB. This was the CIA’s version of killing two 
birds with one stone. But the KGB did not react to those false messages (Bearden & 
Risen, 2003, pp. 158 – 161).  
 
By October 1986, senior CIA officials knew; the CIA’s communication system had not 
been breached by the KGB and that left them with only one possibility – the CIA had 
been penetrated by a mole working for the Soviets.542 Even so, the FBI was not alerted. 
  
Amidst the upheaval within the CIA, Ames was assigned to Rome in July 1986 for his 
first overseas assignment since Ankara.543 But Ames’ access to important US secrets did 
not diminish even though he was stationed in Italy because the CIA station in Rome 
routinely received secret documents from Headquarters on CIA operations all over 
Europe, including the Soviet bloc.544 According to testimonies given by Ames later, he 
simply picked up extra copies of secret CIA documents and handed them over to the 
KGB. He did not even have to photocopy them because it was not CIA practice to index 
its documents.545  
                                                  
542 Ibid, pp. 198  
543 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 20          
544 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 21 – 22.  
545 Testimony of Aldrich Ames, Aug 5, 1994. In the SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 93 – 94  
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Meanwhile, Ames did little to conceal his ill-gotten wealth; he and Rosario splurged on 
designer clothing, dined in expensive restaurants, lived in an exclusive residential area in 
Rome and took holidays throughout Europe (Earley, 1997; Wise, 1995). Ames was 
plainly living a lifestyle which could not be justified by his pay-grade. Yet, none of those 
extravagant behaviors set off alarms at the CIA even though one of Ames’ colleagues 
later claimed that he was not surprised at all that Ames had turned out to be a Soviet 
spy.546  
 
8.3.6 THIRD MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
 
By 1988, the CIA task force created to analyze the CIA’s 1985 – 86 losses fell into a 
lull.547 At the FBI, the task force created to investigate the losses of Martynov and 
Motorin also failed to resolve the compromise (since the FBI task force was not given 
access to CIA operational files).548 The two task force would not work together again 
until 1991 and the catalyst for that was Ames’ return to CIA Headquarters.   
 
After Ames returned to Langley from Rome in 1989, the traitor made a huge mistake that 
finally brought suspicion on him – he bought a $540,000 house in cash. Thanks to a tip 
off from a close family friend (who was also a CIA employee herself) of the Ames’, the 
CIA was alerted to Ames’ newfound wealth.549  But a CIA investigation into Ames’ 
                                                  
546 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 1 & 43  
547 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 14          
548 Ibid. See also SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 28.  
549 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 24 – 25           
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newfound wealth turned up naught owing largely to the sloppiness and inexperience of 
those assigned to conduct the investigation (Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 473). Frustrated 
by the lack of progress, the CIA finally decided in April 1991 to approach the FBI for 
help and as a result of that, the two CIA and FBI task forces created in 1986 to investigate 
the 1985 – 86 losses were rejuvenated.550 Only then was the FBI finally told of the huge 
losses suffered by the CIA in 1985 – 86 (Weiner, Johnston & Lewis, 1995, pp. 166).  
 
In August 1992, the major breakthrough in the mole-hunt came when one of the CIA 
officers assigned to the joint task force discovered that Ames had made large cash 
deposits into his bank accounts every time he had a meeting with Soviet officials in 1985 
and 1986.551 Ames had not even bothered to conceal his ill-gotten payoffs – he simply 
made the deposits on the same day he met with the Soviets. At that point, the joint task 
force was reasonably certain that Ames was a traitor.552 But the CIA then made the 
decision to withhold that piece of vital information from FBI Headquarters even though 
two Bureau agents were already working together with the CIA as part of the joint task 
force.553 This was the third missed opportunity that the CIA had to promptly alert the 
FBI; it would be another six more months (March 1993) before the FBI even learned of 
the correlation between Ames’ meetings with Soviet officials and the large cash deposits 




                                                  
550 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In the HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 15          
551 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 15 
552 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 50.  
553 Ibid 
554 Ibid 
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DIAGRAM 8.4: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN THE AMES CASE 
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8.3.7 FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE CIA TO WITHHOLD 
INFORMATION FROM THE FBI 
 
 
This thesis has established four major factors which ultimately led the CIA to repeatedly 
hold back vital information from the FBI in this case. Notably, these are largely identical 
to those that prompted the CIA to withhold information on Ed Howard from the Bureau 
earlier.  
 
Detailed analysis of testimonies given by Ames after his arrest in early 1994 revealed a 
key factor – the CIA opted to withhold information from the FBI because it wanted to 
retain control over the investigation into the 1985 – 86 losses. According to Ames: 
 
 [Turning] the case to the FBI is not simply a matter of getting the assistance 
of the FBI, it’s a matter of it [becoming] the FBI case and the Agency loses 
all control [and] that’s a deterrent to doing that.555   
                                                  
555 See “Interview with Aldrich Ames”, Aug 5, 1994. In SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 106  
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As in the Howard case, the CIA deliberately withheld information on the Ames case from 
the FBI so that the Agency could manage the course of its investigation into the 1985 – 
86 losses. Crucially, the CIA wanted an investigative approach that would be sensitive to 
the culture of the Directorate of Operations (DO) and its personnel; one that would be 
less intrusive and demeaning to those under investigation.556 Turning the investigation to 
the FBI (as required under E.O. 12333) meant surrendering CIA control over it as well.   
 
Consider the FBI’s investigation of Ed Howard. The Bureau deployed its full arsenal of 
investigative techniques on Howard after the fired CIA officer came under suspicion for 
espionage – Howard was placed under constant physical surveillance, his telephone was 
tapped, his personal finances and travels scrutinized, his friends and boss were 
interviewed, and he himself was harshly interrogated by Bureau agents (Howard, 
1995).557 After his escape to Moscow, Howard wrote that the FBI’s investigation alone 
had ruined his life.558  
 
In light of that ugly incident, the CIA would never allow its officers to be subjected to 
another FBI investigation especially when those who came under suspicion for the 1985 – 
86 losses included senior CIA officers (see Table 8.4). Even if the CIA officer was not a 
traitor, the fact that he was suspected of being one would have been enough to ruin his 
                                                  
556 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 41.  
557 According to Howard, the Bureau agents who interrogated him even threatened to question his two-year 
old son (Howard, 1995, pp. 77).  
558 Ibid, pp. 81  
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career, according to former CIA Director Robert Gates (Weiner, 1994).559 To protect the 
careers of innocent Agency officers, the CIA had to be sensitive in its approach to the 
investigation. The FBI, on the other hand, was less troubled by such sensitivities since 
none of its personnel were involved.  
 
TABLE 8.3: SAMPLE OF SENIOR CIA OFFICER WHO WERE UNDER 



















































Washington Station Chief 
 
Source: Bearden & Risen, 2003; Weiner, Johnston & Lewis, 1995; Wise, 1995.  
 
                                                  
559 Indeed, James Angleton – the legendary CIA counterintelligence chief – did end up ruining the careers 
of CIA officers who came under suspicion for being Soviet spies (HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 58).  
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That the CIA wanted a less intrusive investigation was evident in public records; the CIA 
task force created to analyze the 1985 – 86 losses had only four members and none had 
experience in criminal investigation. The task force’s approach was to focus on reviewing 
old files on the compromised cases for clues to the losses.560 Only when the task force 
learned in 1989 that Ames had purchase a $540,000 house in cash did it turn its attention 
to the finances of the CIA traitor. There was no indication that the CIA task force ever 
scrutinized the finances of other high-ranking CIA officers who were also under 
suspicion. Until 1991, the CIA task force did not compile a list of potential suspects or 
initiate rigorous investigations of those individuals.561  Only after the CIA task force 
joined forces with the FBI task force did the former adopt a more active investigative 
approach.562 In short, the CIA did not promptly alert the FBI to the 1985 – 86 losses 
because the Agency wanted to control the investigation so that it could be carried out a 
less intrusive and demeaning manner.  
 
The second major factor that prompted the CIA to withhold information from the FBI in 
this case was the self-protective and insular culture of the CIA’s Directorate of 
Operations (DO). Accordingly, this fostered an errant attitude within the DO that its 
problems ought to be “dealt with internally” since it understood them best.563   
 
The major drawback with such a culture was that it led to bureaucratic inertia and more 
importantly, erected a formidable barrier to cooperation with outsiders. So even when it 
                                                  
560 SSCI Report, Nov1, 1994, pp. 26 – 27.  
561 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 47.  
562 Ibid 
563 HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp 67 – 68.  
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became evident to senior DO officers in late 1986 that their division had been penetrated 
by a KGB mole, their response was to handle the problem internally by creating a small 
CIA task force to look into the losses. Even though alerting the FBI was not an option but 
a statutory requirement under E.O. 12333, the insular culture of the DO dictated 
otherwise.  
 
Looking at the backgrounds of the officers on the CIA task force created to investigate 
the 1985 – 86 losses, it is clear that the CIA was unable to mount an effective mole-hunt. 
No one on that task force had the requisite financial and legal training.564 Without an 
understanding of law enforcement procedures, any future criminal prosecution of the 
mole also risked being jeopardized.565 As a further testament to the insular culture of the 
DO, four out of the five task force members were DO officers (see Table 8.5). Even the 
CIA would later concede that had the expertise of the FBI been brought to bear on the 
case from the beginning, Ames would almost certainly have been exposed sooner.566   
 
Although the insular culture of the DO was essential in some aspects (e.g., it fostered 
camaraderie between DO officers, created an elite status for the DO within the CIA and 
reinforced a collective mindset within the DO), it also prevented the DO from reaching 
out for external assistance even when it did not possess the expertise.567 As a result, Ames 
was able to remain undetected for almost a decade.  
 
                                                  
564 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 27. See also, Wise, 1995.  
565 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 30  
566 See CIA IG Report, Oct 21, 1994. In HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 16  
567 HPSCI Report, Nov 30, 1994, pp. 66 – 68.  
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Office of Security, Directorate of Administration 
 
 
Source: Earley, 1997; Aldrich Ames Exhibit, International Spy Museum, Washington D.C., 2011.  
 
The third major factor which limited interagency cooperation in this case was the CIA’s 
policy of not sharing operational information with other agencies. 569  Operational 
information basically pertains to how the CIA operates; they reveal the identities of CIA 
agents and the case officers who handled them, how the CIA rendezvous with them, the 
secrets that they stole for the CIA, the CIA’s means of communicating with them as well 
as CIA technical (e.g., bugging and wiretapping) operations (Wise, 1995; Bearden & 
Risen, 2003). These nuts and bolts workings of the CIA are fundamental to the Agency’s 
trade; if compromised, the CIA would lose its ability to operate in hostile environments 
overseas. In other words, operational information is among the CIA’s most prized secrets. 
To limit the risks of these secrets being betrayed, the CIA adopted a policy of not sharing 
                                                  
568 This is the composition of the CIA task force from 1991 until 1993, when the FBI finally took over the 
Ames investigation. The CIA task force created in 1986 had only four members – Vertefeuille, Payne and 
two annuitants from the DO (SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 26).   
569 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 28.  
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them with other US intelligence agencies, former CIA Inspector General Fred Hitz 
explains.570 Even after its entire network of Soviet agents had been decimated, the CIA 
still refused to open its operational files to the FBI because, according to Hitz, “they may 
have had in them some links to other cases that the FBI was not authorized to see”.571   
 
Again, the policy or standard practice of compartmentalizing secrets to protect them from 
being betrayed resulted in another agency being denied crucial information; in this case, 
the FBI was denied access to the CIA’s operational files because the CIA had maintained 
a policy of not sharing operational information with other agencies. The CIA’s 
operational files would have been significant to the FBI’s investigation since they 
contained vital clues to the source of the 1985 – 86 losses. At the very least, the CIA files 
would have revealed those CIA officers who had comprehensive access to the 
compromised cases; a list could then be drawn up and the suspects investigated one by 
one. It is certainly not without irony that the CIA’s security protocols failed to prevent 
Ames from walking out with shopping bags filled with secret documents but instead 
hampered a Bureau investigation into the traitor.  
 
The point here is not to downplay the importance of secrecy – without a stringent level of 
secrecy intelligence agencies cannot function – but to highlight the need to strike a 
balance between secrecy and information sharing. On one hand, secrecy prevents secrets 
from being betrayed but restricts informational exchanges; on the other hand, more 
openness facilitates informational exchanges but increases the risk of secrets being 
                                                  
570 Email interview with Frederick Hitz, Oct 25, 2011.  
571 Ibid. Hitz was the CIA IG who investigated the Ames case after the traitor was arrested.   
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betrayed. Unfortunately, in the absence of strong compelling reasons, US intelligence 
agencies have a tendency to err on the side of caution and invariably, opt for greater 
secrecy over informational exchanges.    
 
It is important to point out that a balance between secrecy and informational exchange 
was struck in the HTLINGUAL program (see Section 7.2). Owing in large part to the 
extraordinary security measures introduced by the FBI to handle HTLINGUAL materials, 
the CIA ultimately conceded to sharing sensitive intelligence generated by that program 
with the Bureau. If anything, that case demonstrates that it is certainly possible for the 
two agencies to share intimate secrets while minimizing the risk of betrayal.  
 
Lastly, detailed analysis of public records revealed that lapses in the leadership of DCI 
William Casey contributed to the dismal state of affairs between the CIA and FBI in this 
case. As CIA Director from January 1981 to January 1987, William Casey was the person 
with the most intimate knowledge of the 1985 – 86 losses. More importantly, Casey was 
also the DCI so it was his responsibility to alert the FBI. Nevertheless, the DCI failed to 
exercise his leadership as head of the US intelligence community and bring the FBI in.  
 
As it happened, when the CIA began losing agents in late 1985, senior CIA officers 
briefed Casey and the CIA Director was told that it was statistically improbable to lose 
that many agents due to chance.572 Somewhere within the CIA there was a breach and it 
was either a technical or a human penetration (Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 157 – 158). In 
response, Casey authorized then CIA Inspector General (IG), John Stein, to look into the 
                                                  
572 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 16 
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losses.573 But Casey never alerted the FBI even though the CIA Director did acknowledge 
then that the losses presented “a huge problem”.574  
 
Stein apparently arrived at three possible causes; (1) a human penetration at the CIA, (2) 
a technical penetration of the CIA’s communication system, and (3) the compromised 
cases contained “the seeds of [their] own destruction” (i.e., the losses were the result of 
bad tradecraft on the part of the agents or their CIA handlers).575 On this last possibility, 
there was little the CIA could do since it was sheer bad luck – everything that could go 
wrong during a rendezvous between an agent and his handler did. However, on the 
prospect of a human penetration, Stein recommended that a major mole-hunt be carried 
out to uncover the traitor; and on the likelihood of a technical penetration, Stein 
recommended that the NSA be alerted (since the NSA was also responsible for 
communication security or COMSEC).576  
 
Even though Casey had learned earlier from his deputies that the losses could not be due 
to chance (that would have to mean that all the agents and their CIA handlers in the 
compromised cases had practiced bad tradecraft), the CIA Director did not act on Stein’s 
recommendations (Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 166). Soon after Stein submitted his 
assessment to Casey, the Iran-Contra scandal broke and CIA Director’s attention to the 
                                                  
573 Ibid 
574 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 62.  
575 Ibid. See also Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 164 – 166.  
576 Bearden & Risen, 2003, pp. 164 – 166. 
308   
1985 – 86 losses was diverted (Weiner, Johnston & Lewis, 1997, pp. 105 – 109).577 
Before Casey could act on the losses again, the DCI died of brain cancer.578  
 
DIAGRAM 8.5: KEY FACTORS WHICH PROMPTED THE CIA TO 
WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM THE FBI 
 
 
            
            
            
            







Casey’s failure to alert the FBI demonstrated a severe lapse in leadership. As DCI, Casey 
was supposed to oversee and coordinate the activities of the entire USIC. When faced 
with the distinct possibility of a human penetration at the CIA, Casey should have 
exercised leadership as head of US intelligence and brought the FBI in. But the DCI 
                                                  
577 In November 1986, the CIA’s role in the Iran-Contra affair came to light. Specifically, the CIA was 
involved in the illegal operation to supply arms to the anti-government Contras in Nicaragua with proceeds 
received from arm sales to Iran. The entire operation was illegal because Congress had banned both arm 
sales to Iran and US assistance to the Contras (Weiner, 2007, pp. 398 – 408).  
578 Ibid 
The FBI was not 
promptly alerted to 
the 1985 – 86 losses 
(Consequence) 
 
The insular and self-
protective culture of 
the DO  
(Setting) 
 
Casey failed to 
exercise leadership 




The CIA wanted to 
retain control over the 








309   
never did because as CIA Director simultaneously, Casey was inclined to protect his own 
CIA staff from an invasive and potentially career ruining FBI investigation. This was 
perhaps one of the most difficult dilemmas faced by the DCI and unless the two 
responsibilities were separated, it would be next to impossible for the head of the USIC to 
enhance interagency cooperation even if he had wanted to. The four major factors that 
prompted the CIA to withhold espionage information in this case are presented in 
Diagram 8.5 above.     
 
8.3.8 CONCLUSION TO THE AMES CASE 
  
By October 1992, the CIA task force was fairly certain that Ames had been responsible 
for the 1985 – 86 losses; but the CIA could not arrest Ames because it did not have police 
powers – only the FBI had that power. Still, FBI Headquarters was not officially alerted 
until March 1993.579  
 
The subsequent FBI investigation into Ames took nine months to complete and the 
Bureau had to deploy its full range of investigative techniques. To obtain proof of Ames’ 
espionage activities, the FBI tapped the CIA officer’s phone calls, placed him under 
constant surveillance, read his mails, rummaged through his trash, and broke into his 
house.580 Finally, the FBI arrested both Ames and his wife, Rosario, for espionage on 
February 21, 1994.581   
 
                                                  
579 SSCI Report, Nov 1, 1994, pp. 50.  
580 Ibid, pp. 51 
581 Ibid, pp. 52 
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However, as the FBI was preparing to prosecute the Ames’, Ames’ lawyer surprised the 
Bureau by challenging the legality of the techniques used by the Bureau to uncover 
Ames’ espionage activities. There was no question that Ames was a spy – the problem 
was that by reading his mails, rummaging through his trash and breaking into his house, 
the FBI had violated Ames’ Fourth Amendment rights. Because the CIA traitor had been 
subjected to illegal searches by the US government, the risk that Ames could end up 
being acquitted became very real (Diamond, 2008, pp. 357).  
 
Procedure-wise, the FBI did obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
warrant before investigating Ames. Enacted in 1978 to prevent US intelligence agencies 
from ever engaging in warrantless domestic surveillance, FISA ruled that a special 
warrant must be obtained from a secret court – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) – before an intelligence investigation of a person or entity in the US could 
be conducted (Kris, 2006). But until 1995, FISA only authorized the use of electronic 
wiretaps – not physical searches of a suspect’s house, mail or trash (Diamond, 2008, pp. 
357 – 359). Fortunately for the FBI, Ames, against the advice of his lawyer, entered into 
a plea bargain with the US government to save his wife from prolonged imprisonment; in 
the end, Ames was sentenced to life imprisonment while Rosario received a five-year 
prison sentence for abetting her husband in espionage (Diamond, 2008, pp. 358; Wise, 
1995, pp. 284 & 298; Earley, 1997, pp. 338).  
 
Because of the close shave with Ames’ prosecution, FISA was amended in 1995 to 
include physical searches (Diamond, 2008, pp. 359). The Justice Department also 
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implemented new rules that sought to restrict the use of information developed during an 
intelligence investigation for prosecution. Over time, these restrictions supposedly 
erected a “wall” limiting information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement 
officers (Kris, 2006; Diamond, 2008). Indeed, in the aftermath of 9/11, the CIA would 
appeal to this “wall” as justification for withholding information on al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi from the FBI.582 The following chapter shall address how truly formidable this 
“wall” was in limiting informational exchanges between the CIA and FBI prior to 9/11.  
 
In the aftermath of Ames’ arrest, the Bureau’s handling of the case also upset the 
atmosphere for future cooperation between the FBI and CIA. Firstly, the FBI held a 
highly-publicized press conference touting the arrest of Ames. Not only did the press 
conference embarrass the CIA, the Bureau also failed to give due credit to the CIA task 
force that had helped caught Ames (Zeman et al, 2004; Earley, 1997, pp. 335; Smith, 
2004, pp. 130 – 132).  Secondly, convinced of another mole in the CIA, the FBI launched 
a second round of mole-hunt within the Agency after Ames was arrested (Kessler, 2002, 
pp. 441; Theoharis, 2007; pp. 236). The vicious mole-hunt devastated morale at the CIA 
and when another senior CIA officer – Harold J. Nicholson – was arrested for espionage 
in late 1996, the CIA seemed doomed at last (Weiner, 2007, pp. 464 – 466; see Appendix 
6 for more information on Nicholson). Hoover’s observation that the CIA could not be 
trusted with important secrets owing to its “limited methods” and “questionable 
personnel” seemed as relevant in the 1990s as it had been in the 1950s (FBI VENONA, 
pp. 51). Then the FBI discovered that two of its special agents – Earl E. Pitts and Robert 
                                                  
582 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002; 
pp. 83 & 150 – 151.  
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P. Hanssen – had also been spying for the Russians since the mid-1980s (see Appendix 6 
for more information on Pitts and Hanssen). It was a sordid situation in which the pot was 
calling the kettle black.   
 
Chapter 9 continues with this investigation focusing on 9/11 and an assessment of six 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
A DISCUSSION ON SIX DECADES OF  















The first part of this chapter returns to the case introduced at the beginning of this thesis – 
9/11. The aim is to ascertain the key factors that hampered NSA–CIA–FBI cooperation 
prior to 9/11 as well as to establish if factors uncovered in earlier cases were observed 
once more. The second part of this chapter then sorts out those factors that are most 
important to US interagency intelligence cooperation using the criteria stipulated by 
grounded theory.  
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9.2 CASE XII: US INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE 
COOPERATION PRIOR TO 9/11 
 
Below is a summary of the key intelligence events that transpired before 9/11 (see 
Diagram 9.1): 
 
(a) The CIA had obtained vital information on two 9/11 hijackers – Khalid al-
Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi – but opted to withhold it from the FBI. 
(b) The FBI withheld information it had developed on al-Qaeda from the CIA even 
though both agencies recognized the grave threat posed by the terror organization.  
(c)  The CIA had requested for SIGINT intercepts of al-Qaeda communications but 
its requests were denied by the NSA.  
(d) The NSA intercepted a phone call made by al-Mihdhar when he was in the US to 
a phone in Yemen linked to al-Qaeda but failed to alert the FBI.  
 
DIAGRAM 9.1: TIMELINE OF KEY INTELLIGENCE EVENTS BEFORE 9/11 
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9.2.1 KEY FACTORS WHICH LIMITED CIA–FBI COOPERATION 
BEFORE 9/11 
 
According to former CIA SE division chief, Burton Gerber, one of the most important 
reasons the FBI and CIA shunned cooperation on the issue of al-Qaeda before 9/11 was 
that “the atmosphere [for CIA–FBI cooperation] had been poisoned”.583 Specifically, the 
rancorous relationship between the chief of the FBI’s counterterrorism section, John 
O’Neill and the chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, had engendered an 
environment so hostile to FBI–CIA cooperation that it was next to impossible for the two 
agencies to work together on the issue of counterterrorism.584  
 
Using this piece of significant information as a guide, further analysis of the relationship 
between John O’Neill and Michael Scheuer was conducted to establish how CIA–FBI 
cooperation was affected. As Table 9.1 clearly shows, both O’Neill and Scheuer were 
indeed heavily involved in investigating al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.  
 
O’Neill, whose background had been in criminal investigation, became the FBI’s top 
official on counterterrorism in 1995; over the next six years, O’Neill would lead the 
capture of Ramzi Yousef (mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) in 
Pakistan (1995), the investigation into the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia 
(1996), the US embassy bombings in East Africa (1998) and the attack on the USS Cole 
                                                  
583 Interview with Burton Lee Gerber, Jun 14, 2011.  
584 Ibid 
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off the coast of Yemen (2000). For six years prior to his retirement from the Bureau in 
June 2001, O’Neill worked on nothing but counterterrorism.585   
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Source: PBS586; Scheuer, 2008.  
 
In the same year that O’Neill became the FBI’s head of counterterrorism, the CIA for the 
first time in its history created a special unit targeting not a country but an individual – 
Osama bin Laden. Having spent most of his CIA career working on the subject of Islamic 
extremism, Scheuer was the natural choice to lead the CIA’s bin Laden tracking unit.587  
 
                                                  
585 After he left the Bureau, O’Neill went to work in late August 2011 as head of security of the World 
Trade Center; he perished on 9/11.  
586 Public Broadcasting Station, “Frontline – The Man Who Knew”,  Oct 3, 2002, URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/john/timeline.html  
587 Interview with Michael Scheuer on “Frontline – The Torture Question”, PBS, Oct 18, 2005, URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/scheuer.html   
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Although O’Neill and Scheuer were focused squarely on al-Qaeda and even accurately 
foresaw the threat posed by the terror group, the two men were also fierce rivals who 
often “were at each other’s throats” (Zeman et al, 2004).588  
 
From the beginning, O’Neill was dead set against working with Scheuer. In one instance, 
O’Neill refused to hand over an al-Qaeda notebook which his unit had come into 
possession of to Scheuer arguing that the notebook “is the FBI’s; I just don’t want 
[Scheuer] to have it; I want the FBI to control this [case]”.589 As a result, the FBI 
withheld that notebook from the CIA for almost a year denying Scheuer’s bin Laden unit 
access to a vital piece of intelligence material on al-Qaeda.   
 
Scheuer meanwhile also barred FBI agents working on the bin Laden unit from passing 
information back to O’Neill at FBI Headquarters without CIA permission. So even 
though there were FBI agents working alongside CIA analysts on the bin Laden unit at 
the CIA, little or no information actually flow back to the FBI. The same also held true of 
CIA officers working alongside FBI agents at the Counterterrorism Section of the FBI. 
The function of the liaison officer in facilitating interagency cooperation had been 
completely nullified in this case because those in charge simply refused to work together 
(Zeman et al, 2004; Wright, 2006; Scheuer, 2004).    
 
Although Scheuer was eventually replaced as head of the bin Laden unit in June 1999, 
the CIA’s bin Laden unit and the FBI’s Counterterrorism Section had ceased to talk each 
                                                  
588 Quote from former senior CIA official for clandestine operations, John MacGaffin; in Zeman et al, 
2004.  
589 Ibid 
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other (Zeman et al, 2004). Comparable to how rancorous relations between Hoover and 
Donovan had hampered FBI–OSS cooperation six decades ago, the bitter rivalry between 
O’Neill and Scheuer had also made it impossible for their units to work together even as 
a major attack by al-Qaeda loomed.  
 
This largely explains why when FBI agent Mark Rossini requested in early 2000 that CIA 
information on al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi be shared with FBI Headquarters, he was told 
by the CIA officer in charge of the bin Laden unit that “No, it is not the FBI’s case; it is 
not the FBI’s jurisdiction.” Without CIA permission, Rossini was barred from passing 
information back to FBI Headquarters. Ironically, that was the same justification O’Neill 
had used to withhold from Scheuer the al-Qaeda notebook in the Bureau’s possession. 
The bitter rivalry between O’Neill and Scheuer had created an environment in which 
CIA–FBI cooperation on the problem of al-Qaeda was no longer viable. Even after 
Scheuer was replaced as head of the bin Laden unit, the atmosphere for CIA–FBI 
cooperation did not improve because Scheuer’s successor (a man the CIA refers to only 
as “Rich”) and his staff on the bin Laden unit were socialized into that poisoned 
environment. As noted scholar Robert Jervis explains, “Bad blood tends to linger on for a 
long time [in that type of situation]”.590   
 
One can only speculate on the source of that bitter rivalry between O’Neill and Scheuer. 
In terms of personality, the two men could not have been more different; O’Neill was 
always impeccably dressed whereas Scheuer looked more like a poor American 
professor; O’Neill was charming whereas Scheuer was described as being “an angry 
                                                  
590 Interview with Prof. Robert Jervis, SIPA, Columbia University, New York, Jun 9, 2011.  
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person” (Zeman et al, 2004). But on a bureaucratic level, the two men also had reasons to 
compete aggressively with each other.  
 
According to Burton Gerber, information is power in the intelligence business – an 
agency that controls a piece of vital intelligence information wields tremendous power 
over other agencies, departments and even the White House; conversely, an agency that is 
shut out risks being marginalized.591 Remember, the OSS was reduced to a subordinate 
role during World War II because, among other things, it did not have access to MAGIC-
ULTRA intercepts (see Section 5.4). By the same token, the FBI and CIA were not only 
aiming to become the lead agency in charge of the al-Qaeda issue but also to marginalize 
each other at the same time by withholding information from each other. As it were, 
O’Neill and Scheuer were central figures in this high stake bureaucratic competition. 
While competition might bring out the best in a person, in this case, it brought out the 
worse for CIA–FBI cooperation.  
 
In Gerber’s view, the DCI should have had the authority to swiftly remove those persons 
responsible for such a hostile environment. As head of the USIC, it was the responsibility 
of the DCI to ensure that US intelligence agencies work together, especially when the 
threat of an attack on the US was escalating rapidly. Unfortunately, the DCI had little 
personnel authority beyond the CIA itself.592  
 
                                                  
591 Interview with Burton Lee Gerber, Jun 14, 2011.  
592 Ibid 
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Was the “wall” created by FISA (1978) to blame for the lack of informational exchanges 
between the CIA and FBI on the subject of al-Qaeda prior to 9/11 (see Section 8.3.8)? In 
particular, it has been suggested that the reason the CIA did not share with the FBI vital 
intelligence information on al-Qaeda because the Agency wanted to avoid contaminating 
the Bureau’s own investigation into the terror group.593  
 
This is no more than an excuse by the CIA for withholding crucial information from the 
FBI. According to former FBI agent Mark Rossini, the CIA’s information on al-Qaeda 
would in fact have facilitated the FBI’s request for a FISA warrant to investigate al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, if the Bureau had wanted to. Because the information in the 
CIA’s possession would indicate that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were not only linked to an 
international terrorist organization but were also living in the US at the time, the key 
criteria for obtaining a FISA warrant would have been fulfilled.594 “[Obtaining a FISA 
warrant] would have been easy,” according to Rossini.595 Any doubt about the FISA 
“wall” being nothing but an excuse is dispelled by John Rizzo, Deputy CIA General 
Counsel from 1995 to 2001. According to Rizzo, “there would have been no legal 
impediments to sharing that information [on al-Mihdhar & al-Hazmi] with the FBI”.596 If 
                                                  
593 See also House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 
2002; pp. 83.  
594 Before 9/11, FISA required the FBI to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
whenever the Bureau needed to carry out an intelligence investigation into a US person. Crucially, the FBI 
must demonstrate to the FISC that it had “probable cause to believe that the subject of the surveillance is a 
foreign government or organization engaging in clandestine intelligence activities, or is an individual 
engaging in clandestine intelligence activities or international terrorism on behalf of a foreign government 
or organization (source: “Special Report: A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Prior 
to the September 11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, US Dept. of Justice, Nov 2004, Chapter 2, 
pp. 2, URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0506/chapter2.htm       
595 Interview with Mark Rossini, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, Public Broadcasting Station, Feb 3, 2009  
596  Interview with John Rizzo, “Frontline – The Interrogator”, PBS, Sep 13, 2011, URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-interrogator/   
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there were no legal impediments to sharing that information with the FBI, then the real 
reason behind it becomes more evident. Incidentally, the CIA finally shared that 
information with the FBI in August 2001 – one month after O’Neill retired from the FBI.  
 
9.2.2 KEY FACTORS THAT PROMPTED THE NSA TO WITHHOLD 
SIGINT INTERCEPTS FROM THE CIA 
 
For close to three years before 9/11, the NSA had been monitoring phone calls made to 
and from an al-Qaeda safehouse in Sana’a, Yemen. That phone was in effect a 
switchboard for al-Qaeda operatives around the world to communicate with one another 
and its number was actually passed on to the NSA by the FBI (see Section 1.1). Of course 
the FBI did not share that phone number with the NSA for altruistic reasons – it had to do 
so because the Bureau did not have the signals intelligence resources and expertise to 
monitor that phone. To eavesdrop on all the calls made to and from that phone would 
require an array of spy satellites and ground listening stations – the Bureau simply did not 
have that capability after withdrawing from the foreign signals intelligence realm six 
decades ago. Therefore, the Bureau had no choice but to share that phone number with 
the NSA and leverage on its resources.      
 
Soon, that phone created a bone of contention between the CIA and NSA. After learning 
that the phone was being used by al-Qaeda as a switchboard, Scheuer’s bin Laden unit 
demanded access to verbatim transcripts of intercepted conversations made to and from 
that phone; the CIA wanted the raw intercepts and not the written summaries which the 
NSA would only provide. Crucially, the CIA wanted the raw intercepts because even 
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though the phone conversations were not encrypted, al-Qaeda operatives often talked in a 
cryptic manner and only by analyzing the verbatim transcripts could CIA analysts better 
understand the hidden meanings. Despite repeated attempts by the CIA to secure access 
to the raw intercepts, the NSA refused to share them with the Agency.597  
 
The NSA’s justification for denying the CIA access was that it was never NSA policy to 
share raw intercepts with any other agencies. 598  Indeed, the still-classified National 
Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 6: “Signals Intelligence” (1972) did 
give the NSA full control over signals intelligence, according to author James 
Bamford.599 Notwithstanding that, it must be pointed out that even though NSCID 6 laid 
down the NSA’s dominance in the collection, analyses and dissemination of signals 
intelligence, the NSA had in the past, as an example, shared raw VENONA intercepts 
with the FBI (see Section 6.4). Hence, the NSA’s appeal to NSCID 6 and standard 
practices to deny the CIA’s bin Laden unit access to raw intercepts of al-Qaeda 
communications should strike one as somewhat disingenuous.  
 
In an exclusive interview with me, NSA expert Matthew Aid offered a more convincing 
explanation. According to Aid, the main reason the NSA withheld raw intercepts from the 
CIA in this case was to retaliate against the CIA for encroaching onto NSA domain.600 To 
understand how the CIA had violated NSA domain, one must first understand the 
                                                  
597 Interview with Michael Scheuer, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009. See also Scheuer, M., 
“How Not to Catch a Terrorist”, The Atlantic Monthly, Dec 2004, URL: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/how-i-not-i-to-catch-a-terrorist/3627/#  
598 “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009. 
599 Interview with James Bamford, “NOVA – The Spy Factory: Expert Q & A”, PBS, Feb 9, 2009, URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/bamford-nsa.html    
600 Email interview with Matthew Aid, Oct 28, 2011. An attempt was made to corroborate Aid’s account 
herein with Michael Scheuer; unfortunately, Scheuer did not reply to my emails.  
323   
standard procedure in which the NSA handles requests from other agencies for signals 
intelligence.  
 
Owing largely to the efforts of a senior NSA staffer named Mary “Polly” Budenbach601, 
the NSA in fact engages in active liaisons with other US intelligence agencies. Thanks to 
Budenbach, the NSA today maintains an office dedicated to liaison duties and its officers 
regularly solicit requirements for SIGINT coverage from other US intelligence 
customers. Of course, the NSA is not being altruistic; NSA officials simply recognize that 
their agency is extremely expensive to maintain. Reportedly, the annual budget for the 
NSA in 2010 was close to US$26 billion or almost one-third of the entire US intelligence 
budget making the NSA the most expensive US spy agency. To justify its massive 
budget, the NSA has always sought to make itself useful by offering signals intelligence 
coverage to other US agencies and departments.602   
 
According to Aid, when an intelligence customer requires SIGINT coverage of a 
particular target, the request must be made through a special NSA board known as the 
Signals Intelligence Committee before it lumbers up the NSA bureaucracy for approval. 
This process, though slow, has ensured that other US agencies and departments can gain 
access to NSA signals intelligence. However, beginning in the late 1990s, the CIA, in its 
haste to acquire intelligence on al-Qaeda, bypassed the Signals Intelligence Committee 
and acted unilaterally to collect signals intelligence on the terror organization.603 The 
                                                  
601 NSA, “Women in Cryptology: Mary Budenbach” Jan 15, 2009, URL: 
http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/women/honorees/budenbach.shtml  
602 Telephone interview with Matthew Aid, Jul 8, 2011   
603 Email interview with Matthew Aid, Oct 28, 2011.  
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“peace treaty” signed between the CIA and NSA in 1977 to subordinate the CIA’s signals 
intelligence activities to the NSA was thus invalidated. Bypassing the NSA, the CIA built 
its own listening station to eavesdrop on al-Qaeda communications. But because the CIA 
did not have electronic eavesdropping satellites in orbit, it could only capture one end of 
the communications.604 The CIA’s unilateral action angered NSA officials who viewed 
that as another attempt by the Agency to muscle its way into NSA domain. In retaliation, 
the NSA withheld al-Qaeda intercepts from the CIA.605   
 
In short, the NSA’s appeal to NSCID 6 to deny the CIA access to raw al-Qaeda intercepts 
was more of an excuse than a bona-fide reason. The real reason for the NSA withholding 
raw intercepts from the CIA was to retaliate against CIA incursion into its domain. As 
shown in previous cases, such tit-for-tats were not uncommon between US intelligence 
agencies and in the absence of a powerful authority to resolve such interagency conflicts 
the only beneficiaries had been America’s enemies.  
 
9.2.3 WHY THE NSA FAILED TO ALERT THE FBI  
 
Although the NSA did inform the FBI that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi would be travelling 
to Malaysia in January 2000, it failed to inform the Bureau that on March 20, 2000, the 
NSA intercepted a call made from a phone registered under al-Hazmi’s name in San 
                                                  
604 Interview with Michael Scheuer, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009. 
605 Email interview with Matthew Aid, Oct 28, 2011.  
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Diego, California, to the al-Qaeda phone in Yemen.606 At that point, the NSA must have 
at least suspected that there were al-Qaeda operatives in the US because NSA technology 
would have indicated that the call originated from inside the US; nevertheless, the NSA 
did not pass on that piece of vital information to the FBI.607 Investigations carried out 
after 9/11 established that the call was placed by al-Mihdhar.608   
 
According to author James Bamford, the NSA withheld that piece of information from 
the FBI because it wanted to control the operation. “[The NSA] ignored [to alert the FBI] 
because it would have had to hand the contacts over to the FBI,” explains Bamford.609 
Once the operation was handed over to the FBI, the NSA would almost certainly be 
reduced to a subordinate role because the FBI, being the US agency responsible for 
domestic intelligence, would be the agency leading the investigation into al-Mihdhar and 
al-Hazmi once they arrived in the US. In an intelligence system where access is 
synonymous with influence, it simply made no sense for an agency to surrender its 
control over an important operation to another.   
 
Bamford also suggested that privacy concerns on the part of the NSA Director Michael 
Hayden might have contributed to the NSA’s failure to alert the FBI. 610  Evidently, 
DIRNSA Hayden was averse to sharing information with the FBI in that case because he 
                                                  
606 FBI Report, “9/11 Chronology: Hijackers Timeline – Part 1”, Mar 2011, pp. 58, FBI FOIA, URL: 
http://vault.fbi.gov/9-11%20Commission%20Report/9-11-chronology-part-01-of-02/view  
607 Interview with James Bamford, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.   
608 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002; 
pp. XIII.  
609 Interview with James Bamford, “NOVA – The Spy Factory”, PBS, Feb 3, 2009.   
610 Interview with James Bamford, “NOVA – The Spy Factory: Expert Q & A”, PBS, Feb 9, 2009, URL: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/bamford-nsa.html    
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did not wish the NSA to be again accused of engaging in domestic surveillance.611 During 
the Cold War, the NSA had engaged in widespread domestic surveillance targeting many 
Americans without warrants (see Section 7.4.3). If the FBI were to accidentally reveal 
that the NSA had been listening in on the conversations of US persons, then the NSA 
would be in jeopardy again. Under the threat of inadvertent exposure, it was only logical 
for the NSA to withhold that piece of sensitive information.  
 
During an exclusive interview with me, Matthew Aid suggested another reason for the 
NSA’s failure to alert the FBI to the presence of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi in the US. The 
NSA expert suggests that the principal reason was that the information from that March 
20, 2000 phone call by al-Mihdhar simply did not meet the threshold for dissemination to 
other agencies.612 It is a matter of public records that al-Mihdhar made one phone call to 
the al-Qaeda phone in Yemen prior to 9/11. That phone call on March 20, 2000, lasted for 
only 16 minutes. On June 10, 2000, al-Mihdhar left the US for Yemen and did not return 
until July 4, 2001.613 So that phone conversation is the key – i.e., who did al-Mihdhar 
speak to, what did he discuss and why did he make that call. Until now, the NSA refuses 
to declassify the verbatim transcript of that phone call but Aid, who has wide access to 
NSA personnel, revealed to me what transpired during that call.   
 
                                                  
611 Ibid 
612 Interview with Matthew M. Aid, Jun 14, 2011; phone interview with Aid, Jul 8, 2011   
613 FBI Report, “9/11 Chronology: Hijackers Timeline – Part 1”, Mar 2011, FBI FOIA, URL: 
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Al-Mihdhar spoke for 16 minutes to his wife who at the time was expecting his baby and 
living in that al-Qaeda safehouse.614 Although the couple did at times talk to each other in 
a nuanced and cryptic manner, they discussed only personal matters during that call and 
al-Mihdhar never revealed any operational plans or notable information to his wife. 
Consequently, the NSA analyst who eavesdropped on their conversation did not uncover 
anything suspicious or worth disseminating to other agencies.615  
 
The slightly different accounts given by Bamford and Aid need not be mutually exclusive 
however. Al-Mihdhar was a seasoned al-Qaeda operative who must have known basic 
counter-surveillance techniques and therefore, was unlikely to have discussed secrets 
over the phone. Because that phone conversation between al-Mihdhar and his wife 
seemed so innocuous, there was no point for the NSA to risk losing its control over the 
case by alerting the FBI. Furthermore, if the FBI were alerted, the risk of inadvertent 
exposure (of the NSA’s domestic surveillance activities) would also increase for the 
NSA. Taken together, the only logical move for the NSA was to withhold that piece of 
sensitive information.  
 
9.2.4 KEY FACTORS THAT LIMITED US INTELLIGENCE 
COOPERATION PRIOR TO 9/11 
 
 
A combination of factors prompted the CIA, NSA and FBI to bottle up vital information 
prior to 9/11.  
                                                  
614 Al-Mihdhar is the son-in-law of Ahmed al-Hada, the owner of that al-Qaeda safehouse in Sana’a, 
Yemen. Al-Hada’s phone was being used by al-Qaeda as a switchboard at the time.  
615 Interview with Matthew M. Aid, Jun 14, 2011; phone interview with Aid, Jul 8, 2011    
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Rancorous relations between those in charge of counterterrorism at the FBI and CIA 
hampered FBI–CIA cooperation on the problem of al-Qaeda even as an attack by the 
terror organization loomed. Competition to maintain control of the case further restricted 
the flow of vital information on al-Qaeda within the US intelligence system. As before, 
the CIA’s incursion into the realm of signals intelligence ended up hampering NSA–CIA 
cooperation. Putting an end to such domain violations is a necessary condition for 
interagency cooperation to improve.  
 
In this particular case, privacy concerns prevented information from being shared 
between agencies. The NSA, in particular, shied away from the issue of domestic 
surveillance for fear of being accused of violating the privacy of Americans. As a result, 
it opted to withhold information on al-Mihdhar from the FBI.616 Unless the information 
were of extreme importance, it was only logical for the NSA to limit information flow so 
as to minimize the risk of exposure of its domestic surveillance activities. In the aftermath 
of 9/11, the PATRIOT Act (2001) was passed to ease such privacy concerns paving the 
way for the NSA to engage in domestic surveillance with minimal constraints (Gill, 2004; 
Doyle, 2002). In February 2008, FISA was also amended removing the requirement for a 
FISC warrant to conduct intelligence surveillance in the domestic-to-international context 
(Bazan, 2008, pp. 12).617  
 
                                                  
616 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, 
pp. 73 – 74.   
617 Bazan, E. B., "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues.” CRS Report 
for Congress, updated July 2008. URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34279.pdf  
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The CIA, NSA and FBI all had in their possession vital information which, if shared, 
would have significantly improved the chances of uncovering the 9/11 plot.618 Instead, 
for the reasons mentioned above, these agencies opted to squirrel away vital information 
(see Diagram 9.2). The uncanny similarities between 9/11 and the Pearl Harbor attack 
beg the question: why has US interagency intelligence cooperation remained so 
problematic even after two generations? 
 
DIAGRAM 9.2: KEY FACTORS WHICH LIMITED US INTERAGENCY 
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION BEFORE 9/11 
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In this final case, one can certainly observe several categories of information that were 
uncovered previously and repeated observation of these categories certainly suggests that 
they are not idiosyncratic. So while the historical cases examined herein are not uniform, 
they do contain categories of information that are largely identical over both time and 
space. The next half of this chapter aims to bring together these central categories.  
 
9.3 A DISCUSSION ON SIX DECADES OF US INTERAGENCY 
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
 
This section collates all the factors discovered in this thesis to form a set of conceptual 
explanations for the research phenomenon. Using the criteria stipulated by grounded 
theory, these categories of information are refined to form central categories that explain 
why US intelligence agencies engage in or shun cooperation.   
 
To repeat, a central category of information must: 
  
 Contain features derived from the data. 
 Appear regularly in the data.  
 Be reliable, consistent and logical.  
 Account for the research phenomenon across time as well as variations in the 
data.  
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In grounded theory research, a category of information is significant only if it satisfies 
these criteria (see Section 3.5). In other words, a factor must meet these standards to be 
considered important.  
 
The following central categories met these criteria.  
 
9.3.1 CENTRAL CATEGORY: COMPETITION FOR 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL LIMITED INTERAGENCY 
COOPERATION 
 
Throughout this investigation, the NSA, CIA and FBI were observed to have struggled 
against each other for operational control. Whether it was control over an individual case 
or a multi-billion dollar program, these agencies competed fiercely against one another 
and the interagency competition engendered invariably created a formidable barrier to 
cooperation.   
 
This factor was a key motivation that prompted the CIA to bypass the NSA in the Berlin 
Tunnel operation. Crucially, the CIA wanted to be in charge of that operation so that its 
civilian requirements would take center-stage. If included in that operation, the NSA was 
likely to take over control and then use the tunnel to satisfy its military requirements. 
Coming to that conclusion, the CIA decided to keep the NSA in the dark opting instead to 
collaborate with the British. In the end, DIRNSA Canine only learned of the Berlin 
Tunnel from the New York Times when that operation was exposed.   
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On a broader level, the Berlin Tunnel operation represented a snapshot of the 
longstanding struggle between the CIA and NSA for control over the national signals 
intelligence program. The NSA was supposed to be responsible for it but as this thesis 
has shown, the CIA mounted unilateral SIGINT operations time and again in direct 
competition with the NSA. Even before the NSA was established in 1952, the CIA was 
already challenging its predecessor – the AFSA – for control of the signals intelligence 
program. That struggle continued until 9/11. Needless to say, that “unrelenting, 
unremitting and never-ending” struggle hurt NSA-CIA relations and hampered 
interagency cooperation. 619       
 
Control over HTLINGUAL – the CIA’s mail opening program – was also an important 
element that factored into the CIA decision to withhold that program from the FBI. Since 
HTLINGUAL was conducted in the Bureau’s domain, the FBI could in theory contest 
CIA control of that program. As CIA Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton 
explained, CIA control over HTLINGUAL was necessary to ensure that the Agency’s 
requirement for foreign intelligence would not be superseded by FBI requirement for 
domestic intelligence. Consequently, the CIA opted to keep HTLINGUAL from the FBI 
to make certain that the Agency retained exclusive control.      
 
This factor was observed once more in the Ed Howard case. Above all, the CIA kept the 
FBI in the dark long after Howard came under suspicion for espionage because the 
Agency wanted to be in control of the investigation. Even though the CIA was required 
                                                  
619 Aid, M. M., “The CIA SIGINT program and its relations with the NSA.” Speech delivered at the 
University of Nottingham, Apr 29 – May 1, 2011. URL: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/04/matthew-
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by law to alert the FBI, doing so might entail surrendering the investigation to the 
Bureau. Fearing that a high-profile arrest would embarrass the CIA, the CIA simply opted 
to withhold vital espionage information from the FBI. This was again observed in the 
espionage case involving Aldrich Ames. Because it wanted to dictate the terms of the 
investigation into the CIA traitor, the CIA repeatedly withheld vital information from the 
FBI even as it was becoming evident that the Agency had been penetrated by a Soviet 
mole. As a result of which, Ames was able to stay undetected for almost a decade even 
though he had been a clumsy spy.  
 
Finally, the FBI and CIA refused to share vital intelligence on al-Qaeda even after they 
had come to recognize the threat posed by the terror group because both wanted to 
control the case. As it happened, the FBI refused to hand over an al-Qaeda notebook in its 
possession to the CIA’s bin Laden unit because it wanted to be in charge of the 
investigation. Later, the CIA’s bin Laden unit would refuse to share crucial information 
on al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with FBI Headquarters because it too wanted to control the 
case. This factor, manifested as poor interagency intelligence sharing, was a leading 
cause of the 9/11 intelligence failure.  
 
In an intelligence system where influence over the rest of Washington is closely 
associated with being in charge or involved in important operations, it is only logical for 
an agency to seek operational control or at least gain access to them. Indeed, an agency 
that is responsible for an important operation or program wields considerable power over 
other agencies and departments; and those that are shut out invariably diminish in 
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significance. Moreover, from a self-interested standpoint, being in charge of an important 
operation or program often entails not only additional funding for that agency but also 
complicates any attempt to downsize it. Therefore, there are strong incentives for US 
intelligence agencies to maintain their control or at least become active participants in 
vital operations. When an investigation has the potential to cause deep embarrassment to 
an agency, it makes sense too for that agency to keep it tightly under control so as to 
minimize the risk of public disclosure. Howard and Ames were potentially embarrassing 
cases for the CIA so the impulse was to bottle their cases up. More than anything else, the 
CIA presumed that by acting unilaterally its reputation would be better served. Of course, 
the CIA’s decision to act unilaterally in these cases ultimately did not save its reputation 
but ruined it instead.    
 


























The CIA and FBI withheld information on al-Qaeda from each other 
 
 
How competition for operational control hampered interagency cooperation was observed 
across different time and space (see Table 9.2). First observed in the Berlin Tunnel 
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operation, this factor limited US interagency cooperation throughout the Cold War and 
was last observed in events prior to 9/11. It was also observed across different cases; the 
Berlin Tunnel project was primarily a SIGINT operation, HTLINGUAL was a mail-
opening program, the Howard and Ames investigations involved espionage and 9/11 was 
a counterterrorism subject-matter. Taken together, the wide spectrum of historical cases 
in which this factor was observed and its enduring nature are clearly indicative of its 
significance. After reading this thesis, the reader may notice that the FBI and NSA have 
not experienced major interagency issues for decades. Certainly, once the FBI withdrew 
from the foreign signals intelligence in 1947, there is no public record of internecine 
clashes between the Bureau and NSA. That, according to Ivian Smith, is no coincidence. 
As the former FBI SAC explains to me in an exclusive interview: 
 
One reason for the decades of good relations between the Bureau and NSA 
is that they weren’t really competitors. There was a mutual admiration of the 
relative skills – mainly technical – that both enjoyed and there was a 
mutually satisfying relationship that resulted in a sound and supportive 
relationship that often times resulted in really good intelligence coups.620    
 
On the other hand, the CIA competes incessantly with the NSA and FBI and over time, 
serious damage was done to its cooperative relationships with the NSA and FBI.   
 
9.3.2 CENTRAL CATEGORY: EXCESSIVE SECRECY AS A MAJOR 
BARRIER TO INTERAGENCY COOPERATION  
                                                  
620 Email interview with Ivian C. Smith, Nov 13, 2012 
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The weight of the evidence contained herein strongly supports the notion that excessive 
secrecy restricted the flow of intelligence information and undermined US interagency 
intelligence cooperation. Like a double-edged sword, secrecy can reduce the risk of vital 
secrets being compromised but it can also stymie the flow of vital information. In the 
intelligence business, secrecy is necessary to protect important sources and methods; but 
in some cases, it can also prompt intelligence officials to bottle up vital information 
instead of disseminating it to other legitimate users. This problem was first observed prior 
to the bombing of Pearl Harbor when stringent security requirements prevented various 
US government and intelligence agencies from sharing fragmentary information pointing 
to the attack. In the end, the bits and pieces of critical clues were not synthesized into a 
coherent picture of the impending attack and culminated in one of the most devastating 
attacks on US forces in history.   
 
During World War II, the War Department adopted stringent security protocols that 
severely restricted the flow of Axis signals intelligence to non-military users. As a result, 
both the OSS and FBI were denied access to vital enemy signals intelligence even though 
those agencies did have a legitimate right to that important intelligence product. 
Admittedly, the War Department’s exacting security policy reduced the risk of betrayal; 
but that practice also limited the flow vital information from that source to other 
legitimate users. Furthermore, it also had a lasting consequence in that the successor to 
the OSS – the CIA – would exact revenge on the NSA for many years after. For similar 
reason, the FBI shunned cooperation with the OSS during the war even though both 
agencies were simultaneously engaged in double-agent operations. To be sure, the OSS 
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shared some of the blame. Owing to serious security lapses, the OSS wound up with a 
dismal reputation and was seen in Washington to be an insecure repository of vital 
secrets. Under those circumstances, no agencies would risk their own sources by 
cooperating with the OSS. By the same token, given Hoover’s strong emphasis on 
secrecy, it was needless to say that the FBI Director would not have shared anything of 
importance with the predecessor of the CIA.     
 
Stringent security requirement was also a key factor that prompted the NSA to withhold, 
at least initially, VENONA from the FBI and the CIA. Secrecy was central to that code-
breaking program since its success rested squarely on the Soviets believing that their 
cryptographic system was secure. As a consequence, the FBI was not brought into that 
program until 1947 while the CIA was kept in the dark until 1953 even though VENONA 
had started earlier during World War II. More importantly, by withholding VENONA 
from the CIA, the NSA and FBI had also precluded that agency from taking prompt 
actions to minimize the damage caused by enemy spies who had penetrated the Agency.  
 
At the height of the Cold War, both the CIA and FBI conducted mail interception 
programs in the US but stringent requirement for secrecy prevented them from working 
together. In particular, the CIA kept HTLINGUAL from the Bureau due to the sensitive 
nature of that program; the CIA was breaking the law by opening US first-class mails and 
thus had to limit the number of people with knowledge of that program. Meanwhile, the 
FBI kept its mail interception program from the CIA because senior Bureau officials, 
presuming that the CIA had been penetrated by Soviet spies, did not trust the Agency 
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with important secrets. As a result, the two agencies mounted parallel mail-opening 
operations in the country for many years behind each other’s back when some form of 
collaboration would have been more productive.  
 
At its worst, secrecy as a routine to protect secrets can also turn into bureaucratic silence 
– one that ultimately fosters an insular and self-protective culture. This was observed in 
the Howard and Ames cases in which the desire on the part of senior CIA officials to 
keep these embarrassing incidents under wraps ultimately prompted the CIA to delay 
sharing vital information with the FBI. In the end, Howard managed to escape arrest 
whereas Ames was able to remain undetected for almost a decade. More significantly, 
grave damage was done to US national security as a result of the CIA’s bureaucratic 
silence.  
 
There is no question that secrecy is absolutely essential in the intelligence business. Any 
advantages provided by high-tech spy gears or well-placed spies will quickly evaporate 
unless stringent security measures are put in place to keep them secret. Sufficed to say, a 
spy agency cannot function without maintaining a high degree of secrecy. Indeed, it is not 
at all unusual for intelligence officers in one room to have absolutely no clue of what 
others are working on in the adjoining room – let alone other agencies (Burrows, 1986). 
But when an intelligence agency join forces with another agency, it is required to share 
its secrets with its collaborator and as more people gain access to a secret, the risk of 
betrayal also increases. Therefore, the logical option for an intelligence agency is to shun 
cooperation. In the absence of an overarching authority – one who can act as an impartial 
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advocate for all interested parties and ensure that they comply with community-wide 
imperatives – the tendency is to bottle up information.   
 



































The CIA withheld from the FBI information on Ames 
 
 
This investigation has also uncovered exclusive information which indicates that 
excessive secrecy can even stymie the work of coordinating committees. The best 
example of this took place with the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). Known 
as the USIB until 1976, the NFIB was the nation’s highest intelligence policy-making 
body with responsibilities ranging from approving the National Intelligence Estimates 
(NIEs) to intelligence coordination to maintaining security (Richelson, 1999, pp. 320, 390 
– 391).621 Sometime between 1993 and 1995, an NIE analyzing primarily the unclassified 
                                                  
621 The NIE is produced by the National Intelligence Council with inputs from all US intelligence agencies. 
After it is approved by the NFIB, the NIE is disseminated to the president, the NSC and senior policy-
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issue of law enforcement was produced for key US policy-makers. But due to excessive 
secrecy, that report was squirreled away instead of being disseminated widely as it 
should. In the end, an important report was essentially rendered useless and information 
flow was constricted when that should never have been in that particular case.622   
 
Whether manifested as strict security protocols, as bureaucratic silence or as a means to 
preclude betrayal, excessive secrecy has hampered US interagency cooperation across 
different time and space (see Table 9.3). In a majority of the historical cases examined 
herein involving US intelligence agencies shunning cooperation, excessive secrecy has 
been an important factor. Because secrecy as a factor limiting interagency cooperation 
was observed repeatedly over an extended time period, its significance is hard to refute.  
 
9.3.3 CENTRAL CATEGORY: LOOSELY DEFINED 
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCOURAGED INTERAGENCY 
COOPERATION 
 
A major source of interagency conflict, vaguely delineated responsibilities made it 
possible for US intelligence agencies to encroach each other’s turf or domain. One crucial 
reason why US policy-makers intentionally left this loosely defined intelligence system in 
place is that they wanted to stimulate interagency competition (see, e.g., Berkowitz, 2005; 
Scheuer, 2008; Betts, 2007). For one, stimulating interagency competition may ensure 
that agencies belonging to the USIC perform at their best. They may also acquire each 
others’ expertise thus making them capable of substituting for one another. According to 
                                                                                                                                                    
makers (Richelson, 1999, pp. 3200. An unclassified version is also periodically released into the public 
domain. 
622 Email Interview with Ivian C. Smith, Jan 14, 2012.  
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Berkowitz (2005), building in this redundancy ensures that some elements of the US 
intelligence apparatus will survive and continue to function in the event of a catastrophic 
attack such as a nuclear holocaust. The outcome of this Cold War-era mentality though is 
that US intelligence agencies invariably shun cooperation even when the need for 
collective action arises. In an intelligence system that supports interagency competition, 
cooperation naturally becomes marginalized.     
 
Throughout this thesis, the weakness of this intelligence system was observed.  
 
First observed during World War II, the broad mandate of the OSS made it possible for 
the wartime predecessor of the CIA to mount intelligence collection operations in the 
domain of the FBI. Those domain violations in turn prompted the Bureau to retaliate 
against the OSS further aggravating already strained interagency relations. Cooperation 
under those circumstances was next to impossible. For its part, the FBI also sought a 
foothold in signals intelligence – a discipline that was traditionally dominated by the 
military – during World War II. But even though the Bureau demonstrated proficiency in 
that discipline, close cooperation never did materialize between the Bureau and its signals 
intelligence counterpart from the military, OP-20-G. According to historical documents, 
the two agencies clashed on a regular basis instead. More significantly, cooperation 
between them materialized only when the Bureau withdrew from the foreign signals 
intelligence realm in 1947.  
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With the exception of law enforcement, the broad mandate of the CIA (as defined by the 
1947 National Security Act) also made it possible for the CIA to carry out signals 
intelligence and domestic intelligence operations. Consequently, the CIA mounted the 
Berlin Tunnel operation without the NSA even though the latter was the lead agency 
responsible for the national signals intelligence program. Meanwhile, the CIA also 
intercepted first-class mails in the US – on FBI domain – without the Bureau’s 
acquiescence.   
 
Then prior to 9/11, the CIA again encroached on NSA domain by mounting SIGINT 
operations against al-Qaeda even though the CIA had signed an agreement with the NSA 
in 1977 to never carry out SIGINT operations unilaterally. The CIA constructed its own 
ground listening station to eavesdrop on al-Qaeda electronic communications but without 
a SIGINT satellite in orbit, it was only able to intercept one side of the conversation. 
Nevertheless, the CIA’s unilateral action fueled interagency conflict with the NSA 
retaliating by withholding raw intercepts from the CIA. Ironically, the odds of the CIA 
receiving raw intercepts from the NSA would have been better if the Agency had 
proceeded according to established bureaucratic channels (see Table 9.4).   
 
Owing to the loosely defined responsibilities of US intelligence agencies, domain 
violations have become a regular feature of the US intelligence system. This was 
observed in historical cases dating from World War II to 9/11 often with devastating 
consequences. Moreover, because of the strong enticements that await those holding 
more responsibilities (e.g., generous funding and influence in Washington), US 
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intelligence agencies are incentivized to expand their domains on a constant basis. Unless 
the responsibilities of US intelligence agencies are laid down clearly, domain violations 
and interagency conflicts are almost impossible to avoid. The net effect on the USIC in 
the long run is an intelligence system that undervalues the importance of interagency 
cooperation.   
 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that the NSA never operated beyond the realm of signals 
intelligence because according to Aid (2009, pp. 44), its powers and responsibilities – 
what it can and cannot do – were clearly set down by Truman in 1952 when the president 
established the NSA. So in spite of its whopping intelligence budget, the NSA never 
sought a significant human intelligence capability counting instead on other human 
intelligence agencies such as the FBI and CIA for support. In short, the NSA is an 
excellent model of the value of clearly delineating the responsibilities of US intelligence 
agencies to minimize interagency conflicts and promote cooperation.  
 


























The CIA encroached on the domain of the NSA prior to 9/11 
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9.3.4 CENTRAL CATEGORY: RANCOROUS RELATIONS 
LIMITED INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
 
 
Rancorous relations between key intelligence officials also prevented US intelligence 
agencies from working together.  
 
During World War II, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and OSS Director William Donovan 
were at loggerheads because both were working to undermine each other at the same 
time. Besides Donovan, Hoover was also at odds with an OSS operative named Donald 
Downes for operating on FBI turf without Bureau acquiescence. Without a doubt, these 
personality clashes made it impossible for the FBI and OSS to work together during the 
war. Similarly, rancorous relations between Hoover and Director of Naval Intelligence 
Roscoe Schuermann also limited cooperation between OP-20-G and the FBI in the field 
of signals intelligence during the war. After the OSS was transmuted into the CIA, 
Hoover was almost never on good terms with any of his counterparts at the CIA. Even 
though there were FBI officials who saw the benefits of cooperating with the CIA, the 
FBI Director’s personal animus toward the Agency ensured that FBI–CIA cooperation 
would be limited. Indeed, one major reason that prompted the CIA to withhold 
HTLINGUAL from the FBI was that relations between the two agencies were spotty at 
the time.  
 
During the Cold War, the animosity between DIRNSA Ralph Canine and DCI Allen 
Dulles also hampered NSA–CIA cooperation. The CIA’s decision to bypass the NSA in 
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the Berlin Tunnel operation is a case in point. Canine’s grudge with Berlin Tunnel project 
chief, Frank Rowlett, also ensured that the NSA would be shut out of that project. 
Rancorous interagency relations need not necessarily stem from differences between two 
persons though. As a matter of fact, a single person can also cause severe damage to 
interagency relations hampering cooperation. As a case in point, FBI Liaison Cartha 
DeLoach exacerbated lingering FBI-CIA tensions by fuelling Hoover’s animosity toward 
the CIA. Only when Sam Papich took over as FBI liaison to the CIA was friction between 
the two agencies tempered.            
 
Lastly, the personal feud between John O’Neill and Michael Scheuer poisoned FBI–CIA 
relations to the point where interagency cooperation on the issue of al-Qaeda before 9/11 
was all but impossible. Significantly, the poisoned atmosphere between the CIA and FBI 
lingered on even after Scheuer left his position as head of the bin Laden unit as 
information flow between the CIA and FBI on the subject-matter of al-Qaeda remained 
restricted. Only after O’Neill had left the Bureau was vital CIA information on al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi passed on to the FBI. But by then, it was already too late to stop 
9/11.    
   
Whether it was the product of bureaucratic or personality conflict, rancorous relations 
invariably poisoned the atmosphere for interagency cooperation. Mindful of their careers, 
few intelligence officials would defy their superiors by supporting interagency 
cooperation when it was not sanctioned by their superiors. More importantly, junior 
officials were socialized into that poisoned setting. The inevitable outcome was hostility 
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between US intelligence agencies which lingered on for many years even after the 
loggerheads had left the scene. The enduring nature of this factor is clearly indicative of 
its significance (see Table 9.5). Observed across various time periods, rancorous relations 
simply made it impossible for interagency cooperation to materialize.  
 



























O’Neill-Scheuer conflict hampered FBI-CIA cooperation before 9/11 
 
 
9.3.5 CENTRAL CATEGORY: CLOSE BONDS FACILITATED 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION  
 
While rancorous relations poisoned the atmosphere for interagency cooperation, close 
bonds between key intelligence personnel facilitated close cooperation between US 
intelligence agencies. This thesis has uncovered five instances across various time 
periods which support the importance of solid interpersonal relations.    
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During the early Cold War years, the strong bond between Robert Lamphere and 
Meredith Gardner greatly enhanced FBI–NSA cooperation in the VENONA program. It 
is important to emphasize that in spite of their radically different intelligence background, 
Lamphere and Gardner quickly developed a close relationship which produced a number 
of important breakthroughs in the ultra-secret code-breaking program. Similarly, at the 
height of the Cold War, the strong bond between Sam Papich and James Angleton not 
only facilitated close cooperation between the FBI and CIA but also helped to soothe 
interagency tensions. As a case in point, when Hoover found out that the CIA had been 
secretly intercepting US first-class mail in the US without Bureau acquiescence, it was 
Papich who helped to defuse a potentially explosive situation. In part, it was also due to 
Papich’s bond with Angleton that made it possible for the CIA to share intelligence from 
HTLINGUAL with the FBI.  
 
Meanwhile, the close bond between CIA Director Richard Helms and Deputy NSA 
Director Louis Tordella also facilitated cooperation between their agencies when they 
were in office. Thick as thieves, the two men created an atmosphere in which their 
subordinates could work together. Consequently, both CIA and NSA intercept operators 
were able to work alongside one another targeting drug-related phone calls placed 
between the US and South America. NSA–CIA cooperation in that phone interception 
program was also made possible by the close bond between CIA Division D chief Carlton 
Swift and NSA head of G Group Francis Raven. In addition to that operation, the close 
bond between Swift and Raven also made it possible for Division D to work closely with 
G Group on other aspects of their clandestine activities.          
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Lastly, as the Cold War was drawing to a close, the close bond between FBI Director 
William Webster and CIA Director Stansfield Turner promoted an atmosphere conducive 
to FBI–CIA cooperation. No longer fearful of upsetting their directors, FBI and CIA 
officials put forth a proposal for a joint operation codenamed COURTSHIP. Eventually, 
COURTSHIP led to the recruitment of at least two high ranking KGB officers from the 
Soviet embassy in Washington giving the CIA and FBI valuable insights into KGB 
operations. 
 

























Turner and Webster facilitated CIA–FBI cooperation in COURTSHIP 
  
 
Observed across different agencies and time periods, solid interpersonal relations 
facilitated as well as reinforced an atmosphere in which interagency cooperation could 
flourish. Indeed, all the historical cases involving close interagency cooperation 
examined herein bore this hallmark (see Table 9.6). The positive effect on interagency 
cooperation engendered by those close relationships is consistent over a sustained period 
of time indicating that this factor is indeed central to this investigation.    
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9.3.6 CENTRAL CATEGORY: COOPERATION FACILITATED BY 
THE NEED TO POOL EXPERTISE & RESOURCES 
 
No intelligence agency can single-handedly collect and process the vast amount of 
information available (Richelson, 1999, pp. 291 & Herman, 1996, pp. 204). 
Notwithstanding its massive budget and workforce, the NSA for example still does not 
command the full spectrum of expertise and resources to support all its espionage 
activities around the world. Hence, it is only logical that intelligence agencies would pool 
their expertise and resources on matters of mutual concerns.   
 
Throughout this thesis, interagency cooperation was facilitated in large part by this 
requirement to pool expertise and resources.  
 
The VENONA program saw the NSA, FBI and eventually the CIA working closely 
together during the Cold War. In that code-breaking program, the NSA provided its 
expertise in cryptanalysis whereas the FBI and CIA supplied the manpower. In particular, 
the FBI supplied field agents to chase down domestic leads provided by the NSA as well 
as the plain-text messages (stolen by Bureau agents) that enabled NSA cryptanalysts to 
make fresh breakthroughs. The CIA was eventually brought into the VENONA program 
to chase down international leads – a function which the FBI was unable to fulfill. In 
return, the FBI and CIA were given access to VENONA decrypts to augment their own 
investigations. Spanning more than three decades, VENONA turned out to be one of the 
most durable interagency cooperative projects.  
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At the height of the Cold War, the NSA and CIA joined forces in a drug surveillance 
program that intercepted phone calls made between the US and South America. Though 
the NSA acted alone in the beginning, the CIA was eventually brought into that program 
to monitor specific phone numbers. Crucially, the CIA was brought in because Agency 
career intercept operators were required to enhance overall security for that sensitive 
operation. In other words, the CIA was brought in primarily because it commanded a 
resource which the NSA had short supply of. Nevertheless, this is perhaps one of the best 
cases of close NSA-CIA cooperation considering their history of bureaucratic struggle. 
 
Similarly, the COURTSHIP program saw the FBI and CIA pooling their expertise and 
resources to recruit Soviets in Washington D.C. The CIA brought to that joint operation 
its expertise in recruiting foreigners as well as the ability to handle recruited spies when 
they departed the US. Meanwhile, the FBI brought to that program its substantial 
manpower to carry out pre-recruitment surveillances as well as its authority over 
domestic intelligence. A highly-successful program, COURTSHIP faltered only when it 
was betrayed by Aldrich Ames. Above all, it was the requirement for each other’s 
expertise and resources that made COURTSHIP possible (see Table 9.7).   
 
As this thesis has shown, signals and human intelligence actually reinforce each other 
even though the two disciplines are distinct. Hence, the assertion that the two intelligence 
disciplines are dichotomous or even competing completely misses the point that one 
invariably requires the other to produce accurate intelligence. The fact is, signals 
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intelligence agencies generate a vast amount of information and field agents are needed to 
refine the information produced. On the other hand, human intelligence agencies 
regularly count on the leads generated by signals intelligence agencies for their own 
operations. It is precisely this mutually dependent relationship that draws the NSA, FBI 
and CIA together. The FBI and CIA provide the field agents that help the NSA to narrow 
its focus on specific targets whereas the NSA provides the FBI and CIA with leads that 
enable these agencies to direct their agents to important cases. The close collaboration 
between the NSA, FBI and CIA in the VENONA program is axiomatic of this mutually 
dependent relationship. It is worth pointing out that when Graham Allison was asked if 
this requirement to leverage on another agency’s expertise and resources is indeed a key 
determinant of US intelligence cooperation, the Harvard professor’s response to me was 
that it “almost always is”.623 
 
TABLE 9.7: WHEN THE REQUIREMENT TO POOL RESOURCES AND 






















FBI–CIA cooperation in COURTSHIP materialized because each agency retained 
unique expertise and resources  
 
 
                                                  
623 Email interview with Graham Allison, May 25, 2011.  
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9.3.7 CENTRAL CATEGORY: A COMMITMENT TO PROTECT 
SHARED SECRETS ENHANCED INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
 
A commitment to protect shared secrets was found in this thesis to be an important factor 
facilitating interagency cooperation.    
 
It was first observed in the VENONA program. By taking extraordinary security 
measures to keep that code-breaking program secret, the FBI convinced the NSA that the 
Bureau could be trusted with VENONA. In particular, the FBI made sure that information 
obtained from the VENONA program was never introduced during the trials of 
Americans accused of espionage. FBI Headquarters also disguised all intelligence 
generated by VENONA as information obtained through other means before 
disseminating them to other Bureau offices. Lastly, the Bureau operated strictly on a 
‘need-to-know’ basis which meant that some Bureau agents who worked on the 
VENONA program were not told that they were in fact working for that program. As a 
consequence of those stringent security measures, the NSA was willing to share that 
source with the Bureau.   
 
The second case in which a commitment to secrecy facilitated interagency cooperation 
involved the CIA mail interception program known as HTLINGUAL. Owing in large part 
to the extraordinary security measures introduced by the FBI to protect HTLINGUAL 
materials from being mishandled, the CIA ultimately agreed to share that source with the 
Bureau. Not unlike those security measures introduced by the FBI to protect VENONA, 
the extraordinary security measures adopted by the FBI to protect HTLINGUAL 
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materials reassured the CIA that its sensitive mail interception program would not be 
mishandled.  
 











The FBI’s commitment to protect HTLINGUAL facilitated CIA–FBI cooperation 
 
 
Although this thesis uncovered but two cases in which a commitment to secrecy 
facilitated interagency cooperation, its significance should not be underestimated 
considering the role of secrecy in the intelligence business. When an agency commits to 
protect a secret, it demonstrates that any shared secrets will be treated as if it was that 
agency’s own. Since intelligence agencies are inclined to shun cooperation to limit the 
risk of betrayal, a commitment to protect shared secrets will almost certainly discourage 
them from bottling up vital information.  
 
9.4 THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS INFLUENCING US 
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION OVER TIME 
 
This section addresses the following research questions first posed in Chapter 1:  
 
1. What are the most important factors that hampered intelligence cooperation between the 
NSA, CIA and FBI over time? 
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2. What are the most important factors that facilitated intelligence cooperation between the 
NSA, CIA and FBI over time?  
 
This thesis has established four central categories that explain why US intelligence 
agencies shunned cooperation. Satisfying the criteria set by grounded theory, these are the 
most important factors that hampered cooperation between the NSA, CIA and FBI.  
 
Firstly, competition for operational control invariably limited US interagency 
cooperation. Cooperation was also undermined by excessive secrecy. Meanwhile, 
vaguely delineated areas of responsibilities fueled interagency conflicts that ultimately 
impeded cooperation. Fourthly, rancorous relations between key intelligence personnel 
were found to discourage interagency cooperation (see Diagram 9.3 below).  
 
DIAGRAM 9.3: MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS THAT LIMITED US 
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This thesis has also established three central categories that explain why US intelligence 
agencies joined forces. Fulfilling the criteria stipulated by grounded theory, these are the 
most important factors that facilitated cooperation between the NSA, CIA and FBI over 
time.  
          
Firstly, strong personal relationships between key intelligence officials promoted close 
interagency cooperation. At the very least, these close relations helped to defused 
interagency conflicts. Meanwhile, cooperation is almost always facilitated by the 
requirement to pool expertise and resources since no agency can single-handedly collect 
and process all the information available. Thirdly, a commitment to protect shared secrets 
assuaged fears of betrayal and hence, facilitated interagency cooperation (see Diagram 
9.4).   
 
DIAGRAM 9.4: MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS THAT FACILITATED US 
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE OVER TIME 
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These eight factors were observed repeatedly throughout six decades of US intelligence 
history. They influenced interagency cooperation between different agencies over a 
sustained period of time. Even when different personnel and events were involved, the 
impact of these factors remained fairly consistent. Overall, their effect on interagency 
cooperation – whether it was close or limited – was persistently identical across time and 
space. Given this uniformity, these factors can be refined into a set of broad conceptual 
explanations. Besides offering a theoretical framework for understanding the research 
phenomenon, this set of conceptual explanations is also abstract enough to guide 
intelligence policies on a broader level. Regardless of the intelligence agencies involved, 
the conceptual explanations presented henceforth is applicable. More importantly, 
policies aimed at improving interagency cooperation are unlikely to be successful unless 
this framework is taken into consideration during the formulation stage. 
 
Firstly, there is always an element of instrumentality when intelligence agencies work 
together. In other words, spy agencies cooperate because there is often the requirement to 
pool resources or expertise. No intelligence agency can have all the resources and 
expertise needed to operate on an industrial scale. In order to collect and process the vast 
amount of information available, spy agencies have few options but to leverage on each 
other. Even though the friendly cooperative relations between some intelligence agencies 
have sometimes been romanticized in the public domain, the weight of the evidence 
suggests that interagency cooperation is largely dictated by an unemotional calculation of 
instrumentalism. Comparable to cooperation between states, interagency intelligence 
cooperation is based in large part on a cold calculation of agency interests and 
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imperatives (see, e.g., Synder, 1990; Liska, 1962; Wolfers, 1962; Holsti et al, 1973). The 
danger of course with relying on this system to facilitate interagency cooperation is that 
those without the requisite resources or expertise can easily be cut off from the flow of 
important information. So the policy challenge given this is really how to ensure that 
legitimate users of information is not being unduly bypassed.   
 
Nevertheless, while interagency cooperation is to a great extent instrumentally-oriented, 
the evidence also suggests that it is influenced by values and preferences which may or 
may not conform to a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. In particular, this normative 
aspect reflects how individualized relations can either limit or enhance interagency 
cooperation. Rancorous relations poison the atmosphere for cooperation whereas solid 
ones promote it. More importantly, these individualized preferences can circulate within 
the organization and over time, direct the mindsets of those within it. At times, 
individualized preferences can even nullify the effects of coordinating mechanisms. 
Similar to the way in which norms influence the actions of states, this normative aspect 
plays a central role in interagency cooperation and the challenge to policy-makers is 
managing the impact it has on intelligence agencies (see, e.g., Thoenig, 2007; 
Katzenstein, 1996). 
 
Needless to say, interagency competition marginalizes cooperation. If intelligence 
agencies are competitors then they are unlikely to work together. Conversely, if they do 
not view each other as competitors then they are more likely to join forces. Although 
interagency competition does offer certain benefits, it also encourages unilateral actions 
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and information hoarding. Interagency competition can be even more intense in an 
intelligence system where the responsibilities of its constituents are not clearly defined. 
By making it possible for them to engage in similar tasks, turf battles – not cooperation – 
become the norm (see, e.g., Wilson, 1989). If the goal is to improve interagency 
cooperation, then it is necessary to set down clear lines of responsibility for every agency 
in that system. By stipulating in no uncertain terms what its responsibilities are, an 
agency in that system will have a clear direction as to what is permissible and what is not. 
In addition to limiting interagency competition, this will also drive them to work together 
on matters of mutual concerns since duplicating functions and domain violations are no 
longer tolerated.  
 
Lastly, security measures put in place to protect secrets can hamper interagency 
cooperation if they are routinized to an excessive degree. As this thesis shows, excessive 
secrecy invariably restricts the flow of information when some intelligence sharing is 
warranted. Of course, putting an end to secrecy is not the answer because intelligence 
agencies will always be required to conceal certain aspects from the public. Sensitive 
sources and methods, for example, still need to be protected. So the challenge is 
ultimately striking that balance between the need to conceal things and intelligence 
sharing. One approach to mitigate excessive secrecy is to conduct periodic security 
classification reviews while standardizing protocols for handling secrets within an 
intelligence system (Moynihan, 1999; Chesterman, 2009; Aftergood, 2009). Firstly, this 
will ensure that security classifications are not abused. Secondly, it will make sure that 
the recipient of vital secrets will treat the information as if it were its own. 
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This set of conceptual explanation is central to understanding the subject of interagency 
intelligence cooperation. More importantly, by emphasizing the significance of 
instrumentalism, norms, competition and secrecy, it detracts from dominant perspectives 
on this policy issue and thus raises important questions pertaining to their validity. By the 
same token, this set of conceptual explanation also provides valuable insights into the 
kind of policy initiatives needed to close out existing gaps in US interagency cooperation. 
 
9.5 THE RESULTS MEASURED AGAINST DOMINANT 
PERSPECTIVES ON US INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION  
 
 
The most important factors established in this thesis are dramatically different from those 
postulated by prevailing literature on this subject. This outcome strongly suggests that 
dominant perspectives in this policy field are at least incomplete.  
 
Taken together, the evidence obtained for this thesis indicate that the so-called foreign vs. 
domestic dichotomy is not a significant barrier limiting US interagency cooperation (see 
Section 2.3.1). In particular, this perspective presupposes that the CIA and FBI shun 
cooperation because the former operates abroad whilst the latter domestically. On the 
contrary, this thesis actually established that even when the FBI operated in the realm of 
foreign intelligence alongside the precursors of the CIA – the OCOI and OSS – during 
World War II, there was little collaboration between them. In addition, this thesis also 
found that when the CIA conducted operations in the US, it often did so unilaterally. 
Even when these agencies operated in the same realm, they shunned each other 
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nevertheless. This strongly suggests that the significance of the ‘foreign vs. domestic’ 
dichotomy may not be as prominent as it has been made out to be. To be sure, there are 
differences in their institutional cultures; but that alone is insufficient to hamper 
interagency cooperation (see, e.g., Crumpton, 2012).    
 
The body of evidence also indicates that the so-called military vs. civilian dichotomy is 
not a significant barrier limiting US interagency cooperation (see Section 2.3.2). 
Specifically, this perspective holds that cooperation between an agency that maintains a 
civilian culture and an agency that maintains a military ethos must be near impossible. 
Quite the opposite, this thesis found that this difference in institutional culture did not 
stop the NSA, FBI and CIA from working closely together especially when they were 
required to pool expertise and resources. As a case in point, the difference in institutional 
cultures did not prevent the NSA, FBI and CIA from joining forces in the VENONA 
program even though admittedly, there were doubts in the beginning as to whether they 
could work together.   
  
Thirdly, the so-called HUMINT vs. SIGINT dichotomy is not a significant barrier 
limiting US interagency cooperation, based on the evidence obtained for this thesis. This 
perspective holds that cooperation between an agency that operates in the realm of human 
intelligence and an agency that operates in the realm of signals intelligence must be 
limited (see Section 2.3.3). On the contrary, this thesis found that human intelligence and 
signals intelligence are integral to one another. The two disciplines actually reinforce 
each other and interagency cooperation was almost always facilitated by this mutually 
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dependent relationship. It is also worth pointing out that operating in the same collection 
discipline actually engendered interagency conflicts, not cooperation.  
 
Lastly, this thesis has found that the so-called spy vs. cop dichotomy is “of only marginal 
truth”.624 To repeat, this perspective maintains that cooperation between the CIA and FBI 
is limited because the former spies whilst the latter enforces the law (see Section 2.3.4). 
On the contrary, this thesis found that the FBI has been active in the intelligence field 
since at least World War I. Besides solving crimes, the Bureau mounted intelligence 
operations not unlike those carried out by the CIA. While the FBI might have become 
more rule-bounded after its intelligence abuses were exposed by the Church Committee, 
treating Bureau agents as merely ‘cops’ is to completely discount the myriad of 
intelligence-related activities that they actually undertake.625  
 
The results of this thesis do suggest that dominant perspectives in this policy field have 
not provided a comprehensive explanation of the research phenomenon. Equally 
important, according to grounded theory research since these results do not conform to 
pre-existing explanations, a discovery that contributes toward human understanding has 
been made (see Diagram 3.1).  
 
9.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS  
 
                                                  
624 Email interview with Ivian C. Smith, Nov 10, 2011.  
625 Interview with Dr. John Earl Haynes, US Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Jun 14, 2011. Email 
interview with Ivian C. Smith, Nov 10, 2011.  
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The results of this investigation are significant in that they provide valuable insights into 
the kind of policy measures needed to enhance US intelligence cooperation. Meanwhile, 
they also challenge extant views on how that can be achieved.  
 
Based on the results of this thesis, consigning the FBI to law enforcement and then 
creating a new agency to handle domestic intelligence will not enhance interagency 
cooperation. Indeed, without addressing the core issues presented in Section 9.4, this new 
agency (if created) will simply assume much of the FBI’s predicament in its relations 
with other US intelligence agencies.   
 
Meanwhile, the results of this thesis also challenge whether the creation of the Office of 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 to oversee and coordinate the activities 
of the USIC was far-reaching enough. US lawmakers had hoped then that the DNI would 
be more effective than the Director of Central intelligence (DCI) in terms of enhancing 
interagency cooperation. But information made public since 2004 suggest that the DNI 
have had only marginal success in that area and therefore, more can be done (Pillar, 2011, 
pp. 297; Richelson, 2012, pp. 529; Aid, 2012, pp. 62). The following chapter presents 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 








10.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATION TO ENHANCE US 
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
 
With the death of Osama bin Laden, it is tempting to end further discussion on the subject 
of US intelligence cooperation. That would be a mistake because even though the CIA, 
FBI and NSA joined forces to hunt down the al-Qaeda leader, a number of problems that 
had contributed directly to the 9/11 intelligence failure remain unresolved (Aid, 2012, pp. 
60; Mazetti et al 2011; Kessler, 2011, pp. 272). As a matter of fact, according to 
intelligence historian Matthew Aid, some of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms actually 
made the situation worse.626 Furthermore, as this thesis have shown, the forces that pull 
US intelligence agencies apart do recur so there is little doubt that it is only a matter of 
time before US intelligence agencies avoid working together again. Guided by the results 
of this thesis, the following policy recommendation aims to mitigate that possibility.  
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10.2 ESTABLISH AN OVERARCHING INTELLIGENCE 
AUTHORITY WITH BROAD CABINET-LEVEL POWERS 
 
This thesis argues that an overarching authority with far greater powers than the DNI is 
needed to close longstanding gaps in the US intelligence system and facilitate interagency 
cooperation. Similar to the DNI, this overarching authority must not be embedded within 
any existing agency. But unlike the DNI, this overarching authority must be given broad 
powers – above all, it must retain full authority over administrative, personnel, tasking 
and funding issues.  
 
Independent of any agency, this cabinet-level overarching authority is more likely to be 
impartial when adjudicating interagency issues. The problem with the DCI, as pointed out 
in this thesis earlier, was that the incumbent could not stay neutral since he also held the 
position of CIA Director. As former NSA Director William Odom explains it:  
 
“Double-hatting the director of central intelligence as the director of the CIA 
limited his ability to stand above and orchestrate the whole intelligence 
community. Instead, he became the prisoner of the CIA and shared its 
insecurity about control over other agencies’ resources and turf.”627      
 
Odom (2003, pp. 43) then went on to add that “if the DCI gave up his double-hatting as 
head of the CIA, [then] he could stand above the CIA, allowing him to hold it to account 
rather than to serve as its parochial spokesman”. Clearly, there are merits to separating 
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the responsibility for heading the USIC from that of running the CIA and taking away 
responsibility for the USIC from the CIA Director and handing it to the DNI was a small 
step in the right direction because that restored some confidence in the objectivity of the 
head of the USIC.  
  
But when consulted, Paul Pillar disagreed with my assessment above. The former CIA 
senior official pointed out to me that the issue of fairness was irrelevant because the focus 
should instead be on the unique position of the CIA – that it is not part of a US federal 
department but actually sits “at the center of US intelligence”. By its very name, the CIA 
is central to the USIC.628 As to the DNI, he considers that position to be superfluous 
(Pillar, 2011, pp. 297).   
 
Although Pillar’s view is significant, one cannot dispute the fact that several DCIs did 
turn into champions of the CIA even though they were supposed to be an unbiased 
authority overseeing the USIC. This unfortunate outcome suggests that only an external 
authority has the unbiased standing to preside over the USIC.629 Independent of any 
agency, this overarching authority will not be easily swayed on major interagency 
matters. At the same time, it is important to add that independence for this overarching 
authority overseeing US intelligence is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Indeed, 
being a standalone entity only satisfies part of the requirement for this proposed 
overarching authority. Only with broad cabinet-level powers will the head of the USIC be 
                                                  
628 Email interview with Paul Pillar, Nov 14, 2011.  
629 Interview with Robert Jervis, Colombia University, Jun 9, 2011.  
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able to break down the most formidable barriers that limit interagency cooperation while 
promoting those factors that facilitate it.  
 
At present, the authority of the DNI is wholly inadequate for the tasks on hand. When the 
House-Senate Joint Inquiry Committee proposed the creation of that position in 2004, it 
had insisted that the DNI must retain a range of “management, budgetary and personnel 
responsibilities”.630 However, the legislation which authorized the creation of the DNI – 
the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) – was tempered 
down so much by political lobbying and obstructionist conduct that the DNI position was 
essentially reduced to that of a figurehead with little authority (Aid, 2012, pp. 61). 
Underscoring the titular nature of the DNI position, current DNI James Clapper even 
compared that position to that of a car mascot during his confirmation hearings in 2010 
(Mazzetti, 2010). As a matter of fact, the DNI’s authority is so inadequate that in the 
summer of 2009 CIA Director Leon Panetta was brazen enough to instruct his CIA staff 
to ignore a directive from Clapper’s predecessor – DNI Dennis Blair (Mazetti, 2010a).  
 
Another example that underscored the weak authority of the DNI occurred earlier in 
2005. Then DNI John Negroponte had wanted to appoint an NSA official as the chief of 
station in New Zealand – a position traditionally held by a CIA official – but was forced 
to withdraw that appointment when a number of CIA officials balked at his choice of 
appointee (Aid, 2012, pp. 62). The dismal state of affairs with regard to the authority of 
                                                  
630 House-Senate Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001; Dec 2002, 
Section IV: Recommendations, pp. 2.   
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the DNI was most recently revealed in a 2010 report by the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board which stated that: 
 
“For the IC to function effectively and deliver credible and timely 
intelligence, it needs an acknowledged leader. That should be the DNI. [But] 
this has not yet happened.”631 
 
Ten years after 9/11, it is patent that the USIC still does not have an effective leader that 
is powerful enough to close out gaps in US intelligence that contributed to the disastrous 
events of that day. In the absence of an overarching authority with broad powers, it is no 
surprise that imperfections in US interagency intelligence cooperation remain unresolved. 
Therefore, the most pressing task at hand is to augment the administrative, personnel, 
tasking and funding authority of the head of the USIC so that he may close out 
longstanding gaps in US interagency intelligence cooperation.   
 
Firstly, with broad administrative power, the head of the USIC will be able to promote 
information sharing by standardizing the security protocols of US intelligence agencies – 
an initiative which has yet to be implemented. As it were, according to an influential 
report published by the DNI Office of the Inspector-General in 2008, the DNI has yet to 
“fully implement common security and access standards across the USIC” even though it 
is required by law to do so.632 Hinting that the reason for this delay was due to the 
inadequate authority of the DNI, the report goes on to argue that until the DNI 
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632 See “Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges.” Office of the Inspector General, ODNI, 
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368   
“implement and enforce critical IC-level policies and processes for information sharing”, 
gaps in informational exchanges between US intelligence agencies shall remain. 633  
 
The significance of a common set of security protocols cannot be overlooked in light of 
the evidence uncovered herein. Excessive secrecy has been observed repeatedly to be a 
formidable barrier limiting informational exchanges between the NSA, CIA and FBI. 
Putting in place a standardized set of procedures for handling shared information will 
address to a significant degree this persistent problem. Crucially, a common set of 
security protocols not only limit the risk of betrayal by committing all US intelligence 
agencies to a high standard of confidentiality but also ensure that this commitment to 
secrecy is not merely ad hoc. As shown in this thesis, a commitment to stringent security 
requirements is an important factor for interagency cooperation. By treating shared 
secrets as if they were its own, an agency can gain access to prized intelligence which it 
cannot collect for technical, legal or political reasons. On the other hand, an agency that 
fails to do so risk being cut off from the flow of vital intelligence. Because a commitment 
to secrecy is vital to the exchange of prized information between US intelligence 
agencies, it must be a standard practice at all times and not an exercise contingent on the 
discretion of intelligence officials. With broader administrative authority than the DNI, 
the overarching authority proposed herein will be in a stronger position to implement 
community-wide best practices that balance the need to protect prized secrets with 
maximum access by those agencies with a legitimate need. By standardizing security 
protocols across the USIC, the overarching authority proposed herein will close an 
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important gap that has limited interagency cooperation on a regular basis – excessive 
secrecy.       
 
Secondly, an overarching authority with greater control over personnel appointments than 
the DNI will be able to make swift appointment changes to improve interagency 
cooperation. From the earlier example of DNI John Negroponte having to kowtow to the 
CIA over the appointment of a station chief in New Zealand, one can logically conclude 
that the DNI retains little personnel authority. Indeed, the DNI is only able to carry out 
permanent personnel adjustments with the approvals of the agency heads (Richelson, 
2012, pp. 469). Meanwhile, the DNI is completely powerless if the agency heads were 
the ones that had to be removed. If the DNI cannot even appoint a station chief without 
being threatened by those who are supposedly his subordinates, then he is hopeless in 
terms of replacing agency heads. The predicament with the DNI is analogous to that of a 
general who must always seek approval from his colonels whenever he makes an 
appointment – that poor leader is clearly not much of one.  
 
But since solid interpersonal relation enhances cooperation between US intelligence 
agencies, the head of the USIC must be able to carry out swift personnel adjustments at 
the highest levels when senior intelligence officials cannot work together. As shown in 
this thesis, this situation occurs regularly throughout the history of the NSA, CIA and 
FBI. The most obvious is of course the example between Hoover and his counterparts at 
the CIA. The FBI director, as this thesis recounted earlier, simply could not work with 
several contemporaneous CIA directors. In spite of that state of affairs, no one – not even 
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the US president – could remove him from office. Another glaring example is the 
problematic relation between FBI counterterrorism chief John O’Neill and Alec Station 
chief Michael Scheuer. At a time when the nation was facing a grave threat from al-
Qaeda, then DCI George Tenet could not swiftly recuse either of them even though their 
feuding was poisoning the atmosphere for CIA–FBI cooperation.634 As it were, their 
feuding created a gap in the US intelligence system that culminated in the 9/11 attacks.           
 
With enhanced personnel authority, the overarching authority proposed herein will be 
able to swiftly remove those intelligence officials who poison the atmosphere for 
collaboration. Meanwhile, he will be in a stronger position to appoint those who support 
interagency cooperation. More importantly, his personnel authority must be broad enough 
for him to effect key adjustments at the director-level. This will in effect place all agency 
heads under his authority. In short, the head of the USIC must have the authority to hire 
and fire intelligence personnel at all levels. Only then will he be a credible leader.    
 
Thirdly, an overarching authority with greater tasking power will be in a stronger position 
than the DNI right now to ensure that the exclusive domains of US intelligence agencies 
are respected by each other. As this thesis has shown, pernicious interagency conflicts 
can occur when a US intelligence agency violates the domain of another. Because the 
lines of responsibility of some US intelligence agencies are vaguely delineated, this state 
of affairs has been observed regularly in this thesis. With greater control over their 
activities, the overarching authority proposed herein will be able to establish clear lines of 
responsibility thereby ensuring that US intelligence agencies do not encroach on each 
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other’s turf. Even when such incursions do occur, this overarching authority will at least 
be in a strong position to adjudicate any dispute that arises.  
 
Notably, the issue of enhancing the tasking authority of the head of the USIC is absent in 
the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) as well as the House-Senate Report of the Joint 
Inquiry into 9/11 (2002).  The failure on the part of these influential panels to address this 
issue is significant because the DNI at the moment has little control over the activities of 
US intelligence agencies (see, e.g., Mazzetti, 2010b). As a case in point, even though 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are major theaters of operation for the CIA in the War on 
Terror, the DNI has no control whatsoever over that agency’s operations in those 
countries (Aid, 2012, pp. 159). Indeed, when former DNI Dennis Blair sought to assert 
his authority over those CIA activities in 2009, his effort was stymied by the White 
House and CIA.635 Powerless to direct US intelligence operations and establish which 
intelligence activities are permissible, the DNI can never become a credible leader of the 
USIC let alone temper interagency competition. Therefore, it is no surprise that beyond 
adding another layer of bureaucracy to the already massive US intelligence system, the 
Office of the DNI has achieved little in term of closing those gaps that limited 
interagency cooperation.    
 
Meanwhile, the risk of a major conflict between the FBI and CIA has increased 
dramatically after 9/11 since the Bureau became a competitor to the Agency by stepping 
up FBI intelligence operations abroad. According to Aid (2012, pp. 47), there are 
currently about 200 FBI agents stationed in more than 60 US embassies as liaison 
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officers. Known as “legal attaches”, these Bureau agents have traditionally served as 
intermediaries between the FBI and local intelligence services; but since 9/11, their duties 
have widened to encompass intelligence collection on terrorist organizations and 
organized crime groups.636 Such Bureau activities are unlikely to be appreciated by the 
CIA since the Agency has always been the primary collector of foreign human 
intelligence for the US government. Even though the Bureau may have a legitimate 
reason for operating abroad, the CIA is unlikely to tolerate this incursion into its domain. 
Having witnessed how domain incursions have regularly resulted in pernicious 
interagency conflicts, one is safe to presume that the Bureau’s intelligence collection 
activities abroad will become a source of tension between the two powerful agencies. 
With the power to set down clear lines of responsibility, the overarching authority 
proposed herein can limit the risk of the FBI encroaching onto the exclusive domain of 
the CIA. In the event that FBI–CIA relation deteriorates to the point where the two 
agencies stopped working together, this overarching authority can at least remedy that 
situation by tasking the FBI away from foreign intelligence collection.     
 
In addition to resolving interagency conflicts that crop up when a US intelligence agency 
violates the domain of another, the overarching authority proposed herein will also 
promote interagency by compelling US intelligence agencies to pool their unique 
expertise and resources. In particular, if the responsibilities of US intelligence agencies 
are clearly delineated, then they will have few alternatives but to work together. As 
opposed to acting unilaterally, US intelligence agencies will have to count on each other 
to accomplish their missions. Neither will these agencies be incentivized to build up 
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capacity in collection disciplines other than their own. Taken together, the entire US 
intelligence system should become a more cohesive entity over time.        
 
Lastly, the overarching authority proposed herein must controls the purse strings of US 
intelligence agencies. At present, the DNI is authorized to transfer up to a maximum of 
US$150 million between agencies without the concurrence of agency heads (Richelson, 
2012, pp. 469). While this may be considered an improvement over the authority of the 
DCI to affect such transfers, it is also patent that the amount the DNI has unilateral 
control over is insignificant compared to the estimated US$80 billion annual US 
intelligence budget (see, e.g., Dilanian, 2010). 
 
It is important to note that the US intelligence budget is actually divided into two distinct 
parts: approximately two-thirds go to the sixteen agencies and departments in the USIC 
whereas the remainder goes to the Pentagon and funds its intelligence operations (Aid, 
2012, pp. 43 – 44). By right, the DNI should be in control of the entire US intelligence 
budget given that he is the designated head of US intelligence; but the fact of the matter is 
that he controls a mere silver of that massive budget. To put things in perspective, out of 
the roughly US$50 billion that goes to the USIC, the DNI retains unilateral control over a 
meager US$150 million. If the DNI wants to transfer an amount greater than US$150 
million, he is required to secure the acquiescence of the agency heads involved. 
Meanwhile, the DNI has absolutely no control over the remainder US$30 billion that 
goes to the Pentagon.637  
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With little control over how the US intelligence budget is spent, the DNI is essentially a 
figurehead – a “hoot ornament” in the words of current DNI James Clapper (Mazzetti, 
2010). Beyond the sixteen agencies which he supposedly oversees, the DNI is completely 
powerless over the Pentagon’s intelligence activities because he does not have control 
over that department’s intelligence budget. As a result, even though Afghanistan is 
currently one of the most important targets for US intelligence agencies, the DNI’s 
influence over intelligence matters in that country is minimal primarily because he had 
been shut out by the Pentagon (Aid, 2012, pp. 43 – 44). Due to the absence of an 
overarching authority to oversee US intelligence operations in Afghanistan, the current 
intelligence situation in that country has degenerated into “a mess” with pernicious 
interagency competition and wasteful duplication of efforts the norm, according to 
intelligence expert Matthew Aid.638                  
 
In retrospect, the formative history of the NSA certainly underscores the need for a 
central authority to maintain firm budgetary control. Indeed, one of the principal reasons 
the AFSA failed to unify the US national signals intelligence program was that the 
predecessor of the NSA did not have control over the budgets of the SCAs. As it 
happened, the NSA was able to unify US signals intelligence only when it was granted 
full control of the budgets of the SCAs.  
 
Fully in control of the spending of US intelligence agencies, the overarching authority 
proposed herein will be in a forceful position to ensure that they comply with 
community-wide imperatives and not just their parochial interests. The risks of US 
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intelligence agencies shutting one another out of their operations in order to retain 
operational control will be reduced. Moreover, by making US intelligence agencies more 
responsive to community-wide imperatives, the tendency to withhold intelligence – 
especially from those agencies with a ‘need to know’ – will also be suppressed.  
 
Equally important, the overarching authority proposed herein must at least exercise some 
control over that part of the intelligence budget that is disbursed to the Department of 
Defense. Both the 9/11 Commission and the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Committee did 
not recommend giving the DNI authority over the Pentagon’s intelligence budget and 
there is evidence that the two influential panels were mistaken in failing to do so. If the 
DNI had been given some control over the Pentagon’s intelligence budget, then it might 
not have been shut out of Afghanistan, for example. This gap in intelligence cooperation 
between the DNI and the DOD can certainly prevent vital intelligence collected by the 
Pentagon’s estimated 100 thousand soldier-spies from being synthesized into a coherent 
picture of a looming national crisis. Most notably, by recommending that the overarching 
authority proposed herein be given budgetary authority over the Pentagon’s intelligence 
operations, this thesis has gone further than both the 9/11 Commission and the House-
Senate Joint Committee in terms of augmenting the powers of the head of the USIC.  
 
Ultimately, creating an overarching authority with broad powers to enhance US 
interagency intelligence cooperation is the most realistic policy option. Independent of 
any agency, the overarching authority proposed herein will have the unbiased standing to 
be a credible leader of the USIC. More importantly, being fully in charge of 
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administrative, personnel, tasking and funding matters will enable this overarching 
authority to break down the most important factors that hamper interagency cooperation 
and promote those that enhance it. The least bad solution, this policy option is analogous 
to the cleanest dirty shirt in a laundry basket full of soiled clothes; after all, it is always 
more palatable in Washington to create new institutions than it is to dismantle pre-
existing ones. Even then, one must still recognize that creating an overarching authority 
with broad powers to head the USIC will be an uphill task because its powers can only be 
augmented by curtailing those of others.  
 
10.3 OTHER POLICY OPTIONS CONSIDERED 
This thesis also assessed three other policy options that might enhance US intelligence 
cooperation. Though reasonable, these policy options were ultimately discarded because 
realistically, they stood no chance of being adopted by Washington.  
 
Since 9/11, a number of intelligence experts and scholars have recommended that the FBI 
be split into two entities – one responsible for counterintelligence while the other for law 
enforcement (see. e.g., Odom, 2003; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007; Hulnick, 2004; Riebling, 
2000). By creating an American MI5, problems associated with the so-called spy vs. cop 
dichotomy will be eliminated, they argue. The newly reformed FBI can then focus 
exclusively on law enforcement whereas its domestic intelligence counterpart can focus 
solely on intelligence work. Going further, this hypothetical American MI5 will be poised 
to work closely with the CIA.  
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However, former FBI senior official Ivian C. Smith disagreed completely with the above 
assessment. In particular, Smith is of the view that the disadvantage of breaking the FBI 
up far outweighs the benefit of doing so. According to him: 
 
There are occasional calls to break up the FBI – usually by individuals with 
little understanding or experience in intelligence. When I talked to officials 
from MI5, the Australian Security Intelligence Service and the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service, they were all envious of the FBI's dual role 
[i.e., intelligence and law enforcement]. All [of them] cited difficulties in 
referring criminal investigations [e.g., espionage and terrorism] to the 
Metropolitan London Police, the Australian Federal Police and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police [respectively]. In the FBI, the [handing over] was 
done rather seamlessly.639  
 
 
So the central issue for Smith is the difficulty of “handing off” intelligence cases to 
criminal prosecutors if the FBI were to be broken up. Because the FBI retains dual 
responsibility for intelligence and law enforcement, Bureau agents in the 
counterintelligence division are able to transfer cases to Bureau agents in the criminal 
investigation division with fewer problems. Breaking the FBI into two will presumably 
only complicate this process.  
 
It is worth noting that calls to break the FBI up give little consideration for the multitude 
of intelligence work the Bureau has been involved in since its inception. While the FBI 
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may have botched intelligence investigations in the past, it has also mounted many 
successful operations in the realm of counterintelligence, counterespionage and signals 
intelligence. One would be seriously mistaken to think that the Bureau is anything but a 
well-resourced and competent intelligence apparatus. More importantly, it is worth 
pointing out too that the main responsibility for 9/11 rests not with the Bureau but with 
the CIA. If CIA officials from Alec Station had swiftly alerted FBI Headquarters to al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, the Bureau might have opened an investigation into the two 9/11 
hijackers once they arrived in the US. Unfortunately, that was not the case.  
 
Since the main responsibility for 9/11 rests with the CIA, one might wonder if the CIA 
instead should be broken up. Dismantling the CIA is certainly not a novel idea. In the 
early nineties, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan sought to have the CIA abolished 
because it had been blindsided by the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Moynihan, 1991). The 
late senator’s antipathy toward the CIA was also shared by veteran US diplomat, Eric 
Kocher, who argued that the CIA was “neither necessary, nor in most cases desirable”.640 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are indications that the CIA has refused to submit to the 
authority of the DNI complicating his efforts to build a more cohesive US intelligence 
system. Not only has the CIA failed to fulfil its core responsibility as the coordinator of 
US intelligence, it is now stymieing efforts by the DNI to do so. Still adhering to the 
belief that it is central to US intelligence, the CIA will disregard the authority of the DNI 
as long as it remains. So there is definitely a case for dismantling the CIA.  
                                                  
640 Kocher, E., “Usually Unnecessary, Often Undesirable, That’s the CIA.” The New York Times, Jun 16, 
1991. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/16/opinion/l-usually-unnecessary-often-undesirable-that-s-
the-cia-561891.html   
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But realistically, this policy option has almost no chance of being adopted for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the CIA has staunch supporters in Washington and any attempt 
to dismantle the CIA is likely to run into fierce opposition. Furthermore, this policy 
option will not gain widespread backing since the CIA’s reputation has been greatly 
burnished by its central role in the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011. Thirdly, concerns 
over who might replace the CIA and replicate its functions will also temper support for 
dismantling the Agency. Lastly, bureaucratic inertia will ensure the continued survival of 
the CIA despite all its foibles.     
 
The third policy option that was considered (but ultimately rejected) involved 
consolidating the FBI and CIA into a single agency. Almost identical to the KGB, this 
hypothetical agency would hence be responsible for law enforcement, domestic 
intelligence as well as foreign intelligence. Such a move will put an end to pernicious 
interagency competition between the FBI and CIA once and for all. Bringing the CIA and 
FBI under one command will also, in theory, facilitate informational exchanges between 
those working on different subject-matters.  
 
Given these advantages, one might argue that it makes sense to combine the FBI and CIA 
into a single apparatus – one that will be responsible for all forms of intelligence matters 
– an American KGB so to speak. However, such a policy solution is unlikely to be 
adopted as it will to run counter to established beliefs that the American people needs to 
be protect from the invasive techniques of their own intelligence services. Moreover, 
according to Smith, “[The] US population would not stand for a KGB type organization 
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[and] with good reason”.641 Indeed, when one considers the domestic intelligence abuses 
perpetrated by the FBI and CIA during the Cold War, it is not hard to see why an 
American KGB is so unpalatable.  
 
10.4 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has identified several areas worthy of further research.  
 
Firstly, the results of this thesis can be evaluated against those from a study of 
interagency cooperation between US military intelligence agencies. It is important to 
point out that besides the NSA, the US Defense Department also exercises authority over 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the intelligence agencies of the 
armed services. Although these agencies operate under the unified command of the 
Secretary of Defense, each retains unique capabilities and military cultures. To date, it 
remains unclear how cohesive these agencies truly are.  
 
A second area that requires further research is that of international intelligence 
cooperation. An often cited example of how close cooperation can materialize between 
intelligence services in the same discipline is the UKUSA alliance. Responsible for the 
notorious ECHELON network, the UKUSA alliance was established in the immediate 
post-World War II years and comprised of the signals intelligence services of the US 
(National Security Agency), the UK (Government Communications Headquarters), 
                                                  
641 Email interview with Ivian C. Smith, Jan 25, 2012.  
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Australia (Defense Signals Directorate), Canada (Communications Security 
Establishment) and New Zealand (Government Communications Security Bureau). 
Chesterman (2006, pp. 22), in particular, has reported that relationship between the five 
agencies is so close that “home and foreign contributions” are indistinguishable within 
this secretive transnational alliance. Because UKUSA agencies operate in the same 
collection discipline, the alliance can be studied to establish if their close cooperation 
were the outcome of homophilic factors.  
 
A third area worthy of future research is an in-depth investigation into each of three 
major US intelligence agencies examined herein. In particular, the FBI is essentially 
divided into two functions: law enforcement and intelligence, and this delineation offers 
researchers the opportunity to study cooperation between law enforcement and 
intelligence elements within the Bureau. Similarly, the CIA can be broadly segregated 
into two distinct functions: operations and analysis, and this division between those who 
collect intelligence and those who analyze it is an area that can be explored further. 
Meanwhile, because the NSA employs more or less an equal number of civilians and 
military personnel, researchers can study cooperation between the two groups within the 
NSA. Although these suggested studies pertain to intra-agency cooperation, they are 
significant nevertheless since limited intra-agency cooperation can also increase the risk 
of overlooking fragmentary clues pointing to national security crises.  
 
10.5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
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Like trying to untie a Gordian knot, enhancing US interagency intelligence cooperation is 
an extremely complex undertaking. 2011 marked the 70th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor 
attack as well as the 10th anniversary of 9/11. The cataclysmic event of December 7, 1941 
prompted US lawmakers to push for a central authority to coordinate the activities of the 
vast US intelligence apparatus. The outcome was the creation of the CIA and the CIA 
Director, as DCI, also oversaw the USIC. However, the DCI was not given broad-based 
authority over US intelligence agencies. The FBI remained under the Justice Department 
whereas the NSA would eventually fall under the Defense Department. Despite the Pearl 
Harbor intelligence fiasco, interagency cooperation did not improve.   
 
9/11 provoked a similar response. In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act established the DNI to replace the DCI as head of the USIC. The FBI 
remained under the Justice Department, the NSA remained under the Defense 
Department and the CIA remained an independent agency. The only difference this time 
is that the DNI was given slightly more power than the DCI. For one, of the roughly 
US$80 billion annual intelligence budget, the DNI now has full discretion over US$150 
million. That is still a remarkable US$150 million more than the DCI had.  
 
In spite of the creation of the DNI, gaps in US intelligence cooperation remain.  
 
In an exclusive interview with me, Richard K. Betts is nihilistic over the potential for 
resolving these imperfections in US interagency intelligence cooperation. Indeed, the 
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Columbia University professor noted that if major gaps in US interagency intelligence 
cooperation could be closed, it would have already been.642  
 
Certainly, establishing an overarching authority with broad powers to preside over the US 
intelligence system will be a Sisyphus undertaking because its powers can only be 
augmented by curbing those of other US federal departments. Both the Department of 
Defense and the Justice Department are unlikely to surrender any of their authority over 
the NSA and FBI respectively unless forced to do so by the US president. But few 
presidents would risk alienating these powerful departments by compelling them to do so 
even though he may be the only person up to that task.643 Admittedly, in the absence of 
strong leadership and political resolve, it will be extremely difficult to create an 
overarching authority with broad powers to oversee the USIC. 
 
Nevertheless, the formative history of the NSA suggests that unifying US intelligence 
agencies under a central authority is not an impossible undertaking. Empowered by 
Truman and a series of secret NSC directives, an authoritarian Ralph Canine did manage 
to rein hidebound SCAs into the rubric of the NSA – an outcome thought to be 
impossible then. Moreover, Betts seems to have forgotten that cataclysmic events can 
have an impact on US intelligence reform. The Pearl Harbor attack led to the creation of 
the DCI to oversee the USIC. 9/11 prompted US policy-makers to create the DNI as a 
replacement for the ineffective DCI. If there was a silver lining to those cataclysmic 
events, then it was the recognition on the part of US policy-makers that steps had to be 
                                                  
642 Interview with Richard K. Betts, SIPA – Columbia University, Jun 20, 2011.  
643 Ibid 
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taken to enhance US intelligence cooperation. Above all, more than two thousand deaths 
in each of those cataclysmic events resulted in small incremental steps to bring about 
close cooperation between US intelligence agencies.  
 
Assuming that the boldness of the steps taken to improve US intelligence cooperation is a 
function of the severity of a cataclysmic event, then Washington will be forced to act 
decisively one day. With armed groups and rogue states bent on acquiring Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, one just wonders how severe that next intelligence fiasco must be 
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APPENDIX 1 






Brief Description & Context 
 
Main Findings  
1. Attack on Pearl Harbor (1941)  
 
On December 7, 1941, US forces 
stationed at Pearl Harbor was 
attack by the Japanese imperial 
navy and that incident finally 
pushed the US into World War II 
on the side of the Allies. But most 
notably, vital clues pointing to the 
attack had actually been collected 
by various US intelligence 
agencies. Notwithstanding that, 
the pieces of fragmentary 
information were never 
synthesized in time into a 
coherent picture of the impending 
attack. Limited cooperation 
between various US intelligence 
agencies led to one of the most 
devastating attack on the US in 
modern history.  
(1) The atmosphere for US 
interagency intelligence was 
poisoned because of the bad 
relationship between Hoover and 
Donovan.  
 
(2) FBI–OCOI cooperation was 
also hurt by the latter’s 
encroachment into the former’s 
realm.  
 
(3) Concern over lax security at 
the OCOI was a major factor 
limiting informational exchanges.  
 
(4) Cooperation between the FBI 
and military intelligence was 
terminated because the Bureau 
wanted to retaliate against the 
War Department for denying the 
FBI signals intelligence.  
 
(5) The War Department’s strict 
policy of secrecy severely limited 
the dissemination of signals 
intelligence to other agencies. 
 
2. OSS–SIS cooperation during 
World War II 
During World War II, the OSS 
was denied access to MAGIC-
ULTRA communication 
intelligence by the US SIS 
(Signals Intelligence Service). 
Crucially, these intercepts would 
have been extremely valuable to 
the OSS in terms of fine-tuning 
its disinformation operations 
against Axis enemies. This lack 
of access ultimately doomed the 
OSS to a subordinate role during 
the war. After the OSS was re-
constituted as the CIA in 1947, 
the CIA would exact revenge on 
the NSA (eventual successor to 
(1) Lax security practices within 
the OSS discourage the SIS from 
sharing prized signals intelligence 
with Donovan’s wartime outfit.  
 
(2) Crude US security protocols 
for disseminating Axis signals 
intelligence also limited the OSS’ 
access to MAGIC-ULTRA 
materials.  
 
(3) The US intelligence system 
encouraged hoarding of 
information and resources which 
ultimately hampered 
informational exchanges.  
387   
the SIS) for many years to come.  
3. OSS–FBI cooperation during 
World War II 
 
During Second World War, both 
the OSS and FBI ran double-
agent operations to feed bogus 
information to the Axis powers. 
But those operations were 
conducted with so little 
coordination that the two 
agencies actually ended up 
feeding contradictory information 
to the enemies. Limited 
cooperation between the FBI and 
OSS almost thwarted an elaborate 
program to deceive the Axis 
powers. 
(1) Lax security practices within 
the OSS severely limited OSS – 
FBI cooperation.  
 
(2) The OSS’ invasion of the 
FBI’s domestic domain further 
strained interagency relations. 
 
(3) The FBI also harmed 
interagency relations when it 
retaliated against OSS 
encroachment of its domain. 
 
(4) Pre-existing tensions between 
Hoover and Donovan limited 
interagency cooperation.  
 
(5) Fresh tensions between 
Hoover and other OSS personnel 
also upset interagency relations. 
 
4. FBI–OP-20-G cooperation 
during World War II 
The FBI was actually fairly 
competent in the discipline of 
signals intelligence during World 
War II. Not only was the Bureau 
capable of intercepting and 
decoding Axis communications, 
it was also able to make use of 
that capability to improve its 
double-agent operations against 
Axis enemies. Despite the 
Bureau’s competence in the 
signals intelligence field, there 
was actually little cooperation 
between the FBI and OP-20-G 
(Navy predecessor of the NSA). 
In fact, interagency feuding had 
been the norm.  
(1) OP-20-G saw the FBI’s 
SIGINT activities as a challenge 
to its dominance and control over 
that discipline.  
 
(2) Technical compatibility was 
by itself not a sufficient condition 
to bring about interagency 
cooperation. 
 
(3) Interagency cooperation was 
limited by the OP-20-G’s practice 
of not sharing raw SIGINT 
transcripts.  
 
(4) Room for cooperation was 
further reduced by a less than 
diplomatic Director of Naval 
Intelligence and an FBI Director 
given to carrying out retributive 
acts.   
    
5. The VENONA program Perhaps the first well-
documented incident of close 
cooperation between the NSA 
and FBI, the VENONA program 
was a top secret code-breaking 
program to read Soviet 
communications. Significantly, 
the FBI and the NSA worked 
closely together on the VENONA 
program for a number of years 
before the CIA was finally 
(1) In terms of interagency 
cooperation, an agency with a 
dismal security reputation would 
be shunned.  
 
(2) Strict legal and policy 
measures to protect a secret 
limited interagency cooperation. 
However, the ability to protect it 
would enhance interagency 
cooperation. 
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brought into the project. As much 
as this case exposed some of the 
most important factors that 
brought the three agencies 
together, it also revealed the key 
factors that prompted the NSA 
and FBI to keep the CIA out of 
the program in the beginning.   
 
(3) The requirement for 
specialized skill sets and 
resources facilitated interagency 
cooperation. 
 
(4) Clearly defined lines of 
responsibility enhanced 
interagency cooperation.  
 
(5) Interagency cooperation was 
enhanced when the parties 
involved actually benefitted from 
the exchange.  
 
6. The Berlin Tunnel Operation 
(1950 – 1956) 
In this eavesdropping operation, 
the CIA opted to shun 
cooperation with the NSA even 
though the latter was the primary 
agency responsible for 
eavesdropping on enemy 
communications. The sequence of 
events suggest that there must be 
a link between the decision by the 
NSA to keep the CIA out of the 
VENONA program and the later 
decision by the CIA to shut the 
NSA out of the Berlin Tunnel 
operation.  
(1) MI6 was chosen by the CIA 
as an intelligence partner because 
it was less of a threat to the CIA’s 
control of the operation.  
 
(2) MI6 retained the necessary 
experience and skill sets.  
 
(3) The NSA was bypassed due to 
rancorous relations with the CIA.  
 
(4) The CIA wanted to ensure 
that its civilian requirements 
would not be sidelined by the 
NSA.  
 
(5) The CIA wanted to acquire a 
larger stake in the SIGINT realm. 
 
7. HTLINGUAL (1953 – 1973)  In the early 1950s, someone in 
the CIA came up with the idea of 
monitoring mails sent between 
the US and USSR for much-
needed intelligence on the latter. 
As a result, an illegal mail 
opening program called 
HTLINGUAL was initiated by 
the CIA in 1953 and over a 
period of 20 years, the CIA 
opened millions of first-class 
mails. But even though the 
program was conducted in the 
US, the CIA withheld it from the 
FBI until it was accidentally 
discovered by the Bureau. 
Cornered at last, the CIA began 
sharing HTLINGUAL-related 
intelligence with the FBI. 
Unknown to the CIA though, the 
FBI had been running its own 
mail opening program behind the 
(1) The CIA concealed 
HTLINGUAL from the FBI to 
retain operational control of the 
program.  
 
(2) Fear of betrayal prompted the 
CIA and FBI to conceal their mail 
interception programs from each 
other (and other US agencies and 
departments).  
 
(3) Poor CIA–FBI relations at the 
director-level limited interagency 
exchanges.  
 
(4) The significance of 
jurisdictional delineation in 
limiting CIA–FBI exchange was 
residual.  
 
(5) The FBI revealed its mail 
opening program to the CIA only 
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CIA’s back.     when the Bureau needed to gain 
access to the CIA’s list of 
European addresses. 
 
(6) Extraordinary security 
measures adopted by the FBI to 
handle HTLINGUAL materials 
facilitated the sharing of those 
items between the CIA and FBI. 
 
(7) The role played by the FBI 
Liaison to the CIA in terms of 
facilitating interagency 
cooperation must not be 
discounted.  
 
8. NSA–CIA domestic drug 
surveillance (1970 – 1973) 
For a brief period of time during 
the Cold War, the NSA and CIA 
collaborated on a domestic 
surveillance program to intercept 
phone communications between 
New York and South America. 
The program was initiated when 
BNDD officials came to suspect 
that several public telephone 
booths in New York City were 
used by drug dealers in the US to 
call their counterparts in South 
America. The NSA, and later the 
CIA were called in to monitor 
those specific phone 
conversations for information. 
But as it turned out, scores of 
unrelated phone conversations 
were also intercepted.       




(2) Close interpersonal relations 
at the highest levels of the CIA 
and NSA promoted cooperation 
between the two agencies in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
 
(3) Presidential leadership helped 
focused the CIA’s priorities.  
 
(4) NSA–CIA cooperation 
materialized because the CIA 
employed career intercept 
operators – an asset which the 
NSA did not have then. 
 
(5) Requirement for greater 
confidentiality actually brought 
about NSA–CIA cooperation in 
this case. 
 
9. Edward Lee Howard (1985) In the mid-1980s, a rookie CIA 
officer named Edward Lee 
Howard ended up selling US 
secrets to the USSR after he was 
abruptly fired by the CIA. The 
CIA withheld information on 
Howard from the FBI even after 
Howard had confessed to CIA 
officials that he had thought of 
selling US secrets to the Soviets. 
Howard did give away vital US 
secrets to the Soviets and when 
the dragnet started to close in on 
him, he evaded FBI surveillance 
and escaped to the USSR.  This 
case illustrates the kind of deep 
(1) Although Howard was under 
suspicion for espionage, the CIA 
withheld that information from 
the FBI because the CIA wanted 
to retain control over the case.  
 
(2) Information sharing with the 
FBI was also hampered because 
the CIA sought to contain the 
problem within itself to avoid 
embarrassment.  
 
(3) The secretive culture of the 
CIA’s Directorate of Operations 
contributed to the delay in 
sharing vital information on 
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divisions that operate to keep the 
two agencies apart as well as the 
challenges faced by the FBI when 
conducting surveillance.   
Howard with the FBI.  
 
(4) Future CIA–FBI cooperation 
was not reinforced when CIA 
Director William Casey failed to 
severely punish those CIA 
officers who mishandle the case. 
  
10. Aldrich Hazen Ames (1994) Ames, a high ranking CIA officer 
was arrested in 1994 for selling 
US secrets to the Russians over a 
10-year period. He betrayed the 
identities of scores of Russian 
agents on the CIA’s payroll to 
Russian intelligence and as a 
result, almost single-handedly 
wiped out the CIA’s entire 
operation in Russia. For his 
treason, Ames received more than 
US$2.5 million from the Russians 
making him one of the highest 
paid turncoats in US history. This 
case also revealed the deep-seated 
divisions that kept the CIA from 
sharing counterespionage 
information with the FBI. 
(1) The CIA sought to maintain 
its control over the investigation 
into the losses of CIA agents by  
keeping vital espionage 
information from the FBI  
 
(2) The insular and self-protective 
culture of the DO limited the flow 
of information within the CIA as 
well as to the FBI.  
  
(3) The CIA’s standard policy of 
denying operational information 
to other intelligence counterparts 
hampered the investigation into 
Ames’ espionage activities. 
 
(4) By not wanting to alienate his 
own CIA staff, the DCI also 
failed to exercise adequate 
leadership over the investigation 
of Ames.  
 
11. COURTSHIP (1980)  Initiated in 1980, COURTSHIP 
was a joint FBI – CIA program to 
recruit Soviet officials in the US. 
Those Soviets targeted for 
recruitment included diplomats, 
code clerks and intelligence 
officers. The idea was that once 
recruited as US spies, these 
Soviet would pass on secret 
information to the FBI and CIA 
while they were in the US and 
continue to spy for the US when 
they return to the USSR. Despite 
the success of COURTSHIP, it 
was ultimately betrayed by 
Aldrich Ames to the KGB in 
1985.  
(1) Interagency cooperation in the 
COURTSHIP program was made 
possible by the solid bond 
between CIA Director Stansfield 
Turner and FBI Director William 
Webster   
 
(2) The FBI supported the joint 
program because it profited from 
the experience and foreign 
resources of the CIA  
 
(3) The CIA supported the joint 
program because it profited from 
the authority and domestic 
resources of the FBI.  
 
 
12. The 9/11 attacks (2001) Similar to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor sixty years before, 
fragmentary information pointing 
to the 9/11 attacks were in fact 
collected by various US 
intelligence agencies but were 
eventually withheld from each 
(1) The atmosphere for 
interagency cooperation had been 
poisoned to the extent that the 
NSA, CIA and FBI could not 
work together.  
 
(2) The NSA withheld SIGINT 
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other. If these tidbits of 
information if synthesized in 
time, could very well have tipped 
the country off to the impending 
attacks. But as it turned out, 
limited cooperation between the 
NSA, CIA and FBI culminated in 
the attack on New York and 
Washington D.C. on September 
11, 2001. 
from the CIA to retaliation 
against the Agency for 
encroaching on its domain.  
 
(3) The bureaucratic impulse to 
maintain operational control over 
the case severely hampered 
interagency cooperation. 
 
(4) The information collected by 
the NSA failed the threshold for 
dissemination to the FBI.  
 
(5) Privacy concerns on the part 
of DIRNSA Michael Hayden 
prevented the NSA from sharing 
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APPENDIX 2 
DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE & THEIR TENURES 
 
 




John Negroponte 2005 – 2007  
John M. McConnell 2007 – 2009  
Dennis C. Blair 2009 – 2010  
David C. Gompert 2010 (Acting) 
James R. Clapper 2010 – Present  
 
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
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APPENDIX 3 
FBI DIRECTORS & THEIR TENURES 
 
 




Stanley Finch 1908 – 1912 (Bureau of Investigation) 
A. Bruce Bielaski 1912 – 1919 (Bureau of Investigation) 
William E. Allen (Acting Director) 1919 (Bureau of Investigation) 
William J. Flynn 1919 – 1921 (Bureau of Investigation) 
William J. Burns 1921 – 1924 (Bureau of Investigation) 
J. Edgar Hoover 1924 – 1935 (Bureau of Investigation) 
J. Edgar Hoover 1935 – 1972  
L. Patrick Gray (Acting Director) 1972 – 1973  
William Ruckelshaus (Acting Director) 1973  
Clarence M. Kelley 1973 – 1978  
James B. Adams (Acting Director) 1978 
William H. Webster 1978 – 1987  
John E. Otto (Acting Director) 1987 
William S. Sessions 1987 – 1993  
Floyd I. Clark (Acting Director) 1993 
Louis Freeh 1993 – 2001  
Thomas J. Pickard (Acting Director) 2001 
Robert Mueller 2001 – Present  
 
Source: The FBI 
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APPENDIX 4 
CIA DIRECTORS & THEIR TENURES 
 
 




William J. Donovan 1941 (COI) 
William J. Donovan 1942 – 1945 (OSS) 
Sidney Souers 1946 (Central Intelligence Group) 
Hoyt Vandenberg 1946 – 1947 (Central Intelligence Group) 
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter 1947 – 1950 
Walter Bedell Smith 1950 – 1953  
Allen W. Dulles 1953 – 1961  
John McCone 1961 – 1965  
William Raborn 1965 – 1966  
Richard M. Helms 1966 – 1973  
James R. Schlesinger 1973 
William E. Colby 1973 – 1976  
George H.W. Bush 1976 – 1977  
Stansfield Turner 1977 – 1981  
William J. Casey 1981 – 1987  
William H. Webster 1987 – 1991  
Robert M. Gates 1991 – 1993  
R. James Woolsey 1993 – 1995  
John M. Deutch  1995 – 1996  
George J. Tenet 1996 – 2004  
Porter J. Goss (last DCI) 2004 – 2005  
Michael V. Hayden 2005 – 2009 
Leon E. Panetta 2009 – 2011 
David Petraeus 2011 – Present  
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APPENDIX 5 
NSA DIRECTORS & THEIR TENURES 
 
 




Earl E. Stone 1949 – 1951 (AFSA) 
Ralph J. Canine 1951 – 1952 (AFSA) 
Ralph J. Canine 1952 – 1956  
John A. Samford 1956 – 1960  
Laurence H. Frost 1960 – 1962  
Gordon A. Blake 1962 – 1965  
Marshall S. Carter 1965 – 1969  
Noel Gaylor 1969 – 1972  
Samuel C. Phillips 1972 – 1973  
Lew Allen 1973 – 1977  
Bobby Ray Inman 1977 – 1981 
Lincoln D. Faurer 1981 – 1985  
William E. Odom 1985 – 1988  
William O. Studeman 1988 – 1992  
John M. McConnell 1992 – 1996  
Kenneth A. Minihan 1996 – 1999  
Michael V. Hayden 1999 – 2005  
Keith B. Alexander 2005 – Present 
 
Source: The NSA 
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Position & Role 
James Jesus Angleton CIA The CIA’s legendary counterintelligence chief, Angleton 
was an OSS veteran and Yale graduate. Nicknamed the 
‘Gray Ghost’ for his pale complexion, Angleton was a 
chain-smoker and workaholic. An avid orchid 
horticulturist, Angleton was known to have used that as 
a cover to travel overseas – ostensibly to attend orchid 
trade shows but secretly to collect intelligence while 
there. Intensely paranoid, Angleton believed that the 
CIA had been deeply penetrated by the KGB and his 
molehunt efforts paralyzed the CIA for decades. For 
instance, when a KGB officer named Yuri Nosenko 
defected to the US, he was subjected to harsh 
interrogation and solitary confinement, presumably 
because Angleton thought that he was really a double 
agent sent by the KGB to feed disinformation to the 
CIA. Angleton was a close friend of FBI liaison man, 
Sam Papich, and the two would often exchange 
information in Angleton’s orchid hothouse and while on 
fishing trips. Angleton was forced to resign from the 
CIA in 1975 presumably because of his principal role in 
HTLINGUAL and he died of lung cancer in 1987.  
Ralph Canine NSA As the first Director of the NSA, Canine oversaw the 
formation of the NSA from the AFSA. A decorated 
general, Canine was known for his quick temper and 
abrupt mannerism. Canine was also reported to have had 
a bad relationship with DCI Allen Dulles whom he 
clashed with regularly. The NSA was shut out of the 
Berlin Tunnel operation by the CIA when Dulles was 
DCI and Canine, the DIRNSA. According to NSA 
records, Canine only found out about the Berlin Tunnel 
operation in 1956 from the New York Times.     
William J. Donovan COI & OSS Nicknamed “Wild Bill”, Donovan was appointed by 
FDR to be the COI in 1941 only a few months before the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. A prominent New York lawyer 
and socialite, Donovan attended Columbia University 
and was a decorated war hero during World War I. 
Notably, Donovan and FBI Director Hoover were fierce 
rivals. The OCOI was renamed the OSS when the US 
entered World War II and Donovan managed to stay on 
as the new outfit’s chief. But when the war ended, the 
OSS was quickly disbanded and Donovan was denied 
any role in the CIA when it was later established. 
Donovan died in 1959.   
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Donald C. Downes OSS Considered one of the OSS’ best agents, Donald Chase 
Downes shared the same legendary but rarefied status as 
James Jesus Angleton. Like Angleton, Downes went to 
Yale before joining the OSS during World War II. And 
like Angleton, Downes contributed immensely to the 
OSS’ wartime efforts. But unlike Angleton (who was in 
counterintelligence), Downes operated in the realm of 
covert missions that often put himself at great risks. And 
unlike Angleton, Downes did not join the CIA after it 
was formed opting instead to retire to Italy after the war. 
Meanwhile, Downes and Hoover hated each other 
deeply and the FBI Director went to the extent of 
hounding Downes even in his retirement. Downes, on 
the other hand, rejoiced when Hoover died. Ironically, 
like Hoover, Downes was also believed to be a 
homosexual. Downes passed on in 1983.    
Allen Dulles CIA An OSS veteran, Dulles was the first civilian director of 
the CIA. The longest serving DCI, Dulles oversaw some 
of the CIA most controversial operations at home and 
abroad. Under Dulles, the CIA experimented with LSD 
and other psychedelic drugs in a mind control program 
known as MKULTRA. Abroad, the CIA mounted covert 
operations to overthrow the governments of Iran, 
Guatemala and Cuba. Dulles was also reported to have 
had a bad relationship with DIRNSA Ralph Canine in 
particular. The NSA was shut out of the Berlin Tunnel 
operation by the CIA when Dulles was DCI and Canine 
was the DIRNSA.    
Meredith Knox Gardner NSA A brilliant mathematician and linguist, Gardner joined 
the SIS – the precursor of the NSA – shortly after the US 
entered World War II. When the war ended, Gardner 
turned his attention to the VENONA intercepts. Working 
closely together with Robert Lamphere of the FBI, 
Gardner soon made significant breakthroughs that 
enabled US intelligence to read Soviet communications. 
But Gardner’s work was so sensitive that his 
contributions remained classified until the mid-1990s 
when the VENONA program was finally declassified. 
Gardner died in 2002.     
Robert Philip Hanssen FBI Six months after Aldrich Ames volunteered his service 
to the KGB, the FBI traitor Robert P. Hanssen also 
started selling US secrets to the KGB. A senior FBI 
agent at the time of his arrest in 2001, Hanssen had 
given to the Russians, information on some of the most 
sensitive US intelligence programs. For example, 
Hanssen told the Soviets that the FBI and NSA were 
building a tunnel under the Soviet embassy in 
Washington D.C. to eavesdrop on Soviet 
communications. Similar in many ways to the Berlin 
Tunnel project, the FBI – NSA tunnel was an ultra-
sensitive project that married the authority of the FBI in 
the US with the expertise of the NSA. Basically, 
Hanssen was not detected by the FBI earlier because he 
had been much craftier a spy than Ames was; in fact, 
Hanssen was so careful that even his Russian handlers 
did not know his real identity until his arrest. 
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William King Harvey CIA A high ranking CIA officer who was involved in a 
number of high-profile and oftentimes, controversial 
CIA programs during the Cold War. Fired from the FBI 
by Hoover, Harvey then went to work for the Agency 
shortly after it was established. A man of drive and 
imagination, Harvey soon made his mark in the CIA and 
was quickly promoted within its ranks. Most notably, 
Harvey was responsible for the Berlin Tunnel operation. 
An alcoholic, Harvey was also believed to have colluded 
with the Mafia in CIA plots to kill Castro. Harvey died 
in 1976 from a heart attack.  
Richard Helms CIA An OSS veteran, Helms eventually reached the pinnacle 
of US intelligence in 1966. During his 7 years tenure as 
the CIA Director, Helms oversaw some of the most 
controversial programs the CIA was known to have 
conducted. At home, the CIA mounted invasive 
surveillance operations against US citizens. Abroad, the 
CIA worked to overthrow governments that were not 
friendly to the US. Helms was also the CIA chief who 
ordered the destruction of CIA records pertaining to 
MKULTRA – a CIA program that experimented with 
LSD and other psychedelic drugs to control the mind. A 
popular DCIA, Helms maintained a close relationship 
with DDIRNSA Louis Tordella. Indeed, according to 
author James Bamford, the two men were “thick as 
thieves”.     
J. Edgar Hoover FBI The legendary FBI Director deeply resented the CIA 
since its formation as the OCOI. At one point, Hoover 
even ordered that all Bureau ties with the CIA be cut. A 
desk-bounded bureaucrat, Hoover was also rumored to 
be a homosexual. Indeed, he shared a close relationship 
with his deputy, Clyde Tolson. A vindictive man, 
Hoover would often set out to destroy the lives of those 
who had crossed him. During World War I, Hoover 
worked as a clerk for the US Library of Congress and 
later attended George Washington University where he 
received his law degree. Despite being a controversial 
figure, Hoover was nevertheless instrumental in turning 
the Bureau into an effective and modern law 
enforcement and intelligence service. When he was 
found dead on the floor of his bedroom in 1972, Hoover 
had been at the helm of the FBI for 37 years.    
Robert Lamphere FBI Lamphere joined the FBI in 1941 and for the next 14 
years worked on some of the biggest Soviet espionage 
cases of that period. Most notably, through working 
closely with Meredith Gardner of the NSA on the 
VENONA program, Lamphere eventually exposed a 
vast network of Soviet spies operating in the West. 
Lamphere left the FBI in 1955 and later wrote the book 
The FBI- KGB War in 1986. He passed on in 2002.  
David Murphy CIA Murphy was the deputy chief and then the chief of the 
CIA’s Berlin base from 1954 to 1961. In that capacity, 
Murphy oversaw key operational details of the Berlin 
Tunnel operation. Later, Murphy was believed to be one 
of those senior CIA officials who recommended that the 
KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko, be subjected to harsh 
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interrogation and solitary confinement. Murphy retired 
from the CIA in the 1970s.   
Harold J. Nicholson CIA A high-ranking CIA employee for almost 26 years, 
Nicholson began spying for the Russians in 1994 until 
his arrest in 1996. During that two-year period, 
Nicholson had been an instructor at CIA’s training camp 
and thus, was able to pass on to the SVR the identities of 
every CIA case officer who trained there from 1994 to 
1996. Nicholson also hacked into CIA’s mainframe 
computer and passed on to the Russians every piece of 
secret information that he could download. For his 
espionage activities, Nicholson was sentenced to 23 
years in prison.  
John O’Neill FBI Senior FBI official responsible for investigating the 
bombings of US embassies in Africa and the USS Cole. 
O’Neil and Michael Scheuer of the CIA were intense 
rivals. Despite being in debt, O’Neil liked fine Italian 
clothing and the high life. One of the first FBI officials 
to recognize the threat of al Qaeda, O’Neil pushed senior 
Bureau and Clinton administration official hard to tackle 
the problem. But because O’Neil committed a number of 
security violations, he was further promotion within the 
FBI. He retired early from the Bureau and went to work 
as the head of security for the World Trade Center 
shortly before 9/11. O’Neil was killed when the Twin 
Towers collapsed.  
Sam Papich FBI Papich was the FBI’s liaison to the CIA. After Hoover 
ordered the termination of all FBI contacts with the CIA, 
Papich was instrumental in keep communications 
between the two agencies open by going behind the FBI 
Director’s back. Papich eventually developed a close 
bond with James Angleton and the two men were known 
to have exchanged information in Angleton’s orchid 
hothouse and while on fishing trips. For a while, that 
was how information was shared between the CIA and 
FBI. Papich retired from the Bureau in 1970 and passed 
on in 2004.   
Ronald W. Pelton NSA Pelton, a NSA personnel from 1966 to 1980, was 
arrested by the FBI in 1986 for selling highly-classified 
US secrets to the KGB after his retirement from the 
NSA. Among the secrets he sold to the Russians was 
Operation Ivy Bells – a joint NSA and US Navy 
program that wiretapped Russian underwater 
communications cables (Broad, 1998). Pelton’s illegal 
activities was only discovered in 1985 after a KGB 
defector, Colonel Vitaly Yurchenko, provided 
information that led ultimately to his arrest in 1986. A 
poor manager of his own personal finances, it was 
believed that Pelton was driven into espionage primarily 
because he was facing financial difficulties. Pelton is 
currently serving three consecutive life sentences for his 
crime.    
Earl Edwin Pitts FBI Pitts was a senior FBI agent when he was arrested in 
1996 by the FBI for espionage. He had begun spying for 
the KGB in 1987 and of the secrets he sold to the 
Soviets, he betrayed the names of FBI informants in the 
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US who were providing information on the USSR to the 
FBI. Pitts was identified by his own KGB handler, 
Aleksandr Karpov, after Karpov himself became an FBI 
double-agent. For his espionage activities, Pitts was 
sentenced to 27 years in prison. 
Kim Philby MI6 A senior MI6 officer, Philby was also secretly a Soviet 
spy who later defected to the USSR. Not only did Philby 
passed on to the Soviets vital British secrets, he also 
gave away sensitive US secrets that he had come across 
as a result of his position as MI6’s liaison to US 
intelligence. Trusted by Frank Wisner, Philby eventually 
betrayed scores of Wisner’s early CIA operations to 
infiltrate ethnic spies into the Soviet bloc. Another secret 
US program Philby betrayed was the VENONA 
program. Philby fled to Moscow in 1963 just before he 
was to be arrested and lived there until his death in 1988.    
Frank Raven NSA A brilliant cryptanalyst, Francis A. Raven was recalled 
by the Navy in 1940 to work on Axis cipher systems. 
During World War II, Raven came under the command 
of OP-20-G and was central to breaking a number of 
Japanese cipher systems. After the war, Raven remained 
in the cryptologic service and rose quickly within it. 
When the NSA was created in 1952, Raven was 
appointed the spy agency’s deputy technical director for 
“P” or Production division. Raven held a number of key 
positions within the NSA but in 1962, Raven was made 
chief of G Group in “P” – a position he held until his 
retirement in 1974. As G Group was responsible for 
signals intelligence from all non-Communist countries, it 
became the unit tasked with monitoring drug-related 
phone calls made from paid phones in New York to 
South America in the early 1970s. All the evidence 
indicated that Raven maintained a close working 
relationship with Carleton Swift of the CIA. Raven 
retired from the NSA in 1974 and passed on in 1983. 
Mark Rossini FBI FBI agent detailed to the CIA’s bin Laden desk in the 
run-up to 9/11. He was denied permission by the CIA to 
pass on to FBI Headquarters information on al-Midhdar 
and al-Hazmi after discovering that at least one of the 
two al Qaeda operatives had held a valid visa to enter the 
US.  
Frank B. Rowlett CIA & NSA In 1930, Rowlett was one of the first few to join the 
fledgling Signals Intelligence Service (SIS). Before the 
US entered World War II, Rowlett contributed to the 
breaking of the Japanese ciphers known as RED and 
Purple which allowed the Americans to read Japanese 
diplomatic communications throughout the war. After 
the war, Rowlett was made chief of the intelligence 
division and later, technical director of operations in the 
AFSA. In 1952, unhappy over his transfer to COMSEC 
by DIRNSA Canine, Rowlett resigned from the NSA 
and joined the CIA. From 1952 to 1958, Rowlett 
essentially headed a mini-NSA at the CIA. Rowlett 
returned to the NSA to take over William Friedman’s 
duties in 1958 and stayed with the NSA until his 
retirement in 1966. Rowlett passed on in 1998.  
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Michael Scheuer CIA Head of the CIA’s bin Laden desk until 2000. Scheuer 
and John O’Neil of the FBI were fierce rivals. Scheuer 
holds a PhD in history and looks more like a nutty 
professor than a spook. He pushed hard to bring al 
Qaeda to the attention of senior CIA officials but was 
ultimately sidelined for his harsh but prescient 
assessment of the terror group.   
William Sullivan FBI Sullivan joined the FBI during World War II and by 
1971, had reached the Number Two position in the 
Bureau as head of the intelligence division. Under 
Sullivan, the FBI mounted aggressive intelligence 
operations against numerous domestic groups and enemy 
intelligence services. But Sullivan ultimately made the 
mistake of crossing Hoover and was fired by the FBI 
Director in late 1971. Sullivan was killed in a hunting 
accident in 1977.  
Carleton Swift CIA A Harvard graduate, Swift joined the OSS shortly after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 and 
later, the CIA when it was created in 1947. On top of 
tours in Korea, Iraq, London and Vietnam, Swift was 
also Frank Wisner’s deputy. In that capacity, Swift 
witnessed many of the OPC’s ill-fated operations to 
infiltrate CIA operatives into Communist bloc countries. 
In 1963, Swift replaced William King Harvey as head of 
the CIA’s Division D (formerly known as Staff D) and 
held that position until 1974 when he retired from the 
CIA. Division D was the CIA’s signals intelligence arm 
but besides intercepting signals intelligence, it was also 
responsible for breaking into foreign embassies abroad 
to steal codes and cipher materials. That division is still 
in existence today but is now known as the Office of 
Technical Collection. Most notably, when Swift was 
head of Division D, he had worked closely with Frank 
Raven who was the chief of G Group at the NSA. 
According to Matthew Aid, a significant portion of 
SIGINT materials procured by Division D was turned 
over to G Group for analysis. On a working level, both 
Swift and Raven had maintained a close relationship.  
Louis Tordella NSA The longest serving deputy director of the NSA (1958 – 
1974), Tordella was an influential figure in the history of 
the NSA. Tordella was first drafted into the OP-20G in 
1942 and he eventually reach the number two position in 
America’s most powerful spy agency. A brilliant 
mathematician, Tordella pushed the NSA to use 
computers for cryptologic work even when modern 
computing technology was still in its infancy. In addition 
to being a visionary spymaster, Tordella was also known 
to be consummate diplomat that helped the US solidified 
its intelligence relationships with other members of the 
UKUSA alliance. Most notably perhaps is that Tordella 
maintained a close relationship with DCI Richard 
Helms. Indeed, according to author James Bamford, the 
two men were “thick as thieves”.     
Stansfield Turner CIA As CIA Director, Turner was perhaps best known for the 
“Halloween Massacre” when in 1979, he fired more than 
800 experienced CIA officers all at once. It is believed 
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that that purge effectively ended the Ivy Leaguers’ grip 
on power within the CIA. During his tenure, Turner also 
worked to enhance the DCI’s authority over the USIC 
but was largely unsuccessful. Notably, Turner and FBI 
Director William Webster were close friends and 
relations between the FBI and CIA were better when 
Turner was CIA Director.  
William H. Webster FBI & CIA Webster was appointed FBI Director in 1978 and then 
the CIA Director in 1987 when his term at the Bureau 
ended. A federal judge before he was appointed to head 
the FBI by Carter, Webster was instrumental in restoring 
public confidence in the FBI after the Church Committee 
exposed various intelligence abuses committed by the 
Bureau during the 60s and 70s. When DCI William 
Casey died, Judge Webster was appointed CIA Director 
by Reagan. Under Casey, the CIA had become 
embroiled in the Iran-Contra scandal – an illegal 
program to fund Contra rebels in Nicaragua through arm 
sales to Iran. Webster’s role, among others, was to 
restore faith in the CIA. Most notably, Webster was a 
close friend of CIA Director Stansfield Turner and 
relations between the FBI and CIA were better when 
Webster was FBI Director.  
Frank Wisner CIA A veteran of the OSS, Wisner was head of the CIA’s 
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). OPC was 
responsible for a number of early CIA covert operations 
to spy on the Soviet bloc. Under Wisner’s direction, 
scores of CIA operatives were infiltrated into enemy 
territories by air or sea. But the majority of these 
operations ended in failure because they had been 
betrayed by KGB spies who had penetrated the CIA. 
Wisner also ran the CIA’s Domestic Collection Service 
– a division which targeted foreigners within the US for 
recruitment. As a result, Wisner invariably angered 
Hoover over the DCS’ frequent incursion into the FBI’s 
domain. In the end, Wisner suffered a mental breakdown 
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Appendix 7 
Sample of intercepted communications between Japanese Special Envoy Saburo 
Kurusu in Washington D.C. and Kumaicho Yamamoto, head of the American 




Kurusu: I have made all efforts but they will not yield.  
Yamamoto: The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult. 
Kurusu: I believe it is of no avail. I rather imagine you had expected this outcome.  
Yamamoto: Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort to the final moment in the hope that 
something might be accomplished. 





Kurusu: Sorry to trouble you so often. 
Yamamoto: How did the matrimonial question go today [coded reference to ongoing negotiations between 
Washington and Tokyo on the issue of US oil embargo against Japan]? 
Kurusu: There wasn’t much that was different from what Miss Umeko [coded reference to US Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull] said yesterday. 
Yamamoto: Oh, there wasn’t much difference? 
Kurusu: No, there wasn’t. As before, that Southward matter [coded reference for Japan’s invasion of 
French Indo-China] is having considerable effect. 
Yamamoto: Oh the South matter. It’s effective? 
Kurusu: Yes. And at one time, the matrimonial question (coded reference to an agreement on the US 
embargo) seemed as if it could be settled. How do things look there? Does it seem as if a child might be 
born?   
Yamamoto: Yes, the birth of a child seems imminent.  
Kurusu: It does seem as if the birth is going to take place? In which direction? I mean…..is it going to be a 
boy or a girl? 
Yamamoto: It seems as if it will be a strong healthy boy.  
 
Message 3: 
Yamamoto: Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman effort, but in spite of this, the United 
States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. The Imperial Government can by no means 
use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. However, do not 
give the impression that the negotiations are broken off [an act which could only be interpreted as a 




Source: “Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor.” BBC, April 24, 2001.  
 
 
404   
Appendix 8 
How to convert a plain text message into an encoded text using a one-time pad 
 
 
Take for example the sentence “ALEX IS A CIA SPY”.  
 
Let’s assume that Alex is a CIA case officer who will soon be posted to the US embassy in Moscow under 
the cover of a US State Department official. However, a mole within the CIA has already tipped off his 
KGB handler to Alex’s real identity and the KGB in Washington D.C. wants to send KGB Headquarters in 
Moscow this important piece of information.  
 
The only way to deliver this message to its intended recipient at KGB Headquarters in Moscow without 
unauthorized personnel reading it is to encode the message.  
 
The first step to encode the sentence “ALEX IS A CIA SPY” is to use a standardized KGB codebook. This 
codebook is similar to a dictionary except that for every word, instead of a meaning, a unique 5-digit 
number is associated with it.    
 
But because “ALEX” has no 5-digit number representing it, the code clerk has to find the corresponding 5-
digit number for “A”, “L”, “E” and “X”. Fortunately for the code clerk, there are corresponding 5-digit 
numbers for “IS”, “A”, “CIA” and “SPY”. The encoded message should look something like the set of 
(hypothetical) numbers below: 
 
           A           L            E            X           IS           A         CIA       SPY 
 
27450 84231 96504 64234 09238 23967 03498 37645  
 
However, this encoded message is not ready for transmission to Moscow yet. For added security, the KGB 
uses a one time pad to encode the above set of 5-digit numbers a second time. The one time pad contains a 
series of random numbers and, as its name implies, is used only once and then destroyed. The code clerk 
then encodes the above set of 5-digit numbers using the first eight 5-digit numbers on a particular one time 
pad. This is done by adding the above set of 5-digit numbers to the first eight 5-digit numbers on this one 
time pad. To further complicate attempts by hostile intelligence services to decipher this message, the KGB 
uses the Chinese arithmetic system in which a number greater then 10 is not carried over. Below is the 
finished product: 
 
          A           L            E            X           IS           A         CIA       SPY 
 
27450 84231 96504 64234 09238 23967 03498 37645 
+            93456 02357 84357 12385 93454 67349 06678 45275 
 
 10806 86588 70851 76519 92682 80206 09066 72810 
 
Now this encoded set of numbers can finally be transmitted to KGB Headquarters in Moscow. Once this 
encoded text is received by its intended recipient in Moscow, it can only be decoded by subtracting the 
above set of numbers with the first eight 5-digit numbers on an identical one time pad. Used correctly, a 
plain text message encoded with a one time pad is virtually unbreakable.  
 
 
Source: Lamphere & Shachtman, 1995, pp. 81  
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APPENDIX 9 
CIA memorandum on the COURTSHIP program obtained through the  
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APPENDIX 10 
SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Q1 (to Dr. John Earl Haynes):  
 
The VENONA program is a fascinating case of NSA–FBI cooperation. Can you tell me why the two 
agencies were able to establish such close cooperation in the immediate post-World War II years 
despite frequent interagency clashes during World War II?  
 
Q2 (to Dr. John Earl Haynes): 
 
The NSA needed the FBI’s participation in VENONA because the Bureau had the field 
investigators as well as an extensive collection of personal dossiers. Were there other factors 
involved? 
 
Q3 (to Dr. John Earl Haynes): 
 
The FBI, on the other hand, needed the NSA because Arlington Hall had the VENONA decrypts. 
Indeed, you mentioned in your book “Spies” that VENONA decrypts ultimately confirmed what 
Elizabeth Bentley had told the FBI. Without the VENONA decrypts, the FBI’s investigations into 
Bentley allegations had basically grounded to a halt. Is this quid pro quo an accurate description of 
things at the time?  
 
Q4 (to Dr. John Earl Haynes): 
 
Indeed, the NSA’s historical account of the VENONA program paid tribute to the close working 
relationship between Meredith Gardner and Robert Lamphere. How important was that relationship 
for NSA–FBI cooperation? After all, Mr. Lamphere left the Bureau in 1955 but NSA–FBI continued 
unabated until 1980.  
 
Q5 (to Dr. John Earl Haynes): 
 
The CIA was initially denied access to VENONA materials because, according to your co-author, 
Prof. Harvey Klehr, there were certainly concerns that the Agency could not be trusted with 
important secrets because VENONA decrypts had pointed to Soviet penetration of the OSS and 
some of these moles could have also penetrated the CIA when it was re-constituted in 1947 from the 
remnants of the OSS. Was this the only reason why the CIA was shut out of the VENONA program 
in the first place?  
 
Q6 (to Dr. John Earl Haynes): 
 
Why was the CIA given full access to VENONA materials in 1953? Ostensibly, it was because the 
NSA and FBI needed the CIA to chase down international leads exposed in the VENONA decrypts; 
but were there any other reasons? Why only in 1953 could the CIA finally be trusted with 
VENONA materials?  
 
Q7 (to Mr. Matthew Aid): 
 
You mentioned in your book The Secret Sentry how Rumsfeld actually complained when the NSA 
passed information on an al-Qaeda leader to the CIA and that information allowed the CIA to carry 
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out a drone strike which killed the Yemeni. How can there be close cooperation between the CIA 
and NSA when the Secretary of Defense actually exercises authority over the NSA?   
 
Q8 (to Mr. Matthew Aid): 
 
In my research, I found that the NSA and CIA actually managed to overcome longstanding 
differences between them and cooperated on a BNDD-initiated drug surveillance program. This was 
prior to the 1977 agreement in which the CIA finally concurred to get out of the SIGINT business. 
How did that happen? 
 
Q9 (to Mr. Matthew Aid): 
 
Author James Bamford said in the documentary The Spy Factory that the reason the NSA did not 
pass on al-Mihdhar’s intercepted conversation with his wife to the FBI was that the NSA had 
become risk-averse – that it was privacy concerns. What is your view on that? 
 
Q10 (to Dr. Richard K. Betts): 
 
What about amending the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to give the DNI more 
authority? 
 
Q11 (to Dr. Robert Jervis): 
 
You mentioned the problem of personal feuds. But key personalities such as Ralph Canine, J. Edgar 
Hoover, William Donovan and Allen Dulles have long departed the scene. How could their personal 
feuds still be influencing interagency cooperation?  
 
Q12 (to Dr. Robert Jervis): 
 
What is your view on taking the NSA away from the DOD and handing it over to the DNI for 
control? 
 
Q13 (to Dr. Robert Jervis): 
 
Some US lawmakers and academics have suggested that the FBI should be broken up into two parts. 
One for domestic intelligence and the other for law enforcement. What is your view on this? 
  
Q14 (to Dr. Robert Jervis): 
 
In the course of my research, I have come across operational control as an important factor limiting 
interagency cooperation. Specifically, agencies shun cooperation because they want to maintain 
control over an operation. How significant is this factor in your assessment? 
 
Q15 (to Mr. Burton Gerber): 
 
You mentioned in your book Transforming Intelligence that there is a need to rebuild HUMINT. I 
agree because SIGINT seems to work better when paired with HUMINT. One simply cannot do 
without the other. But a surge in the CIA’s budget cannot be accomplished without a simultaneous 
cut in the budget of another agency. Where do you think these cuts can come from? 
 
Q16 (to Mr. Burton Gerber): 
 
To penetrate radical Islamic groups where blood-ties are very important, you will have to hire 
people with the right credentials. Is that problematic? 
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Q17 (to Mr. Burton Gerber): 
 
You mentioned in your book some of the ramifications that might arise out of a more diversified 
workforce at the CIA. In my research, I discovered that one of the main reasons the CIA was 
shunned by other agencies during the Agency’s early years was that the CIA hired first generation 
immigrants who later became the target of KGB recruitment. Consequently, many in the FBI 
distrusted the CIA. How do you balance this requirement for diversity with the need for security at 
the CIA?  
 
Q18 (to Mr. Burton Gerber): 
 
Throughout the history of the DCI, he was never able to exercise full authority over the entire USIC 
because the DOD controlled more than 80 percent of the intelligence budget. That situation has 
remained more or less the same with the DNI. What is your assessment of the position of the DNI 
given the dominance of the DOD over intelligence matters? 
 
Q19 (to Mr. Burton Gerber): 
 
Why do you think the FBI withheld VENONA from the CIA in the early stages of the program? 
 
Q20 (to Mr. Burton Gerber): 
 
Why were the FBI agents detailed to Alec Station denied permission to share information on al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with the FBI? What was the CIA’s rationale for turning down their requests? 
 
Q21 (to Dr. Athan Theoharis): 
 
In the early 1970, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) received a tip-off that a 
number of public telephone booths in New York City were used by drug dealers to place calls to 
South America. In response, the BNDD requested the NSA to listen in on those calls and the NSA 
complied. Later in 1972, the NSA approached the CIA for assistance because the NSA needed the 
career intercept operators of the CIA to listen in on the conversations of those people who had been 
watchlisted by the BNDD. As it happened, the CIA readily complied with the NSA’s request for 
assistance and so began a 6-month period of close NSA-CIA cooperation in the BNDD-initiated 
drug surveillance program. Why did the CIA extend its assistance to the NSA so readily given a 
history of bad blood between the two agencies up to that point?  
        
Q22 (to Dr. Athan Theoharis): 
 
In Chapter 8 of “The Quest for Absolute Security”, you wrote that CIA officials would rather 
operate unilaterally and to maintain control over a case (pp. 232). Specifically, in the Ed Howard 
and Rick Ames cases, CIA officials were convinced that they should and could act alone to resolve 
those compromises. Can you explain to me why CIA officials were inclined to act unilaterally even 
when the Bureau had to be alerted? In particular, what were the perverse incentives that prompted 
them to seek control over what were clearly cases for the Bureau?  
 
Q23 (to Mr. Ivian C. Smith): 
 
How significant was the Community Management Staff (CMS) in terms of facilitating interagency 
cooperation?  
Q24 (to Mr. Ivian C. Smith): 
 
Is the FBI really a poor intelligence outfit so much so that its usefulness as an intelligence partner is 
severely limited? 
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